Unintentional collective action

In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pressed into service for constructing accounts of collective action. Specifically, I argue that the best analogy to collective action is a class of individual action that Carl Ginet has called ‘aggregate action.’ Furthermore, once we use aggregate action as a model of collective action, then we see that existing accounts of collective action have failed to accommodate an important class of (what I shall call) ‘unintentional collective actions.’     

Temptation and Deliberation

There is a great deal of plausibility to the standard view that if one is rational and it is clear at the time of action that a certain move, say M₁, would serve one’s concerns better than any other available move, then one will, as a rational agent, opt for move M₁. Still, this view concerning rationality has been challenged at least in part because it seems to conflict with our considered judgments about what it is rational to do in cases of temptation that share the structure of Warren Quinn’s self-torturer case. I argue that there is a way to accomodate our considered judgments about the relevant cases of temptation without giving up the standard view or dismissing, as in some way rationally defective, the concerns of the agents in the relevant cases. My reasoning relies on the idea that, at least in some cases, whether an action serves one’s concerns well depends on what action(s) or course(s) of action it is part of. In the final section of the paper, I explain how this idea sheds light on an important source of frustration in collective decision-making.     

On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy

Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others’ actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other minds.     

THE MORAL LEGACY OF COMMUNAL WRONGS: ETHNIC IDENTITY GROUPS AND INTERGENERATIONAL MORAL SENTIMENT

Abstract: Many individuals experience feelings of collective guilt or shame for the blameworthy historical acts of the nations or ethnic groups to which they belong. I reject the idea that collective moral sentiment rests on inherited moral responsibility. I suggest that the possibilities for individual action inherent in membership in ethnic identity groups can be a source of special moral duties. I argue that collective guilt and shame are moral emotions that individuals experience in response to complex assessments of their groups' histories and of their own practical responses to those histories. The approach I take to analyzing the concept of an ethnic identity group makes use of tools developed by Max Weber. Weber's conceptual work on social groups and related phenomena has been strongly criticized in a widely discussed book by Margaret Gilbert. I show that Gilbert's arguments fail to discredit Weberian analyses of social groups and their properties.     

Disappointment expression evokes collective guilt and collective action in intergroup conflict: the moderating role of legitimacy perceptions

Research on intergroup emotions has largely focused on the experience of emotions and surprisingly little attention has been given to the expression of emotions. Drawing on the social-functional approach to emotions, we argue that in the context of intergroup conflicts, outgroup members’ expression of disappointment with one’s ingroup induces the complementary emotion of collective guilt and correspondingly a collective action protesting ingroup actions against the outgroup. In Study 1 conducted immediately after the 2014 Gaza war, Jewish-Israeli participants received information about outgroup’s (Palestinians) expression of emotions (disappointment, fear, or none). As predicted, outgroup’s expression of disappointment increased collective guilt and willingness to participate in collective action, but only among those who saw the intergroup situation as illegitimate. Moreover, collective guilt mediated the relationship between disappointment expression and collective action, moderated, again, by legitimacy perception. In Study 2, we replicated these results in the context of racial tension between Black and White Americans in the US. We discuss the theoretical and applied implications of the findings.     

What they think of us: Meta-beliefs and solidarity-based collective action among the advantaged

Collective action researchers have recently started investigating solidarity-based collective action by advantaged groups. This literature, however, has overlooked intergroup meta-beliefs (MBs, i.e., beliefs about the outgroup's beliefs), which we argue are crucial, since solidarity inherently involves protesting for the outgroup. In the context of racial inequality in the U.S., we focused on three MBs White Americans could hold: responsibility, inactivity, and allyship. In two studies (N_total = 648), we found that inactive and responsible MBs predicted higher collective action tendencies among low White identifiers via guilt and obligation to act. Conversely, we found that both predicted lower collective action tendencies among high White identifiers, via perceived unfairness. Finally, we found that ally MB was positively associated with collective action tendencies, regardless of identification. We highlight the importance of the meta-perspective in understanding solidarity-based collective action, and discuss conceptual and practical implications of these findings.     

Reasons,impossibility and efficient steps: reply to Heuer

Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of what ‘efficient steps’ are, Heuer’s claim is consistent with my claim. I end by showing that Heuer fails to undermine the arguments I gave for my claim.     

With infinite utility,more needn't be better

Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss when assigning duties in circumstances where only a collective could perform some morally desirable action and no collective exists. But, I argue, we are not at a loss. This article outlines a new way of assigning duties over collective acts when there is no collective. Specifically, we should assign collectivization duties to individuals. These are individual duties to take steps towards forming a collective, which then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivization duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers.     

Pity for economically disadvantaged groups motivates donation and ally collective action intentions

We argue that pity can motivate collective action intentions toward groups that are both politically and economically deprived. We tested this connection in four online surveys and an experiment. In Study 1 (N = 1,007), pity for the Roma in Hungary predicted collective action intentions, which was replicated in Study 2 in connection with refugees in Germany (N = 191) and in Hungary (N = 563). Study 3 (N = 475) demonstrated that for not economically but politically disadvantaged groups (e.g., sexual minorities), pity was not a predictor of ally action. In an experiment (Study 4, N = 447), pity was just as strong a predictor of collective action intentions as outrage on behalf of an economically and politically disadvantaged outgroup. Pity can be a mobilizing emotion when it comes to groups that are both economically and politically disadvantaged; however, outrage remains more important in the absence of economic hardship.     

Concerning the resilience of Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument

Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no factor contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agent’s chance for being responsible for that action.     

Does witnessing gender discrimination predict women's collective action intentions for gender justice? Examining the moderating role of perceived female support

Previous research has indicated that witnessing gender discrimination may instigate women's participation in collective action for gender justice. However, relatively little is known about the role of perceived female support in motivating collective action among women who witness gender discrimination in public life. This study aims to analyse whether and when perceived support from feminist-minded women moderates the association between women's witnessing gender discrimination and their willingness to engage in collective action for gender justice. We argue that the association between witnessing gender discrimination and willingness to engage in collective action depends on the support women perceive from their female friends and family members. In studies of women in the U.S. (Study 1; N = 271) and Ukraine (Study 2; N = 256), witnessing gender discrimination predicted greater willingness to participate in collective action for gender justice, and this association was stronger when female support was perceived to be lower. Study 3 (N = 1,304) replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 with self-identified feminist women in Turkey. Our research offers novel insights regarding why perceived lack of female support may encourage women to engage in collective action for gender justice.     

Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability

Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga’s intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen’s and Plantinga’s intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed.     

Political distrust,perceived threat,and intentions to engage in normative and violent collective action: A mixed-methods study

In three studies, we examined the role of distrust and perceived threat in intentions to engage in normative and violent non-normative collective action. A field-based qualitative study of 35 pro-democracy protestors during the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-Extradition protests revealed that perceived threat to Hong Kong values alongside distrust of political institutions spurred collective action engagement and support for defensive violent collection action. In Study 2, a questionnaire (N = 639) testing pro-democracy action intentions demonstrated direct paths on both normative and violent collective action intentions from distrust and threat. In Study 3 (N = 133), experimental trust and threat manipulations demonstrated a significant association between distrust and threat on violent collective action intentions and acceptance, and a significant interaction on acceptance of violent collective action. Our results reveal the importance of distrust and threat in attitudinal support for, and engagement in, collective action and their role in transitioning from non-violent to violent collective action.     

Too great to act in solidarity: The negative relationship between collective narcissism and solidarity-based collective action

Three studies examined the association between narcissistic identification with one’s advantaged in-group and engagement in solidarity-based collective action. Drawing on theory and past research, a negative effect of collective narcissism on solidarity-based collective action was expected. A two-wave longitudinal study (N = 162) found that Polish participants’ narcissistic, but not secure, national identification decreased their willingness to engage in collective action in solidarity with refugees over time. A field study (N = 258) performed during a mass protest against a proposed abortion ban showed that men’s gender-based collective narcissism was a negative predictor of solidarity-based engagement (operationalized as protest behavior and collective action intentions) and this effect was mediated by lowered empathy for women. Finally, a web-based survey (N = 1,992) revealed that heterosexual/cisgender individuals’ collective narcissism was negatively associated with collective action intentions in support of LGBT rights and that this effect was sequentially mediated by increased intergroup anxiety and decreased empathy for LGBT people. Theoretical implications of the present findings, research limitations, and future directions are discussed.     

“Cannot” Implies “Not Ought”

I argue for a version of “ought” implies “can”. In particular, I argue that it is necessarily true that if an agent, S, ultima facie ought to do A at T’, then there is a time T* such that S can at T* do A at T’. In support of this principle, I have argued that without it, we cannot explain how it is that, in cases where agents cannot do the best thing, they often ought to do some alternative action – such as get help or do the promised action later; nor can we explain the phenomenon of necessary enablers or the phenomenon of more stringent prima facie obligations overriding less stringent ones in cases where the agent cannot fulfill both.     

Mentoring: Some ethical considerations

To counter confusion about the term ‘mentor’, and address concerns about the scarcity of mentoring, I argue for an “honorific” definition, according to which a mentor is virtuous like a saint or hero. Given the unbounded commitment of mentors, mentoring relationships must be voluntary. In contrast, the role of advisor can be specified, mandated, and monitored. I argue that departments and research groups have a moral responsibility to devise a system of roles and structures to meet graduate students’ and postdoctoral fellows’ needs for information and advice. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference sponsored by the National Science Foundation on Mentoring and Research Values: Students as Vital Human Resources, Chicago, March 1995.     

Explaining Normative Versus Nonnormative Action: The Role of Implicit Theories

The current research investigates what motivates people to engage in normative versus nonnormative action. Prior research has shown that different emotions lead to different types of action. We argue that these differing emotions are determined by a more basic characteristic, namely, implicit theories about whether groups and the world in general can change. We hypothesized that incremental theories (beliefs that groups/the world can change) would predict normative action, and entity theories (beliefs that groups/the world cannot change) as well as group identification would predict nonnormative action. We conducted a pilot in the context of protests against a government plan to relocate Bedouin villages in Israel and a main study during the Israeli social protests of the middle class. Results revealed three distinct pathways to collective action. First, incremental theories about the world predicted hope, which predicted normative action. Second, incremental theories about groups and group identification predicted anger, which also predicted normative collective action. Lastly, entity theories about groups predicted nonnormative collective action through hatred, but only for participants who were highly identified with the group. In sum, people who believed in the possibility of change supported normative action, whereas those who believed change was not possible supported nonnormative action.     

The Power of Political Déjà Vu: When Collective Action Becomes an Effort to Change the Future by Preventing the Return of the Past

This article examines the conditions under which political déjà vu (PDV), a perceived analogy between past and present societal-level traumatic events, can mobilize people to support system-changing collective action. We propose that individuals' perceptions of PDV can evolve both social identification with a group that sustains the victimized and disidentification with the perceived perpetrators. We further suggest that disidentification and identification can form two distinct psychological paths to collective action through the sequential effects of moral outrage and collective efficacy beliefs. We tested these ideas in a cross-sectional field study (N = 272) in the context of antigovernment protests over a missing activist in Argentina, a country with a legacy of enforced disappearances. The findings demonstrated that perceiving two events from different times as similar simultaneously predicted identifying as a supporter of the victimized and disidentifying with the perceived wrongdoer. Disidentification was found to predict collective action intentions through the sequential effect of collective efficacy beliefs and moral outrage, whereas the indirect effect of social identification was nonsignificant. Results provide an intriguing example of the effects of perceived PDV in social mobilization and extend our understanding of disidentification as a powerful predictor of collective action.     

独立预测作用,还是基础性影响？——价值观对集体行动的影响机制

为阐明价值观在集体行动参与中的地位和影响机制,研究者以利比亚事件为背景,针对现实和网络场域中不同程度的4类集体行动倾向,在天津市957名大学生中进行问卷调查研究,结果发现：价值观显著增加了低成本集体行动倾向解释率,并调节着情绪、工具性动机和社会认同对集体行动倾向的影响;中国人进行集体行动决策时具有集体主义理性计算特征;不同场域和程度的集体行动有其各自规律.结论：价值观在集体行动参与决策中是一种与社会认同类似的基础性变量.