How to be a structuralist all the way down

This paper considers the nature and role of axioms from the point of view of the current debates about the status of category theory and, in particular, in relation to the “algebraic” approach to mathematical structuralism. My aim is to show that category theory has as much to say about an algebraic consideration of meta-mathematical analyses of logical structure as it does about mathematical analyses of mathematical structure, without either requiring an assertory mathematical or meta-mathematical background theory as a “foundation”, or turning meta-mathematical analyses of logical concepts into “philosophical” ones. Thus, we can use category theory to frame an interpretation of mathematics according to which we can be structuralists all the way down.     

Normativity is the mother of intention: Wittgenstein, normative practices and neurological representations

To many philosophers, a scientific explanation of our contentful intentional states requires us to identify neurological representations that implement intentional states, and requires a reductive explanation of such representations' contents in terms of objective physical properties. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, however, contentful intentional states are normatively constituted within linguistic, social practices. These cannot be completely accounted for in purely physical terms. I outline this normative thesis, defending it from four objections: that it is not naturalistic, that social norms depend on optional desires to conform, that it over-intellectualizes having intentional states (so excludes animals and infants), and that it cannot account for the causal role of content. I explain the ramifications for scientific psychology and neuroscience, and for interpreting the results of such empirical research. Nothing is objectively a contentful representation, yet some brain states or processes can be normatively constituted as representations with content.     

Doing it all Bass-Ackwards: The development of hierarchical factor structures from the top down

A simple method is presented for examining the hierarchical structure of a set of variables, based on factor scores from rotated solutions involving one to many factors. The correlations among orthogonal factor scores from adjoining levels can be viewed as path coefficients in a hierarchical structure. The method is easily implemented using any of a wide variety of standard computer programs, and it has proved to be extremely useful in a number of diverse applications, some of which are here described.     

Correction to: The Sources of Political Normativity: the Case for Instrumental and Epistemic Normativity in Political Realism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice -     

Naturalism, Reduction and Normativity: Pressing from Below

David Papineau's model of scientific reduction, contrary to his intent, appears to enable a naturalist realist account of the primitive normativity involved in a biological adaptation's being "for" this or that (say the eye's being for seeing). By disabling the crucial anti-naturalist arguments against any such reduction, his model would support a cogni-tivist semantics for normative claims like "The heart is for pumping blood, and defective if it doesn't." No moral claim would follow, certainly. Nonetheless, by thus "pressing from below" we may learn something about moral normativity. For instance, suppose non-cognitivists like Mackie are right that the semantics of normative claims should be "unified": if the semantics of moral claims is non-cognitivist, so too is that of all normative claims. Then, assuming that a naturalist reduction does yield a sound cognitivist account of the primitive normativity, it would follow that our semantics of moral claims is cognitivist as well.     

The Sources of Political Normativity: the Case for Instrumental and Epistemic Normativity in Political Realism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - This article argues that political realists have at least two strategies to provide distinctively political normative judgements that have nothing to do with...     

规范性、唯物论与历史唯物论——评徐英瑾的新著《唯物论者何以言规范》

如何从自然主义或唯物论的角度刻画规范性,是当代哲学的许多领域都共同关心的议题。徐英瑾提出,唯物论所需要的规范性理论,就是将其刻画为"功能实现的完成度"。这样既肯定了规范性是自然律和因果性存在的逻辑衍生物,同时又保证其相对独立性。然而,对规范性的功能主义解释将不可避免地深陷于"结构"与"行动"的不平衡关系,在呈现人类的理性能动性方面有所缺漏。一种更为优越的规范性理论,将不能仅仅奠基于一般的唯物论视角,而须以历史唯物论的眼光处理个体与整体、结构与行动之间的张力关系。     

How to Distinguish Good and Bad Arguments: Dialogico-Rhetorical Normativity

Deductivism is not merely a logical technique, but also a theory of normativity: it provides an objective and universal standard of evaluation. Contemporary dialectical logic rejects deductive normativity, replacing its universal standard by an intersubjective standard. It is argued in this paper that dialectical normativity does not improve upon deductive normativity. A dialogico-rhetorical alternative is proposed.