Effects of Playing Violent Computer Games on Emotional Desensitization and Aggressive Behavior1

This study analyzed the effects of playing a violent computer game on emotional desensitization and aggressive behavior. College students (N = 58) were randomly assigned to play a violent game (VG) or a nonviolent game (NVG), and then were exposed to a set of emotional pictures. Participants' physiological responses were recorded, and the Self‐Assessment Manikin scale was used to assess affective valence and arousal while viewing the pictures. Participants were then asked to replay the game, after which aggressive behavior was measured. Participants' violent game habits (VGH) were also measured. We found that VG playing interacted with participants' VGH to influence aggression, and that self‐reported valence mediated this effect by lowering the feelings of pleasure and displeasure toward emotional stimuli.     

Eliciting mixed feelings with the paired-picture paradigm: A tribute to Kellogg (1915)

Can people experience mixed feelings; that is, concurrent experiences of pleasure and displeasure? Kellogg (1915) examined this question with alternating presentations of pleasant and unpleasant pictures. Although some participants reported mixed feelings, Kellogg's data were inconclusive. The present study used the paired-picture paradigm to examine this question more systematically. In addition, the nature of the positive and negative pictures was manipulated. Results show that positive pictures inhibit displeasure and negative pictures inhibit pleasure. Nevertheless, conflicting pairs elicit mixed feelings at low to moderate intensities. Furthermore, the strength of the inhibition effect and the intensity of mixed feelings varied with the nature of the positive and negative pictures. The results show that the paired-picture paradigm is a useful paradigm to study the relation between pleasure and displeasure experimentally.     

Pleasure,displeasure, and mixed feelings: Are semantic opposites mutually exclusive?

Are pleasure and displeasure opposite markers of a single dimension, or are pleasure and displeasure two separate feelings? The present article argues that the existing evidence proved inconclusive for four reasons: (a) assessment of affect in unspecified situations, (b) assessment of affect at one moment in time, (c) use of inappropriate statistics, and (d) lack of theoretical predictions. The present article presents a study in which affect was assessed before and after an induction of mild displeasure via unpleasant pictures. Furthermore, pleasure and displeasure ratings are compared to ratings of feeling hot and cold. Results indicate that hot and cold ratings represent opposite ends of a single hot-cold dimension. Pleasure ratings could not be represented along a single pleasure-displeasure dimension. Methodological implications for future research on the structure of affect are discussed.     

The Subjective Basis of Kant's Judgment of Taste

Kant claims that the basis of a judgment of taste is a merely subjective representation and that the only merely subjective representations are feelings of pleasure or displeasure. Commentators disagree over how to interpret this claim. Some take it to mean that judgments about the beauty of an object depend only on the state of the judging subject. Others argue instead that, for Kant, the pleasure we take in a beautiful object is best understood as a response to its qualities, and that, accordingly, feelings of pleasure or displeasure are no different from other representations, such as colors or smells. While I agree that the judgment of taste is best understood as asserting a claim about an object's qualities, I argue that the distinction Kant makes between feelings of pleasure or displeasure and other representations should not be ignored. I show that one's liking or disliking for an object is merely subjective in the sense that its significance depends on what one has made of oneself through one's aesthetic education. The judgment of taste, then, is merely subjective because one must first become the kind of person whose feelings have the right significance at the right time before one can determine whether an object's qualities make it beautiful.     

The content and structure of laypeople's concept of pleasure

Five studies were conducted to map the content and structure of laypeople's conceptions of pleasure. Instances of the pleasure concept collected in Study 1 consisted predominantly of objects, events or persons described as sources of pleasure. Content analysis suggested that the pleasure category, like emotional response categories, might be formed at an implicit level where various pleasure antecedents are grouped based on common phenomenological qualities of the affective experience. Studies 2 and 3a showed that the pleasure category possesses a graded structure and fuzzy boundaries. Results further revealed that, either when explicitly presented with labels (Study 3b) or left to their own implicit categories during a sorting task (Study 4), laypeople represented pleasure as a hierarchical concept in which differentiated pleasure types (i.e., intellectual, emotional, social and physical) were subsumed under a higher level unitary form of pleasure. In this structure, unitary and differentiated pleasures shared a set of common affective qualities but were also distinguishable by unique and distinctive affective characteristics (Study 5). Ties to prior theories of pleasure and implications for decision making and behavioural research are discussed.     

Critique,Finitude and the Importance of Susceptibility: A Rossian Approach to Interpreting Kant on Pleasure

In this paper, I take Philip Rossi’s robust interpretation of critique as an interpretive guide for thinking generally about how to interpret Kant’s texts. I reflect first upon what might appear to be a minor technical issue: how best to translate the term Fähigheit when Kant utilizes it in reference to the human experience of pleasure and displeasure. Reflection upon this technical issue will, however, end up being a case study in how important it is when we are interpreting Kant’s texts to have Rossi’s focus on human finitude in the background. The terrain for these reflections on human finitude will be the realm of feelings of pleasure and displeasure. And the result will be that, counter to recent interpreters, like Elizondo (2014), who have suggested that Kant could welcome a thoroughly active conception of rational feeling, we must instead, as guided by Kant’s commitment to human finitude (and really his commitment to Transcendental Idealism itself), remember that every feeling for Kant—even the most rational of feelings, like the moral feeling of respect, or the pleasure he notes that we take in the proper functioning of one’s virtuous rational self—must be understood within the purview and constraints of the finite and sensibly-affected human being. I hope, then, that this brief reflection can be taken as one small piece of that larger story Rossi so aptly describes in his book, the story which answers the question of “What is critique?” in a way that insists upon but also simultaneously celebrates the centrality of finitude in human existence.

     

Offset control during recurrent 20% carbon dioxide-enriched air induction: relation to individual difference variables

Although control over aversive events maintains a central role in contemporary models of anxiety pathology, particularly panic disorder, there is little understanding about the emotional consequences of specific types of control processes. In the present study, offset control over 8 20% carbon dioxide-enriched air administrations was experimentally manipulated in a large nonclinical population (n = 96) varying in anxiety sensitivity (high or low) and gender. Dependent measures included self-reported anxiety, affective reports of valence, arousal, emotional control, and physiological indices of heart rate and skin conductance. High anxiety-sensitive participants who lacked offset control reported significantly greater elevations in self-reported anxiety, emotional displeasure, arousal, and dyscontrol relative to their yoked counterparts with offset control. In contrast, low anxiety-sensitive individuals responded with similar levels of cognitive and affective distress regardless of the offset control manipulation. Although the provocation procedure reliably produced bodily arousal relative to baseline, at a physiological level of analysis, no significant differences emerged across conditions. These findings are discussed in relation to offset control during recurrent interoceptive arousal, with implications for better understanding anxiety about abrupt bodily sensations.     

Kant on animal and human pleasure

Feeling, for any animal, is a faculty of comparing objects or representations with regard to whether they promote its vital powers (pleasure) or hinder them (displeasure). But whereas these comparisons presuppose a species-concept in non-rational animals, nature has not equipped the human being with a universal principle or life-form that would determine what agrees or disagrees with it. As humans, we must determine our mode of life for ourselves. Contrary to other interpretations, I argue that this places the human capacity for pleasure and displeasure outside of nature and in a realm of spirit.     

Individual differences in the relationship between pleasure and arousal

The two fundamental dimensions assumed to underlie emotional experience—pleasure and arousal—are considered to be independent across individuals. We present evidence from an experience sampling study demonstrating that this independence does not necessarily hold when considering the affective experiences of a single individual. Participants (N = 80) reported how they were feeling in terms of pleasure and arousal nine times a day for seven days. The data showed that, although on average pleasure and arousal were independent, within-person pleasure–arousal associations substantially varied and ranged from strongly positive to strongly negative. This finding demonstrates that pleasant/unpleasant feelings usually co-occur with high arousal for some (reflecting joy/stress), but with low arousal for others (reflecting relaxation/sadness) and that persons differ in whether arousal is usually pleasant or unpleasant. These differences were found to be related to dispositional reward responsiveness, with high reward responsive individuals being characterized by a positive relation between pleasure and arousal and vice versa.     

Rational suicide: a test of the prescriptions of Epicurus concerning suicide

The purpose of this research was to test the hypothesis that the individual who believes death is the end and who expects to experience more displeasure than pleasure over the remainder of his life will choose suicide. College students (N = 272) completed questionnaires measuring their beliefs about after-life, expectations of pleasure and displeasure should certain negative events happen to them, and expectations of suicide should these negative events happen to them. Support was not found for the hypothesis. The students who believed that death was the end stated that they would choose to live even if negative events promised them a life of greater displeasure than pleasure.     

Opponent processes in human emotions? An experimental investigation of hedonic contrast and affective interactions

Three hypotheses of opponent process theory (e.g., Solomon, 1980) were examined: (1) Following the removal of emotionally charged stimuli, an emotional response opposite in hedonic tone to the initial affective response will occur; (2) this response occurs as a reaction to the initial affective response (and is not the result of perceptual processes or reinterpretations of the situation); and (3) when opponent affective processes cooccur, they tend to cancel each other's effects.Individuals were led to associate happiness and sadness with stimuli through hypnotic inductions; other stimuli were conditioned to the emotional responses that followed the offset of these stimuli. On both physiological and self-report measures, affective afterreactions were observed following the termination of a stimulus eliciting happiness in a context where this result could not be attributed to individuals' perceptions of the likelihood of future pleasant events or to changes in the individuals' adaptation levels. In agreement with previous findings, no afterreaction following the termination of a stimulus eliciting sadness was observed. Evidence that affective processes interact was also obtained. When opponent affective processes cooccur, they appear to interact and cancel. When two nonopponent affective processes are elicited simultaneously, they appear to add or average. This result supports the assumption, common to many theories of emotion, that affective processes interact to determine individuals' observed emotional states.It is my pleasure to thank Patricia Barchas, Gordon Bower, Nelson Donegan, Mary Rothbart, Roger Shepard, and Philip Zimbardo for their advice and encouragement, and to express a special thanks to Phoebe Ellsworth for her invaluable assistance.     

Extrinsic attitudinal pleasure

I argue for an alternative interpretation of some of the examples Fred Feldman uses to establish his theory of happiness. According to Feldman, the examples show that certain utterances of the form ??S is pleased/glad that P?? and ??S is displeased/sad that P?? should be interpreted as expressions of extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and hence must be excluded from the aggregative sum of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure that constitutes happiness. I develop a new interpretation of Feldman??s examples. My interpretation is plausible in its own right. Moreover, it is significant within the context of the debate. It allows the attitudinal hedonist to preserve the initial understanding of happiness that Feldman believes is open to counterexample: that happiness is the sum of attitudinal pleasure minus attitudinal displeasure and that all attitudinal pleasure and displeasure counts equally in the aggregation that constitutes happiness.     

On Lions and Adolescents: Affective Temperaments and the Influence of Negative Stimuli on Memory

The present study investigated the relation between reaction to negative stimuli and memory for stimuli. The relation was further investigated using as a framework individuals’ affective temperaments (AFTs). Eighty adolescents participated in the study. The AFTs are based on selfreported affect and categorizes individuals in four temperaments: self-actualizing, high affective, low affective and self-destructive. Reaction to negative stimuli was measured by interpretation of specific words in a short story. Two days later, participants were presented with a list of words and asked which of them were present in the short story. Individuals’ AFTs were expected to predict the promotion of pleasure or the prevention of displeasure. On a general level, reaction to negative stimuli predicted memory for negative, positive and neutral words. At an individual level, self-actualizers and high affectives’ negative reaction predicted the memory of positive words (i.e., promotion). In contrast, low affectives’ negative and positive reaction predicted the memory of neutral words (i.e., prevention).     

The regulatory benefits of high levels of affect perception accuracy: A process analysis of reactions to stressors in daily life

Individuals attuned to affective signals from the environment may possess an advantage in the emotion-regulation realm. In two studies (total n = 151), individual differences in affective perception accuracy were assessed in an objective, performance-based manner. Subsequently, the same individuals completed daily diary protocols in which daily stressor levels were reported as well as problematic states shown to be stress-reactive in previous studies. In both studies, individual differences in affect perception accuracy interacted with daily stressor levels to predict the problematic outcomes. Daily stressors precipitated problematic reactions-whether depressive feelings (Study 1) or somatic symptoms (Study 2)-at low levels of affect perception accuracy, but did not do so at high levels of affect perception accuracy. The findings support a regulatory view of such perceptual abilities. Implications for understanding emotion regulation processes, emotional intelligence, and individual differences in reactivity are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Beyond pleasure: emotion activity affects the relationship between attitudes and behavior

The research examined an additional proposed moderator of the attitude-behavior relationship: the activity level of emotions associated with an attitude object. In Experiment 1, participants who self-generated active rather than passive emotions as being associated with gay men displayed greater attitude-behavior consistency in hiring recommendations for a gay job applicant, as did participants who rated active rather than passive experimenter-provided emotions as being associated with gay men. In Experiment 2, participants who were instructed to associate active rather than passive emotions with gay men subsequently displayed greater attitude-behavior consistency in similar hiring recommendations. It is suggested that future research on the affective component of attitudes might benefit from going beyond consideration of whether the associated emotions entail displeasure or pleasure.     

Self-reported tolerance influences prefrontal cortex hemodynamics and affective responses

The relationship between cognitive and sensory processes in the brain contributes to the regulation of affective responses (pleasure–displeasure). Exercise can be used to manipulate sensory processes (by increasing physiological demand) in order to examine the role of dispositional traits that may influence an individual’s ability to cognitively regulate these responses. With the use of near infrared spectroscopy, in this study we examined the influence of self-reported tolerance upon prefrontal cortex (PFC) hemodynamics and affective responses. The hemodynamic response was measured in individuals with high or low tolerance during an incremental exercise test. Sensory manipulation was standardized against metabolic processes (ventilatory threshold [VT] and respiratory compensation point [RCP]), and affective responses were recorded. The results showed that the high-tolerance group displayed a larger hemodynamic response within the right PFC above VT (which increased above RCP). The low-tolerance group showed a larger hemodynamic response within the left PFC above VT. The high-tolerance group reported a more positive/less negative affective response above VT. These findings provide direct neurophysiological evidence of differential hemodynamic responses within the PFC that are associated with tolerance in the presence of increased physiological demands. This study supports the role of dispositional traits and previous theorizing into the underlying mechanisms (cognitive vs. sensory processes) of affective responses.     

The role of self-evaluation and envy in schadenfreude

In this article we address why and when people feel schadenfreude (pleasure at the misfortunes of others) in both interpersonal and intergroup contexts. Using findings from our own research programmes we show that schadenfreude is intensified when people are chronically or momentarily threatened in their self-worth, whereas it is attenuated when their self-evaluation is boosted; that malicious envy, but not benign envy, intensifies pleasure at the misfortunes of others; that these emotional responses are manifested in intergroup contexts via the same mechanisms; and that mere stereotypes, in the absence of any interaction or overt competition, are sufficient to elicit schadenfreude via such mechanisms. Together, these findings suggest that self-evaluation and envy both play an important role in evoking schadenfreude; people feel pleasure at the misfortunes of others when these misfortunes provide them with social comparisons that enhance their feelings of self-worth or remove the basis for painful feelings of envy.     

Contradictions of emotion in schizophrenia

This paper considers contradictory features of emotional or affective experience and expression in schizophrenia in light of the “Kretschmerian paradox”—the fact that schizophrenia-spectrum patients can simultaneously experience both exaggerated and diminished levels of affective response. An attempt is made to explain the paradox and explore its implications. Recent research on emotion in schizophrenia is reviewed, including subjective reports, psychophysiological measures of arousal or activation, and behavioural measures, focusing on flat-affect and negative-symptom patients. After discussing relevant concepts and vocabulary of emotion (“affect”, “emotion”, “mood”, “feelings”, the “passions”), the need for a phenomenological approach focusing on subjective experience is proposed. Four modes of nonparanoid experience in schizophrenia are discussed: Bodily Alienation, Disengagement, Unworlding, and Subjectivisation. Each mode involves withdrawal from functional contexts—temporal, practical, and interpersonal—normally associated with emotional reactivity and expression; each may be accompanied by forms of non-emotional affectivity no less intense than the emotions they replace. Possible relationships between psychophysiological measures, expressive behaviour, and subjective emotional or affective response are considered.     

Effects of emotional state on sexual desire and sexual dysfunction

The present study explored effects of emotional states on sexual desire and dysfunction. Three basic emotion dimensions, pleasure-displeasure, arousal-nonarousal, and dominance-submissiveness, served as the independent factors. Factor analysis of a sexual desire and problems questionnaire yielded a single factor with sexual desire as one pole and sexual problems as the opposite pole. The resulting sexual desire scale had a KR-20 reliability coefficient of .98 and constituted a highly homogeneous dependent measure. Sexual desire was greater when subjects felt pleasure rather than displeasure, unaroused rather than aroused, and dominant rather than submissive. Desire increased with increasing arousal in pleasant states and decreased with increasing arousal in unpleasant states (Pleasure × Arousal interaction). Desire increased with increasing dominance in pleasant states and decreased with increasing dominance in unpleasant states (Pleasure × Dominance interaction). In unaroused states, submissiveness attenuated the polarization of sexual desire as a function of pleasure-displeasure (Pleasure × Arousal × Dominance interaction). The highest levels of sexual desire and freedom from sexual problems were associated with pleasant and dominant feelings (e.g., admired and vigorous or relaxed and leisurely); the lowest levels were reported for unpleasant and aroused feelings (e.g., hostile and hateful or pained and embarrassed). Except for the uniformly greater sexual desire of males than of females across all conditions, all findings were applicable equally to the two sexes.     

Motivated prediction of future feelings: effects of negative mood and mood orientation on affective forecasts

This article examines the role of motivational factors in affective forecasting. The primary hypothesis was that people predict positive emotional reactions to future events when they are motivated to enhance their current feelings. Three experiments manipulated participants' moods (negative vs. neutral) and orientation toward their moods (reflective vs. ruminative) and then assessed the positivity of their affective predictions for future events. As hypothesized, when participants adopted a reflective orientation, and thus should have been motivated to engage in mood-regulation processes, they predicted more positive feelings in the negative than in the neutral mood condition. This pattern of mood-incongruent affective prediction was not exhibited when participants adopted a ruminative orientation. Additionally, within the negative mood condition, generating affective forecasts had a more positive emotional impact on reflectors than on ruminators. The findings suggest that affective predictions are sometimes driven by mood-regulatory motives.