Attribute Framing and Goal Framing Effects in Health Decisions

Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (LSG, 1998) have distinguished among three types of framing—risky choice, attribute, and goal framing—to reconcile conflicting findings in the literature. In the research reported here, we focus on attribute and goal framing. LSG propose that positive frames should be more effective than negative frames in the context of attribute framing, and negative frames should be more effective than positive frames in the context of goal framing. We test this framework by manipulating frame valence (positive vs negative) and frame type (attribute vs goal) in a unified context with common procedures. We also argue that the nature of effects in a goal-framing context may depend on the extent to which the research topic has “intrinsic self-relevance” to the population. In the context of medical decision making, we operationalize low intrinsic self-relevance by using student subjects and high intrinsic self-relevance by using patients. As expected, we find complete support for the LSG framework under low intrinsic self-relevance and modified support for the LSG framework under high intrinsic self-relevance. Overall, our research appears to confirm and extend the LSG framework.     

Multiple Framing: Verbal,Facial, and Vocal Cues in Risky Choice

Verbal framing effects have been widely studied, but little is known about how people react to multiple framing cues in risk communication, where verbal messages are often accompanied by facial and vocal cues. We examined joint and differential effects of verbal, facial, and vocal framing on risk preference in hypothetical monetary and life–death situations. In the multiple framing condition with the factorial design (2 verbal frames × 2 vocal tones × 4 basic facial expressions × 2 task domains), each scenario was presented auditorily with a written message on a photo of the messenger's face. Compared with verbal framing effects resulting in preference reversal, multiple frames made risky choice more consistent and shifted risk preference without reversal. Moreover, a positive tone of voice increased risk‐seeking preference in women. When the valence of facial and vocal cues was incongruent with verbal frame, verbal framing effects were significant. In contrast, when the affect cues were congruent with verbal frame, framing effects disappeared. These results suggest that verbal framing is given higher priority when other affect cues are incongruent. Further analysis revealed that participants were more risk‐averse when positive affect cues (positive tone or facial expressions) were congruently paired with a positive verbal frame whereas participants were more risk‐seeking when positive affect cues were incongruent with the verbal frame. In contrast, for negative affect cues, congruency promoted risk‐seeking tendency whereas incongruency increased risk‐aversion. Overall, the results show that facial and vocal cues interact with verbal framing and significantly affect risk communication. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐framing of risky choice

Previous research on framing effects has largely focused on how choice information framed by external sources influences the response of a decision maker. This research examined how decision makers framed choice options and how the hedonic tone of self‐framing influenced their risk preference. By using pie charts and a complementary sentence‐completion task in Experiment 1, participants were able to interpret and frame the expected choice outcomes themselves before making a choice between a sure option and a gamble in either a life–death or a monetary problem. Each of these self‐frames (phrases) was then rated by a group of independent judges in terms of its hedonic tone. The hedonic tone of self‐frames was mostly positive and was more positive in the life–death than the monetary context, suggesting a motivational function of self‐framing. However, positive outcomes were still more likely to be framed positively than negative outcomes. In Experiment 2, choice outcomes were depicted with a whole‐pie chart instead of a pie slice in order to emphasize positive and negative outcomes equally. The results showed that the hedonic tone of self‐framing was still largely positive and more positive in the life domain than the monetary domain. However, compared to Experiment 1, the risk preference in the life–death domain was reversed, showing an outcome salience effect: when the pie‐slice chart emphasized only survival outcomes, participants were more risk taking under positive hedonic frames whereas when the whole‐pie chart depicted both survival and mortality outcomes, they became risk averse under positive frames. In sum, self‐framing reflected a positive bias in encoding risk information and affected the risk preference of the decision maker. Like the tone of voice used in communication, the hedonic tone of self‐framing, either positive or negative, can affect risk perception of a choice problem. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

选项框架和认知负载对风险决策的影响

本研究采用实验法探讨了选项框架和认知负载对风险决策的影响。结果发现:(1)不同的认知负载条件下,被试在正向框架下表现出风险回避,负向框架下表现出风险寻求,出现了框架效应现象;(2)相对于认知负载条件下,被试在无认知负载的负向框架下更偏好于风险选项,而正向框架下的风险偏好没有显著变化,即无认知负载条件下框架效应较强。这表明,框架效应不仅仅是启发式系统作用的结果,分析式系统也在其中发挥着重要的作用。     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择     

道德判断中的框架效应:一个新的视角

道德领域亦存在框架效应,但有关这类偏差的研究仍然存在不足。研究以600名大学生为对象,以亚洲疾病和工厂风波两类经典情境为实验情境,设置正面和负面两类属性框架,以研究道德判断的框架效应。结果发现,在面临道德判断情境时,在正面框架下被试倾向于选择确定性方案,而在负面框架下被试倾向于选择风险性方案; 在正面框架下被试倾向于评价风险性方案更违背道德,在负面框架下则认为确定性方案更违背道德; 被试对情境中人物选择确定性或风险性方案道德之可谴责性评价与确定性或风险性方案本身之道德违背性评价的判断并不一致:在正面框架下,若情境中人物选择风险性方案,被试认为其行为更应受到谴责; 但在负面框架下,被试对情境中人物选择确定性方案和风险性方案在道德上应受谴责性的评价并无显著差异。研究还发现道德判断框架效应存在性别差异,负面框架下女生更为风险寻求。     

Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda

This article examines strategic framing efforts within the president's inner circle of foreign policy advisors. The comparative case study method is used to describe and explain the framing process involved in President Jimmy Carter's arms control decisions with respect to the Soviet Union. Carter's two central foreign policy advisors, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, portrayed the Soviets in very different terms. The premise underlying this study is that advisors attempt to frame their policy preferences favorably in order to influence the group process and the president's policy choice. Advisors do so by playing up the positive aspects of an option and downplaying any negative aspects. Three components of the framing process are explored: historical/cultural symbolism, personal beliefs and values, and political cost assessments.     

Framing effects under cognitive load: The role of working memory in risky decisions

Framing effects occur in a wide range of laboratory and natural decision contexts, but the underlying processes that produce framing effects are not well understood. We explored the role of working memory (WM) in framing by manipulating WM loads during risky decisions. After starting with a hypothetical stake of money, participants were then presented a lesser amount that they could keep for certain (positive frame) or lose for certain (negative frame). They made a choice between the sure amount and a gamble in which they could either keep or lose all of the original stake. On half of the trials, the choice was made while maintaining a concurrent WM load of random letters. In both load and no-load conditions, we replicated the typical finding of risk aversion with positive frames and risk seeking with negative frames. In addition, people made fewer decisions to accept the gamble under conditions of higher cognitive load. The data are congruent with a dual-process reasoning framework in which people employ a heuristic to make satisfactory decisions with minimal effort.     

Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains

The author examines the mechanisms and dynamics of framing effects in risky choices across three distinct task domains (i.e., life–death, public property, and personal money). The choice outcomes of the problems presented in each of the three task domains had a binary structure of a sure thing vs a gamble of equal expected value; the outcomes differed in their framing conditions and the expected values, raging from 6000, 600, 60, to 6, numerically. It was hypothesized that subjects would become more risk seeking, if the sure outcome was below their aspiration level (the minimum requirement). As predicted, more subjects preferred the gamble when facing the life–death choice problems than facing the counterpart problems presented in the other two task domains. Subjects’ risk preference varied categorically along the group size dimension in the life–death domain but changed more linearly over the expected value dimension in the monetary domain. Framing effects were observed in 7 of 13 pairs of problems, showing a positive frame–risk aversion and negative frame–risk seeking relationship. In addition, two types of framing effects were theoretically defined and empirically identified. Abidirectional framing effectinvolves a reversal in risk preference, and occurs when a decision maker's risk preference is ambiguous or weak. Four bidirectional effects were observed; in each case a majority of subjects preferred the sure outcome under a positive frame but the gamble under a negative frame. In contrast, aunidirectional framing effectrefers to a preference shift due to the framing of choice outcomes: A majority of subjects preferred one choice outcome (either the sure thing or the gamble) under both framing conditions, with positive frame augmented the preference for the sure thing and negative frame augmented the preference for the gamble. These findings revealed some dynamic regularities of framing effects and posed implications for developing predictive and testable models of human decision making.     

The Role of Inference in Attribute Framing Effects

Previous research has shown that a speaker's choice between logically equivalent frames is influenced by reference point information, and that listeners draw accurate inferences based on the frame. Less clear, however, is whether these inferences play a causal role in generating attribute framing effects. Two experiments are reported, which suggest that frame‐dependent inferences are sufficient to generate attribute framing effects, and that blocking such inferences may block framing effects. Experiment 1 decomposed the typical framing design into two parts: One group of participants saw a target described in one of two attribute frames and reported their estimates (inferences) of the typical attribute value. These estimates were then given to a second group of yoked participants, who evaluated the target. Although this latter group was not exposed to different attribute frames, they nevertheless exhibited a “framing effect” as a result of receiving systematically different inferences. In contrast, Experiment 2 shows that experts—who are familiar with an attribute's distribution and are therefore less likely to draw strong frame‐based inferences—exhibit a diminished framing effect. Together, these findings underscore the role of inferences in the generation and attenuation of attribute framing effects. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Looking at Both Sides of the Coin: Mixed Representation Moderates Attribute‐framing Bias in Written and Auditory Messages

Objects and events are often evaluated more favourably when presented in a positive frame than when presented in the complementary negative framing. Recent studies show that this attribute‐framing bias can be moderated when both positive and negative frames are represented in the message. Most attribute‐framing studies used written messages, although important messages are often conveyed auditorily. Unlike written messages, recipients cannot reread auditory messages and have to rely on their memory when evaluating them; consequently, the moderating effect of mixed representation may depend on memory constraints. The current study compared the framing bias in single‐attribute versus mixed‐attribute representations in written and auditory messages. In both written and auditory messages, single‐attribute representation yielded substantial framing bias whereas mixed‐attribute representation moderated the bias. The results are discussed in terms of the role of memory and attention in the attribute‐framing bias. Theoretical and practical implications are considered, and future research is suggested. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing of Decisions: Effect on Active and Passive Risk Avoidance

Decision makers intending to avoid risk in a decision situation can choose a less risky alternative (passive risk avoidance) or intervene actively in an alternative applying a risk‐defusing action (active risk avoidance). In Experiment 1 (64 participants), we compared active and passive risk defusing in two framing conditions. In the negative frame, in the uncertain alternative, a change to the worse was possible; in the positive frame, a change to an improvement was possible. Each participant decided in both framing conditions. As expected, active risk avoidance behavior for preventing a negative outcome (i.e., in the negative frame) was more likely than for promoting a positive one (i.e., in the positive frame). If decision makers did not or could not actively defuse the risk, they chose in correspondence to the classical pattern: risk avoidance in the positive frame and risk seeking in the negative one. We replicated the latter result in a second experiment (32 participants). The classical framing pattern in passive risk avoidance in both experiments is remarkable, because participants were not presented or did not search for exact probabilities. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing Effects and Arenas of Choice: Your Money or Your Life?

This paper investigates the consistency of outcome framing effects on choice across two arenas of outcome: human life and money. Past research has yielded notable variability in the magnitude of framing effects. One possible contributor to the variation in magnitude is outcome arena. Past research has varied along this dimension without systematically assessing its effects. Undergraduates (N= 297) responded to three decision scenarios involving either human lives or money in which outcomes were framed either positively or negatively. Based on prospect theory, an interaction between framing and arena was predicted, such that a greater framing effect was expected in the human life arena (i.e., more risky choices were expected when outcomes involved human life than money in the negative frame and the reverse in the positive frame). Results were only partly consistent with this prediction. Regardless of frame, subjects made riskier choices when outcomes involved human lives rather than money. This was not expected for the positive frame. Even though human lives presumably have greater utility than dollars, subjects in the positive framing condition made riskier choices regarding human life than money. Additionally, no overall framing effect was observed. There was a significant sex by frame interaction such that only women exhibited framing effects on choice. This extends the finding of sex differences in framing to the monetary arena. This has important implications for the conduct of future studies on framing as well as for the interpretation of past and future framing research.     

Moments in time: metacognition, trust, and outcomes in dyadic negotiations

This research tested the relationships between turning points, cognitive and affective trust, and negotiation outcomes. After completing a simulated negotiation, participants identified turning points from videotape. Turning points were then classified as substantive (interest, offer), characterization (positive, negative), or procedural (positive, negative). Prenegotiation affective trust predicted subsequent turning points, whereas prenegotiation cognitive trust did not, suggesting that different cues influence the two types of trust. Postnegotiation cognitive trust was increased by the occurrence of interest, positive characterization, and positive procedural turning points and decreased by negative characterization turning points. Affective trust was increased by positive procedural turning points. Finally, interest turning points resulted in higher joint outcomes, whereas negative characterization turning points resulted in lower joint outcomes. We conclude that there are two paths to building trust and increasing joint gain, one through insight and one through signaling good faith intentions.     

得失框架效应的分离—— 来自收益与损失型跨期选择的研究

本研究通过创设收益和损失跨期选择情境, 采用不同表征方式(得框架、失框架)的跨期选择任务, 分别探讨了收益和损失情境下的跨期选择是否存在得失框架效应, 及其是否会受任务难度的影响。结果发现：(1)收益型跨期选择只在任务容易时存在得失框架效应, 与失框架相比, 被试在得框架下选择即时获益的概率更高; 任务困难时得失框架效应消失(实验a); (2)损失型跨期选择中不存在得失框架效应(实验b)。结果表明, 得失框架效应在损、益型跨期选择中出现了分离, 收益型跨期选择中的得失框架效应的内在认知机制很可能与风险决策中的框架效应类似并且是一种较为初级的认知加工过程。     

心理距离对风险决策框架效应的影响

解释水平理论是一种解释心理距离怎样影响个体的思维决策的社会认知理论。研究基于解释水平理论,探查了心理距离对风险决策框架效应的影响。实验从心理距离的四个维度入手,每个维度均采用2（解释水平高、低）×2（正框架、负框架）的被试间设计,用于检验解释水平是否调节框架对被试决策任务的选择。结果表明,当心理距离越远,解释水平越高时,被试产生明显的框架效应;而当心理距离越近,解释水平越低时,框架效应明显减弱。除了大概率情况下的框架效应削弱至不显著,其余维度的高、低解释水平下的框架效应均显著。     

Feeling the green? Value orientation as a moderator of emotional response to green electricity

Framing effects on emotional responses in a green electricity choice are investigated in a survey of a random sample of 655 Swedish residents. The results show that overall more positive and less negative emotions are experienced for a promotion frame (“choosing green electricity and paying more”) than for a prevention frame (“not choosing green electricity and paying less”). Value orientation is shown to moderate the framing effect in that for the promotion frame, individuals with a self‐transcendence value orientation show the most positive and least negative emotion, whereas for the prevention frame, individuals with a self‐enhancement value orientation show the most positive and least negative emotion. Emotional responses are further shown to mediate the relationship between value orientation and intention to purchase eco‐labeled electricity.     

Intentions to use hormonal male contraception: The role of message framing,attitudes and stress appraisals

Two studies are reported. Study one (N = 104) explored the extent to which male hormonal contraception is perceived as risky compared to other prevention behaviours. Study two examined the effects of message framing on intentions to use hormonal male contraception and investigated whether attitude moderates message framing effects. Three hundred and four participants read either a loss frame or gain frame message and then completed questionnaires assessing their intentions to use hormonal male contraception, stress appraisals and the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) variables. Exposure to a loss frame influenced intention to use the daily male pill in men with a more postive attitude. This suggests that attitude, but not other TPB variables or stress appraisals have the capacity to moderate framing effects. Stress appraisals, in addition to TPB variables, significantly predicted variance in behavioural intentions in men and women. These findings are discussed within the context of Prospect Theory, perceived risk and prevention/detection behaviours.