“… the art of shaping a democratic reality and being directed by it …”—philososophy of science in turbulent times

This article has three objectives: First, it revises the history of the reception of Ludwik Fleck??s monograph Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (1935, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact). Contrary to the established picture, Fleck??s book was largely discussed in the years before the outbreak of World War II. What becomes clear when reading these early reviews and especially Fleck??s comments to those written by representatives of Nazi Germany is, second, the political dimension of his epistemology. In this respect, Fleck??s emphasis on the genuinely democratic character of science will be discussed in some detail. And third, Fleck??s notion of ??Denkstil????thought-style??shall be examined more closely since, as we will claim, it can be understood as a notion indicating where the democratic dimension of science encounters its limits.     

The material memory of history: Edgar Zilsel’s epistemology of historiography

The paper focuses on the concept of matter and the material in Edgar Zilsel??s considerations about historiographical methods in the context of the Marxist debates on the materialist conception of history in the 1920s and 1930s (Gy?rgy Lukács, Max Adler). It sheds light on Zilsel??s understanding of matter as fluctuating, interfering processes in the lapse of time and the related concept of irreversible laws and relates it to Ernst Mach??s philosophy and to Richard Semon??s theory of mneme. Finally, it shows the practical consequences of the concept of materialism in Edgar Zilsel??s epistemology.     

Hegelians Axel Honneth and Robert Williams on the Development of Human Morality

An individual is in the lowest phase of moral development if he thinks only of his own personal interest and has only his own selfish agenda in his mind as he encounters other humans. This lowest phase corresponds well with sixteenth century British moral egoism which reflects the rise of the new economic order. Adam Smith (1723?C1790) wanted to defend this new economic order which is based on economic exchange between egoistic individuals. Nevertheless, he surely did not want to support the moral theory of British egoism. His book The Wealth of Nations suits well into the world view of British moral egoism, but in the book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he presents a moral theory which is the total opposite of moral egoism. Contemporary German intellectuals saw contradiction in Adam Smith??s moral (social) philosophy which they called as Das Adam-Smith-Problem. Smith himself didn??t think that there is any contradiction in a situation where in economic sphere (civil society) individual act egoistically and in ethical sphere (encounter with the imagined Other) he feels humanity and compassion toward his fellow men. Hegel was a passionate reader of Adam Smith and he acknowledged Das Adam-Smith-Problem. He set the task of his social philosophy to overcome this paradox. He wanted to create a theory of a social totality where economic egoism and feelings of humanity are not in contradiction. In the same time Hegel wanted to create a theory on Bildung process where human spirit develops from moral un-freedom (heteronomy) to moral freedom and maturity (autonomy) taking care both aspect of love and reason. In certain Hegel??s texts notion of recognition plays crucial role. That is why modern Hegelians Ludwig Siep, Axel Honneth and Robert Williams consider the notion of recognition to be elementary in Hegel??s threefold theory of developing human spirit from family via civil society to sittliche state. For Hegel family is a sphere where people love their ??concrete other?? and where feeling surpasses reason. Civil Society is a sphere of private contracts and economic exchanges where cold egoistic and calculative reason surpasses feelings. In the sphere of State the contradiction between family and Civil Society (Das Adam-Smith-Problem) is solved by ??rational feeling??. According to Hegel State should protect citizens from alienating effect of egoistic reason of Civil Society and cultivate ??family-feelings?? to rational feelings which integrate citizen into ??sittliche community?? through reciprocal process of recognition. In this article I want to consider Hegelians Honneth??s and Williams??s relevance to the theory of moral development.     

Causation, Principle of Common Cause and Theoretical Explanation: Wesley C. Salmon and G. W. F. Hegel

The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon??s concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his Science of Logic, and which can be applied to the issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the author??s contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon??s philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science.     

Neural Policy Style Transfer

Style Transfer has been proposed in a number of fields: fine arts, natural language processing, and fixed trajectories. We scale this concept up to control policies within a Deep Reinforcement Learning infrastructure. Each network is trained to maximize the expected reward, which typically encodes the goal of an action, and can be described as the content. The expressive power of deep neural networks enables encoding a secondary task, which can be described as the style. The Neural Policy Style Transfer (NPST)¹ algorithm is proposed to transfer the style of one policy to another, while maintaining the content of the latter. Different policies are defined via Deep Q-Network architectures. These models are trained using demonstrations through Inverse Reinforcement Learning. Two different sets of user demonstrations are performed, one for content and other for style. Different styles are encoded as defined by user demonstrations. The generated policy is the result of feeding a content policy and a style policy to the NPST algorithm. Experiments are performed in a catch-ball game inspired by the Deep Reinforcement Learning classical Atari games; and a real-world painting scenario with a full-sized humanoid robot, based on previous works of the authors. The implementation of three different Q-Network architectures (Shallow, Deep and Deep Recurrent Q-Network) to encode the policies within the NPST framework is proposed and the results obtained in the experiments with each of these architectures compared.     

Keith Lehrer on the basing relation

In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer??s account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311?C313, 1971). We show that Lehrer??s examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases show that it is the justification (rather than the belief) that must be based in the evidence. We compare Lehrer??s account of basing with some alternative accounts that have been offered, and show why Lehrer??s own account is more plausible.     

Our element: Flesh and democracy in Merleau-Ponty

Although Merleau-Ponty??s early phenomenology of perception and his essays on art, politics, and language already showed an affinity between the aesthetic phenomena of expression and style and the political and cultural dynamics of society at large, this paper specifically focuses on his late theorizing of the notion of flesh and its relevance to his late understanding of politics and democracy. The emergence of flesh as a concept was contemporary to Merleau-Ponty??s break with Marxism as a philosophical model and with revolutionary dialectics as a political project. It is by showing that such a break was consistently grounded on his theorizing of the being flesh of both the body and of society that this paper shows Merleau-Ponty??s unique contribution to democratic theory and to contemporary political philosophy. In the course of this analysis, it will become clear that in philosophically breaking with the position of a ??no that is a yes????i.e. the model of the revolution, which implies a total negation of the given that becomes a total affirmation of the new order (dictatorship) once in power??he would politically embrace the Weberian ??heroic liberalism????or his ??non-communist left????of parliamentary democracy.     

Wogegen wandte sich Husserl 1891?

A comprehensive and agreed-upon account of Husserl??s relation to Gottlob Frege does not yet exist. In this situation we encounter interpretations that allow systematic dogmas to reappear that should have long been vanquished??for instance, that the author of the Logical Investigations was not only decisively influenced by Frege, but also that he had already retracted his sharpest Frege-critique by 1891. The present essay contains a largely historical response to W. Künne??s new monograph on Frege that advocates such views. We will concentrate on a small remark that turns out to reference a defining moment for any understanding of Husserl??s early philosophy. We shall argue that Husserl??s supposed self-criticism does not turn on the critique that he had earlier leveled at Frege??s Grundlagen der Arithmetik; rather, it has to do exclusively with his own earlier systematic positions on the grounding of arithmetic. In this context, an important particular of Husserl??s Philosophie der Arithmetik takes center stage: this book is a mosaic composed from old and new insights, a fact that becomes most evident in the two distinct concepts of ??equivalence?? that are founded there, which reflects Husserl??s transition from a theory of arithmetic based on the concept of number to one based on the parallelism between proper and symbolic (improper) presentations. This change involves a long historical development that goes back to a tradition marked by the work of Bolzano, Lotze, Brentano, and Stumpf, and it is closely tied to the problem of how to distinguish between the sense and the object of an act. Systematic neglect of the historical background of the Frege?CHusserl relation has led to disputes over who owns the copyright to the sense/reference distinction, but it has obscured the very core of the original line of questioning.     

Women’s anger, epistemic personhood, and self-respect: an application of Lehrer’s work on self-trust

I argue in this paper that the work of Keith Lehrer, especially in his book Self-Trust has applications to feminist ethics; specifically care ethics, which has become the leading form of normative sentimentalist ethics. I extend Lehrer??s ideas concerning reason and justification of belief beyond what he says by applying the notion of evaluation central to his account of acceptance to the need for evaluation of emotions. The inability to evaluate and attain justification of one??s emotions is an epistemic failure that leads one not to act on one??s own aspirations and desires and treat those desires as if they did not exist. I argue that this is a common condition among women in patriarchal societies because patriarchy can cause women to believe that they are not worthy of their trust concerning what they accept, specifically acceptance of their anger over their own mistreatment. As a result, many women are unable to realize the self-protective role of their anger. All of this reflects a lack of what I shall call epistemic personhood, a concept based on Lehrer??s theory concerning the keystone role of self-trust in the epistemic arch of rationality, justification and knowledge. Lastly, I use this concept of epistemic personhood to develop a care ethical account of self-respect that counters the Kantian account.     

Buber from the Cartesian Perspective? A Critical Review of Reading Buber’s Pedagogy

The positive reception of Buber??s philosophy does not fully match Buber??s intention in terms of overcoming the problem of the subject?Cobject binary. In other words, a number of authors have remained within the traditional way of thinking by merely replacing the subject and object with Buber??s I and You, establishing a more dogmatic normative subjectivity, paradoxically going against Buber??s intent and even seemingly not noticing this problem. In this article, we will investigate the reasons for these paradoxical readings of Buber. By focusing on the structure and significance of Buber??s ontology of between-humane, we will study the concept of I?CYou and I?CIt, suggesting that these are not intentionality-oriented concepts, but a radically relationship-centered one. The theoretical problem caused by Buber himself in the process of adaptation of his dialog-philosophy to his dialog-pedagogy, namely the impossibility of complete mutuality in the educational relationship will be critically examined, based on Buber??s own declaration in his ??Afterword?? (1957) in I and Thou (1923). With this, we will reflect on the problematic situation of post-Buberian literature in contemporary pedagogy to pave a way to modernize Buber??s dialog-pedagogy.     

Rousseau’s Emile, or the Fear of Passions

Notwithstanding the general accepted understanding that Rousseau is the master of modern education reflecting the progress by enlightenment this articles suggests that Rousseau??s Emile is??as most of Rousseau??s other writings are, too??testimony to a brilliant and passionate writer expressing thoughts about his concern how to deal with passions??passion being one of the most disputed concepts in late seventeenth and in eighteenth century. The reading of Emile has therefore take into account polemic as a literary trope in Rousseau??s style of writing.     

Shen Dao��s Own Voice in the Shenzi Fragments

Shen Dao ???? is known as one of the Legalists who influenced Han Feizi ?n???? in terms of the concept of shi ?? (circumstantial advantage, power, or authority). This argument is based on the ??A Critique of Circumstantial Advantage (Nanshi ?y??)?? chapter of the Hanfeizi, where Han Feizi advances his own idea of shi after criticizing both Shen Dao and an anonymous Confucian. However, there are other primary sources to contain Shen Dao??s thought, namely, seven incomplete Shenzi ???? chapters of the Essentials on Government from the Assemblage of Books (Qunshu zhi yao ??????) and other fragments preserved in other Chinese texts. This article examines the Shenzi fragments in order to ask whether Shen Dao stresses the concept of shi.     

Discussions with Bocheński concerning Soviet Marxism–Leninism, 1952–1986

Boche??ski??s lucid, unpartisan, and judiciously critical discussion of Soviet Marxism?CLeninism in his book Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (1950) filled a major gap in our understanding of that influential movement. Prior to its publication there had been only two works on the subject in English, John Somerville??s Soviet Philosophy (1946) and the Handbook of Philosophy (1949), edited and adapted by Howard Selsam from the Kratkij filosofskij slovar?? (2nd ed. 1940). Both are marked by strong partisanship and ideological bias. Somerville is uncritically pro-Soviet and abjectly Stalinist. Selsam, although he tones down the adulation of Marx, Stalin et al. of the KFS, retains that work??s abuse of such ??reactionary?? and ??idealist?? thinkers as Plato and such ??reactionary?? and ??bourgeois?? thinkers as Hegel. The benign influence of Boche??ski??s work increased with the publication of the English translation, Soviet Russian Dialectical Materialism, in 1963.     

The phenomenon and the transcendental: Jean-Luc Marion, Marc Richir, and the issue of phenomenalization

After reviewing the status of the concept of the phenomenon in Husserl??s phenomenology and the aim of successive attempts to reform, de-formalize, and to widen it, we show the difficulties of a method that, following the example of Jean-Luc Marion??s phenomenology, intends to connect the phenomenon directly to the revelation of an exteriority. We argue that, on the contrary, Marc Richir??s phenomenology, which strives to grasp the phenomenon as nothing-but-phenomenon, is more likely to capture the ??meaning?? of the phenomenological, and hence to help us orient in the field of problems that phenomenology encounters without always knowing how to tackle them. Yet, this extension of the phenomenon??s domain does not thereby encompass everything: there may well be certain issues that require a phenomenology without phenomenon; but the meaning of this cannot be determined before the complete reenvisioning of transcendental phenomenology.     

Objects with a past: Husserl on “ad-memorizing apperceptions”

In a late notation from 1932, Husserl emphasizes the fact that a broad concept of ??apperception?? should also include, alongside his usual examples, the apprehension of objects as bearers of an individual or inter-subjective past, specifically ??indicated?? with them; thus, he distinguishes between apperceptions ??appresenting?? a simultaneous content (co-presentations), anticipatory apperceptions pointing to future incidents, and retrospective apperceptions referring to ??ad-memorized?? (hinzuerinnert, ad-memoriert) features and events. The latter sort of apperceptions are involved not only in our apprehension of historical traces and relics, but also in that of causal relations, familiar objects, and cultural objects in general. Following several later notations of Husserl concerning the topic of ??apperceptions,?? this paper outlines the specific intentional structure of retrospective or evocative apperceptions, analyzing their various possible forms.     

Perception, knowledge and freedom in the age of extremes: on the historical epistemology of Ludwik Fleck and Michael Polanyi

This paper deals with Ludwik Fleck??s theory of thought styles and Michael Polanyi??s theory of tacit knowledge. Though both concepts have been very influential for science studies in general, and both have been subject to numerous interpretations, their accounts have, somewhat surprisingly, hardly been comparatively analyzed. Both Fleck and Polanyi relied on the physiology and psychology of the senses in order to show that scientific knowledge follows less the path of logical principles than the path of accepting or rejecting specific conventions, where these may be psychologically or sociologically grounded. It is my aim to show that similarities and differences between Fleck and Polanyi are to be seen in the specific historical and political context in which they worked. Both authors, I shall argue, emphasized the relevance of perception in close connection to their respective understanding of science, freedom, and democracy.     

Local axioms in disguise: Hilbert on Minkowski diagrams

While claiming that diagrams can only be admitted as a method of strict proof if the underlying axioms are precisely known and explicitly spelled out, Hilbert praised Minkowski??s Geometry of Numbers and his diagram-based reasoning as a specimen of an arithmetical theory operating ??rigorously?? with geometrical concepts and signs. In this connection, in the first phase of his foundational views on the axiomatic method, Hilbert also held that diagrams are to be thought of as ??drawn formulas??, and formulas as ??written diagrams??, thus suggesting that the former encapsulate propositional information which can be extracted and translated into formulas. In the case of Minkowski diagrams, local geometrical axioms were actually being produced, starting with the diagrams, by a process that was both constrained and fostered by the requirement, brought about by the axiomatic method itself, that geometry ought to be made independent of analysis. This paper aims at making a twofold point. On the one hand, it shows that Minkowski??s diagrammatic methods in number theory prompted Hilbert??s axiomatic investigations into the notion of a straight line as the shortest distance between two points, which start from his earlier work focused on the role of the triangle inequality property in the foundations of geometry, and lead up to his formulation of the 1900 Fourth Problem. On the other hand, it purports to make clear how Hilbert??s assessment of Minkowski??s diagram-based reasoning in number theory both raises and illuminates conceptual compatibility concerns that were crucial to his philosophy of mathematics.     

Capacity and Potentiality: Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.6–7 from the Perspective of the De Anima

The notion of a capacity (dunamis) in the sense of a power to bring about or undergo change plays a key role in Aristotle??s theories about the natural world. However, in Metaphysics ?? Aristotle also extends ??capacity??, and the corresponding concept of ??activity?? (energeia), to cases where we want to say that something is in capacity, or in activity, such and such but not, or not directly, in virtue of being capable of initiating or undergoing change. This paper seeks to clarify and confirm a certain view of how Aristotle wishes us to see the relationship between the two uses of ??capacity?? and ??activity??. To that end, I consider also Aristotle??s employment of the terms in the De Anima, which sheds light on the key examples which direct the discussion in Metaph. ??.     

The mathematical form of measurement and the argument for Proposition I in Newton’s Principia

Newton characterizes the reasoning of Principia Mathematica as geometrical. He emulates classical geometry by displaying, in diagrams, the objects of his reasoning and comparisons between them. Examination of Newton??s unpublished texts (and the views of his mentor, Isaac Barrow) shows that Newton conceives geometry as the science of measurement. On this view, all measurement ultimately involves the literal juxtaposition??the putting-together in space??of the item to be measured with a measure, whose dimensions serve as the standard of reference, so that all quantity (which is what measurement makes known) is ultimately related to spatial extension. I use this conception of Newton??s project to explain the organization and proofs of the first theorems of mechanics to appear in the Principia (beginning in Sect. 2 of Book I). The placementof Kepler??s rule of areas as the first proposition, and the manner in which Newton proves it, appear natural on the supposition that Newton seeks a measure, in the sense of a moveable spatial quantity, of time. I argue that Newton proceeds in this way so that his reasoning can have the ostensive certainty of geometry.