Correia Semantics Revisited

Despite a renewed interest in Richard Angell’s logic of analytic containment (\({\mathsf{AC}}\)), the first semantics for \({\mathsf{AC}}\) introduced by Fabrice Correia has remained largely unexamined. This paper describes a reasonable approach to Correia semantics by means of a correspondence with a nine-valued semantics for \({\mathsf{AC}}\). The present inquiry employs this correspondence to provide characterizations of a number of propositional logics intermediate between \({\mathsf{AC}}\) and classical logic. In particular, we examine Correia’s purported characterization of classical logic with respect to his semantics, showing the condition Correia cites in fact characterizes the “logic of paradox” \({\mathsf{LP}}\) and provide a correct characterization. Finally, we consider some remarks on related matters, such as the applicability of the present correspondence to the analysis of the system \({\mathsf{AC}^{\ast}}\) and an intriguing relationship between Correia’s models and articular models for first degree entailment.     

Turing–Taylor Expansions for Arithmetic Theories

Turing progressions have been often used to measure the proof-theoretic strength of mathematical theories: iterate adding consistency of some weak base theory until you “hit” the target theory. Turing progressions based on n-consistency give rise to a \({\Pi_{n+1}}\) proof-theoretic ordinal \({|U|_{\Pi^0_{n+1}}}\) also denoted \({|U|_n}\). As such, to each theory U we can assign the sequence of corresponding \({\Pi_{n+1}}\) ordinals \({\langle |U|_n\rangle_{n > 0}}\). We call this sequence a Turing-Taylor expansion or spectrum of a theory. In this paper, we relate Turing-Taylor expansions of sub-theories of Peano Arithmetic to Ignatiev’s universal model for the closed fragment of the polymodal provability logic \({\mathsf{GLP}_\omega}\). In particular, we observe that each point in the Ignatiev model can be seen as Turing-Taylor expansions of formal mathematical theories. Moreover, each sub-theory of Peano Arithmetic that allows for a Turing-Taylor expansion will define a unique point in Ignatiev’s model.     

Structural Completeness in Relevance Logics

It is proved that the relevance logic \({\mathbf{R}}\) (without sentential constants) has no structurally complete consistent axiomatic extension, except for classical propositional logic. In fact, no other such extension is even passively structurally complete.     

On All Strong Kleene Generalizations of Classical Logic

By using the notions of exact truth (‘true and not false’) and exact falsity (‘false and not true’), one can give 16 distinct definitions of classical consequence. This paper studies the class of relations that results from these definitions in settings that are paracomplete, paraconsistent or both and that are governed by the (extended) Strong Kleene schema. Besides familiar logics such as Strong Kleene logic (K3), the Logic of Paradox (LP) and First Degree Entailment (FDE), the resulting class of all Strong Kleene generalizations of classical logic also contains a host of unfamiliar logics. We first study the members of our class semantically, after which we present a uniform sequent calculus (the SK calculus) that is sound and complete with respect to all of them. Two further sequent calculi (the \({{\bf SK}^\mathcal{P}}\) and \({\bf SK}^{\mathcal{N}}\) calculus) will be considered, which serve the same purpose and which are obtained by applying general methods (due to Baaz et al.) to construct sequent calculi for many-valued logics. Rules and proofs in the SK calculus are much simpler and shorter than those of the \({\bf SK}^{\mathcal{P}}\) and the \({\bf SK}^{\mathcal{N}}\) calculus, which is one of the reasons to prefer the SK calculus over the latter two. Besides favourably comparing the SK calculus to both the \({\bf SK}^{\mathcal{P}}\) and the \({\bf SK}^{\mathcal{N}}\) calculus, we also hint at its philosophical significance.     

The Category of Node-and-Choice Preforms for Extensive-Form Games

It would be useful to have a category of extensive-form games whose isomorphisms specify equivalences between games. Since working with entire games is too large a project for a single paper, I begin here with preforms, where a “preform” is a rooted tree together with choices and information sets. In particular, this paper first defines the category \(\mathbf {Tree}\), whose objects are “functioned trees”, which are specially designed to be incorporated into preforms. I show that \(\mathbf {Tree}\) is isomorphic to the full subcategory of \(\mathbf {Grph}\) whose objects are converging arborescences. Then the paper defines the category \(\mathbf {NCP}\), whose objects are “node-and-choice preforms”, each of which consists of a node set, a choice set, and an operator mapping node-choice pairs to nodes. I characterize the \(\mathbf {NCP}\) isomorphisms, define a forgetful functor from \(\mathbf {NCP}\) to \(\mathbf {Tree}\), and show that \(\mathbf {Tree}\) is equivalent to the full subcategory of \(\mathbf {NCP}\) whose objects are perfect-information preforms. The paper also shows that many game-theoretic entities can be derived from preforms, and that these entities are well-behaved with respect to \(\mathbf {NCP}\) morphisms and isomorphisms.     

A Second Pretabular Classical Relevance Logic

Pretabular logics are those that lack finite characteristic matrices, although all of their normal proper extensions do have some finite characteristic matrix. Although for Anderson and Belnap’s relevance logic R, there exists an uncountable set of pretabular extensions (Swirydowicz in J Symb Log 73(4):1249–1270, 2008), for the classical relevance logic \( \hbox {KR} = \hbox {R} + \{(A\,\, \& \sim A)\rightarrow B\}\) there has been known so far a pretabular extension: \({\mathcal L}\) (Galminas and Mersch in Stud Log 100:1211–1221, 2012). In Section 1 of this paper, we introduce some history of pretabularity and some relevance logics and their algebras. In Section 2, we introduce a new pretabular logic, which we shall name \({\mathcal M}\), and which is a neighbor of \({\mathcal L}\), in that it is an extension of KR. Also in this section, an algebraic semantics, ‘\({\mathcal M}\)-algebras’, will be introduced and the characterization of \({\mathcal M}\) to the set of finite \({\mathcal M}\)-algebras will be shown. In Section 3, the pretabularity of \({\mathcal M}\) will be proved.     

A Theory of Infinitary Relations Extending Zermelo’s Theory of Infinitary Propositions

An idea attributable to Russell serves to extend Zermelo’s theory of systems of infinitely long propositions to infinitary relations. Specifically, relations over a given domain \({\mathfrak{D}}\) of individuals will now be identified with propositions over an auxiliary domain \({\mathfrak{D}^{\mathord{\ast}}}\) subsuming \({\mathfrak{D}}\). Three applications of the resulting theory of infinitary relations are presented. First, it is used to reconstruct Zermelo’s original theory of urelements and sets in a manner that achieves most, if not all, of his early aims. Second, the new account of infinitary relations makes possible a concise characterization of parametric definability with respect to a purely relational structure. Finally, based on his foundational philosophy of the primacy of the infinite, Zermelo rejected Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem; it is shown that the new theory of infinitary relations can be brought to bear, positively, in that connection as well.     

Matching Topological and Frame Products of Modal Logics

The simplest combination of unimodal logics \({\mathrm{L}_1 \rm and \mathrm{L}_2}\) into a bimodal logic is their fusion, \({\mathrm{L}_1 \otimes \mathrm{L}_2}\), axiomatized by the theorems of \({\mathrm{L}_1 \rm for \square_1 \rm and of \mathrm{L}_2 \rm for \square_{2}}\). Shehtman introduced combinations that are not only bimodal, but two-dimensional: he defined 2-d Cartesian products of 1-d Kripke frames, using these Cartesian products to define the frame product\({\mathrm{L}_1 \times \mathrm{L}_2 \rm of \mathrm{L}_1 \rm and \mathrm{L}_2}\). Van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, ten Cate and Sarenac generalized Shehtman’s idea and introduced the topological product\({\mathrm{L}_1 \times_{t}\mathrm{L}_2}\), using Cartesian products of topological spaces rather than of Kripke frames. Frame products have been extensively studied, but much less is known about topological products. The goal of the current paper is to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the topological product to match the frame product, for Kripke complete extensions of \({\mathrm{S}4: \mathrm{L}_1 \times_t \mathrm{L}_2 = \mathrm{L}_1 \times \mathrm{L}_2 \rm iff \mathrm{L}_1 \supsetneq \mathrm{S}5 \rm or \mathrm{L}_2 \supsetneq \mathrm{S}5 \rm or \mathrm{L}_1, \mathrm{L}_2 = \mathrm{S}5}\).     

Axiomatizing Jaśkowski’s Discussive Logic $$\mathbf {D_2}$$

We outline the rather complicated history of attempts at axiomatizing Ja?kowski’s discussive logic \(\mathbf {D_2}\) and show that some clarity can be had by paying close attention to the language we work with. We then examine the problem of axiomatizing \(\mathbf {D_2}\) in languages involving discussive conjunctions. Specifically, we show that recent attempts by Ciuciura are mistaken. Finally, we present an axiomatization of \(\mathbf {D_2}\) in the language Ja?kowski suggested in his second paper on discussive logic, by following a remark of da Costa and Dubikajtis. We also deal with an interesting variant of \(\mathbf {D_2}\), introduced by Ciuciura, in which negation is also taken to be discussive.     

Topological-Frame Products of Modal Logics

The simplest bimodal combination of unimodal logics \(\text {L} _1\) and \(\text {L} _2\) is their fusion, \(\text {L} _1 \otimes \text {L} _2\), axiomatized by the theorems of \(\text {L} _1\) for \(\square _1\) and of \(\text {L} _2\) for \(\square _2\), and the rules of modus ponens, necessitation for \(\square _1\) and for \(\square _2\), and substitution. Shehtman introduced the frame product \(\text {L} _1 \times \text {L} _2\), as the logic of the products of certain Kripke frames: these logics are two-dimensional as well as bimodal. Van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, ten Cate and Sarenac transposed Shehtman’s idea to the topological semantics and introduced the topological product \(\text {L} _1 \times _t \text {L} _2\), as the logic of the products of certain topological spaces. For almost all well-studies logics, we have \(\text {L} _1 \otimes \text {L} _2 \subsetneq \text {L} _1 \times \text {L} _2\), for example, \(\text {S4} \otimes \text {S4} \subsetneq \text {S4} \times \text {S4} \). Van Benthem et al. show, by contrast, that \(\text {S4} \times _t \text {S4} = \text {S4} \otimes \text {S4} \). It is straightforward to define the product of a topological space and a frame: the result is a topologized frame, i.e., a set together with a topology and a binary relation. In this paper, we introduce topological-frame products \(\text {L} _1 \times _ tf \text {L} _2\) of modal logics, providing a complete axiomatization of \(\text {S4} \times _ tf \text {L} \), whenever \(\text {L} \) is a Kripke complete Horn axiomatizable extension of the modal logic D: these extensions include \(\text {T} , \text {S4} \) and \(\text {S5} \), but not \(\text {K} \) or \(\text {K4} \). We leave open the problem of axiomatizing \(\text {S4} \times _ tf \text {K} \), \(\text {S4} \times _ tf \text {K4} \), and other related logics. When \(\text {L} = \text {S4} \), our result confirms a conjecture of van Benthem et al. concerning the logic of products of Alexandrov spaces with arbitrary topological spaces.     

Propositional Epistemic Logics with Quantification Over Agents of Knowledge

The paper presents a family of propositional epistemic logics such that languages of these logics are extended by quantification over modal (epistemic) operators or over agents of knowledge and extended by predicate symbols that take modal (epistemic) operators (or agents) as arguments. Denote this family by \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\). There exist epistemic logics whose languages have the above mentioned properties (see, for example Corsi and Orlandelli in Stud Log 101:1159–1183, 2013; Fitting et al. in Stud Log 69:133–169, 2001; Grove in Artif Intell 74(2):311–350, 1995; Lomuscio and Colombetti in Proceedings of ATAL 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), vol 1193, pp 71–85, 1996). But these logics are obtained from first-order modal logics, while a logic of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) can be regarded as a propositional multi-modal logic whose language includes quantifiers over modal (epistemic) operators and predicate symbols that take modal (epistemic) operators as arguments. Among the logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) there are logics with a syntactical distinction between two readings of epistemic sentences: de dicto and de re (between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing of’). We show the decidability of logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) with the help of the loosely guarded fragment (LGF) of first-order logic. Namely, we generalize LGF to a higher-order decidable loosely guarded fragment. The latter fragment allows us to construct various decidable propositional epistemic logics with quantification over modal (epistemic) operators. The family of this logics coincides with \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\). There are decidable propositional logics such that these logics implicitly contain quantification over agents of knowledge, but languages of these logics are usual propositional epistemic languages without quantifiers and predicate symbols (see Grove and Halpern in J Log Comput 3(4):345–378, 1993). Some logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) can be regarded as counterparts of logics defined in Grove and Halpern (J Log Comput 3(4):345–378, 1993). We prove that the satisfiability problem for these logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) is Pspace-complete using their counterparts in Grove and Halpern (J Log Comput 3(4):345–378, 1993).     

$${\in_K}$$: a Non-Fregean Logic of Explicit Knowledge

We present a new logic-based approach to the reasoning about knowledge which is independent of possible worlds semantics. \({\in_K}\) (Epsilon-K) is a non-Fregean logic whose models consist of propositional universes with subsets for true, false and known propositions. Knowledge is, in general, not closed under rules of inference; the only valid epistemic principles are the knowledge axiom K _i φ → φ and some minimal conditions concerning common knowledge in a group. Knowledge is explicit and all forms of the logical omniscience problem are avoided. Various stronger epistemic properties such as positive and/or negative introspection, the K-axiom, closure under logical connectives, etc. can be restored by imposing additional semantic constraints. This yields corresponding sublogics for which we present sound and complete axiomatizations. As a useful tool for general model constructions we study abstract versions of some 3-valued logics in which we interpret truth as knowledge. We establish a connection between \({\in_K}\) and the well-known syntactic approach to explicit knowledge proving a result concerning equi-expressiveness. Furthermore, we discuss some self-referential epistemic statements, such as the knower paradox, as relaxations of variants of the liar paradox and show how these epistemic “paradoxes” can be solved in \({\in_K}\). Every specific \({\in_K}\)-logic is defined as a certain extension of some underlying classical abstract logic.     

Public announcement logic with distributed knowledge: expressivity,completeness and complexity

While dynamic epistemic logics with common knowledge have been extensively studied, dynamic epistemic logics with distributed knowledge have so far received far less attention. In this paper we study extensions of public announcement logic (\(\mathcal{PAL }\)) with distributed knowledge, in particular their expressivity, axiomatisations and complexity. \(\mathcal{PAL }\) extended only with distributed knowledge is not more expressive than standard epistemic logic with distributed knowledge. Our focus is therefore on \(\mathcal{PACD }\), the result of adding both common and distributed knowledge to \(\mathcal{PAL }\), which is more expressive than each of its component logics. We introduce an axiomatisation of \(\mathcal{PACD }\), which is not surprising: it is the combination of well-known axioms. The completeness proof, however, is not trivial, and requires novel combinations and extensions of techniques for dealing with \(S5\) knowledge, distributed knowledge, common knowledge and public announcements at the same time. We furthermore show that \(\mathcal{PACD }\) is decidable, more precisely that it is \(\textsc {exptime}\)-complete. This result also carries over to \(\mathcal{S 5\mathcal CD }\) with common and distributed knowledge operators for all coalitions (and not only the grand coalition). Finally, we propose a notion of a trans-bisimulation to generalise certain results and give deeper insight into the proofs.     

Duality Theory and Skeleta for Semisimple MV-Algebras

We start from Marra–Spada duality between semisimple MV-algebras and Tychonoff spaces, and we consider the particular cases when the \(\omega \)-skeleta of the MV-algebras are restricted in some way. In particular we consider antiskeletal MV-algebras, that is, the ones whose \(\omega \)-skeleton is trivial.     

Modality,Quantification, and Many Vlach-Operators

Consider two standard quantified modal languages \(\textbf{\textsf{A}}\) and \(\textbf{\textsf{P}}\) whose vocabularies comprise the identity predicate and the existence predicate, each endowed with a standard S5 Kripke semantics where the models have a distinguished actual world, which differ only in that the quantifiers of \(\textbf{\textsf{A}}\) are actualist while those of \(\textbf{\textsf{P}}\) are possibilist. Is it possible to enrich these languages in the same manner, in a non-trivial way, so that the two resulting languages are equally expressive—i.e., so that for each sentence of one language there is a sentence of the other language such that given any model, the former sentence is true at the actual world of the model iff the latter is? Forbes (1989) shows that this can be done by adding to both languages a pair of sentential operators called Vlach-operators, and imposing a syntactic restriction on their occurrences in formulas. As Forbes himself recognizes, this restriction is somewhat artificial. The first result I establish in this paper is that one gets sameness of expressivity by introducing infinitely many distinct pairs of indexed Vlach-operators. I then study the effect of adding to our enriched modal languages a rigid actuality operator. Finally, I discuss another means of enriching both languages which makes them expressively equivalent, one that exploits devices introduced in Peacocke (1978). Forbes himself mentions that option but does not prove that the resulting languages are equally expressive. I do, and I also compare the Peacockian and the Vlachian methods. In due course, I introduce an alternative notion of expressivity and I compare the Peacockian and the Vlachian languages in terms of that other notion.     

Epistemic modals and informational consequence

Recently, Yalcin (Epistemic modals. Mind, 116, 983–1026, 2007) put forward a novel account of epistemic modals. It is based on the observation that sentences of the form ‘\({\phi}\) &; Might \({\neg\phi}\) ’ do not embed under ‘suppose’ and ‘if’. Yalcin concludes that such sentences must be contradictory and develops a notion of informational consequence which validates this idea. I will show that informational consequence is inadequate as an account of the logic of epistemic modals: it cannot deal with reasoning from uncertain premises. Finally, I offer an alternative way of explaining the relevant linguistic data.     

Arithmetical Soundness and Completeness for $$\varvec{\Sigma }_{\varvec{2}}$$ Numerations

We prove that for each recursively axiomatized consistent extension T of Peano Arithmetic and \(n \ge 2\), there exists a \(\Sigma _2\) numeration \(\tau (u)\) of T such that the provability logic of the provability predicate \(\mathsf{Pr}_\tau (x)\) naturally constructed from \(\tau (u)\) is exactly \(\mathsf{K}+ \Box (\Box ^n p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Box p\). This settles Sacchetti’s problem affirmatively.