共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 62 毫秒
1.
David Phillips 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):457-468
I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
相似文献
David PhillipsEmail: |
2.
Dan Arnold 《Argumentation》2008,22(1):135-147
This paper examines some Indian philosophical arguments that are understandable as transcendental arguments—i.e., arguments
whose conclusions cannot be denied without self-contradiction, insofar as the truth of the claim in question is a condition
of the possibility even of any such denial. This raises the question of what kind of self-contradiction is involved—e.g.,
pragmatic self-contradiction, or the kind that goes with logical necessity. It is suggested that these arguments involve something like practical reason—indeed, that they just are arguments against the primacy of “theoretical reason.” This characterization illuminates a characteristically
Indic appeal to ordinary language.
相似文献
Dan ArnoldEmail: |
3.
Number sense and quantifier interpretation 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
We consider connections between number sense—the ability to judge number—and the interpretation of natural language quantifiers.
In particular, we present empirical evidence concerning the neuroanatomical underpinnings of number sense and quantifier interpretation.
We show, further, that impairment of number sense in patients can result in the impairment of the ability to interpret sentences
containing quantifiers. This result demonstrates that number sense supports some aspects of the language faculty.
相似文献
Robin ClarkEmail: |
4.
Rasmus Thybo Jensen 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):371-388
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational
motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous
preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest
we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance
both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
相似文献
Rasmus Thybo JensenEmail: |
5.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):141-148
Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
相似文献
Peter Godfrey-SmithEmail: |
6.
Gabriele Contessa 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):187-190
In this note, I argue that a dynamically shifted world—i.e. a world identical to our own except for a fixed constant difference
in the absolute acceleration of each object—is nomically impossible in a Newtonian world populated by finitely many objects.
A dynamic shift however seems to be nomically possible in a world populated by infinitely many objects, but only in a broad
sense of nomic possibility.
相似文献
Gabriele ContessaEmail: |
7.
Dan Cavedon-Taylor 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):105-107
Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying
himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands
the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
相似文献
Dan Cavedon-TaylorEmail: |
8.
Alexander A. Guerrero 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(1):59-97
This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,”
which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she
is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that
applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that
supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in
this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.
相似文献
Alexander A. GuerreroEmail: |
9.
David Liggins 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):113-127
Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims
to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical
science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that
this attribution is mistaken. Quine’s argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument
which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of
abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam’s writings reveals some neglected
arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.
相似文献
David LigginsEmail: |
10.
Baron Reed 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):91-104
The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario:
because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is
in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is
another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that
makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies
equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.
相似文献
Baron ReedEmail: |
11.
Kious BM 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(4):213-234
There is currently much concern over the use of pharmaceuticals and other biomedical techniques to enhance athletic performance—a
practice we might refer to as doping. Many justifications of anti-doping efforts claim that doping involves a serious moral
transgression. In this article, I review a number of arguments in support of that claim, but show that they are not conclusive,
suggesting that we do not have good reasons for thinking that doping is wrong.
相似文献
Brent M. KiousEmail: |
12.
Julius Bautista 《Contemporary Islam》2008,2(1):75-83
This paper discusses the extent to which Saba Mahmood’s ideas about Muslim women and agency are relevant for works beyond
her ethnographic speciality. The first part will reflect upon her arguments about Muslim female piety within the larger context
of progressive politics in the USA and the Middle East. The second part will describe the implications of Mahmood’s work towards
the production of alternative discourses—that is, works inspired by and produced from outside the overarching influence of
a Euro-American intellectual tradition.
相似文献
Julius BautistaEmail: |
13.
Garry Young 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):341-360
Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic
distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge
intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting
a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished
from a mere physical ability because they are (1) intentional and (2) knowledge-based; yet these actions fail to satisfy the
criteria for propositional knowledge. It is therefore my contention that there exists a form of intentional action that not
only constitutes a genuine claim to knowledge but, in being irreducible to knowing that, resists the intellectualist argument
for exhaustive epistemic reduction.
相似文献
Garry YoungEmail: |
14.
Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their
opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds
of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether
or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. Our thesis explains
why intuitions play a role in persuasion and inquiry, without conceding that they are evidential. The account also makes predictions
about the structure of intuitions that are confirmed by independent arguments.
相似文献
Bernard MolyneuxEmail: |
15.
Hans Muller 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):109-112
I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world
with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according
to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these
options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously
been recognized.
相似文献
Hans MullerEmail: |
16.
David Enoch 《The Journal of Ethics》2009,13(1):15-50
Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand
how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several
distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating
their merits. My conclusions are rather skeptical: Some of the arguments I discuss fail rather clearly. Others supply with
a challenge to realism, but not one we have any reason to believe realism cannot address successfully. Others beg the question
against the moral realist, and yet others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that—when carefully stated—can be
seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement. Arguments based on moral disagreement itself have almost no weight,
I conclude, against moral realism.
相似文献
David EnochEmail: |
17.
Nick Tosh 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):465-482
Historians must be sensitive to the alienness of the past. Insofar as they are concerned with their actors’ reasoning, they
must (through open-minded empirical investigation) find out how their actors thought, and not assume that they thought like us. This is familiar historiographical advice, but pushed
too far it can be brought to conflict with rather weak assumptions about what historians must presuppose if they are to interpret
their actors at all. The present paper sketches those assumptions, and argues that the influential ‘Strong Program’ in the
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) falls foul of them. We do not argue from the correctness of the assumptions to the
falsity of SSK. Rather, we note the incompatibility, and then show how SSK theorists’ tendency to take interpretation for granted blinds them—and perhaps their readers—to the existence of the conflict.
相似文献
Nick ToshEmail: |
18.
Joseph Shieber 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):169-181
In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss
the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion
KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion,
from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised in favor of the knowledge account, I suggest that neither the
AK nor the KA theses are plausible. That is, I argue that the knowledge account of assertion to which DeRose appeals is in
fact not suitable as an account of assertion. Given that DeRose’s argument stands and falls with the knowledge account, I
claim that the argument therefore fails.
相似文献
Joseph ShieberEmail: |
19.
Timo Kajamies 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):525-534
In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests
on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic
assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress
problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in
fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit
of paramount epistemic values.
相似文献
Timo KajamiesEmail: |
20.
Farrokh B. Sekaleshfar 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(2):161-171
Personhood constitutes the pivotal point in the abortion debate. There exists a diversity of views as to when foetal personhood
actually starts—from conception and implantation to viability and even birth. One perspective that has lost support for decades
is that of quickening, a stance associated with Lord Ellenborough’s 1803 Act. This paper attempts to put quickening back into
the limelight, albeit through a new interpretation. After discussing its philosophy and underpinning rationale, I will assess
a number of arguments that have been directed against quickening as a viable point of distinction. I conclude by suggesting
that according to modern proponents of quickening proponents, rational soul ensoulment begins after a certain degree of cerebral
cortical formation has been realized, thus marking foetal volition, which promotes foetal interests, for the first time.
相似文献
Farrokh B. SekaleshfarEmail: Email: |