Comments on “selective attention: Perception or response?“ reply

We cannot understand why Treisman and Geffen (1967) think their experiment argues against our theory (Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963). Briefly, Treisman and Geffen ask subjects to repeat and tap to certain words in one message, played to one ear, and only tap to such words when they occur in another message played to the other ear. They find that subjects neglect the words to which they only have to tap. According to our theory, stimuli with a greater weighting of importance inhibit certain outputs (such as storage, motor response) of the structures processing stimuli with a lesser weighting of importance. Now it seems to be clear that Treisman and Geffen have by their instructions (to tap and repeat one set of words and only to tap to another set of words) produced a situation in which one set of stimuli is given a larger weighting of importance than the other. It is therefore not surprising on our theory that the less important set is almost disregarded. It is instructive here to consider Lawson's (1966) very similar experiment. In this experiment the signals to which the subject has to tap do not also have to be repeated if they occur in the message which is being shadowed. (These signals are non-verbal.) Lawson's results are almost the opposite of Treisman and Geffen's, as would be expected from our theory. Treisman and Geffen have some difficulty in explaining the discrepancy. “It seems that analysis of simple physical signals precedes both the selective filter and the analysis of verbal content in the perceptual sequence, that the bottle-neck in attention arises chiefly in speech recognition where of course the information load is usually much higher. To confirm the belief that the verbal content of the secondary message was not being analysed, we find no evidence whatever of interference from secondary target words when these received no tapping response.” (We quote the last sentence as just one example of the fact that Treisman and Geffen have failed to understand our theory. It is one of the major points of this theory to explain why “secondary” messages do not cause interfernce with the “primary” message while they are being analysed.) To return now to the subject of Lawson's experiments, we would suggest that the outcome of such experiments would be the same if instead of signals, words were used in Lawson's paradigm. These words should occur on both channels and should be distinguishable by another speaking voice. The subject should be asked to respond to, but not to repeat such words. To make sure the subject is not simply responding to differences in timbre, pitch, etc., the target words should be interspersed with other words. Treisman and Geffen could not then postulate differences in information load to explain an unfavourable result.     

“Statistical,” “Practical,” and “Clinical”: How Many Kinds of Significance Do Counselors Need to Consider?

The present article reviews and distinguishes 3 related but different types of significance: “statistical,” “practical,” and “clinical.” A framework for conceptualizing the many “practical” effect size indices is described. Several effect size indices that counseling researchers can use, or that counselors reading the literature may encounter, are summarized. A way of estimating “corrected” intervention effects is proposed. It is suggested that readers should expect authors to report indices of “practical” or “clinical” significance, or both, within their research reports; and it is noted that indeed some journals now require such reports.     

Families of Adolescent Drug Abusers Are “Rigid”: Are These Families Either “Disengaged” or “Enmeshed,” or Both?

The FACES instrument, based on Olson's Circumplex Model of family functioning, was administered to 96 adolescent drug-abuse clients and their parents. The majority of these families categorized themselves as "disengaged" (rather than "enmeshed") on the cohesion dimension, and as "rigid" (rather than "chaotic") on the adaptability dimension. These findings were unexpected as they were substantially different from published findings on families with other types of problems. Family therapists, utilizing Olson's Clinical Rating Scale for the Circumplex Model, characterized significantly more of these same families as "enmeshed," rather than "disengaged." Possible explanations for the difference between the therapists' perceptions and the families' self-perceptions are discussed.     

Is Society “Sick”? Comment on Zerbe Enns's Article

The author responds critically to the argument (Zerbe Enns, 1988) that an integration of “feminist perspectives” within a “family systems” epistemology will advance the latter's treatment of “power” and “equality” issues.     

What's in a Name? The Effects of the Labels “Fat” Versus “Overweight” on Weight Bias1

This research examined the effects of the labels “fat” vs. “overweight” in the expression of weight bias, with the prediction that the label “fat” biases individuals to respond more negatively than does the label “overweight.” In Study 1, participants' attitudes toward people labeled as fat were less favorable than were their attitudes toward people labeled as overweight. In Studies 2 and 3, although participants chose similar‐sized figures to depict fat and overweight targets, weight stereotypes and weight attitudes were more negative toward people labeled as fat than those labeled as overweight. In addition, the endorsement of weight stereotypes mediated the biasing effect of the “fat” label on weight prejudice. Implications of this work for prejudice researchers and for public attitudes are discussed.     

“… And How About Now?”: Effects of Item Redundancy on Contextualized Self‐Reports of Personality

A common method of studying cross-situational variation in personality involves asking people to describe their behavior in several different contexts. Although this approach is intuitively appealing, it introduces a great deal of redundancy into the measurement process and may affect the interpretation of contextualized self-reports. Specifically, when participants are asked the same questions repeatedly in a single questionnaire, they may be compelled to focus on how their behavior is different. We tested this hypothesis by experimentally manipulating the number of contexts that were included in a measure of role-related personality. In 2 experiments (Study 1 N=377, Study 2 N=524), we found that multiple-role questionnaires produced greater variation in trait levels across roles, larger differences between general and role-specific ratings, and weaker correlations between general and role-specific ratings than single-role questionnaires. These findings illustrate how the measurement process can have an effect on the variability of responses to contextualized self-reports.     

Do We “do”?

A normative framework for modeling causal and counterfactual reasoning has been proposed by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993; cf. Pearl, 2000). The framework takes as fundamental that reasoning from observation and intervention differ. Intervention includes actual manipulation as well as counterfactual manipulation of a model via thought. To represent intervention, Pearl employed the do operator that simplifies the structure of a causal model by disconnecting an intervened-on variable from its normal causes. Construing the do operator as a psychological function affords predictions about how people reason when asked counterfactual questions about causal relations that we refer to as undoing, a family of effects that derive from the claim that intervened-on variables become independent of their normal causes. Six studies support the prediction for causal (A causes B) arguments but not consistently for parallel conditional (if A then B) ones. Two of the studies show that effects are treated as diagnostic when their values are observed but nondiagnostic when they are intervened on. These results cannot be explained by theories that do not distinguish interventions from other sorts of events.     

How Do “Religion” and “Spirituality” Differ? Lay Definitions Among Older Adults

Research and public interest in religion and spirituality is on the rise. Consequently, there is an increasing need for rigorously obtained information on what individuals mean when they use these terms. This study examined how 64 older adults living in three retirement communities (including one Christian‐based community), a relatively understudied population, conceptualize religion and spirituality. Participants defined “religion” and “spirituality,” and their narrative definitions were coded and compared using a framework derived from Hill et al.'s (2000) conceptualization of religion and spirituality. Despite considerable overlap, participants' definitions differed on several dimensions. Participants were more likely to associate religion than spirituality with personal beliefs, community affiliation, and organized practices. Moreover, spirituality appeared to be a more abstract concept than religion, and included nontheistic notions of a higher power.     

CAN WE STILL TALK ABOUT “TRUTH” AND “PROGRESS” IN INTERDISCIPLINARY THINKING TODAY?

On a cultural level, and for Christian theology as part of a long tradition in the evolution of religion, evolutionary epistemology “sets the stage,” as it were, for understanding the deep evolutionary impact of our ancestral history on the evolution of culture, and eventually on the evolution of disciplinary and interdisciplinary reflection. In the process of the evolution of human knowledge, our interpreted experiences and expectations of the world (and of the ultimate questions we humans typically pose to the world) have a central role to play. What evolutionary epistemology also shows us is that we humans can indeed take on cognitive goals and ideals that cannot be explained or justified in terms of survival‐promotion or reproductive advantage only. Therefore, once the capacities for rational knowledge, moral sensibility, aesthetic appreciation of beauty, and the propensity for religious belief have emerged in our biological history, they cannot be explained only in biological/evolutionary terms. Finally, in this way a door is opened for seeing problem solving as a central activity of our research traditions. As philosophers of science have argued, one of the most important shared rational resources between even widely divergent disciplines is problem solving as the most central and defining activity of all research traditions. As will become clear, the very diverse reasoning strategies of theology and the sciences clearly overlap in their shared quests for intelligible problem solving, including problem solving on an empirical, experiential, and conceptual level.     

The Market as “God”?

This article explores two lines of inquiry. The first is related to the production of human subjectivities in relation to market ideology and practices. What kinds of human subjectivities are produced when people worship the market as “God”? The market and its values of hyper‐competition become idols as people overly direct their energy toward earning and accumulating financial and social capital in order to find meaning and worth. Worshiping the market reflects a perverted anthropology. The second line of inquiry is related to the language of sacrifice intrinsic to both free market logic and Western Christian theology. Could Christian theology, even unwittingly, reinforce the problem of sacrifice in market logic, which justifies forms of human loss (such as chronic poverty) in order to promote long‐term economic growth and greater human wellbeing?      

WHAT IS “MYTHIC REALITY”?

Abstract. The topic of the March 2011 symposium in Zygon is “The Mythic Reality of the Autonomous Individual.” Yet few of the contributors even discuss “mythic reality.” Of the ones who do, most cavalierly use “myth” dismissively, as simply a false belief. Rather than reconciling myth with reality, they oppose myth to reality. Their view of myth is by no means unfamiliar or unwarranted, but they need to recognize other views of myth and to defend their own. Above all, they need to appreciate the grip that any belief aptly labelled myth has—a grip that holds at least as much for a false belief as for a true one.