Another quasi-30 years of slow progress

Meehl (1978) discussed a variety of characteristics of the culture of scholarly psychology that critically affect its progress toward a stronger science. These characteristics include assumptions about the nature of theory, approaches to the testing of theories, and the reliance on significance tests that is pervasive in many subfields of psychology research. Several of these characteristics and Meehl’s perspective on them are examined years later in this brief commentary. Meehl’s criticisms, though sometimes misrepresented, remain compelling and strikingly current. Yet it should be remembered that Meehl emphasized that “soft” psychology at its best is a profound and worthy challenge and will necessarily progress slowly. It can be improved, but not replaced, by hardnosed scholarship.     

Falsification and the protective belt surrounding entity-postulating theories

Meehl’s article is a contradiction. In every area, he recognizes some of what is wrong and then advocates a course that will produce more of the same. He sees the problem with falsification and in essence advocates for its alternative, verification, but falsely claims this strategy is still falsification and is useful when there is a loose link between theories and their auxiliaries and conditions. He acknowledges the proven value of tightening the link between theories and their auxiliaries and conditions, but rejects that course because it does not apply to his preferred theories. Twenty-five years later there is even more “slow progress” to ponder. It is time to dismantle the protective belt surrounding entity-postulating theories that Meehl’s reasoning has helped to create.     

Paul Everett Meehl

A brilliant thinker and a gifted teacher, Paul Meehl’s love for and dedication to the philosophy of science did not lead him, as it seems to have led others, to assume that all minds have the same structure and differ only parametrically. One of Meehl’s main interests in the latter part of his career was in taxometric methods for identifying psychological types or taxa. Another taxonomic method seeks traits that are very similar, for genetic reasons, in monozygotic twins, but not in other sib pairs. These emergenic traits may be more common than previously realized. Two examples are briefly discussed.     

Statistical significance testing, construct validity, and clinical versus actuarial judgment: an interesting (seeming) paradox

What practical implications does Meehl’s attack on significance testing have for clinical psychologists, and doesn’t Meehl contradict himself in placing so much emphasis on scientific theories in such works as “Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks” and yet advocating for actuarial judgement, which is essentially an atheoretical approach to clinical predication? This seemingly paradoxical ideology, when considered within the broader context of Meehl’s work, can be readily aligned.     

A few dissents from a magnificent piece of work

Despite enthusiastic agreement with most of Meehl’s paper, I dissent on “the idiographic problem” (as based on false premises), and on the goal of refuting theoretical propositions in soft psychology with any useful certainty (its generalizations are inescapably statistical, and Popper’s paradigm does not apply). Some implications for research, especially on psychoanalytic theory, are briefly outlined.     

Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, (Sir) Paul, and the human element in the progress of soft psychology

Meehl’s article related to theoretical risks and tabular asterisks reminds us of the importance of thinking and theorizing as well as hypothesizing and testing, a point that is as relevant today in soft psychology as it was in 1978. Although progress is impeded by the profusion of tabular asterisks, we should recognize as well that the course of events is shaped by the actors involved—theories not only fade away, they are excluded by these actors.     

The fallacy of the null hypothesis in soft psychology

In his classic article on the fallacy of the null hypothesis in soft psychology [J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 46 (1978)], Paul Meehl claimed that, in nonexperimental settings, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of nil group differences in favor of a directional alternative was 0.50—a value that is an order of magnitude higher than the customary Type I error rate. In a series of real data simulations, using Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Revised (MMPI-2) data collected from more than 80,000 individuals, I found strong support for Meehl’s claim.     

The philosophical legacy of Meehl (1978): confirmation theory, theory quality, and scientific epistemology

The reach and impact of Paul Meehl’s work is extraordinary. Focusing on his “Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks”, I trace three consequences of his findings. The first is the influence of his work on confirmation theory in the philosophy of science, in which he provided a more sophisticated alternative to Popperianism, despite some affinities with it. The second is a clear focus on the evaluation of theory quality as an explanation for the success of hard vs. soft theories. The third is a very deep critique of the practices of contemporary epistemology; his research recommends the replacement of demonstrably unreliable, subjective judgments about justification and knowledge with simple predictive models that outperform human experts. This is an impressive array of intellectual contributions to psychology and philosophy. As influential as his work was, it is just now beginning to receive attention commensurate with its merits.     

The myth of open concepts: Meehl’s analysis of construct meaning versus black box essentialism

Two views of theoretical concepts in psychology are compared. Meehl’s “open concept” account holds that theoretical concepts are implicitly defined by theories but that empirical criteria can be changed over time (e.g., added or dropped, weightings changed, exchanged for theoretical reductions). This account confuses concepts and theories, does not reflect how diagnostic concepts actually work in medicine and psychology, leads to theory incommensurability, and is unclear about when concepts are the same or different. I propose that an alternative “black box essentialist” account of theoretical concepts, drawn from recent philosophical work on natural kind concepts, better explains how we manage to refer to the same construct even as our theories and criteria change. One implication is that Meehl is incorrect to claim that a reason for psychology’s lack of progress is that its concepts are inherently different from those in the hard sciences.     

Tabular asterisks, Paul Meehl, and looking at the data

Three of Meehl’s major concerns are examined in this summary. They are the problem of null-hypothesis testing as a strategy, the central significance of heterogeneity in human behavior, and the over-dependence on rating scales with their inherent lack of precision.     

Constructs, operational definition, and operational analysis

We argue that a certain picture of the relationship between language and the world informed Meehl’s outlook on how science worked. That picture authorized talk about constructs and has led to construct proliferation and other problems. Operational analysis offers an alternative view and suggests that a major shortcoming of soft psychology is its lack of disciplined limits on acceptable verbal behavior.     

Understanding the Influence Theory of Causation: A Critique of Strevens

In this paper, I will first clarify Lewis’s influence theory of causation by relying on his theory of events. And then I will consider Michael Strevens’s charge against the sufficiency of Lewis’s theory. My claim is that it is legitimate but does not pose as serious a problem for Lewis’s theory as Strevens thinks because Lewis can surmount it by limiting the scope of his theory to causation between concrete events. Michael Strevens raises an alleged counterexample to the necessity of Lewis’s theory that, if successful, would have a very important advantage over other alleged counterexamples. But I will assert that it is simply mistaken. My defense of Lewis’s theory will shed interesting light on the relationship between Lewis’s theory and Salmon’s mark theory.     

Black,White and Gray: Quine on Convention

This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to provide an explanatory account of analytic truth, they in fact anticipate Quine’s later critique of conventionalism. I further argue that Quine eventually deconstructs both his own metaphor and the thesis of under-determination it serves to illustrate. This enables him to hold onto under-determination, but at the cost of depleting it of any real epistemic significance. Lastly, I explore the implications of this deconstruction for Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis.     

Conjoining Mathematical Empiricism with Mathematical Realism: Maddy’s Account of Set Perception Revisited

Penelope Maddy’s original solution to the dilemma posed by Benacerraf in his (1973) ‘Mathematical Truth’ was to reconcile mathematical empiricism with mathematical realism by arguing that we can perceive realistically construed sets. Though her hypothesis has attracted considerable critical attention, much of it, in my view, misses the point. In this paper I vigorously defend Maddy’s (1990) account against published criticisms, not because I think it is true, but because these criticisms have functioned to obscure a more fundamental issue that is well worth addressing: in general – and not only in the mathematical domain – empiricism and realism simply cannot be reconciled by means of an account of perception anything like Maddy’s. But because Maddy’s account of perception is so plausible, this conclusion raises the specter of the broader incompatibility of realism and empiricism, which contemporary philosophers are frequently at pains to forget.     

A Critique of Resnik’s Mathematical Realism

This paper attempts to motivate skepticism about the reality of mathematical objects. The aim of the paper is not to provide a general critique of mathematical realism, but to demonstrate the insufficiency of the arguments advanced by Michael Resnik. I argue that Resnik’s use of the concept of immanent truth is inconsistent with the treatment of mathematical objects as ontologically and epistemically continuous with the objects posited by the natural sciences. In addition, Resnik’s structuralist program, and his denial of relational properties, is incompatible with a realist metaphysics about mathematical objects.     

Unsafe Knowledge

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample.     

Henry Cavendish and Asperger’s syndrome: A new understanding of the scientist

Although it has recently been suggested that Henry Cavendish (1731–1810) suffered from Asperger’s syndrome (James, 2005; Sacks, 2001), there has yet to be a systematic exploration of this claim. For various reasons, Cavendish is considered here through the diagnostic framework described by Gillberg (1989), with further support from the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). The potential for such a retro-diagnosis is evident, given Cavendish’s biographers’ lament of Cavendish as the ‘incomplete man’: the oddly misanthropic man characterised by negations. Such an impression is evident in the memoirs of Cavendish’s contemporaries but finds its best expression in Wilson’s (1851) biography. With a new and cautious interpretation from an Asperger’s syndrome perspective, this fragmented picture dissipates and Cavendish emerges as a man of remarkable intellect whose syndrome stunted his social development and expression, yet so crucially enabled his research into a paradoxically catholic taste of scientific study. Topics relevant to a ‘retro-diagnosis’ are first addressed, before Cavendish is compared to Gillberg’s and the DSM-IV criteria.     

Peter Singer’S Argument for Utilitarianism

The paper begins by situating Singer within the British meta-ethical tradition. It sets out the main steps in his argument for utilitarianism as the ‘default setting’ of ethical thought. It argues that Singer’s argument depends on a hierarchy of reasons, such that the ethical viewpoint is understood to be an adaptation – an extension – of a fundamental self-interest. It concludes that the argument fails because it is impossible to get from this starting-point in self-interest to his conception of the ethical point of view. The fundamental problem is its mixing the immiscible: the Humean subordination of reason to interest with the Kantian conception of reason as universal and authoritative.     

Popper and Synthetic judgements A Priori

Summary  Popper uses the “Humean challenge” as a justification for his falsificationism. It is claimed that in his basic argument he confuses two different doubts: (a) the Humean doubt (Popper’s problem of induction), and (b) the “Popperean” doubt whether – presupposing that there are laws of nature – the laws we accept are in fact valid. Popper’s alleged solution of the problem of induction does not solve the problem in a straightforward way (as Levison and Salmon have remarked before). But if Popper’s solution of the Humean challenge is re-interpreted as being close to Kant’s it makes sense. Even though Popper explicitly rejects Kant’s synthetic judgements a priori, it is claimed here that this is so because he misinterprets Kant’s argument. If he had understood Kant correctly he should have been a modern “Kantianer”!     

History and Method of Charles V. Gerkin’s Pastoral Theology: Toward an Identity-Embodied and Community-Embedded Pastoral Theology,Part I. History

The purpose of this article is to explore the legacy of Charles V. Gerkin’s pastoral theology and to construct a method of pastoral theology. In Part I, I will trace within a larger context of pastoral theology the history of Gerkin’s pastoral theology since his early clinical praxis. In Part II, I will explore his method of developing pastoral theology and construct a renewed critical and constructive method of pastoral theology, reflecting on the implications of exploring the history and method of his pastoral theology.