Whose forest? Whose land? Whose Ruins? Ethics and conservation

The stakes are very high in many struggles over cultural property, not only because the property is itself valuable, but also because property rights of many kinds hinge on cultural identity. However, the language of property rights and possession, and the standards for establishing cultural rights, is founded in antiquated and essentialized concepts of cultural continuity and cultural purity. As cultural property and culturally-defined rights become increasingly valuable in the global marketplace, disputes over ownership and management are becoming more and more intense. Using the example of a recent lawsuit over logging on Mayan Indian reservations in the Central American country of Belize, this paper argues that cultural essentialist positions are no longer tenable. Assigning exclusive ownership of globally important resources to any group or entity on purely cultural grounds is likely to prolong conflict instead of creating workable management structures. The author instead advocates a concept of “stakeholding” which acknowledges the legitimate interests of diverse individuals and groups. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium entitled “Ethics in Science: Special Problems in Anthropology and Archaeology” held at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Philadelphia, PA, 15 February, 1998.     

Is psychoanalysis alive and well at 85? A rejoinder

Psychoanalysis has declined in public interest and scientific validity. It has become a “dead science” and an anachronistic system of beliefs. Its goal of total personality reconstruction is frustrating and futile. Psychoanalytic practice became a form of “exclusive salvationism,” and unconscionable, when it excluded the spouse from participation in the total treatment plan. More frequent interviews over a longer period of time do not produce a therapeutic effect that is “deeper,” and there is no reason to believe that fewer interviews are superficial, or temporary, and that prolongation of an analysis is more likely to produce better therapeutic results. Research studies do not produce any clear-cut winners when psychotherapies are compared. Psychoanalytic theories rest more on argument than on scientific evidence. The patient’s needs seldom, if ever, correspond to the therapist’s theoretical preoccupations, system of beliefs, and indoctrination. Research psychologists, philosophers of science, and eclectic psychiatrists have expressed their dissatisfaction with unproven psychoanalytic doctrines and the concept of “mental energy.” Psychoanalysis is not a pseudoscience, but a “half-science,” whose poetic mythology requires translation into the prose of science.     

Does Openness to Experience predict changes in conservatism? A nine-wave longitudinal investigation into the personality roots to ideology

Although Openness to Experience correlates negatively with conservatism, recent studies question the assumption that personality precedes political attitudes. We contribute to this debate by using nine annual waves of a nation-wide longitudinal panel study (N = 17,207) to investigate the temporal ordering of Openness to Experience and conservatism. Although cross-lagged panel models suggest that Openness to Experience predicts decreases in conservatism, analyses that properly separate between-person stability from within-person change find no evidence to suggest that personality precedes ideology (or vice-versa). These findings raise concerns about a critical assumption in the literature and suggest that personality and political ideology develop in parallel with one another, rather than personality causally preceding conservatism.     

Health promotion--science or ideology?

This article is the author's American Psychological Association Division 38 Presidential Address, which was delivered at the 1987 APA meetings. It challenges health psychologists to be wary of becoming zealots in health promotion activities without continuing to recognize that health promotion programs should be anchored in sound science. This is discussed in terms of the biomedical research support for a recommended health practice or in terms of the psycho-socio-behavioral research support for techniques applied or advocated in intervention programs. To illustrate this problem in health promotion, the research foundations for recommendations of cholesterol control programs and the "Say No to Drugs" campaigns are explored. Other concerns relating to the appropriate role for the health psychologist in health promotion activities are also discussed.     

Theological Shamelessness? A Response to Arthur Peacocke and David A. Pailin

This is a theological response to two programmatic essays, “Science and the Future of Theology: Critical Issues,” by Arthur Peacocke and “What Game is Being Played? The Need for Clarity about theRelationship between Scientific and Theological Understanding,” by David A. Pailin. It argues that the two authors, well informed by the recent developments in science, are reduplicating some methodological and epistemological trends common to nineteenth‐century theology. The feasibility of their project should, therefore, be examined on whether they succeed in answering the questions posed to the liberal project that dominated theological and philosophical scholarship in the last century. They are found to be wanting in their inadequate response to three considerations: (1) the persistence of particular manifestations of religion and theology's enduring refusal to accept thoroughly scientific “enlightened” criteria, (2) the epistemological implications of the eschatological character of the Christianmessage, and (3) the trinitarian paradigm for Christian theology and the life of faith.     

Whose harm? Which metaphysic?

Douglas Diekema has argued that it is not the best interest standard, but the harm principle that serves as the moral basis for ethicists, clinicians, and the courts to trigger state intervention to limit parental authority in the clinic. Diekema claims the harm principle is especially effective in justifying state intervention in cases of religiously motivated medical neglect in pediatrics involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists. I argue that Diekema has not articulated a harm principle that is capable of justifying state intervention in these cases. Where disagreements over appropriate care are tethered to metaphysical disagreements (as they are for Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists), it is moral-metaphysical standards, rather than merely moral standards, that are needed to provide substantive guidance. I provide a discussion of Diekema’s harm principle to the broader end of highlighting an inconsistency between the theory and practice of secular bioethics when overriding religiously based medical decisions. In a secular state, ethicists, clinicians, and the courts are purportedly neutral with respect to moral-metaphysical positions, especially regarding those claims considered to be religious. However, the practice of overriding religiously based parental requests requires doffing the mantle of neutrality. In the search for a meaningful standard by which to override religiously based parental requests in pediatrics, bioethicists cannot avoid some minimal metaphysical commitments. To resolve this inconsistency, bioethicists must either begin permitting religiously based requests, even at the cost of children’s lives, or admit that at least some moral-metaphysical disputes can be rationally adjudicated.

     

Which God? What Power? A Response to Andrew H. Gleeson

Andrew H. Gleeson has written an essay commenting on an exchange between Dewi Z. Phillips and me, arguing that I was mistaken to dismiss Phillips’ criticism of the standard definition of omnipotence as unsuccessful. Furthermore, he charges Swinburne, me, and analytic theists in general, with an excessive anthropomorphism that obliterates the distinction between Creator and creature. In response, I contend that all of Gleeson’s criticisms are unsound.     

Whose Evolution? Which Theology?

The importance of scientific conflicts for theology andphilosophy is difficult to judge. In many disputes of significance, prominent scientists can be found on both sides. Profound philosophical and religious implications are sometimes said to be implied by the new theory as well. This article examines the dispute over natural selection between Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould as a contemporary instance of such a conflict. While both claim that profound philosophical conclusions flow from their own alternativeaccount of evolution, I suggest that the implication is not as great as is claimed and that the alleged implications have as much to do with their own perceptions of theology as with the actual theories themselves. Nevertheless, evolutionary theory is not irrelevant for theology. Theologians should be aware of the possible implications of evolutionary theory and at the same time theextent and limits of such implications.     

Critique or Misrepresentation? A Reply to Timimi et al.

In rebuttal to Timimi et al., we show that their critique is not a form of reasonable scientific debate with informed, constructive criticism, but merely a misrepresentation of the existing scientific literature on ADHD apparently designed to convince the scientifically uninformed of its nonexistence and of the misuse of medications for its management. We show their argument to be based on faulty logic, selective citation, misreprensentation of individual studies, ignorance of the vast literature on ADHD, and innuendo that maligns the integrity of scientists studying the disorder. Our original International Consensus Statement on ADHD remains untarnished by this faux critique – indeed it was intended to refute just such unsupported and unsupportable criticism that often appears in the popular media.     

Obscurity,falsehood, and innuendo – A response to M. John Lamola

In a paper on a “contextual South African philosophy curriculum”, M. John Lamola makes some sweeping comments about South African philosophers during the apartheid era and insinuates parallels with those today who ask questions about what a decolonised curriculum is. His arguments here are unclear, are based on false and insufficiently nuanced claims, and are pregnant with innuendo. In my response I demonstrate this.     

Consenting to Donate Organs: Whose Wishes Carry the Most Weight?

An experimental simulation methodology examined how people weigh the wishes of the donor and the next-of-kin in recommending whether the latter should consent to donate the organs of a deceased loved one. Subjects read several brief stories, each describing a young adult who had died suddenly and whose kin faced the decision of whether to donate their loved one's organs. Each scenario had four versions, identical except for minor wording changes providing information about the organ donation wish of the potential donor and the next-of-kin. Subjects indicated "yes,""no," or "I'm undecided" about whether the kin should donate the organs. Subjects weighted the wishes of the deceased much more heavily than their own or those of the next-of-kin when those wishes were stated directly. When the deceased's wishes had to be inferred indirectly, attitudes of the next-of-kin and the experimental subject affected the decision much more. Implications for organ procurement practice are considered.