Why Friedman's non-monotonic reasoning defies Hempel's covering law model

In this paper we will show that Hempel's covering law model can't deal very well with explanations that are based on incomplete knowledge. In particular the symmetry thesis, which is an important aspect of the covering law model, turns out to be problematic for these explanations. We will discuss an example of an electric circuit, which clearly indicates that the symmetry of explanation and prediction does not always hold. It will be argued that an alternative logic for causal explanation is needed. And we will investigate to what extent non-monotonic epistemic logic can provide such an alternative logical framework. Finally we will show that our non-monotonic logical analysis of explanation is not only suitable for simple cases such as the electric circuit, but that it also sheds new light on more controversial causal explanations such as Milton Friedman's explanation of the business cycle.We gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions and critical comments of Johan van Benthem, Bert Hamminga, Kevin Hoover, Theo Kuipers, and Rick Looyen.     

Can First-Order Logical Truth be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?

W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism is confused in ways that have not yet been noticed in the literature. This may seem to favour Strawson's side of the debate. In fact, however, a proper analysis of the difficulties that Quine's reply faces suggests a new way to clarify and defend the view that logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms.     

Constitutive essence and partial grounding

Kit Fine and Gideon Rosen propose to define constitutive essence in terms of ground-theoretic notions and some form of consequential essence. But we think that the Fine–Rosen proposal is a mistake. On the Fine–Rosen proposal, constitutive essence ends up including properties that, on the central notion of essence (what Fine calls ‘the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity’), are necessary but not essential. This is because consequential essence is (roughly) closed under logical consequence, and the ability of logical consequence to add properties to an object’s consequential essence outstrips the ability of ground-theoretic notions, as used in the Fine–Rosen proposal, to take those properties out. The necessary-but-not-essential properties that, on the Fine–Rosen proposal, end up in constitutive essence include the sorts of necessary-but-not-essential properties that, others have noted, end up in consequential essence.     

Completeness and Categoricity,Part II: Twentieth-Century Metalogic to Twenty-first-Century Semantics

This paper is the second in a two-part series in which we discuss several notions of completeness for systems of mathematical axioms, with special focus on their interrelations and historical origins in the development of the axiomatic method. We argue that, both from historical and logical points of view, higher-order logic is an appropriate framework for considering such notions, and we consider some open questions in higher-order axiomatics. In addition, we indicate how one can fruitfully extend the usual set-theoretic semantics so as to shed new light on the relevant strengths and limits of higher-order logic.     

The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanations: A developmental hypothesis

In this paper we shall argue that mentalistic action explanations, which form an essential component of a mature theory of mind, are conceptually and developmentally derived from an earlier and purely teleological interpretational system present in infancy. First we summarize our evidence demonstrating teleological action explanations in one-year-olds. Then we shall briefly contrast the structure of teleological vs. causal mentalistic action explanations and outline four logical possibilities concerning the nature of the developmental relationship between them. We shall argue for the view that causal mentalistic action explanations are constructed as useful theoretical extensions of the earlier, purely teleological, nonmentalistic interpretational stance.     

Action-centred negative priming: Evidence for reactive inhibition

Experiments are described in which the spatial relationship between a stimulus and respondent is held constant in terms of visual and body-centred coordinates, while the complexity of the response is manipulated. It is demonstrated that the degree of complexity of an action directed to the same spatial location determines the level of negative priming observed. This result supports the notions that (1) inhibitory selection mechanisms act on action-centred representations, and (2) the level of inhibition is reactive to the relative potency of the evoked action. The results are also discussed in terms of alternative explanations of negative priming. It is concluded that the results are inconsistent with theories that do not involve inhibitory selection mechanisms.     

DEFLATIONISM AND THE SUCCESS ARGUMENT

Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal–explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal–explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal–explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal–explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one.     

FIRST‐ORDER LOGICAL VALIDITY AND THE HILBERT‐BERNAYS THEOREM

What we call the Hilbert‐Bernays (HB) Theorem establishes that for any satisfiable first‐order quantificational schema S, there are expressions of elementary arithmetic that yield a true sentence of arithmetic when they are substituted for the predicate letters in S. Our goals here are, first, to explain and defend W. V. Quine's claim that the HB theorem licenses us to define the first‐order logical validity of a schema in terms of predicate substitution; second, to clarify the theorem by sketching an accessible and illuminating new proof of it; and, third, to explain how Quine's substitutional definition of logical notions can be modified and extended in ways that make it more attractive to contemporary logicians.     

The psychoanalytic theories of wish‐fulfilment and meaning

Psychoanalysis regards many previously inexplicable phenomena as wish‐fulfilments, which have meaning inasmuch as they express the person's wishes or affects. This might appear to make such psychoanalytic explanations rather like ordinary explanations of conduct and to enlarge the area of intentional and possibly that of responsible behavior. But a critique of these psychoanalytic accounts will show that they are very unlike accounts in terms of ordinary notions of fulfilling or expressing wishes and that the psychoanalytic concept of wish‐fulfilment differs sufficiently from the ordinary one for it to be difficult to determine how to test psychoanalytic hypotheses concerning wish‐fulfilment by merely considering the way in which we assess claims utilizing the ordinary notion. In fact, such a critique will show that for a certain type of claim regarding wish‐fulfilments, psychoanalysts have not indicated ways of confirming or disconfirming such claims — in the sense that they have not shown how to find any evidence which would support these claims to a higher degree than contrary or contradictory claims. After offering the first part of this critique, which is a comparison of psychoanalytic and ordinary notions of fulfilling and expressing wishes, some considerations concerning a second part of the critique are presented regarding the connection between the construct of psychic energy and that of wish‐fulfilment.     

Logical Modes of Attack in Argumentation Networks

This paper studies methodologically robust options for giving logical contents to nodes in abstract argumentation networks. It defines a variety of notions of attack in terms of the logical contents of the nodes in a network. General properties of logics are refined both in the object level and in the metalevel to suit the needs of the application. The network-based system improves upon some of the attempts in the literature to define attacks in terms of defeasible proofs, the so-called rule-based systems. We also provide a number of examples and consider a rigorous case study, which indicate that our system does not suffer from anomalies. We define consequence relations based on a notion of defeat, consider rationality postulates, and prove that one such consequence relation is consistent.     

Locality and modular Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games

We study ways to simplify Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games. In particular, we consider decompositions of a structure and their effect on Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games. We investigate notions of locality and we present a generalisation of the theorem of Gaifman to linearly ordered structures.     

The Puzzle of Multiple Endings

Why is it that most fictions present one and only one ending, rather than multiple ones? Fictions presenting multiple endings are possible, because a few exist; but they are very rare, and this calls for an explanation. We argue that such an explanation is likely to shed light on our engagement with fictions, for fictions having one and only one ending seem to be ubiquitous. After dismissing the most obvious explanations for this phenomenon, we compare the scarcity of multiple endings in traditional kinds of fiction to their profusion in the case of interactive fictions. This contrast poses a challenge to accounts of our engagement with fictions in terms of games of make‐believe. We conclude that solving this puzzle is likely to improve our philosophical understanding of fictions.     

An objective counterfactual theory of information

We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information.     

Laws,causality and the intentional explanation of action

Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis, which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the claim “reason is not a cause of action,” namely, the “proper logical” argument, the “logical relation” argument, and the “rule-following” argument. This rebuttal suggests that the causal relationship between reason and action can provide a justification for intentional explanations.     

Projective Explanation: How Theories Explain Empirical Data in Spite of Theory-Data Incommensurability

In scientific explanations, the explanans theory is sometimes incommensurable with the explanandum empirical data. How is this possible, especially when the explanation is deductive in nature? This paper attempts to solve the puzzle without relying on any particular theory of reference. For us, it is rather obvious that the geometric idea of projection plays a key role in Kepler’s explanation of Tycho Brahe’s empirical data. We discover that a similar mechanism operates in theoretic explanations in general. In short, all theoretic explanations are “projective” explanations. If so, there should be no logical reason why explanans theories cannot be incommensurable with explanandum data. For illustration, we analyse Einstein’s explanation of the results of the Michelson–Morley experiment in some detail.     

Real brands in imaginary worlds: investigating players' experiences of brand placement in digital games

• This paper explores the development of brand placement in digital games using focus groups with game‐players. Growth in in‐game brand placement is explained by game developers' financial and creative priorities and experimentation in marketerss' use of media. The external context of game‐play is then examined based on explanations of the non‐material aspects of consumer behaviour. Internal game processes are also reviewed, including psychological processes that are likely to be of interest to marketers. The reported experiences of players are then considered in terms of these processes. Findings seem to support the use of brand placement in games. Players easily recall encounters with brands during game‐play and are generally positive about these experiences, suggesting that brands increase realism because it allows individuals to create and explore consumption‐based daydreams. However, some players reject brand placement, preferring in‐game fantasies that are independent of mundane commodities. The findings also raise issues related to the ways in which individuals may use digital games to reflect on our consumer society and this raises a question of the degree to which digital games may support or oppose existing consumer cultures. Other problems for managers wishing to use this technique were revealed by the repetitive nature of games which may cause message wear‐out, and by playerss' frustration with aspects of a game which may lead to negative evaluations of in‐game brands.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Generalized Logical Consequence: Making Room for Induction in the Logic of Science

We present a framework that provides a logic for science by generalizing the notion of logical (Tarskian) consequence. This framework will introduce hierarchies of logical consequences, the first level of each of which is identified with deduction. We argue for identification of the second level of the hierarchies with inductive inference. The notion of induction presented here has some resonance with Popper's notion of scientific discovery by refutation. Our framework rests on the assumption of a restricted class of structures in contrast to the permissibility of classical first-order logic. We make a distinction between deductive and inductive inference via the notions of compactness and weak compactness. Connections with the arithmetical hierarchy and formal learning theory are explored. For the latter, we argue against the identification of inductive inference with the notion of learnable in the limit. Several results highlighting desirable properties of these hierarchies of generalized logical consequence are also presented.     

The education of attention as explanation of variability of practice effects: learning the final approach phase in a flight simulator

The present study reports two experiments in which a total of 20 participants without prior flight experience practiced the final approach phase in a fixed-base simulator. All participants received self-controlled concurrent feedback during 180 practice trials. Experiment 1 shows that participants learn more quickly under variable practice conditions than under constant practice conditions. This finding is attributed to the education of attention to the more useful informational variables: Variability of practice reduces the usefulness of initially used informational variables, which leads to a quicker change in variable use, and hence to a larger improvement in performance. In the practice phase of Experiment 2 variability was selectively applied to some experimental factors but not to others. Participants tended to converge toward the variables that were useful in the specific conditions that they encountered during practice. This indicates that an explanation for variability of practice effects in terms of the education of attention is a useful alternative to traditional explanations based on the notion of the generalized motor program and to explanations based on the notions of noise and local minima.     

An Inferential Model of Scientific Understanding

In this article I argue that two current accounts of scientific understanding are incorrect and I propose an alternative theory. My new account draws on recent research in cognitive psychology which reveals the importance of making causal and logical inferences on the basis of incoming information. To understand a phenomenon we need to make particular kinds of inferences concerning the explanations we are given. Specifically, we come to understand a phenomenon scientifically by developing mental models that incorporate the correct causal and logical properties responsible for the causes or logical properties of the phenomenon being explained.     

Players,Characters, and the Gamer's Dilemma

Is there any difference between playing video games in which the player's character commits murder and video games in which the player's character commits pedophilic acts? Morgan Luck's “Gamer's Dilemma” has established this question as a puzzle concerning notions of permissibility and harm. We propose that a fruitful alternative way to approach the question is through an account of aesthetic engagement. We develop an alternative to the dominant account of the relationship between players and the actions of their characters, and argue that the ethical difference between so‐called “virtual murder” and “virtual pedophilia” is to be understood in terms of the fiction‐making resources available to players. We propose that the relevant considerations for potential players to navigate concern (1) attempting to make certain characters intelligible, and (2) using aspects of oneself as resources for homomorphic representation.