The duty to believe according to the evidence

‘Evidentialism’ is the conventional name (given mainly by its opponents) for the view that there is a moral duty to proportion one’s beliefs to evidence, proof or other epistemic justifications for belief. This essay defends evidentialism against objections based on the alleged involuntariness of belief, on the claim that evidentialism assumes a doubtful epistemology, that epistemically unsupported beliefs can be beneficial, that there are significant classes of exceptions to the evidentialist principle, and other shabby evasions and alibis (as I take them to be) for disregarding the duty to believe according to the evidence. Evidentialism is also supported by arguments based on both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations.     

Epistemic Gradualism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice: Responce to Hetherington

This paper responds to Stephen Hetherington's discussion of my ‘Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?’ (2004). The Infallibilist skeptic holds that in order to know something, one must be able to rule out every possible alternative to the truth of one’s belief. This requirement is false. In this paper I first clarify this requirement’s relation to our ordinary practice. I then turn to a more fundamental issue. The Infallibilist holds – along with many non-skeptical epistemologists – that Infallibility is epistemically superior to the epistemic position attained when we have (what we ordinarily call) knowledge. This is false, too, as our ordinary practices show. Ordinary epistemic appraisal does not concern our standing on a scale of evaluation which has Infallibility at its apex. For this reason, even if gradualism is correct, it does not show how Infallibilist skepticism can arise out of our ordinary practice.     

Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism

Synthese - I argue that the skeptical force of a disagreement is mitigated to the extent that it is fundamental, where a fundamental disagreement is one that is driven by differences in epistemic...     

Epistemic Inertia and Epistemic Isolationism: A Response to Buchanan

abstract   Allen Buchanan argues that conventional applied ethics is impoverished and would be enriched by the addition of social moral epistemology. The aim here is to clarify this argument and to raise questions about whether such an addition is necessary about how such enrichment would work in practice. Two broad problems are identified. First, there are various kinds and sources of epistemic inertia, which act as an obstacle to epistemic change. Religion is one striking example and seems to pose a deep problem for Buchanan's liberal social moral epistemology. Philosophy also exhibits a distinctive kind of epistemic inertia (metaphilosophical beliefs about the impropriety of applying philosophy are hard to shift), but also suffers from epistemic isolationism: (its arguments and conclusions are isolated from practical influence). It is concluded that not only will a liberal social moral epistemology have to overcome a pernicious epistemic inertia with regard to religious belief, but also a different kind of epistemic inertia closer to home .     

因"用"而信与因"信"而信--以清末中国士大夫宗教观为例的研究

在宗教学上 ,因“用”而信是指信者认为其有用而信 ;因“信”而信是指信者认为其真实而信。从清末中国士大夫的宗教观的流变看 ,单纯强调宗教是否有用的问题 ,而忽视其是否为真的问题 ,必然会影响宗教信仰的坚定性。     

Realism,instrumentalism, and the intentional stance

One of Dennett's principal arguments for an instrumentalistic construal of intentional attributions (e.g., attributions of belief, etc.) is that such attributions are environment relative. I argue that one can and should adopt a realist perspective toward such attributions, but accommodate their environmental relativity by treating intentional properties as relational properties. By doing so one acquires a useful perspective on experimental cognitive psychology; in particular, one can overcome the temptation to treat ecological accounts and information processing accounts as incompatible alternatives and come to see them as mutually supportive. Treating intentional properties as relational may be counter-intuitive, but I provide examples of how other sciences have had to treat what seem to be intrinsic properties as relational.     

Epistemic Uniqueness and the Practical Relevance of Epistemic Practices

Philosophia - By taking the practical relevance of coordinated epistemic standards into account, Dogramaci and Horowitz (Philosophical Issues, 26(1), 130–147, 2016) as well as Greco and...     

Epistemic Side Constraints and the Structure of Epistemic Normativity

In this paper, I develop the notion of an epistemic side constraint in order to overcome one of the main challenges to a goal‐based approach to the structure of epistemic normativity. I argue that the rationale for such side constraints can be found in the work of John Locke and that his argument is best understood as the epistemic analog to David Gauthier's argument as to the rationality of being moral.     

Physicalism,instrumentalism and the semantics of modal logic

The delicate point in the formalistic position is to explain how the non-intuitionistic classical mathematics is significant, after having initially agreed with the intuitionists that its theorems lack a real meaning in terms of which they are true (S. C. Kleene, 1952).     

Introduction: novel therapies in developmental disabilities--hope, reason, and evidence

Complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) is used both alongside (complementary) and as a substitute for (alternative) conventional therapies. Although CAM use is reported to be high among children with typical development, reported rates for CAM use to address symptoms of children with developmental disabilities may be higher. Increased use in this population may relate to hope for amelioration of symptoms, concerns regarding side effects of conventional treatments, and a need on the part of families to participate in decision making regarding their child's care. Primary health care providers may find that the child's needs are best served when they maintain a dialogue with families to evaluate the evidence supporting novel therapies. Interventions need to be assessed in an evidence based fashion whether or not they are initially preceived as CAM. This issue of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Research Reviews contains reviews of CAM used to treat several developmental disabilities as well as some broader discussions related to the determinants of CAM use, current efforts to evaluate novel therapies, and how to consider the possibility of placebo effects.     

入世济世与神仙超越

传统道教伴随着现代化步伐已进入了二十一世纪。在新的世纪里 ,世界各大传统宗教都因应社会的现代化进程 ,程度不等地表现出世俗化倾向 ,从而对人们的物质和精神生活继续发挥着积极作用。但由此也引发了神圣与世俗之关系的讨论 ,宗教的神圣性与世俗化究竟是此消彼长还是相得益彰 ,再次成为宗教界和学术界共同关注的焦点。诚如许多学者所指出的那样 ,宗教的神圣性与世俗化的关系 ,是各大宗教都不可回避的老问题 ,只是由于各大宗教在信仰、教理教义以及所处环境方面存在着差异 ,所以对问题做出了不同的回应。就道教来说 ,所谓世俗与神圣乃是入…     

Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse

One of the most common excuses is ignorance. Ignorance does not always excuse, however, for sometimes ignorance is culpable. One of the most natural ways to think of the difference between exculpating and culpable ignorance is in terms of justification; that is, one’s ignorance is exculpating only if it is justified and one’s ignorance is culpable only if it not justified (call this the justification thesis). Rosen (J Phil 105(10):591–610, 2008) explores this idea by first offering a brief account of justification, and then two cases that he claims are counter examples to the justification thesis. The aim of this paper is to defend the justification thesis against Rosen’s two cases. The argument will proceed in the following way. First, I clarify a few things about the nature of culpable ignorance generally and why the justification thesis is so intuitive. I then present Rosen’s purported counterexamples. Once this is done, I argue that Rosen misses an important view of justification in the epistemology literature that I call the pragmatic view. I present a general picture of the pragmatic view, and explain how it fits naturally with our practices of criticizing people’s beliefs, including claims of culpable ignorance. Finally, I address Rosen’s cases arguing that, if the pragmatic view is right, then Rosen’s cases are not counterexamples to the justification thesis.