Learning to like or dislike by association: No need for contingency awareness

One way to learn to like or dislike a neutral target stimulus is through associations with positive or negative context stimuli. The present research investigates whether people need to be aware of the association between a target and a context stimulus (i.e., contingency aware) in order for associative learning of likes and dislikes to occur. We predicted that awareness of the association between context and target is necessary when target novelty is low, but not when target novelty is high. We conducted two experiments in which we varied target novelty and measured contingency awareness using a picture-bound recognition task. This allowed us to separately investigate evaluative conditioning for “contingency awareness” and “contingency unawareness” context–target pairs. The results show, as predicted, that awareness of the association between context and target is needed for low-novelty targets but not needed for high-novelty targets.     

The duality of virtue: Deconstructing the moral hypocrite

The present study examined the processes giving rise to moral hypocrisy, a phenomenon in which individuals judge their own transgressions to be less morally objectionable than the same transgressions enacted by others. Two alternative models of the source of hypocrisy were compared to determine whether hypocrisy results from automatic or volitional biases. Findings demonstrated not only that participants viewed their own transgressions as significantly more “fair” than the same transgressions enacted by others, but also that this bias was eliminated under conditions of cognitive constraint. These findings support the view that hypocrisy stems from volitionally-guided justifications, and thereby suggest that at a more basic level, humans possess a negative response to violations of fairness norms whether enacted by themselves or others.     

Eating disorder NOS (EDNOS): an example of the troublesome "not otherwise specified" (NOS) category in DSM-IV

The “Not Otherwise Specified” (NOS) category within DSM-IV is designed for disorders of clinical severity that are not specified within broad diagnostic classes. “NOS” diagnoses are intended to be residual categories and they tend to be neglected by researchers. This can be inappropriate. The problems associated with certain NOS diagnoses are well illustrated by “Eating Disorder NOS” (sometimes termed EDNOS), which is the most common category of eating disorder encountered in routine clinical practice yet it has barely been studied. Indeed, there has been no research on its treatment. Interim and longer-term conceptual and practical solutions to the anomalous status of eating disorder NOS are proposed including the creation of a new diagnosis termed “mixed eating disorder”. Several of these solutions are of relevance to NOS categories in general. All the solutions should fulfil criteria for clinical utility.     

Would I lie to you? “leakage” in deceptive facial expressions relates to psychopathy and emotional intelligence

This was the first investigation of individual differences in adopting deceptive universal emotional expressions. We hypothesized that psychopathic traits would lead to a heightened ability to suppress emotional expressions and exhibit less “leakage” of inconsistent emotions during deceptive displays. Further, we predicted that emotional intelligence (EI) would lead to a heightened ability to simulate emotional expressions. Participants (N = 100) viewed emotionally arousing (happy, sad, fearful, disgusting) images, responding to each with a genuine or deceptive expression. Each video frame (30/sec) was coded for emotion (in)consistent with the intended expression (365,550 frames coded for 2437 expressions). As predicted, psychopathic traits - specifically, high levels of interpersonal manipulation - were related to shorter durations of unintended emotional “leakage” during deceptive expressions. In contrast, the erratic lifestyle element of psychopathy predicted greater emotional inconsistency during deceptive displays. Individuals higher in EI - specifically, the ability to perceive and express emotion - feigned emotions more convincingly than others but were not more immune to emotional leakage.     

Interpersonal cognitive self-focus as a function of neuroticism: Basal tendencies and priming effects

Self-focus is one mechanism that may account for the social-evaluative anxiety of individuals high in neuroticism. The present two studies (total N = 183) sought to cognitively model interpersonal self-focus. The cognitive task was a simple one in which participants simply categorized dyadic interpersonal pronouns, with reaction times as the dependent measure. When others engage us, the pronoun “me” refers to the other and the pronoun “you” refers to the self. Study 1 found a neuroticism by pronoun interaction on categorization time consistent with implicit interpersonal self-focus at high (but not low) levels of neuroticism establishing a basal tendency. Study 2 examined boundary conditions. Individuals high in neuroticism exhibited implicit self-focus particularly to the extent that they had been primed to think of themselves as submissive rather than dominant in their interpersonal interactions. Implications for understanding neuroticism, self-focus, and relationship functioning are discussed.     

Teachers' and education students' perceptions of and reactions to children with and without the diagnostic label "ADHD"

Thirty-four elementary school teachers and 32 education students from Canada rated their reactions towards vignettes describing children who met attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptom criteria that included or did not include the label “ADHD.” “ADHD”-labeled vignettes elicited greater perceptions of the child's impairment as well as more negative emotions and less confidence in the participants, although it also increased participants' willingness to implement treatment interventions. Ratings were similar to vignettes of boys versus girls; however, important differences in ratings between teachers and education students emerged and are discussed. Finally, we investigated the degree to which teachers' professional backgrounds influenced bias based on the label “ADHD.” Training specific to ADHD consistently predicted label bias, whereas teachers' experience working with children with ADHD did not.     

Cheapened altruism: Discounting personally affected prosocial actors

Are charitable donors always perceived as charitable? Three studies suggest that although having a personal connection to a cause motivates much charitable giving, donors who have been personally affected by the target cause are given less “credit” for their donations, i.e., are perceived as less intrinsically charitable. These donors are perceived as having selfish motivations even when they have nothing economic or social to gain from the donation. More specifically, personally-affected donors are perceived as driven by emotional selfishness, or a desire to improve their own hedonic state rather a desire to improve the welfare of others, which lessens the charitable credit that they receive. In addition, although donors who have been personally affected by the target cause are seen as less charitable, they are perceived more favorably in other ways (e.g., more loyal).     

Parental Meta-Emotion Philosophy and Emotion Coaching in Families of Children and Adolescents with an Anxiety Disorder

Using a multi-method approach, this study examined differences in parental meta-emotional philosophy (including, parental emotional awareness and emotion coaching) for families with anxiety disordered (AD; n = 74) and non-AD (n = 35) children (aged 7 to 15). Further, it was investigated whether children’s emotion regulation (ER) varied across the AD and non-AD groups. Parent(s) were interviewed about their awareness of emotions and emotion coaching; completed a battery of questionnaires that included a measure assessing children’s emotion regulation; and engaged in a parent-child discussion task. Results indicated that compared to parents of non-AD youth, parents of AD youth were less aware of their own emotions and their children’s emotions, and these results varied by emotion type. Parents of AD youth engaged in significantly less emotion coaching than parents of non-AD youth. AD youth were identified as having significantly greater difficulty regulating their emotions when compared to non-AD youth. Implications for the role of parental meta-emotional philosophy and AD youth’s emotion regulation are discussed.     

Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: still compatibilists

Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we investigated intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘performance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best fit our data.     

Implicit and explicit emotional behavior and mindfulness

The objective of this study was to examine whether the “step back and watch” attitude of mindfulness manifests in less emotional behavior. We hypothesized that the “acceptance” facet of mindfulness, but not the “presence” facet, is negatively associated with the magnitude of emotional behavior in four tests, i.e., (1) rating of words, (2) rating of aversive and neutral pictures, and (3) evaluative conditioning (EC). Additionally, we hypothesized that (4) the acceptance facet is associated with increased reaction time (RT) in an emotional Stroop test, and that the presence facet is associated with decreased RT and lower error rate. The sample consisted of N = 247 non-clinical adults and was tested in a cross-sectional study. The results provide partial evidence that the acceptance facet of mindfulness may be associated with less aversive reactions towards aversive stimuli. Future studies should substantiate these findings but also determine their clinical relevance.     

Contagious resource depletion and anxiety? Spreading effects of evaluative concern and impression formation in dyadic social interaction

Two studies examined how adopting an impression formation or evaluative concern mindset affects individuals' own and their interaction partner's experience of potentially stressful social exchanges, such as first meeting situations and interethnic interaction. Our main hypothesis was that adopting an impression formation mindset would, by diverting individuals' focus away from themselves and toward others, reduce both their own and their partner's cognitive resource depletion and negative affect. Consistent with predictions, positive effects of impression formation were evident and were “contagious” in that they were evident across individuals who received the mindset instructions and their partners, who were unaware of the manipulation. The positive effects of impression formation instructions were generally evident both in comparison to evaluative concern instructions, which provided similar structure, and in comparison to no instructions at all. Thus, adopting an impression formation mindset seems an effective strategy for minimizing negative outcomes experienced in stressful social interactions.     

Religion is natural, atheism is not: On why everybody is both right and wrong

After discussing evidence of irreligion and the rise of the so called “New Atheism”, the authors refute the claim that this poses a problem for the cognitive science of religion and its hypothesis that religion is natural. The “naturalness hypothesis” is not deterministic but probabilistic and thus leaves room for atheism. This, the authors maintain, is true of both the by-product and adaptationist stances within the cognitive science of religion. In this context the authors also discuss the memetic or “unnaturalness” hypothesis, i.e. that religion is a “virus of the mind”. The authors criticize accounts of atheism offered by cognitive scientists of religion as being based on unfounded assumptions about the psychology of atheists, and object to the notion that the natural aspects of religion by corollary make atheism unnatural. By considering human cognition in a semiotic framework and emphasizing its natural ability to take part in semiotic systems of signs, atheism emerges as a natural, cognitive strategy. The authors argue that to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness) hypotheses of religion must be merged. Finally, a preliminary analysis of the “New Atheism” is offered in terms of semiotic and cognitive dynamics.     

The influence of cognitive emotion regulation strategies and depression severity on deliberate self-harm

Elaborating on previous studies on emotion regulation and deliberate self-harm (DSH), in the present study we distinguish between strategies of cognitive content (e.g., suicidal cognitions of perceived burdensomeness, helplessness, poor distress tolerance) and cognitive process (e.g., nonacceptance of emotional responses, lack of awareness of emotional responses). Young women who harmed themselves (n = 85) were compared with young women without a history of DSH (n = 93) across a broad range of strategies. Significant group differences were found for all measures, even when depression severity was controlled for. In addition, logistic regression analyses showed that both cognitive content strategies and cognitive process strategies made significant independent contributions to the prediction of group membership. Controlling for depression severity, suicidal cognitions, and nonacceptance of emotional responses independently predicted DSH. The strong association between suicidal cognitions and DSH seems to indicate the important role of these cognitions in recurrent and chronic DSH. The strong association between nonacceptance of emotional responses and DSH underscores the notion that DSH can be a way to avoid emotional problems. These findings are discussed in relation to recent cognitive-behavioral interventions and specific therapeutic techniques to further insight into how these interventions might work.     

A model of art perception, evaluation and emotion in transformative aesthetic experience

While accounts of “aesthetic” experience inspire art study and drive its cognitive goals the current modeling of art perception, based on the analytic tradition emphasizing successful assimilation of art information, is unable to truly address this phenomenon, leaving us without means of accounting for disruption and fundamental change—either perceptual or self-referential—as well as epiphany and insight, within the experience of art; and no means of addressing ’art’s ability to mark and change lives. To address this, we introduce a five-stage model of art-perception, organized around initial disruption and subsequent meta-cognitive reflection and self-transformation, which allows for this needed discussion of perceptual and conceptual change, and a connection of art-viewing to viewer personality. Based on this, we consider belletristic accounts of aesthetic experience, and discuss the inter-relation of emotional, cognitive and appraisal factors that may be important for objective research.     

Eye'm lovin' it! The role of gazing awareness in mimetic desires

Recent studies showed that people evaluate objects more favorably when these objects are gazed-at by others, an effect coined as “mimetic desire”. In two studies, we tested whether mimetic desire stems from an automatic form of learning by examining one dimension of automaticity, i.e., people's awareness of the object-gaze association. Participants saw 6 neutral art paintings associated with a female gazing toward two of the paintings, away from two of the paintings, and closing her eyes with respect to the last two paintings. After the exposition phase, participants evaluated the paintings and performed a contingency-awareness test. Importantly, participants' responses on this test were genuinely driven by memory and not by inferences from liking. Results show that participants preferred objects that were gazed-at but only when they were aware of the object-gaze association. Hence, despite the adaptive function of joint attention, its impact on valence acquisition does not seem to qualify as an implicit learning process.     

Unawareness of social interaction and emotional control deficits in alzheimer's disease

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to examine unawareness of deficit in Alzheimer's disease (AD) in a previously unexplored functional domain: social interaction and emotional control competency. Impairment of awareness was measured by calculating the degree to which patients and their caregivers disagreed on ratings of patient functioning. to assess potential underlying mechanisms or associated features of social/emotional unawareness, a regression equation examining disease and demographic correlates was created. In addition, to provide a basis of comparison for the social/emotional domain, unawareness of deficit was also assessed in two previously examined domains of functioning (i.e., cognitive and self-care competency). Results revealed that, as compared to caregivers, AD-diagnosed patients overestimated their social/emotional competency but to a lesser extent than they overestimated cognitive and self-care competencies. Regression analysis suggested that impaired awareness of social interaction and emotional control deficits was positively correlated with dementia severity and negatively correlated with education.     

Emotional Competence and Anxiety in Childhood and Adolescence: A Meta-Analytic Review

Anxiety is conceptualized as a state of negative emotional arousal that is accompanied by concern about future threat. The purpose of this meta-analytic review was to evaluate the evidence of associations between emotional competence and anxiety by examining how specific emotional competence domains (emotion recognition, emotion expression, emotion awareness, emotion understanding, acceptance of emotion, emotional self-efficacy, sympathetic/empathic responses to others’ emotions, recognition of how emotion communication and self-presentation affect relationships, and emotion regulatory processes) relate to anxiety in childhood and adolescence. A total of 185 studies were included in a series of meta-analyses (N’s ranged from 573 to 25,711). Results showed that anxious youth are less effective at expressing (r = ?0.15) and understanding emotions (r = ?0.20), less aware of (r = ?0.28) and less accepting of their own emotions (r = ?0.49), and report less emotional self-efficacy (r = ?0.36). More anxious children use more support-seeking coping strategies (r = 0.07) and are more likely to use less adaptive coping strategies including avoidant coping (r = 0.18), externalizing (r = 0.18), and maladaptive cognitive coping (r = 0.34). Emotion acceptance and awareness, emotional self-efficacy, and maladaptive cognitive coping yielded the largest effect sizes. Some effects varied with children’s age. The findings inform intervention and treatment programs of anxiety in youth and identify several areas for future research.     

One size does not fit all: face emotion processing impairments in semantic dementia, behavioural-variant frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer's disease are mediated by distinct cognitive deficits

Patients with frontotemporal dementia (both behavioural variant [bvFTD] and semantic dementia [SD]) as well as those with Alzheimer's disease (AD) show deficits on tests of face emotion processing, yet the mechanisms underlying these deficits have rarely been explored. We compared groups of patients with bvFTD (n = 17), SD (n = 12) or AD (n = 20) to an age- and education-matched group of healthy control subjects (n = 36) on three face emotion processing tasks (Ekman 60, Emotion Matching and Emotion Selection) and found that all three patient groups were similarly impaired. Analyses of covariance employed to partial out the influences of language and perceptual impairments, which frequently co-occur in these patients, provided evidence of different underlying cognitive mechanisms. These analyses revealed that language impairments explained the original poor scores obtained by the SD patients on the Ekman 60 and Emotion Selection tasks, which involve verbal labels. Perceptual deficits contributed to Emotion Matching performance in the bvFTD and AD patients. Importantly, all groups remained impaired on one task or more following these analyses, denoting a primary emotion processing disturbance in these dementia syndromes. These findings highlight the multifactorial nature of emotion processing deficits in patients with dementia.     

Child Saving and the Emergence of Vocational Psychology

Vocational psychology emerged at the beginning of the 20th in a context of social and political change known as the “progressive era.” A popular progressive theme was “child saving,” a movement that expressed concern for the physical, educational, emotional, and social well-being of children and adolescents. Vocational guidance was one manifestation of this and served as the foundation for the emergence first of vocational psychology and later of counseling psychology. The concern for and care of youth was gradually replaced by the professionalization of psychology that over time has changed the focus and direction of vocational psychology.     

Deficits in the ability to recognize one's own affects and those of others: associations with neurocognition, symptoms and sexual trauma among persons with schizophrenia spectrum disorders

While many with schizophrenia experience deficits in metacognition it is unclear whether those deficits are related to other features of illness. To explore this issue, the current study classified participants with schizophrenia as possessing a deficit in both awareness of their own emotions and those of others (n = 30), aware of their own emotions but unaware of the emotions of others (n = 50) and aware of their own emotions and of other’s emotions (n = 17). Groups were compared on assessments of neurocognitive function, symptoms, and history of sexual trauma. ANCOVA controlling for education found that the group unaware of their own emotions and those of others demonstrated poorer verbal memory, processing speed, executive function, less emotional discomfort and higher levels of disorganization symptoms relative to the other groups. The group aware of their own emotions but not those of others had a significantly higher report of childhood sexual abuse.