Work-Induced Changes in Feelings of Mastery

ABSTRACT

Past theory and research indicate that conditions of work can have lasting effects on job incumbents. R. A. Karasek and T. Theorell (1990) Karasek, R. A. and Theorell, T. 1990. Healthy work: Stress, productivity, and the reconstruction of working life, New York: Basic Books.  [Google Scholar], for example, proposed that workers’ feelings of mastery increase with levels of job demands and job control, and that these effects are mediated by the process of active learning. To test these propositions, 657 school teachers completed scales assessing job demands, control, active learning, and mastery on 2 occasions, 8 months apart. As hypothesized, job control predicted change in mastery, an effect that was mediated by active learning. Job demands had a weaker effect on change in mastery. The demands–mastery relationship was moderated by job control, so that under conditions of high control, but not low control, increasing job demands were associated with gains in mastery. The findings partially support R. A. Karasek and T. Theorell's (1990) predictions regarding the main, interactive, and mediated effects of job conditions on employee mastery.     

Expression of Feelings in Group Counseling

70 high school students in 9 counseling groups were administered outcome instruments for self-evaluation and evaluation by peers. Interaction in counseling was classified according to underlying feeling early and late in the series of 12 sessions. Tests of 6 hypotheses relating feeling changes occurring during counseling to counseling outcomes showed 2 results significant at the .05 level. Change in feeling seemed to correlate more with evaluation by peers than with self-evaluation. The 9 groups were found to differ widely in type and amount of affective interaction. Methodological problems were considered. Discussion focused on implications for counseling practice and on relationships to published research.     

Feelings of knowing in the Ranschburg effect

In two experiments, we assessed feelings of knowing (FOKs) for the Ranschburg effect to examine the types of retrieval ease that affect FOKs. In the Ranschburg effect, retrieval performance for repeated items differs from nonrepeated items in supramemory span tasks. We found that FOKs are affected by memory manipulations that affect recall processes, but not by manipulations that affect recognition. This suggests that processes that affect recognition, such as target familiarity, do not affect FOKs, whereas processes that affect recall, such as response suppression and guessing factors, affect FOKs. We propose that an integrated theory of FOKs must include mechanisms responsive to both encoding and retrieval factors (such as retrieval accessibility and cue familiarity), which are highly susceptible to output interference.     

Mixed Feelings About Mixed Solutions

The numbers problem concerns the question of what is the right thing to do in trade-off cases where one can save different non-overlapping groups of persons, but not everyone. Proponents of mixed solutions argue that both saving the many and holding a lottery to determine whom to save can each be morally right in such cases, depending on the relative sizes of the groups involved. In his book The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson presents an ingenious version of such an approach that avoids a commitment to interpersonal value aggregation, which is highly controversial and rejected by many philosophers for a number of reasons. I criticise Peterson’s proposal by first arguing that it cannot account for the idea that holding a lottery is morally wrong if differences in numbers are very large, and by second pointing out that it relies on implausible assumptions about what is good for an individual. Given the shortcomings of Peterson’s non-aggregationist version of a mixed solution, I next address the issue of how problematic a commitment to interpersonal aggregation really is. To this end, I present an aggregationist version of a mixed solution that is reason-based and bypasses most standard objections to interpersonal value aggregation. I conclude that although there is reason to be optimistic, it remains to be seen whether a mixed solution can be worked out in a fully satisfying way.     

Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings

Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch the plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway. Parties to a group intention so understood can reasonably see the resulting action as "ours" as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately respond to the action's badness with a feeling of guilt, even when they themselves are morally innocent in the matter. I label the feeling in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims about the nature of guilt feelings are thrown into question by my argument.     

Feelings,Imagination and Self-Understanding

Starting from some considerations about the text ‘Feelings in Literature’ by Johansen (2010), this article discusses the topic of emotions from the standpoint of moral psychology, namely the relationship between emotions and the conduct of our moral life. From this assumption, we will argue that literature, as an exercise of imagination, helps us understand and evaluate our own emotions, what is essential for establishing our uniqueness, distinguishing ourselves from others. In literature we can learn about emotions and we can understand our own feelings. Literature plays an important role in cultural experience, triggering emotional responses.     

Explaining the Feelings of Justice

Philosophical theories about justice feelings and axiological feelings generally suffer from the fact that they look for simple criteria of justice, legitimacy, fairness. For this reason, they appear as of little help to account for the findings from sociological empirical studies. Weber's notion of "axiological rationality" can be interpreted as suggesting a "cognitivist" theory of axiological feelings. According to this theory, the causes responsible for the fact that a social actor endorses an axiological statement would not be basically different from the causes responsible for his endorsement of a representational statement. He would endorse the statement "X is fair" as he endorses "X is true", because these statements appear to him as grounded on strong reasons, though he may not perceive these reasons explicitly. This cognitivist theory was used by analysts of collective moral sentiments, as Adam Smith, before Max Weber. A careful examination of two empirical studies shows that the cognitivist theory can make the observational findings more easily understandable. The "cognitivist theory" eliminates the weaknesses of the major general philosophical and sociological theories of axiological feelings. It shows notably that these feelings can be context-dependent without this contextuality making them irrational. This theory includes two major principles: that instrumental rationality does not overlap with rationality shortly; that there are no simple criteria of "fairness", "legitimacy", etc.     

论苏轼的医学情怀

苏轼是我国文学史上罕见的全才,在医学领域也颇有建树.搜集验方,编撰方书;施方舍药,救疗民众;宣传中医,遏制巫风;论述医理,针砭时弊;创建病坊,治疗病因等,对医学知识的宣传和普及以及儒医的产生起到了一定的推动作用,对祖国中医药的发展做出了一定的贡献.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.