Three pioneers of comparative psychology in America, 1843-1890: Lewis H. Morgan,John Bascom,and Joseph LeConte

Scientific comparative psychology in America dates from the mid-1890s, but there is a body of earlier literature on the topic, written during a period of theistic debates over Darwinian evolution. The anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan rejected instinct as an explanation of animal behavior in 1843 and defended the mental similarities between animals and humans, although he was not an evolutionist. John Bascom's textbook Comparative Psychology (1878) is the earliest American work to use that title, and its theistic approach anticipates some arguments found in much later evolutionary works. Beginning in 1860, the geologist Joseph LeConte, who is well known for defending the compatibility of evolution and religion, wrote several articles in which he outlined a comparative evolutionary approach to psychological problems. However, these writers did not establish a coherent research tradition and were ignored by the "New Psychologists" of the 1880s.     

The development of Lewis Henry Morgan's evolutionism

Lewis Henry Morgan never used the term evolution in any of his major sociological works. If he may be labeled an evolutionist, the specificity of his views must be taken into account. The main "evolutionist" issue that concerned him was that of the unity or diversity of the human species. This was an urgent political and theological issue in the America of his day, and it impinged also on research on the American Indians. Morgan's first major study was designed to demonstrate the unity of origin of the American aborigines and their "Asian" origins. His methods were derived from the tradition of Indo-European philology. It was virtually as an afterthought that he added a social evolutionary component to what he conceived of as an exercise in philology. Later he came under the direct influence of the English evolutionists, and this was crucial for the conception of Ancient Society.     

Interviews on Freud and Jung on Freud and Jung with Henry A. Murray in 1965

Henry Murray became one of the legendary figures in the history of American psychology. Not only was he a leading pioneer in the field of personality theory, but he created (with Christiana Morgan) the Thematic Apperception test. He also took a leading role in making psychological profiles for the American government's Office of Strategic Services during World War II. For years Murray headed the Harvard Psychological Clinic, and also worked on the writings of Herman Melville for almost half of his long life. Murray took a wholly independent path from Freudian and Jungian organizations, yet his memories of contact with Freud and Jung are worth recording. These interviews with Murray were conducted in 1965. To take only one example, the circumstances of Jung's getting his honorary degree from Harvard in 1936 are elucidated, as well as Freud's inquiry to Murray about why he himself had missed out on that occasion. A postcript to the interview, illustrating Murray's capacities as a writer, concerns his spirited response to the Princeton philosopher Walter Kaufmann's inquiry about Roazen's account of the 1936 honorary degree in his 1975 Freud and His Followers.     

THE BIOLOGIST AS PSYCHOLOGIST: HENRY FAIRFIELD OSBORN'S EARLY MENTAL ABILITY INVESTIGATIONS

In the early 1880s, biologist Henry Fairfield Osborn conducted some of the first questionnaire research in American psychology. This article details how he came to distribute Francis Galton's questionnaire on mental imagery in the United States, as well as how he altered it to suit his own burgeoning psychological research interests. The development and circulation of questionnaires at the very beginning of American scientific psychology, first by Osborn and later by G. Stanley Hall, is discussed in terms of the new psychology's often‐overlooked methodological plurality. Further, Osborn's late nineteenth century interest in individual variation and group differences in mental imagery ability are discussed in relation to his pervasive educational and social concerns, as well as his eventual status as a prominent eugenicist in the twentieth century United States. This research into mental imagery ability foreshadows the eugenic‐oriented intelligence testing that developed in the early twentieth century.     

未完结的本能：郭任远与中国本能论战

受到达尔文生物进化论的深刻影响, “本能”这一概念在19世纪末至20世纪初逐渐成为人类和动物心理学的核心议题。年轻的中国发展心理生物学家郭任远在美国心理学界掀起了一场声势浩大的反本能运动。返回中国后, 他持续阐发其激进行为主义思想, 推动了“中国现代心理学史上三场争论之一”的本能论战。这场争论不仅促使艾伟、潘菽、高觉敷等心理学家纷纷参与, 还吸引了周建人、李石岑等公共知识分子的目光。郭任远的理论主张与实验工作, 桥接起了本能争论的中国与世界战场, 并激荡起诸多积极、消极与混合反应。论战加速了本能的心理学研究在方法论上从“扶手椅”迈向“实验室”, 也深陷混淆发育解释与进化解释的历史圈套。虽然郭任远及其推动的中国本能论战并没有实现对本能心理学的“完结”, 但却揭示出语义和信仰在科学研究中的认识论价值。这种理论渗透的意识形态最终确立起郭氏在行为科学史上独特的学术地位, 并为本能演变成“未完结”的、开放的科学问题提供动力。     

How Lloyd Morgan's canon backfired

Lloyd Morgan's Canon is usually represented as a brave step towards mechanistic behaviourism. Morgan himself, however, was convinced that the behaviour of animals and humans could only be treated in intentionalist terms. In fact, not only the spirit but the details of his Canon have been consistently misunderstood. It was turned around by Neo-Cartesians within psychology and evolutionary biology to attack the very ground that Morgan shared with Darwin—the assumption that organisms are “no mere puppets in the hand of circumstances.” Morgan did not formulate his Canon in “revolt” against Romanes's anthropomorphic approach to comparative psychology. An examination of Morgan's early views reveals that his Canon represented a move towards, not against, Romanes's idea of an animal psychology. Before the Canon, Morgan had denied the very possibility of a comparative psychology.     

Curt Richter: psychobiology and the concept of instinct

Curt Richter is at the origins of psychobiology in the United States. For Richter the concept of instinct was central to his research. While he had diverse interests that traversed a great range of psychobiology, the concept of instinct was fundamental to his research on specific hungers and the regulation of the internal milieu. Debates about the concept of instinct would last the bulk of Richter's experimental career, culminating in an international conference a decade after the Second World War.     

Henry A. Murray. The making of a psychologist?

The work of Henry A. Murray at the Harvard Psychological Clinic played a major role in shaping the face of American psychology. In particular, he was instrumental in broadening the scope of academic psychology to include such topics as personality, abnormal, and clinical psychologies as viable areas of research. However, by reason of his background and education, Murray had virtually nothing in common with his specialist-trained professional colleagues. This article details Murray's education and conversion to psychology and briefly analyzes the controversies surrounding the establishment of the Harvard Psychological Clinic and its relationship with the Department of Psychology.     

Cultural Complexities and Scientific Development

Methodological issues in psychology consist of a key aspect for the scientific development of the discipline. In this paper I elaborate on the reasons why I partially agree with Toomela's ideas, and why I also disagree with some of his arguments. The convergence refers to the need for a radical change concerning the widespread use of methodologies that has been typical of mainstream psychology, which still flavors too positivist and pseudo-quantitative, overlooking the central relevance of theory for scientific development. The divergence resides in Toomela's insistence to oppose what he designates as "the North American" to "the German-Austrian" scientific thinking: from my perspective, the misuse of cultural categories can only lead to misguided and unconstructive dichotomies that entails a naive concept of culture, and do not contribute to scientific development. From a contemporary systemic approach, complex issues deserve more sophisticated analysis.     

Hugo Münsterberg's attack on the application of scientific psychology

No individual in the early history of American psychology is more identified with the promotion of applied psychology than Hugo Münsterberg, whose books and articles on applied topics such as industrial psychology, forensic psychology, psychotherapy, and educational psychology made him one of the most visible psychologists of his day. But there is an earlier chapter to Münsterberg's life that tells a very different story of a Münsterberg opposed to application. The story begins in 1898 when he wrote an article for an American magazine in which he told teachers that the findings of experimental psychology had no relevance for education, setting off a firestorm of controversy among his colleagues in psychology and education. This article describes Münsterberg's early denigration of applied psychology and his subsequent transformation as applied psychologist. Reasons for that transformation are discussed as well as issues involving the stigma associated with applied psychology and the popularization of psychology.     

The mobile frontiers of Piaget’s psychology. From academic tourism to interdisciplinary collaboration / Las fronteras móviles de la psicología de Piaget. Del turismo académico a la colaboración interdisciplinaria

Jean Piaget’s (1896–1980) interdisciplinarity was related to his psychology in several ways. First, he was a simple tourist of other fields: an interested outsider. But as he became increasingly involved in the professionalization of the discipline, he moved through different contexts that constrained the possibilities for successful action in new and different ways. To make these clear, we adopt a little-known aspect of his later epistemological framework: the open hierarchy of levels. This then affords new perspectives of his life, his work, his theory and his location in the history of both Swiss psychology and French psychology. It also outlines his reasoning regarding the necessity of a disciplined approach to interdisciplinary collaboration, institutionalized in the founding of his International Centre for Genetic Epistemology. We therefore come not only to a fuller understanding of how Piaget thought scientific knowledge develops, but also of how the boundaries of scientific disciplines are pushed back.     

The Emergence and Development of Bekhterev's Psychoreflexology in Relation to Wundt's Experimental Psychology

After its foundation, the Laboratory for Experimental Psychology at Leipzig University became an international center for psychological research, attracting students from all over the world. The Russian physiologist and psychiatrist Vladimir Bekhterev (1857–1927) was one of Wilhelm Wundt's students in 1885, and after returning to Russia he continued enthusiastically his experimental research on mental phenomena. However, he gradually distanced himself from Wundt's psychological project and developed a new concept of psychology: the so‐called Objective Psychology or Psychoreflexology. The goal of this paper is to analyze Bekhterev's position in relation to Wundt's experimental psychology, by showing how the former came to reject the latter's conception of psychology. The results indicate that Bekhterev's development of a philosophical program, including his growing interest in establishing a new Weltanschauung is the main reason behind his divergence with Wundt, which is reflected in his conception of scientific psychology. Despite this, Wundt remained alive in Bekhterev's mind as an ideal counterpoint.     

William James and Sigmund Freud: "The Future of Psychology Belongs to Your Work"

Although James and Freud are generally not considered scientific by experimental psychologists, both wrote about their view of what a scientific psychology should look like. Their radically different philosophical epistemologies and historical origins are reviewed, to provide an understanding of their respective visions for psychology. James took his stand on a new metaphysical foundation for the way experiments should be conducted with his formulation of radical empiricism. Freud attempted a neurological explanation of the unconscious in his "Project for a Scientific Psychology." Remarkably, their definitions of psychology as a science had a similar ring. Likely, this is because both took a phenomenological position with regard to how they defined science, which is also probably the primary reason their ideas on the subject have always been rejected by experimentalists. The humanistic implications of the neuroscience revolution, however, have caused a reassessment of their respective positions, as philosophical questions about the nature of consciousness have brought both Freud and James back into vogue, but in new and unexpected ways.     

Dewey Between the Lines: George Kelly and the Pragmatist Tradition

In his own somewhat sly and sardonic way, George Kelly always insisted that personal construct theory could not be assimilated into any other kind of psychology. We believe this was not an example of Kelly being difficult or protecting his turf, but that he resisted such efforts at categorization because he formulated personal construct psychology from an entirely different set of assumptions than those which have traditionally guided the construction of psychological theories. We begin by looking at the unusual life path Kelly took in order to enter the field of psychology and what it reveals about the independent turn of mind he brought to creating his own theory of personality. We then examine what we believe is the single most important influence on Kelly's thinking—the tradition of American pragmatism, in general, and the philosophy and psychology of John Dewey, in particular. We argue that Kelly embraced the pragmatic epistemological assumptions that guided Dewey's work, and that he used these assumptions to develop the only pragmatic theory of personality and psychotherapy. It is, in fact, the influence of Dewey and the pragmatists that makes personal construct psychology so different from and, at times, more difficult to understand than other, more traditional, “realist” theories, but it is also this pragmatic orientation that makes Kelly's theory such an important contribution.     

Physiology as the antechamber to metaphysics: the young William James's hope for a philosophical psychology

In the 5 years before 1878, when his career in psychology was becoming established, William James wrote a series of notes and reviews assessing the work of many of the pioneers in the new field. Adopting a public and confident voice, even while he was privately still uncertain and searching, James criticized the dogmatism of positivist and idealist claims to the study of the human brain and mind. In his short writings of 1873-1877, James started to formulate his own middle path. His first steps on that path show that he did not reject either scientific or philosophic inquiry; instead, he viewed scientific knowledge as a way to understand philosophical questions more deeply. Saving his sharpest critiques for positivism, James endorsed scientific investigation without materialist assmptions. While his career in psychology was still only a hope, James treated science as a means toward humanist insight.     

经验现象学心理学:乔治对胡塞尔现象学的继承与发展

美国现象学心理学家阿米多·乔治基于科学和心理学视角所提出的经验现象学心理学是对胡塞尔现象学的继承和发展。这表现为:在批判对象上,从胡塞尔的反二元论细化为反自然科学心理学;在出发点和基本原则上,将胡塞尔的生活世界、意向性、还原等概念从超验层面放置到经验层面;在研究方法上,从胡塞尔的描述还原过程转向具体的描述现象学心理学方法。本质上,乔治的经验现象学心理学与胡塞尔的现象学一脉相承,不仅完美地展示了后者的基本原理,更在具体概念和操作应用上充实且超越了后者。     

Henry Freund: 1896–1982

Dr. Henry Freund was one of the foremost authorities on stuttering in Europe, and his contributions on the psychology of the disorder continued after emigrating to this country. He was a neurologist and psychiatrist, as well as a speech pathologist. He died in 1982, and in this posthumous paper he describes his career and personal experiences, while undergoing therapy from the most famous European speech pathologists of his time. He also offers some cogent comments about current therapies and future needs.