Imagination

This paper begins by examining a text in which one writer, Richard Ford, is discussing both the persona and the work of another writer, Raymond Carver. Ford's positive reaction to Carver provides us with a puzzle as to what the basis for it is. I suggest that what he is really admiring is a kind of originality that he detects in Carver. I try to specify the constitutive rules for the generation of this form of originality. They seem to take the form of at once being able to preserve what is valuable in existing material and yet managing to add what could be said to be missing. I then argue that, if Carver is doing this sort of work, so too is Ford. Having seen various examples of a kind of originality, I argue that the process we have been seeing might be formulated as the exercise of imagination, and address the issue of the possible significance of accomplishing such imaginative work. If, as many contemporary philosophers and workers in the human sciences have argued, there is no escape from the need for interpretation, there is a problem of what could ever be a satisfactory interpretation. I suggest that the idea or the possibility of an imaginative interpretation could be a way of providing such satisfaction.     

Imagination and Emotion

A study was conducted for the purpose of determining whether or not the addition of one or both of the supplementary WISC subtests, Digit Span of the Verbal Scale—and Mazes of the Performance Scale, materially affected the obtained IQs for high achieving fifth grade subjects. All 12 subtests of the WISC were individually administered to 44 Ss, and IQs were then calculated in such a manner that specific comparisons could be made. These comparisons were between Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs composed of the maximum number of subtests, and Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs exclusive of Digit Span, Mazes, or both subtests. Analyses by use of t tests for correlated means revealed highly significant differences. The addition of Digit Span and Mazes in the WISC battery served to depress the Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs of the high achieving Ss.     

Ethics and Imagination

Cognitive semantics has made important empirical findings about human conceptualization. In this paper some findings concerning moral concepts are analyzed and their implications for medical ethics discussed. The key idea is that morality has to do with metaphors and imagination rather than with well-defined concepts and deduction. It is argued that normative medical ethics to be psychologically realistic should take these findings seriously. This means that an imaginative casuistry is to be preferred compared to principlism and to other forms of casuistry. Furthermore, the metaphorical character of central principles in medical ethics such as autonomy, utility, justice, and integrity is indicated. Such principles are interpreted as rules of thumb summarizing the collective wisdom concerning prototype cases.     

Imagination and Memory

A growing body of literature shows that imagining contrary-to-truth experiences can change memory. Recent experiments are reviewed to show that when people think about or imagine a false event, entire false memories can be implanted. Imagination inflation can occur even when there is no overt social pressure, and when hypothetical events are imagined only briefly. Overall, studies of imagination inflation show that imagining a counter-factual event can make subjects more confident that it actually occurred. We discuss possible mechanisms for imagination inflation and find that, with evidence supporting the involvement of both source confusion and familiarity in creating inflation, the primary mechanism is still to be determined. We briefly review evidence on individual differences in susceptibility to inflation. Finally, the widespread use of imagination-based techniques in self-help and clinical contexts suggests that there may be practical implications when imagination is used as a therapeutic tool.     

Imagination and Will

1. Evoked potentials generated by cerebral self-stimulation were studied in white rats. Stimulus trains of 30 biphasic rectangular waves of various repetition rates (30, 50, 100, 150, 200 pps) were employed. The pulses were always 4 msec in width and of fixed intensity at all repetition rates for a given animal. Potential changes during a 2-second interval after the termination of a stimulus train were recorded from various points in the cerebral mass and averaged electronically.

2. The early portion of the 2-second interval was characterized by rhythmic oscillations in the alpha range whose number and amplitude were related to repetition rate of the rectangular waves within the stimulus train. The periodicity of the oscillations when they occurred was not so affected and remained practically constant over subjects, intensity of stimulus, and repetition rate.

3. The number of oscillations was greatest at 200 and 150 pps and diminished with diminishing stimulus repetition rates, the drop being greatest below 100 pps.

4. There was a positive covariation between the rate of lever pressing for self-stimulation and the phenomenon of rhythmic after oscillations in the evoked potential. Animals who refused to press the lever for cerebral self-stimulation showed no rhythmic potentials when the stimulus was delivered by E; animals who had become pressers gave good after-discharges when so stimulated.     

Distinguishing Belief and Imagination

Some philosophers (including Urmson, Humberstone, Shah, and Velleman) hold that believing that p distinctively involves applying a norm according to which the truth of p is a criterion for the success or correctness of the attitude. On this view, imagining and assuming differ from believing in that no such norm is applied. I argue against this view with counterexamples showing that applying the norm of truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for distinguishing believing from imagining and assuming. Then I argue that the different functional properties of these mental states are enough to distinguish them, and that norm‐application doesn't help us draw the functional distinctions.     

Imagination and the imaginary

This paper argues that real imagination depends on the capacity to acknowledge the absence of what is imagined from the world of material actuality. This leads on to a view of symbol formation as the operation of the transcendent function between the opposites of presence and absence. 'The imaginary' is contrasted with this as a defensive misuse of imagination that attempts to deny 'negation' where negation is defined as all those aspects of the world that constitute a check to the omnipotence of fantasy--e.g., absence, loss, difference, otherness etc. Parallels are drawn with theoretical antecedents in analytical psychology and psychoanalysis, with particular attention to papers published in the Journal of Analytical Psychology (JAP) in the 1960s on the relation between active imagination, transference and ego development. A clinical example is given to show the use of the imaginary as a means of warding off the unbearable pain of Oedipal disappointment.     

The Imagination of Images and Images of Imagination: How the Imagination Relates to Aging,Health, and Spirituality

ABSTRACT

Psychological literature suggests that religion and spirituality increase in late adulthood. Yet, operational definitions of spirituality and religiosity remain widely debated and inadequate for the concepts they are designed to measure. The empirical studies of religion and spirituality as one ages are of poor design and often measure only limited aspects of religion or spirituality. Few empirical studies exist which have been conceived to only study religiosity and spirituality in late adulthood. The purpose of this study was to determine the defining aspects of religiosity and spirituality using the Allport, Ross Intrinsic, Extrinsic Religiosity Scale, Ellison's Spiritual Well-Being Scale, and Neugarten's Life Satisfaction Instrument. Using a principal component factor analysis, the study examined the factor structure using an older adult sample of 320 individuals 65 years of age and older. Having a purpose in life combines with intrinsic religious questions for the first factor. Life satisfaction questions group together on two factors and extrinsic religiosity is clearly one factor. The scales used hold together well when combined. A new, shortened scale to measure aspects of religiosity and spirituality is proposed.     

Freedom,Indeterminism and Imagination

Abstract

A suspicion about libertarian free will is that freedom is undermined, rather than supported, by the positing of indeterminism within processes of volition. In response, this paper presents a way in which moments of indeterminism can enhance freedom, by showing how such moments can genuinely belong to the agent. The key idea is that of putting the imagination to work in the service of free agency. The suggestion is that indeterministic processes of imaginative generativity can both belong to an agent, and provide a ground for claims of freedom. In contrast to Robert Kane’s libertarian proposal of locating critical self-forming actions in special moments of rational choice, freedom-friendly indeterministic moments of self-shaping are instead posited within processes of imaginative generativity in which our future possibilities are imagined. This incompatibilist alternative to traditional libertarianism is briefly compared to Mele’s modest libertarianism, and defended against a selection of likely criticisms.     

Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge

How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemology. When we discover what is possible or what is impossible, we generally exploit important connections between what is possible and what we can coherently imagine. We can often come to knowledge of metaphysical modality a priori.