Revising the concept of lawhood: special sciences and natural kinds

The Kripkean conception of natural kinds (kinds are defined by essences that are intrinsic to their members and that lie at the microphysical level) indirectly finds support in a certain conception of a law of nature, according to which generalizations must have unlimited scope and be exceptionless to count as laws of nature. On my view, the kinds that constitute the subject matter of special sciences such as biology may very well turn out to be natural despite the fact that their essences fail to be microphysical or micro-based. On the causal conception of natural kinds I privilege, the naturalness of a kind is a function of the fact that it figures prominently in at least one causal law. However, there is a strong tendency prevailing among contemporary philosophers to assume that, in order to count as proper laws generalizations must be expectionless. Since most generalizations tracked down by the special sciences turn out not to fulfill these criteria, what this conception of a law implies is that most of the generalizations the special sciences trade in are not proper laws. It follows that, on this view, most if not all of the kinds the special sciences dealing with turn out not to constitute natural kinds, understood as kinds to which bona fide laws apply. In order to establish that the non-microstructurally defined kinds that fall within the domain of enquiry of the special sciences are eligible for the status of natural kind, I must therefore establish that generalizations needn’t have unlimited scope and be exceptionless to count as laws of nature. This is precisely what I seek to do in this paper. I begin by arguing that the question “what is a law of nature?” is most naturally interpreted as the question “what features must generalizations exhibit in order to ground scientific explanations?” and by offering reasons to believe that generalizations needn’t be exceptionless and have unlimited scope to play the crucial role laws have been thought to play in scientific explanation. Drawing on Sandra Mitchell [Mitchell, S. (2000). Philosophy of Science, 67, 242–265] and James Woodward’s [Woodward, J. (1997). Philosophy of science, 64 (proceedings), 524–541; Woodward, J. (2000). British Journal for the philosophy of science, 51(2), 197–254; Woodward, J. (2001). Philosophy of science, 68, 1–20] work, I subsequently develop an alternative account of the criteria generalizations must satisfy in order to count as laws of nature, which at least some of the generalizations of the special sciences turn out to fulfill. I thus give credence to the idea that at least some of the kinds that fall within the domain of the special sciences figure in laws of nature, and I thereby restore the possibility that some special science kinds deserve to be deemed natural.     

Stabilizing and Changing Phenomenal Worlds: Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn on Scientific Literature

In the work of both Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn the scientific literature plays important roles for stability and change of scientific phenomenal worlds. In this article we shall introduce the analyses of scientific literature provided by Fleck and Kuhn, respectively. From this background we shall discuss the problem of how divergent thinking can emerge in a dogmatic atmosphere. We shall argue that in their accounts of the factors inducing changes of scientific phenomenal worlds Fleck and Kuhn offer substantially different approaches, and we shall discuss in which respects their approaches may be compatible. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Perception, knowledge and freedom in the age of extremes: on the historical epistemology of Ludwik Fleck and Michael Polanyi

This paper deals with Ludwik Fleck??s theory of thought styles and Michael Polanyi??s theory of tacit knowledge. Though both concepts have been very influential for science studies in general, and both have been subject to numerous interpretations, their accounts have, somewhat surprisingly, hardly been comparatively analyzed. Both Fleck and Polanyi relied on the physiology and psychology of the senses in order to show that scientific knowledge follows less the path of logical principles than the path of accepting or rejecting specific conventions, where these may be psychologically or sociologically grounded. It is my aim to show that similarities and differences between Fleck and Polanyi are to be seen in the specific historical and political context in which they worked. Both authors, I shall argue, emphasized the relevance of perception in close connection to their respective understanding of science, freedom, and democracy.     

Authoritarian personalities in the natural and social sciences

This research is an extension of a previous finding, that authoritarian personalities are predisposed to the social sciences and nonauthoritarians to the natural sciences. Two hypotheses were tested: (1) Within the social sciences, more authoritarian personalities enter economics and geography than psychology, social work, or sociology; and (2) between the first and last years in college, in “authoritarian departments” there is an increase, while in “nonauthoritarian departments” there is a decrease in the students' authoritarianism.     

Inheritance of attributes in natural concept conjunctions

Attributes defining pairs of concepts (e.g., SPORTS-GAMES) and their conjunctions (e.g., SPORTS THAT ARE ALSO GAMES) were generated and rated for their importance for defining each concept and conjunction. The results support a model in which a composite prototype for the conjunction is formed as the union of the constituent attribute sets, subject to two constraints: (1) attributes must have a sufficiently high average importance across the two concepts, and (2) necessity and impossibility of attributes is always inherited. In regression analyses, those concepts identified by Hampton (1985b) as being dominant in determining item typicality in conjunctions were again dominant in determining attribute importance and also had greater numbers of important attributes. There was limited evidence of noncompositionality for familiar concept conjunctions. Finally, degree of conflict between the attributes of one concept and those of the other had an independent effect on attribute importance for conjunctions.     

析托马斯·阿奎那的自然法概念

作为法律之一类的自然法是托马斯·阿奎那自然法理论体系最重要的概念之一。本文在分析阿奎那的法律定义的基础上,重点阐述了其自然法概念的性质和含义,最后还考察了值得进一步思考与探讨的理论问题。     

On a unified theory of models and thought experiments in natural sciences

In this paper a unified theory of models and thought experiments is proposed by considering them as fictions, á la Vaihinger. In order to reach this aim, the Hertzian and Botzmannian interpretation of theories as Bilder is reconsidered.