Ease‐of‐retrieval effects on procedural justice judgements under conditions of informational and personal uncertainty

This study tests whether individuals' reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval processes when forming procedural justice judgements are moderated by informational and personal uncertainty. In Studies 1 and 2 we examined the predicted effects of informational uncertainty. Results indicated that participants in information‐uncertain conditions relied on ease‐of‐retrieval, whereas those in information‐certain conditions relied on content information to make procedural justice judgements. In Study 3 we examined the combined effects of informational uncertainty and personal uncertainty on reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval when forming procedural justice judgements. The findings of Study 3 indicated that personal uncertain participants who were in informational certain conditions based their procedural justice judgements on content information, whereas all other participants based their procedural justice judgements on ease‐of‐retrieval. This is the first paper to demonstrate that the joint effect of informational uncertainty and personal uncertainty on reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval is different from the two uncertainties acting alone.     

Statistical contingency has a different impact on preparation judgements than on causal judgements

Previous studies on causal learning showed that judgements about the causal effect of a cue on an outcome depend on the statistical contingency between the presence of the cue and the outcome. We demonstrate that statistical contingency has a different impact on preparation judgements (i.e., judgements about the usefulness of responses that allow one to prepare for the outcome). Our results suggest that preparation judgements primarily reflect information about the outcome in prior situations that are identical to the test situation. These findings also add to previous evidence showing that people can use contingency information in a flexible manner depending on the type of test question.     

Metacomprehension judgements reflect the belief that diagrams improve learning from text

In two experiments we systematically explored whether people consider the format of text materials when judging their text learning, and whether doing so might inappropriately bias their judgements. Participants studied either text with diagrams (multimedia) or text alone and made both per-paragraph judgements and global judgements of their text learning. In Experiment 1 they judged their learning to be better for text with diagrams than for text alone. In that study, however, test performance was greater for multimedia, so the judgements may reflect either a belief in the power of multimedia or on-line processing. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and also included a third group that read texts with pictures that did not improve text performance. Judgements made by this group were just as high as those made by participants who received the effective multimedia format. These results confirm the hypothesis that people's metacomprehension judgements can be influenced by their beliefs about text format. Over-reliance on this multimedia heuristic, however, might reduce judgement accuracy in situations where it is invalid.     

Organic Unities

I defend the view that there are organic unities mainly by presenting examples of organic unities. I also defend the view against two objections. The first objection appeals to the notion of an evaluatively incomplete state of affairs. The second objection holds that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs can be different in different contexts. I argue that neither objection provides a compelling reason for rejecting these examples.     

Stochastic pairwise comparative judgements and direct ratings of alternatives in the REMBRANDT system

The REMBRANDT system for multicriteria decision analysis consists of both the multiplicative variant of the AHP (which employs a method of pairwise comparative judgements by a decision maker to arrive at final impact scores for the alternatives under consideration) and SMART, the simple multiattribute rating technique (which utilizes direct rating of alternatives to achieve final impact scores). This paper examines the effect of imprecision or uncertainty in the decision maker's pairwise judgements or ratings of alternatives by expressing each pairwise judgement or rating as a probability distribution, and the structure of REMBRANDT's component models is exploited to derive interval judgements or interval ratings of the alternatives’ final impact scores. These interval judgements or interval ratings can be used to determine the probability of rank reversal amongst alternatives, i.e. to assess the stability of the final impact score vector. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Paraconsistent Solution to the Problem of Moral Dilemmas

Abstract

Moral dilemmas - situations in which an agent has a moral requirement to do each of two acts but cannot do both - seem to suggest some kind of inconsistency. I argue that the inconsistency felt intuitively is actually a logical inconsistency, and then go on to show that we can neither deny the existence of moral dilemmas nor give up the deontic principles involved in the deduction of a contradiction, as both our moral judgements and the deontic principles depend on intuitions that form the basis of our morality. Rather than rejecting our intuitions and thus undermining morality, I suggest regarding moral dilemmas as situations in which a contradiction is not only false, but at the same time true. Finally, the view that moral dilemmas are an example of true contradictions - so-called dialetheias - leads to the application of paraconsistent logic to moral judgements.     

AESTHETIC JUDGEMENTS, ARTWORKS AND FUNCTIONAL BEAUTY

I offer an analysis of the role played by consideration of an item's functions when it is judged aesthetically. The account applies also to artworks, of which some serve extrinsic functions (such as the glorification of God and the communication of religious lore) and others have the function of being contemplated for their own sake alone. Along the way, I deny that aesthetic judgements fit the model of judgements either of free beauty or of dependent beauty, given how these two came to be described in the early twentieth century.     

Social Judgement Theory and Medical Judgement

Social judgement theory is particularly well suited to the study of medical judgements. Medical judgements characteristically involve decision making under uncertainty with inevitable error and an abundance of fallible cues. In medicine, as in other areas, SJT research has found wide variation among decision makers in their judgements and in the weighting of clinical information. Strategies inferred from case vignettes differ from physicians' self-described strategies and from the weights suggested by experts. These observations parallel recent findings of unexplained variation in diagnosis and management in clinical practice that have been the source of concern in the medical community. The lens model provides one of the few methods for quantitatively analysing physicians' judgements. Contrary to what one might expect from the variation in strategies on paper cases, several studies suggest that, in practice, physicians' diagnostic judgements are highly accurate. Cognitive feedback has been less successful as a practical teaching tool than originally hoped, but some aspects of this methodology show promise, particularly in conjunction with the increasing emphasis on statistical decision support. All things considered, SJT has provided insight into physicians' decisions and gives the medical research community important tools for studying judgements in actual practice.     

Contiguity and the outcome density bias in action-outcome contingency judgements

In cause-outcome contingency judgement tasks, judgements often reflect the actual contingency but are also influenced by the overall probability of the outcome, P(O). Action-outcome instrumental learning tasks can foster a pattern in which judgements of positive contingencies become less positive as P(O) increases. Variable contiguity between the action and the outcome may produce this bias. Experiment 1 recorded judgements of positive contingencies that were largely uninfluenced by P(O) using an immediate contiguity procedure. Experiment 2 directly compared variable versus constant contiguity. The predicted interaction between contiguity and P(O) was observed for positive contingencies. These results stress the sensitivity of the causal learning mechanism to temporal contiguity.     

On the influence of affective states on intuitive coherence judgements

Recent research has shown that coherence judgements of semantically related word triads are facilitated by a subtle positive response triggered by their increased fluency of processing. Such positive affective response serves as a cue indicating semantic coherence. However, we argue that the fluency of processing is not the only source of affective response that can influence intuitive judgements. The present study investigated differential influences of mood and affective valence of solution words on intuitive coherence judgements. We show that affective cues resulting from processing fluency can be strengthened or weakened by inducing positive or negative affective response through the activation of solutions to semantically coherent triads. Also, mood is shown to impact the breadth of activated associations therefore affecting not only judgements of semantic coherence but also solvability of word triads. We discuss the implications of our findings for how people might form intuitive judgements of semantic coherence.     

On the influence of affective states on intuitive coherence judgements

Recent research has shown that coherence judgements of semantically related word triads are facilitated by a subtle positive response triggered by their increased fluency of processing. Such positive affective response serves as a cue indicating semantic coherence. However, we argue that the fluency of processing is not the only source of affective response that can influence intuitive judgements. The present study investigated differential influences of mood and affective valence of solution words on intuitive coherence judgements. We show that affective cues resulting from processing fluency can be strengthened or weakened by inducing positive or negative affective response through the activation of solutions to semantically coherent triads. Also, mood is shown to impact the breadth of activated associations therefore affecting not only judgements of semantic coherence but also solvability of word triads. We discuss the implications of our findings for how people might form intuitive judgements of semantic coherence.     

Face encoding is not categorical: Consistent evidence across multiple types of contingent aftereffects

ABSTRACT

Race-contingent aftereffects indicate that faces of different races are encoded via dissociable visual channels. Race-contingent aftereffects reflect perceptions of typicality, indicating a gradual transition of activity across channels as faces change from looking more typical of one race to the other We examine whether faces forming more discrete categories (sex: male/female; species: human/monkey) are encoded in a similar fashion, or whether they are instead encoded via more dichotomous categorical judgements. Curves representing the rate of change of aftereffect magnitude as stimuli changed from male to female produced shallow slopes, closely resembling ratings of typicality, but differing significantly from slopes for categorical judgements. For species, aftereffect slopes were significantly shallower than both ratings of typicality and categorical judgements. Overall, these results suggest that the encoding of facial properties such as these is not categorical, but instead involves a graded response as stimulus typicality varies. Aftereffect slopes were similar across the two experiments, raising the possibility of a common system that is recruited during contingent adaptation, regardless of the specific dimension involved or the categories used by the experimenter.     

Cognitive control and attentional functions

Cognitive control is essential to flexible, goal-directed behavior under uncertainty, yet its underlying mechanisms are not clearly understood. Because attentional functions are known to allocate mental resources and prioritize the information to be processed, we propose that the attentional functions of alerting, orienting, and executive control and the interactions among them contribute to cognitive control in the service of uncertainty reduction. To test this hypothesis, we examined the relationship between cognitive control and attentional functions. We used the Majority Function Task (MFT) to manipulate uncertainty in order to evoke cognitive control along with the Revised Attention Network Test (ANT-R) to measure the efficiency and the interactions of attentional functions. A backwards, stepwise regression model revealed that performance on the MFT could be significantly predicted by attentional functions and their interactions as measured by the ANT-R. These results provide preliminary support for our theory that the attentional functions are involved in the implementation of cognitive control as required to reduce uncertainty, though further investigation is needed.     

Marshall and Parsons on 'Intrinsic'

Dan Marshall and Josh Parsons note, correctly, that the property of being either a cube or accompanied by a cube is incorrectly classified as intrinsic under the definition we have given unless it turns out to be disjunctive. Whether it is disjunctive, under the definition we gave, turns on certain judgements of the relative naturalness of properties. They doubt the judgements of relative naturalness that would classify their property as disjunctive. We disagree. They also suggest that the whole idea of judging relative naturalness is a dubious business. We reply that, like them or not, such judgements cannot easily be avoided.     

Effects of stimulus order on discrimination processes in comparative and equality judgements: Data and models

In typical discrimination experiments, participants are presented with a constant standard and a variable comparison stimulus and their task is to judge which of these two stimuli is larger (comparative judgement). In these experiments, discrimination sensitivity depends on the temporal order of these stimuli (Type B effect) and is usually higher when the standard precedes rather than follows the comparison. Here, we outline how two models of stimulus discrimination can account for the Type B effect, namely the weighted difference model (or basic Sensation Weighting model) and the Internal Reference Model. For both models, the predicted psychometric functions for comparative judgements as well as for equality judgements, in which participants indicate whether they perceived the two stimuli to be equal or not equal, are derived and it is shown that the models also predict a Type B effect for equality judgements. In the empirical part, the models' predictions are evaluated. To this end, participants performed a duration discrimination task with comparative judgements and with equality judgements. In line with the models' predictions, a Type B effect was observed for both judgement types. In addition, a time-order error, as indicated by shifts of the psychometric functions, and differences in response times were observed only for the equality judgement. Since both models entail distinct additional predictions, it seems worthwhile for future research to unite the two models into one conceptual framework.     

Effects of signal uncertainty on statistical decisions

The experimental task involved statistical judgements about parameters of a random sample of dots displayed sequentially from a ‘signal’ or ‘noise’ distribution. Signal uncertainty was introduced by presenting small signal subsets of dots within larger observation sequences. Observer detection performance was adversely affected by this kind of signal uncertainty, but in the same way and to similar extent as that expected on the basis of ‘ideal’ and ‘independent’ statistical decision strategies.     

When do auditory/visual differences in duration judgements occur?

Four experiments examined judgements of the duration of auditory and visual stimuli. Two used a bisection method, and two used verbal estimation. Auditory/visual differences were found when durations of auditory and visual stimuli were explicitly compared and when durations from both modalities were mixed in partition bisection. Differences in verbal estimation were also found both when people received a single modality and when they received both. In all cases, the auditory stimuli appeared longer than the visual stimuli, and the effect was greater at longer stimulus durations, consistent with a “pacemaker speed” interpretation of the effect. Results suggested that Penney, Gibbon, and Meck's (2000) “memory mixing” account of auditory/visual differences in duration judgements, while correct in some circumstances, was incomplete, and that in some cases people were basing their judgements on some preexisting temporal standard.     

The Problem of Counterfactuals in Substituted Judgement Decision‐Making

The standard by which we apply decision‐making for those unable to do so for themselves is an important practical ethical issue with substantial implications for the treatment and welfare of such individuals. The approach to proxy or surrogate decision‐making based upon substituted judgement is often seen as the ideal standard to aim for but suffers from a need to provide a clear account of how to determine the validity of the proxy's judgements. Proponents have responded to this demand by providing the truth‐conditions for the substituted judgement in terms of counterfactual reasoning using a possible worlds semantics. In this paper, I show how these underpinnings fail to support the substituted judgement approach as a reasonable standard for decision‐making. Firstly, I show how this counterfactual element has been poorly interpreted. I then explain how various accounts have failed to reflect problems and limitations associated with providing an interpretation of their truth‐conditions using counterfactuals. Finally, I argue that, even when we attend to the initial problems of providing a counterfactual analysis, it still deeply problematic as a means of determining the validity of substituted judgements for two main reasons. Firstly, making determinate judgements as to the truth‐value of these judgements will often not be possible and, secondly, there is a strong requirement when interpreting many counterfactual claims to charitably accede to their being true. I conclude that substituted judgements, as interpreted through counterfactual reasoning and possible worlds semantics, do not therefore provide an adequate standard for surrogate decision‐making.     

Is subjective shortening in human memory unique to time representations?

Three experiments compared forgetting of the duration of a bar-like visual stimulus with forgetting of its length. The main aim of the experiments was to investigate whether subjective shortening (a decrease in the subjective magnitude of a stimulus as its retention interval increased) was observable in length judgements as well as in time judgements, where subjective shortening has been often observed previously. On all trials of the three experiments, humans received two briefly presented coloured bars, separated by adelay ranging from 1 to 10 s, and the bars could differ in length, duration of presentation, or both. In Experiment 1 two groups of subjects made either length or duration judgements, and subjective shortening-type forgetting functions were observed only for duration. Experiments 2 and 3 used the same general procedure, but the stimuli judged could differ both in length and duration within a trial, and different subject groups (Experiment 2) or the same subjects in two conditions (Experiment 3) made either length or duration judgements of stimuli, which were on average physically identical. Subjective shortening was only found with duration, and never with length, supporting the view that subjective shortening may be unique to time judgements.     

IRTree models with ordinal and multidimensional decision nodes for response styles and trait-based rating responses

IRTree models decompose observed rating responses into sequences of theory-based decision nodes, and they provide a flexible framework for analysing trait-related judgements and response styles. However, most previous applications of IRTree models have been limited to binary decision nodes that reflect qualitatively distinct and unidimensional judgement processes. The present research extends the family of IRTree models for the analysis of response styles to ordinal judgement processes for polytomous decisions and to multidimensional parametrizations of decision nodes. The integration of ordinal judgement processes overcomes the limitation to binary nodes, and it allows researchers to test whether decisions reflect qualitatively distinct response processes or gradual steps on a joint latent continuum. The extension to multidimensional node models enables researchers to specify multiple judgement processes that simultaneously affect the decision between competing response options. Empirical applications highlight the roles of extreme and midpoint response style in rating judgements and show that judgement processes are moderated by different response formats. Model applications with multidimensional decision nodes reveal that decisions among rating categories are jointly informed by trait-related processes and response styles.