Minding Feeling

In this commentary on Jørgen Dines Johansen’s paper, ‘Feelings in Literature’, an expanded approach to feeling is sketched, relying on the work of Susanne Langer. Without challenging the central and valuable insights presented by Johansen, this commentary attempts to develop and refine the notion of feeling beyond that found in Johansen and to focus on the heuristic power of images, especially artistic images, to reveal the deep structures of minding. Langer’s work is rooted in a nuanced philosophical psychology and biology, but she looks for her guide to exploring these domains to the ‘import of art.’ Her approach to the semiotics of art offers a set of powerful analytical tools that reveal the universal scope of aesthetic reflection and its relevance for the sciences of mind.     

耻感与道德体系

在主张德治的儒家和主张法治的法家两大道德哲学的历史传统及其所代表的个体道德和社会伦理的两大道德哲学的逻辑体系中,耻感都是道德哲学体系的原素和原色.耻感的伦理根源和伦理动力是个体"成为一个人"的向伦理实体和人的公共本质回归的精神运动.耻感的道德本性是作为"主观意志的法"的道德自由,因而它的更深刻的本质不是他律而是自律,不是制裁而是激励,是推动人们在道德上自强不息、止于至善的精神力量.     

Fitting In and Feeling Good

Abstract

This study examined self-evaluation (self-esteem, perceived physical attractiveness, and perceived social competence) and indicators of psychological stress (physical and somatic symptoms of depression and substance use) among 463 adolescent biracial girls from three different backgrounds: Black-White, Hispanic-White, and Asian-White. Patterns of self-evaluation and psychological stress were examined as a function of both parentage and self-identification as either White or non-White. Biracial girls were compared with nonbiracial girls on all variables. Results indicated that outcomes vary as a function of parentage and ethnic self-identification and that there is broad variability among biracial girls from different backgrounds.     

Feeling of knowing and restudy choices

Feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOK-Js) reflect people’s confidence that they would be able to recognize a currently unrecallable item. Although much research has been devoted to the factors determining the magnitude and accuracy of FOK-Js, much less work has addressed the issue of whether FOK-Js are related to any form of metacognitive control over memory processes. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that FOK-Js are related to participants’ choices of which unrecallable items should be restudied. In three experiments, we showed that participants tend to choose for restudy items with high FOK-Js, both when they are explicitly asked to choose for restudy items that can be mastered in the restudy session (Exps. 1a and 2) and when such specific instructions are omitted (Exp. 1b). The study further demonstrated that increasing FOK-Js via priming cues affects restudy choices, even though it does not affect recall directly. Finally, Experiment 2 showed the strategy of restudying unrecalled items with high FOK-Js to be adaptive, because the efficacy of restudy is greater for these items than for items with low FOK-Js. Altogether, the present findings underscore an important role of FOK-Js for the metacognitive control of study operations.     

理由、情感与道德的规范性——西方伦理学与元伦理学的论争进路

道德的规范性问题是道德哲学的核心问题之一,对该问题的回答决定了我们在多大程度上能够为道德责任奠定合理性的基础.从古希腊至启蒙时期,道德哲学体系围绕理由还是情感作为道德规范性渊源进行了探索.在当今的元伦理学争论中,虽然实践理由成为道德规范性问题的标准话语体系,但该体系下的争论仍然围绕理由与情感而展开.     

Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom

We seem to have a direct experience of our freedom when we act. Many philosophers take this feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. Spinoza denies that we have free will of any sort, although he admits that we nonetheless feel free. Commentators often attribute to him what I call the ‘Negative Account’ of the feeling: it results from the fact that we are conscious of our actions but ignorant of their causes. I argue that the Negative Account is flawed. The feeling of freedom also depends on a vacillation of the mind. When the mind forms too many incompatible associations, it vacillates between them. When we act, the mind vacillates back and forth between the kinds of actions that we associate with our present mental state. We then mistake this subjective vacillation for an objective feature of ourselves—namely, the power to do otherwise.     

The Logic of Feeling

The contribution of the feelings‐as‐information hypothesis to our understanding of the role of affect in judgment and decision making is discussed. Basic principles and regularities in how affective feelings guide judgments and decisions are then identified. Based on these principles and regularities, it is argued that the role of feelings in judgment and decision making may be more adaptive than has been assumed in most academic circles. This adaptivity transpires (a) in the variety of goal‐relevant signals that feelings convey, (b) the flexibility with which feelings are interpreted, (c) the judgmental properties of feelings, and (d) the selectivity with which feelings are invoked. It is speculated that affective feelings may tap into a separate system of judgment and decision making with its unique strengths and weaknesses.     

Visual Feeling of Presence

Everyday visual experience constantly confronts us with things we can interact with in the real world. We literally feel the outside presence of physical objects in our environment via visual perceptual experience. The visual feeling of presence is a crucial feature of vision that is largely unexplored in the philosophy of perception, and poorly debated in vision neuroscience. The aim of this article is to investigate the feeling of presence. I suggest that visual feeling of presence depends on the visual representation of a very particular spatial relation with the object we interact with: the visual representation of absolute egocentric depth, which is due to stereoscopic vision.     

Thinking and Feeling: A Buddhist Perspective

The work ‘Thinking and Feeling’ edited by Robert C. Solomon may be considered as a landmark in the history of the philosophy of the emotions. The work also has assembled together some of the best minds in the Anglo American Traditions. The central focus in this work is to mediate between the physiological arousal theories of emotions and the cognitive appraisal theories of emotions. My article is an attempt to mediate from my Asian background and in specific terms using the Buddhist perspectives on emotion studies, to find answers, a subject on which I have worked over several decades. The Buddha has discouraged people in attempting to find ultimate answers to the body- mind relationships, but use pragmatic and practical perspectives for a two way interactionism. Thus, in the Buddhist analysis the mental and the cognitive, as well as bodily and the physiological are recognised, thus giving room for a holistic understanding of emotions concepts. In fact, Buddhism expects the body, feelings, perceptions, interpretations, and evaluations as facets of emotion concepts. The second point is the domination of the metaphor of reasons as the charioteer in managing unruly emotions in the West. But Buddhism introduces the factor of ‘mindfulness’ as an important ally in the management of emotions. My personal work in therapy and counselling has helped me to explore new dimensions for managing emotions through mindfulness practice.