Wringing the perceptual rags: reply to IJzerman and Koole (2011)

We Landau, Meier, & Keefer (2010) reviewed a growing body of research demonstrating metaphors' far-reaching influence on social information processing. In their commentary, IJzerman and Koole (2011) claimed that we devoted insufficient attention to the origin of metaphors, and they reviewed research showing that bodily, social, and cultural experiences constrain metaphor development. Given the focus of our article and the tone of our admittedly cursory treatment of metaphors' origins, we view IJzerman and Koole's commentary less as a critique and more as a valuable extension of our analysis. We elaborate on this extension and address three related issues raised in the comment: metaphors and representational format, the explanatory value of a metaphor-enriched perspective over the embodied cognition perspective, and the direction of metaphoric mappings between concrete and abstract concepts.     

Gender, ethnicity, and career trajectories: a comment on Woodward (2010)

Woodward (2010) argued that Maria Rickers-Ovsiankina, Eugenia Hanfmann, and Tamara Dembo constituted a group of Jewish emigré psychologists who received substantial help in America from a "Jewish network" of patronage. This comment focuses on the historiographic problems and pitfalls of essentialized ethnic identification. There was no evidence that Maria Rickers-Ovsiankina was a Jew or that Eugenia Hanffman, raised Russian Orthodox, identified herself as a Jew, in contrast to Tamara Dembo, who did so. We argue that these women were part of an active network of Gestaltists, topologists, and Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues leaders, and that any help that they received may be explained by the shared theoretical and disciplinary outlook of these groups as opposed to a "Jewish network."     

Prejudice,categorization and particularization: From a perceptual to a rhetorical approach

This paper seeks to offer an alternative approach to the study of prejudice than that based upon the notion of categorization which is currently influential in cognitive social psychology. It is argued that the categorization approach assumes the inevitability of prejudice and ignores the issue of tolerance. The assumptions of the categorization approach are criticized, and it is suggested that, by focusing on categorization as a cognitive process, it has overlooked an opposing process—that of particularization. The result has been a rather mechanical and bureaucratic model of cognition. A less mechanical view is possible if the relations between the two processes of categorization and particularization are considered from a rhetorical perspective, which examines the argumentative nature of thought. For theoretical and empirical reasons, this perspective does not equate prejudiced thinking with rigid categorization; instead a rhetorical approach permits a distinction between prejudice and tolerance on the basis of content, rather than form, and thereby avoids assuming the inevitability of prejudice.     

Theoretical developments in decision field theory: comment on Tsetsos, Usher, and Chater (2010)

Tsetsos, Usher, and Chater (2010) presented several criticisms of decision field theory (DFT) involving its distance function, instability under externally controlled stopping times, and lack of robustness to various multialternative choice scenarios. Here, we counter those claims with a specification of a distance function based on the indifference and dominance dimensions. Using this distance function, we show that the instability problems do not arise when using the internally controlled stopping rule. In conclusion, we argue that the predictions of DFT do not conflict with the data presented and that the model yet provides a coherent and accurate account of multialternative choice phenomena.     

From autonomy to heteronomy (and back): The enaction of social life

The term “social cognition” can be construed in different ways. On the one hand, it can refer to the cognitive faculties involved in social activities, defined simply as situations where two or more individuals interact. On this view, social systems would consist of interactions between autonomous individuals; these interactions form higher-level autonomous domains not reducible to individual actions. A contrasting, alternative view is based on a much stronger theoretical definition of a truly social domain, which is always defined by a set of structural norms; moreover, these social structures are not only a set of constraints, but actually constitute the possibility of enacting worlds that would just not exist without them. This view emphasises the heteronomy of individuals who abide by norms that are impersonal, culturally inherited and to a large extent independent of the individuals. Human beings are socialised through and through; consequently, all human cognition is social cognition. The article argues for this second position. Finally, it appears that fully blown autonomy actually requires heteronomy. It is the acceptance of the constraints of social structures that enables individuals to enter new realms of common meaningfulness. The emergence of social life marks a crucial step in the evolution of cognition; so that at some evolutionary point human cognition cannot but be social cognition.     

Depression, autonomic function, and cardiorespiratory fitness: comment on Hughes, et al. (2010)

A recent paper by Hughes and colleagues suggested that dysfunction of the autonomic nervous system in depressed cardiac patients was partly explained by reduced physical activity and fitness. Other data demonstrate that exercise training and improvements in fitness not only lead to improvements in autonomic function in coronary patients but also reduce depression and depression-related increased mortality.     

Three tests and three corrections: comment on Koen and Yonelinas (2010)

The slope of the z-transformed receiver-operating characteristic (zROC) in recognition memory experiments is usually less than 1, which has long been interpreted to mean that the variance of the target distribution is greater than the variance of the lure distribution. The greater variance of the target distribution could arise because the different items on a list receive different increments in memory strength during study (the "encoding variability" hypothesis). In a test of that interpretation, Koen and Yonelinas (2010) attempted to further increase encoding variability to see whether it would further decrease the slope of the zROC. To do so, they presented items on a list for 2 different durations and then mixed the weak and strong targets together. After performing 3 tests on the mixed-strength data, Koen and Yonelinas concluded that encoding variability does not explain why the slope of the zROC is typically less than 1. However, we show that their tests have no bearing on the encoding variability account. Instead, they bear on the mixture-unequal-variance signal-detection (UVSD) model that corresponds to their experimental design. On the surface, the results reported by Koen and Yonelinas appear to be inconsistent with the predictions of the mixture-UVSD model (though they were taken to be inconsistent with the predictions of the encoding variability hypothesis). However, all 3 of the tests they performed contained errors. When those errors are corrected, the same 3 tests show that their data support, rather than contradict, the mixture-UVSD model (but they still have no bearing on the encoding variability hypothesis).     

When egocentrism breeds distinctness--comparison processes in social prediction: comment on Karniol (2003)

In contrast with R. Karniol's (2003) protocentric model, this article proposes an egocentric comparison model of social prediction. To predict the experiences and reactions of a target other, judges are assumed to relate self-knowledge to the target via a process of comparing the target with the self. Two alternative comparison processes are distinguished. Similarity testing yields target judgments that are consistent with the self, whereas dissimilarity testing leads to target judgments that are inconsistent with the self. From this perspective, social prediction is egocentric in that it makes use of self-knowledge as its primary representational basis. At the same time, egocentric prediction does not require the self to be seen and judged as similar to the target other. Conceptualizing social predictions as social comparison suggests that predicting the experiences and reactions of others is a highly flexible process.     

On the status of self in social prediction: comment on Karniol (2003)

A challenge to mainstream notions on the status of the self in social prediction is welcome. The self-as-distinct model (R. Karniol, 2003) is thoughtful, provocative, and parsimonious, but it is also underspecified, undertested, and selective in its treatment of the evidence. More important, the model does not provide compelling answers to issues pertaining to the origins of prototypic social knowledge, the status of self-knowledge, the content of the self-representation, whether the use of self in social prediction is a logical contradiction, and whether the self's role in social prediction is amotivated.     

A misleading review of response bias: comment on McGrath, Mitchell, Kim, and Hough (2010)

In the May 2010 issue of Psychological Bulletin, R. E. McGrath, M. Mitchell, B. H. Kim, and L. Hough published an article entitled "Evidence for Response Bias as a Source of Error Variance in Applied Assessment" (pp. 450-470). They argued that response bias indicators used in a variety of settings typically have insufficient data to support such use in everyday clinical practice. Furthermore, they claimed that despite 100 years of research into the use of response bias indicators, "a sufficient justification for [their] use… in applied settings remains elusive" (p. 450). We disagree with McGrath et al.'s conclusions. In fact, we assert that the relevant and voluminous literature that has addressed the issues of response bias substantiates validity of these indicators. In addition, we believe that response bias measures should be used in clinical and research settings on a regular basis. Finally, the empirical evidence for the use of response bias measures is strongest in clinical neuropsychology. We argue that McGrath et al.'s erroneous perspective on response bias measures is a result of 3 errors in their research methodology: (a) inclusion criteria for relevant studies that are too narrow; (b) errors in interpreting results of the empirical research they did include; (c) evidence of a confirmatory bias in selectively citing the literature, as evidence of moderation appears to have been overlooked. Finally, their acknowledging experts in the field who might have highlighted these errors prior to publication may have prevented critiques during the review process.     

Task preparation and task inhibition: a comment on Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp (2010)

In their recent review article, Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17, 1-14, 2010) present compelling evidence for the role of inhibition in task switching, as measured by n-2 repetition costs. They promote the view that inhibition targets response-related processes of task performance rather than cue-based preparatory stages. In support of this distinction, they cite the finding in the literature that n-2 repetition costs are not reduced given longer preparation intervals. In this article, we advocate the analysis of whole reaction time distributions for investigating the influence of task preparation on task inhibition. We present such analyses from two of our published experiments that support the view that n-2 repetition costs can be reduced given sufficient preparation. The results suggest that cue-based processes do contribute to inhibition in task switching.     

Empirically supported psychotherapies: comment on Westen, Novotny, and Thompson-Brenner (2004)

D. Westen, C. M. Novotny, and H. Thompson-Brenner (2004; see record 2004-15935-005) suggested that efforts to identify empirically supported treatments are misguided because they are based on assumptions that are not appropriate for some types of treatment and patients. The authors of this comment argue that Westen and colleagues are simply incorrect when they assert that empirically supported treatments require that psychopathology must be highly malleable, that treatments must be brief, or that the samples studied are unrepresentative of the kinds of patients typically encountered in clinical practice--comorbidity is common in many clinical trials. Randomized controlled trials remain the most powerful way to test notions of causal agency.     

Beyond artificial, sex-linked distinctions to conceptualize female sexuality: comment on Baumeister (2000)

The authors comment on three aspects of R. F. Baumeister's (2000) theoretical article on female sexuality. Questioning the predominance of nature versus cultural factors in accounting for sexual outcomes for men and women, the authors draw attention to the similarities (as opposed to differences) in the sexual attitudes, behaviors, and responses of men and women, and directly question the suggestion of "controlling" women's sexual attitudes, behaviors, responses, etc. to meet social needs for change.     

Catastrophizing, confounds, and depression: a comment on Sullivan and D'Eon (1990)

Sullivan and D'Eon (1990) concluded that catastrophizing and depression were conceptually and operationally confounded. I argue that (a) the procedures they used to study confounding were suboptimal because multiple measures of depression and catastrophizing were not employed and (b) the distinctiveness of constructs might better be regarded as a continuous rather than all-or-none (having adequate discriminant validity versus being confounded) concept.     

(Re)Applying social psychology to organizational work,well‐being,and leadership

Research on organizational behavior is fundamentally an application of social psychology theory and phenomena. While much of organizational psychology is inherently grounded in social psychological research, these two disciplines are largely disconnected from one another. More visibility of the commonalities may encourage discussion, collaboration, and integration between these two fields—an integration that will only benefit each discipline. The present article briefly reviews the historic overlap between these disciplines, the resulting divide between them, and then discusses recent developments demonstrating the potential power of reconnecting social psychology with organizational‐relevant research. We then examine how the six empirical articles in this Special Issue benefit from applying social psychological theory to organizational research. We will conclude by identifying potential areas ripe for future research.     

Selective attention and distractor frequency in naming performance: comment on Dhooge and Hartsuiker (2010)

E. Dhooge and R. J. Hartsuiker (2010) reported experiments showing that picture naming takes longer with low- than high-frequency distractor words, replicating M. Miozzo and A. Caramazza (2003). In addition, they showed that this distractor-frequency effect disappears when distractors are masked or preexposed. These findings were taken to refute models like WEAVER++ (A. Roelofs, 2003) in which words are selected by competition. However, Dhooge and Hartsuiker do not take into account that according to this model, picture-word interference taps not only into word production but also into attentional processes. Here, the authors indicate that WEAVER++ contains an attentional mechanism that accounts for the distractor-frequency effect (A. Roelofs, 2005). Moreover, the authors demonstrate that the model accounts for the influence of masking and preexposure, and does so in a simpler way than the response exclusion through self-monitoring account advanced by Dhooge and Hartsuiker.     

The representation of social issues in public discourse and newspaper language: a comment on Gardikiotis,Martin and Hewstone's (2004) study

Gardikiotis, Martin and Hewstone ( 2004 ) investigated the representation of majority versus minority headlines in five British newspapers over a period of five years. They found majority headlines to be twice as frequent as minority headlines. However, they identified headlines with the search words ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ only in the singular form. We argue that in the public discourse the minority, but not the majority is likely to be represented in the plural. Replicating their study with the search words in both singular and plural forms, the strong difference they reported disappeared and minority headlines proved to be just as frequent as majority headlines. However, whereas majority is used almost exclusively in the singular, minority is used almost as frequently in both the singular and plural forms. These findings suggest a more complex social representation in real‐life contexts on the minority pole of the minority‐majority dimension compared to the majority pole. Implications of this asymmetric relationship are discussed in terms of communication theory, social representations theory, and experimental research on minority‐majority groups (in particular in‐group homogeneity). Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Return of the ego--self-referent information as a filter for social prediction: comment on Karniol (2003)

The protocentrism paradigm of social prediction (R. Karniol, 2003) challenges the egocentrism paradigm tacitly accepted by many researchers. The author reviews the 2 paradigms comparatively by focusing on 3 conceptual and 3 empirical issues. On conceptual grounds, the author suggests that the egocentrism paradigm has been proven useful because of (a) its greater breadth and parsimony, (b) the difficulties in documenting the origin of protocenters, and (c) the indeterminate nature of self-as-distinct tags (which are crucial to protocentrism). On empirical grounds, the author argues that in research on perceptions of self-other similarities, the egocentric process of social projection is well-established. Self-referent knowledge (a) is most readily accessible, (b) receives greater weight in prediction tasks than does other-referent knowledge, and (c) tends to be suppressed only temporarily, with effort, and incompletely.