Executive Function in Young Children and Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): Evidence From a Nonverbal Dimensional Change Card Sort Task

In this article the authors compared chimpanzees’ executive function with that of children. They developed a nonverbal dimensional change card sorting task, which indexed the development of executive function. Three pairs of mother and offspring chimpanzees and 30 typically developed 5-year-old children were presented with 2 target stimuli and a test stimulus comprising 2 dimensions (size and shape) on a display; they were required to sort the test stimulus according to 1 dimension (e.g., shape). After 5 consecutive correct trials, the participants had to sort the test stimulus according to the other dimension (e.g., size). The results showed that the chimpanzees often failed to sort the test stimuli according to the first and reversed dimensions. On the other hand, the children were correctly able to use both dimensions. These results indicate that chimpanzees may have less developed executive skills than children.     

Disentangling dimensions in the dimensional change card-sorting task

The dimensional change card-sorting task (DCCS task) is frequently used to assess young children's executive abilities. However, the source of children's difficulty with this task is still under debate. In the standard DCCS task, children have to sort, for example, test cards with a red cherry or a blue banana into two boxes marked with target cards showing a blue cherry and a red banana. Typically, 3-year-olds have severe problems switching from sorting by one dimension (e.g. color) to sorting by the other dimension (e.g. shape). Three experiments with 3- to 4-year-olds showed that separating the two dimensions as properties of a single object, and having them characterize two different objects (e.g. by displaying an outline of a cherry next to a red filled circle on the card) improves performance considerably. Results are discussed in relation to a number of alternative explanations for 3-year-olds' difficulty with the DCCS task.     

Bottom-up and top-down dynamics in young children's executive function: Labels aid 3-year-olds’ performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sort

Executive function (EF) improves between the ages of 3 and 5 and has been assessed reliably using the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS), a task in which children first sort bivalent cards by one dimension (e.g., shape) and then are instructed to sort by a different dimension (e.g., color). Three-year-olds typically perseverate on the pre-switch dimension, whereas 5-year-olds switch flexibly. Labeling task stimuli can facilitate EF performance (0110 and 0060), but the nature of this effect is unclear. In 3 experiments we examined 2 hypotheses deriving from different theoretical perspectives: first, that labels facilitate performance in a more bottom-up fashion, by biasing attention to relevant task rules (Kirkham et al., 2003); and second, that labels aid performance in a more top-down fashion by prompting reflection and an understanding of the hierarchical nature of the task (Zelazo, 2004). Children performed better on the DCCS when labels referred to the relevant sorting dimension (Experiment 1). This was a function of the content of the labels rather than the change in auditory signal across phases (Experiment 2). Furthermore, labeling the opposite dimension only did not have a symmetrically negative effect on performance (Experiment 3). Together, these results suggest external, verbal labels bias children to attend to task-relevant information, likely through interaction with emerging top-down, endogenous control.     

Sources of Cognitive Inflexibility in Set-Shifting Tasks: Insights Into Developmental Theories From Adult Data

Two experiments examined processes underlying cognitive inflexibility in set-shifting tasks typically used to assess the development of executive function in children. Adult participants performed a Flexible Item Selection Task (FIST) that requires shifting from categorizing by one dimension (e.g., color) to categorizing by a second orthogonal dimension (e.g., shape). The experiments showed performance of the FIST involves suppression of the representation of the ignored dimension; response times for selecting a target object in an oddity task immediately following were slower when the oddity target was the previously ignored stimulus of the FIST. However, proactive interference from the previously relevant stimulus dimension also impaired responding. The results are discussed with respect to two prominent theories of the source of difficulty for children and adults on dimensional shifting tasks: attentional inertia and negative priming. In contrast to prior work emphasizing one process over the other, the findings indicate that difficulty in the FIST, and by extension other set-shifting tasks, can be attributed to both the need to shift away from the previously attended representation (attentional inertia) and the need to shift to the previously ignored representation (negative priming). Results are discussed in relation to theoretical explanations for cognitive inflexibility in adults and children.     

The dimensional arrow: Agreement in directional mapping of dimensions among Mandarin Chinese- and English-speakers

We present evidence that English- and Mandarin-speakers agree about how to map dimensions (e.g., size and clarity) to vertical space and that they do so in a directional way. We first developed visual stimuli for four dimensions—size, clarity, complexity, and darkness—and in each case we varied the stimuli to express a range of the dimension (e.g., there were five total items expressing the range covering big, medium, and small). In our study, English- and Mandarin-speakers mapped these stimuli to an unlabelled vertical scale. Most people mapped dimensional endpoints in similar ways; using size as a standard, we found that the majority of participants mapped the clearest, most complex, and darkest items to the same end of the vertical scale as they mapped the biggest items. This indicates that all four dimensions have a weighted or unmarked end (i.e., all are directional or polar). The strong similarities in polarity across language groups contrasted with group differences on a lexical task, for which there was little cross-linguistic agreement about which comparative words to use to describe stimulus pairs (e.g., “bigger” vs. “smaller”). Thus, we found no evidence in this study that the perception of these dimensions is influenced by language.     

Physical and cognitive dimensions in stimulus comparison

Two experiments were carried out using a same-different task with sets of four stimuli varying orthogonally in three dimensions. Sameness was defined by each of the three dimensions in turn, as well as by physical identity. Two types of dimensions, physical and cognitive, were studied. In Experiment 1, the numerals 6, 10, VI, and X, which vary in Length, System, and Name, were used. With simultaneous presentation, order of difficulty was from the physical dimension of Length to the cognitive dimension of Name. While overall difficulty was related to dimensional discriminability, internal evidence suggested that Name was not a dimension in the same sense as Length is, and that some stimulus pairs were simply easier to process than others, regardless of the response required (e.g., short stimulus pairs and Arabic numerals). With sequential presentation, Name was processed as fast as System, due largely to the fact that much faster responding occurred when an Arabic numeral was the second stimulus. Thus, with sequential presentation, Name provides a processing mechanism not provided by physical dimensions. In Experiment 2, the numerals 3, 4, 6, and 7, which vary in Magnitude, Oddness, and Curvilinearity, were used. The cognitive dimension of Magnitude was pro cessed most rapidly, and numerical distance between pairs of numbers dominated the results for “same” responses, regardless of the sameness rule used. Again, evidence was found for fast processing of some stimulus pairs (e.g., 3 4), regardless of the response required. Overall, these experiments are interpreted as indicating that cognitive factors such as stimulus familiarity may override aspects of physical discriminability with many dimensions and stimuli, that, even though a cognitive dimension can be used to generate a logically proper set of stimuli, it does not necessarily act as other, more physical dimensions do, and that clarification of the functional role of a dimension is more important than attempts to locate stages.     

The effects of stimulus type,training, and chronological age on children's identification and recoding of multidimensional stimuli

Kindergarten and second-grade children (75 and 99 months of age, respectively) were first taught that the two stimuli within each of four pairs of multidimentional stimuli differed with respect to their values on every one of three bivalued dimensions: color, size, and form. Each of the eight stimuli was then presented twice, one at a time, and the child was asked either to find its duplicate (eight encoding trials) or to find its complementary mate (eight recoding trials) among the complete set of eight stimuli. Next, each of the eight stimulus compounds was presented twice as a display stimulus for 5 sec and, after a delay of 10 to 15 sec, the child was asked to find the display stimulus (eight trials of encoding plus memory) or its complement (eight trials of recoding plus memory) among the complete set. The stimuli for half the children in each age group were standard unitary compounds (e.g., a large red circle, a small blue square, etc.) and for the other half they were partitioned stimuli with their dimensional values spatially separated (e.g., large arrow, circle outline, and patch of color). Half of the children in each of these subgroups were given a basic pretraining, and the other half received extended pretraining, in recoding the stimulus attributes. The results indicated that unitary stimuli were easier to encode but the partitioned stimuli were easier to recode, that recoding was much more difficult than encoding, that extended training improved recoding performance, and that second graders were slightly better at encoding and much better at recoding than the kindergarten children. The patterns of performance on the tasks involving memory were similar to those just described. The results were discussed in terms of children's abilities to analyze multidimensional stimuli into their dimensional components.     

Processing of perceptual information is more robust than processing of conceptual information in preschool-age children: evidence from costs of switching

Is processing of conceptual information as robust as processing of perceptual information early in development? Existing empirical evidence is insufficient to answer this question. To examine this issue, 3- to 5-year-old children were presented with a flexible categorization task, in which target items (e.g., an open red umbrella) shared category membership with one test item (e.g., a folded umbrella) and perceptual characteristics with another test item (e.g., a red mushroom). Participants were instructed to either categorize stimuli by the same dimension (i.e., perceptual similarity or category membership) in both phases of the task, or switch from categorizing by one dimension to categorizing by the other dimension. Results pointed to a strong asymmetry in switch costs: conceptual switch costs were higher than perceptual switch costs. These results suggest that processing of perceptual information remains more robust than processing of conceptual information at least until 5 years of age.     

The way irrelevant dimensions are processed depends on what they overlap with: The case of Stroop- and Simon-like stimuli

Summary According to the dimensional-overlap model (Kornblum, 1992), irrelevant dimensions that overlap with a stimulus dimension (e. g., Stroop-type stimuli) are processed by a different stage than those that overlap with the response (e. g., Simon-type stimuli). We show that the effects of these two types of overlap are additive, thus supporting the model's hypothesis. We also show that the time course of facilitation and interference is different for these two types of overlap.     

Improving postswitch performance in the dimensional change card-sorting task: the importance of the switch and of pretraining by redescribing the test cards

The dimensional change card-sorting task (DCCS) is used to assess the executive abilities of young children. Typically, 3-year-olds have difficulty in performing this task. However, the exact nature of this difficulty is still being debated. In the standard DCCS, children need to sort, for example, test cards with a blue flower or a red car into two boxes marked with the target cards. The 3-year-olds commonly have pronounced difficulty in switching from one sorting criterion (e.g., color) to another (e.g., shape). Here two experiments with 3-year-olds showed that making the transition between the sorting criteria more distinct improved performance significantly. This was achieved by taking away the target cards for a brief time period, asking a question irrelevant to the task, and pretraining the children by redescribing the test cards.     

The free classification of analyzable and unanalyzable stimuli

The free classification of two-dimensional analyzable and unanalyzable stimuli was investigated. Analyzable stimuli consist of dimensions which are distinct and phenomenally separable (e.g., colored geometric forms); unanalyzable stimuli consist of two dimensions which are not distinct, not phenomenally separable, and which are probably perceived as a unitary dimension (e.g., Munsell colors). In the first experiment, Ss judged the similarity between each stimulus pair for both types of stimuli. The results replicated previous work in showing that the city-block metric was appropriate for the analyzable stimuli and that the euclidean metric was appropriate for unanalyzable stimuli. In the second experiment, Ss classified sets of analyzable and unanalyzable stimuli into two or three groups in any way they wished. For analyzable stimuli, classification was based on the dimensional structure-stimuli which alter the dimensional structure by defining another dimension change classification. For unanalyzable stimuli, classification was based on the similarity structure-stimuli which alter the similarity structure change classification.     

Are crossmodal correspondences relative or absolute? Sequential effects on speeded classification

Crossmodal correspondences have often been demonstrated using congruency effects between pairs of stimuli in different sensory modalities that vary along separate dimensions. To date, however, it is still unclear the extent to which these correspondences are relative versus absolute in nature: that is, whether they result from pre-defined values that rigidly link the two dimensions or rather result from flexible values related to the previous occurrence of the crossmodal stimuli. Here, we investigated this issue in a speeded classification task featuring the correspondence between auditory pitch and visual size (e.g., congruent correspondence between high pitch/small disc and low pitch/large disc). Participants classified the size of the visual stimuli (large vs. small) while hearing concurrent high- or low-pitched task-irrelevant sounds. On some trials, visual stimuli were paired instead with “intermediate” pitch, that could be interpreted differently according to the auditory stimulus on the preceding trial (i.e., as “lower” following the presentation of a high pitch tone, but as “higher” following the presentation of a low pitch tone). Performance on sequence-congruent trials (e.g., when a small disc paired with the intermediate-pitched tone was preceded by a low pitch tone) was compared to sequence-incongruent trials (e.g., when a small disc paired with the intermediate-pitch tone was by a high-pitched tone). The results revealed faster classification responses on sequence-congruent than on sequence-incongruent trials. This demonstrates that the effect of the pitch/size correspondence is relative in nature, and subjected to trial-by-trial interpretation of the stimulus pair.     

Space, object, and task selection

Within the field of selective attention, two separate literatures have developed, one examining the effect of selection of objects and another examining the effect of selection of features. The present study bridged these two traditions by examining the compatibility effects generated by two features of attended and unattended nontarget (foil) stimuli. On each trial, participants determined either the identity or the orientation of a visual stimulus. Spatial attention was controlled using cues (presented prior to the target frame) designed to involuntarily capture attention. We independently manipulated the stimulus dimension the participants prepared for and the stimulus dimension on which they actually executed the task. Preparation had little influence on the magnitude of compatibility effects from foil stimuli. For attended stimuli, the stimulus dimension used in executing the task produced large compatibility effects, regardless of whether that dimension was prepared. These and other compatibility effects (e.g., Stroop effects) are discussed in relation to an integrative model of attentional selection. The key assumptions are that (1) selection occurs at three distinct levels (space, object, and task), (2) spatial attention leads to semantic processing of all dimensions, and (3) features do not automatically activate responses unless that object is selected for action.     

The nonindependence of stimulus properties in human category learning

Typically, models of category learning are verified through behavioral experiments with stimuli consisting of putatively independent dimensions such as shape, size, and color. The assumption of independence is critical in both the design of behavioral experiments and the development of models and theories of learning. Using the standard classification learning paradigm and a common stimulus set, the present work demonstrates that the assumption of independence is unwarranted. Systematic relations span stimulus dimensions and govern learning performance. For example, shape is not independent of size and color, because humans quantify size and color over shape when shape is relevant to the categorization. This quantification is reflected in natural language use (e.g., "blue triangle" as opposed to "triangle and blue"). In this example, color and size are predicates and shape is the argument. Across four experiments, the difficulty of mastering a classification rule can be predicted by the number of predicates that must be unbound in order to free rule-relevant stimulus dimensions.     

What meaning means for same and different: Analogical reasoning in humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Thus far, language- and token-trained apes (e.g., D. Premack, 1976; R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In this study, the authors examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent on a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli.     

Perceptual primacy of dimensions: support for a model of dimensional interaction

Do Ss always process multidimensional stimuli according to psychologically primary dimensions? Our hypothesis is that they do: Primary dimensions provide one component of a new model of dimensional interaction, a model that distinguishes information processed at the level of attributes from information processed at the level of the stimulus. By using sound stimuli created from the dimensions pitch-loudness (Experiments 1 and 2), pitch-timbre (Experiment 3), and loudness-timbre (Experiment 4), we tested performance in selective- and divided-attention tasks at each of three orientations of axes: 0 degrees, 22.5 degrees, and 45 degrees. Each experiment revealed strong evidence of primacy: As axes rotated from 0 degrees to 45 degrees, selective attention deteriorated, but divided attention improved, producing a distinct pattern of convergence. Each experiment also revealed effects of congruity: Attributes from corresponding poles of a dimension (e.g., high pitch and loud) were classified faster than those from noncorresponding poles. The results fit well with our new conception but are inconsistent with other current models of dimensional interaction.     

Developmental trends in children's component selection

A new method is introduced for assessing children's component selection—i.e., the disposition to attend to a single feature of multifaceted stimuli. Eight-year-old children were found to exercise component selection to a lesser degree than 4-year-olds; while children at both age levels attended primarily to one stimulus component (shape), the older children showed a moderate amount of attention to a secondary redundant feature (color) as well. However, a comparable age difference in attention deployment was not observed when a single stimulus dimension (shape) was “relevant” in two variant tasks. These results imply a developmentally increasing ability to distinguish between conditions in which attending to redundant stimulus information can and cannot be useful. That this ability undergoes little further development beyond age 8 was suggested in a second experiment with 8- and 12-year-olds in which the three tasks produced relatively similar developmental trends in performance.     

Latencies to name one of three stimulus dimensions: A study of probability effects and dimension integrality

Following each of 400 stimuli that varied according to three binary dimensions (location, color, and shape), subjects named the value of one particular dimension as quickly as possible. Each stimulus appeared on the “left” and “right” side of a screen (location dimension), and was a “red” or “green” triangle (color dimension) with apex oriented “up” or “down” (shape dimension). The alternatives of each dimension varied according to different probability distributions (90/10, 70/30, or 50/50), and three schedule conditions were contrived so that each distribution occurred once for each dimension. Nine groups of 10 subjects each defined the factorial of 3 (response conditions: identify location, color, or shape) by 3 (schedule conditions: 90 left/70 red/50 down, 70 left/50 red/90 down, or 50 left/90 red/70 down). Latencies to identify the shape dimension were influenced reliably by the probabilities of both response-relevant and response-irrelevant stimuli. Shape probabilities did not affect latencies to identify location of color, but these latencies were significantly influenced by both color and location probabilities. Results are discussed with reference to the locus of the stimulus probability effect and dimensional integrality.     

Children perseverate to a human's actions but not to a robot's actions

Previous research has shown that young children commit perseverative errors from their observation of another person's actions. The present study examined how social observation would lead children to perseverative tendencies, using a robot. In Experiment 1, preschoolers watched either a human model or a robot sorting cards according to one dimension (e.g. shape), after which they were asked to sort according to a different dimension (e.g. colour). The results showed that children's behaviours in the task were significantly influenced by the human model's actions but not by the robot's actions. Experiment 2 excluded the possibility that children's behaviours were not affected by the robot's actions because they did not observe its actions. We concluded that children's perseverative errors from social observation resulted, in part, from their socio-cognitive ability.     

Dimensional dominance and stimulus discriminability.

The relationship between the discriminability of scaling stimuli and assessed dimensional dominance was investigated in three studies. Sixty kindergarten children were assessed using a psychophysical scaling method to determine JND values for the size, brightness, and orientation dimensions. Thirty of the same subjects were then assessed for dimensional dominance using stimuli of two levels of known discriminability, based on the obtained JND values. In a third experiment, the remaining 30 subjects were assessed for dimensional dominance using stimuli that systematically emphasized the values of one dimension relative to the other two dimensions, again based on obtained JND values.The results indicated that (1) kindergarten children were able to perform consistently during psychophysical scaling, and there was little variability between children in their judgments of stimuli, (2) the overall level of discriminability affects dimensional dominance scaling behavior, with subjects more likely to exhibit dominance for one dimension when all the values of scaling stimuli are high in discriminability, and (3) some support for the hypothesis that dimensional dominance scaling behavior can be manipulated by manipulating the relative discriminability of scaling stimuli was found, though the trend was not clear.The relative discriminability of scaling stimuli appears to have some effects on dimensional dominance scaling behavior of young children. However, some pre-experimental bias to attend to a particular dimension seems to remain even when the values of all dimensions present are of equal and known discriminability. Dimensional dominance is a function of an interaction between discriminability of scaling stimuli and the experiential bias or perceptual set of the subject.