Where (who) are collectives in collectivism? Toward conceptual clarification of individualism and collectivism

In psychological research on cultural differences, the distinction between individualism and collectivism has received the lion's share of attention as a fundamental dimension of cultural variation. In recent years, however, these constructs have been criticized as being ill-defined and "a catchall" to represent all forms of cultural differences. The authors argue that there is a conceptual confusion about the meaning of ingroups that constitute the target of collectivism. Collectives are rarely referred to in existing measures to assess collectivism. Instead, networks of interpersonal relationships dominate the operational definition of "ingroups" in these measures. Results from a content analysis of existing scales support this observation. To clarify and expand the individualism-collectivism distinction, a theoretical framework is proposed that draws on M. B. Brewer and G. Gardner's (1996) conceptualization of individual, relational, and collective selves and their manifestation in self-representations, beliefs, and values. Analyses of data from past studies provide preliminary support for this conceptual model. The authors propose that this new theoretical framework will contribute conceptual clarity to interpretation of past research on individualism and collectivism and guide future research on these important constructs.     

Stereotypes of singles: are singles what we think?

Four studies examined the accuracy of the single stereotype by comparing perceptions of single and partnered targets with self‐ratings and ratings by others of single and partnered participants. Results revealed that single targets were evaluated more negatively than partnered targets in terms of a wide range of personality characteristics, overall well‐being, and satisfaction with relationships status. These findings were very robust and not qualified by target sex, participant sex, and participant relationship status. In contrast, self‐ratings of single and partnered participants were remarkably similar for all personality characteristics as well as overall well‐being, which was corroborated by ratings of participants by others. However, partnered participants were indeed more satisfied with their relationship status than single participants. When all is considered, the single stereotype is largely inaccurate. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Familiarity and attention: Does what we know affect what we notice?

Previous work on the object and word superiority effects has demonstrated that activation from stored representations can facilitate identification of items in a visual display. We predicted that activation of this sort might exogenously attract visual attention toward items that have stored representations. To test this prediction, we presented a familiar (word) and an unfamiliar (nonword) item simultaneously at unpredictable locations, and after varying delays, moved one of the stimuli. In accord with our prediction, at the shortest intervals subjects were more efficient at discriminating motion of the familiar item. Control data demonstrated that this advantage was due to a competitive interaction and not to the familiarity of the items per se.     

Dimensionality of individualism–collectivism and measurement equivalence of Triandis and Gelfand’s scale

Despite researchers’ strong interest in individualism and collectivism (I–C), the conceptualization and measurement of I–C constructs remain controversial. Through a cross-cultural study, the present research examines the dimensionality of I–C and tests equivalence of a measurement scale recently developed by Triandis and Gelfand. Through confirmatory factor analyses, the authors find that conceiving I–C as separate constructs with multiple dimensions is superior and better fits the data. The measurement scale developed based on such a conceptualization is found warrantable although refinements can be made. The results suggest a need for future research on further testing the dimensionality and measurement of the individualism and collectivism scale.     

Psychological universals: what are they and how can we know?

Psychological universals, or core mental attributes shared by humans everywhere, are a foundational postulate of psychology, yet explicit analysis of how to identify such universals is lacking. This article offers a conceptual and methodological framework to guide the investigation of genuine universals through empirical analysis of psychological patterns across cultures. Issues of cross-cultural generalizability of psychological processes and 3 cross-cultural research strategies to probe universals are considered. Four distinct levels of hierarchically organized universals are possible: From strongest to weakest claims for universality, they are accessibility universals, functional universals, existential universals, and nonuniversals. Finally, universals are examined in relation to the questions of levels of analysis, evolutionary explanations of psychological processes, and management of cross-cultural relations.     

Forming and updating vaccination beliefs: does the continued effect of misinformation depend on what we think we know?

Cognitive Processing - People may cling to false facts even in the face of updated and correct information. The present study confronted misconceptions about the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine...     

Consciousness and identity: who do we think we are?

This article proposes that the epistemological concerns raised by the inherent incoherence of thought requires a dialogical approach to understanding consciousness and identity. It is argued that such an approach leads to (a) a fundamentally spiritual view of self, (b) a radical view of consciousness as a non-local field that shapes the limits of our perception, and (c) a determination of the degree of gap between reality and thought's representation of it. A method of measuring this kind of consciousness is examined, and examples of insights gained through this methodology are provided. Implications of this perspective are explored, and conclusions arising from this inquiry are presented.     

How does culture influence the degree of romantic loneliness and closeness?

A culture promoting a strong desire for romantic relationships can greatly influence feelings of romantic loneliness and of closeness. In this study, the authors hypothesized that when not in a romantic relationship, U.S. young adults experience greater degrees of romantic loneliness because of a high desire for romantic relationships, compared with Korean young adults. The authors also predicted that when in a romantic relationship, U.S. young adults experience greater closeness to their romantic partner than do Korean young adults. Results revealed that in a sample of 227 U.S. and Korean students, U.S. students reported significantly higher levels of romantic loneliness than did Koreans when not in a romantic relationship and significantly lower levels of romantic loneliness when in a stable romantic relationship. U.S. students also reported a greater degree of closeness in romantic relationships than did Korean students. The results suggest that Western cultures' strong emphasis on the importance of romantic relationships may unduly amplify individuals' levels of loneliness.     

Does aging influence people's metacomprehension? Effects of processing ease on judgments of text learning

In 2 experiments, the authors investigated whether age-related differences exist in metacomprehension by evaluating predictions based on the ease-of-processing (EOP) hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, judgments of how well a text has been learned are based on how easily each text was processed; easier processing results in higher judgments. Participants read either sentence pairs or longer texts and judged their learning of each immediately afterward. Although an age-related difference in the use of processing ease in judgments was observed with sentence pairs, for longer texts older and younger adults' judgments were similarly related to processing ease. In both experiments, age equivalence was also evident in the accuracy of the judgments at predicting performance on the criterion test. The overall pattern of results suggests that judging text learning remains largely intact with aging.     

Does negative priming imply preselective identification of irrelevant stimuli?

Responses to recently ignored stimuli are often slower than responses to new stimuli (negative priming). This slowing is thought to imply that the irrelevant stimuli were identified before the relevant stimuli were selected. The slowing may, however, reflect processing that occurred after the selection process had already begun. In two experiments, the opportunity for preselective identification of irrelevant stimuli was eliminated by presenting the irrelevant stimuli late within the trial. Negative priming failed to occur under these conditions.     

Measuring the quality of life: Why,how and what?

In this paper three questions concerning quality of life in medicine and health care are analysed and discussed: the motives for measuring the quality of life, the methods used in assessing it, and the definition of the concept. The purposes of the study are to find an ethically acceptable motive for measuring the quality of life; to identify the methodological advantages and disadvantages of the most prevalent current methods of measurement; and to present an approach towards measuring and defining the quality of life which evades the difficulties encountered and discussed. The analysis comprises measurements both in the clinical situation concerning individual patients and in research concerning whole populations. Three motives are found for evaluating the quality of human life: allocation of scarce medical resources, facilitating clinical decision making, and assisting patients towards autonomous decision making. It is argued that the third alternative is the only one which does not evoke ethical problems. As for the methods of evaluation, several prevalent alternatives are presented, ranging from scales of physical performance to more subtle psychological questionnaires. Clinical questionnaires are found to fail to provide a scientific foundation for universally measuring the quality of life. Finally, the question of definition is tackled. The classical distinction between need-based and want-based theories of human happiness is presented and discussed. The view is introduced and defended that neither of these approaches can be universally preferred to the other. The difficulty with the need approach is that it denies the subjective aspects of human life; whereas the problem of the want approach is that it tends to ignore some of the objective realities of the human existence. In conclusion, it is argued that the choice of methods as well as definitions should be left to the competent patients themselves — who are entitled, if they so wish, to surrender the judgement to the medical personnel. Technical factors as well as the requirements of respect for autonomy and informed consent support this conclusion.     

Information pick-up by infants: what is it, and how can we tell?

Young infants spend the better portion of their 1st year merely looking around, and what they notice can have critical cognitive consequences. Although looking measures are commonly used to predict what information infants pick up about objects and/or their relationship to other objects, these predictions are often ambiguous. Ultimately, that knowledge can be unambiguously revealed only by giving infants an opportunity to directly act on or use it.     

Does how I look at what you're doing depend on what I'm doing?

Previous studies showed that people proactively gaze at the target of another's action by taking advantage of their own motor representation of that action. But just how selectively is one's own motor representation implicated in another's action processing? If people observe another's action while performing a compatible or an incompatible action themselves, will this impact on their gaze behaviour? We recorded proactive eye movements while participants observed an actor grasping small or large objects. The participants' right hand either freely rested on the table or held with a suitable grip a large or a small object, respectively. Proactivity of gaze behaviour significantly decreased when participants observed the actor reaching her target with a grip that was incompatible with respect to that used by them to hold the object in their own hand. This indicates that effective observation of action may depend on what one is actually doing, being actions observed best when the suitable motor representations may be readily recruited.     

Does negative priming reflect inhibitory mechanisms? A review and integration of conflicting views

Negative priming has traditionally been viewed as a reflection of an inhibitory mechanism of attention. However, recent accounts have suggested that negative priming does not reflect inhibitory mechanisms. Rather, slowed reaction times on negative priming trials are either due to retrieval of incompatible response tags or of mismatching perceptual information, or due to extra processes needed to distinguish past from present information. In contrast, it is proposed that there is no firm evidence to discount inhibition models. In fact, although retrieval processes can be implicated in negative priming effects, understanding of these requires consideration of the inhibitory processes involved in selecting information for goal-directed behaviour.     

Semantic and perceptual priming: how similar are the underlying mechanisms?

Both semantic priming and perceptual priming consist of facilitation of the identification of primed stimuli and inhibition of the identification of nonprimed stimuli. The similarities between the two phenomena suggest that a common attentional mechanism underlies both, and this has been explicitly proposed by several attention theorists. In this article it is argued that the phenomena of semantic and perceptual priming are qualitatively different, perceptual priming reflecting a sensitivity change in the recognition process brought about by attention, and semantic priming reflecting a bias change in the recognition process brought about by attention. Because different mechanisms are required to produce sensitivity and bias changes, this implies that the attentional mechanisms responsible for semantic and perceptual priming are distinct. In terms of recent discussions of the modularity versus the unity of cognitive architecture, the present conclusion supports a modular architecture for attentional processes.     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.     

How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action

Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the "sense of agency" have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on some trials. Participants (1) expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, (2) pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start posiment to the target shift if required and (3) reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants' intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive (motoric) and the preconstuctive (intentional) aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness. Delays during either interval boosted undershoots, suggesting increased reliance on a time-limited sensory memory for action. The experience of action is thus strongly influenced by prior thoughts and expectations, but only over a short time period. Thus, awareness of our actions is a dynamic and relatively flexible mixture of what we intend to do, and what our motor system actually does.     

Can performance-feedback accuracy be improved? Effects of rater priming and rating-scale format on rating accuracy

Performance appraisal information is often used for employee feedback and development. Research has found that assessments that are global (i.e., based on broad aspects of performance) and comparative (i.e., explicit interratee comparisons) may be most accurate in terms of Cronbach's (1955) differential accuracy, a type of accuracy that is directly relevant to the provision of feedback. Unfortunately, a global-comparative assessment may not give recipients the most useful diagnostic feedback. In this experiment, an innovative rater-priming manipulation was developed and tested on a sample of 109 participants. The priming manipulation had the effect of improving differential accuracy and providing diagnostic feedback. A 2nd independent variable involving 2 different Behavioral Observation Scale formats also was investigated. Explanations of findings, limitations of this experiment, directions for future research, and implications for performance appraisal practice are discussed.     

Does mood influence the realism of confidence judgments?

Previous research has shown that mood affects cognition, but the extent to which mood affects meta-cognitive judgments is a relatively over-looked issue. In the current study we investigated how mood influences the degree of realism in participants' confidence judgments (based on an episodic memory task). Using music and film in combination, we successfully induced an elated mood in half of the participants, but failed to induce a sad mood in the other half. In line with previous research, the participants in both conditions were overconfident in their judgments. However, and contrary to our prediction, our data indicated that there was no difference in the realism of the confidence between the conditions. When relating this result to previous research, our conclusion is that there is no, or very little, influence of mood of moderate intensity on the realism of confidence judgments.