The contribution of temperament,popularity, and physical appearance to children’s happiness

The relation between the happiness of 9–12 year old children and their temperament, popularity, and physical appearance was examined. Participants included 432 children and their parents and teachers. Happiness in children was assessed using a self-rating scale, parents’ ratings, teachers’ ratings, and the Happiness and Satisfaction Subscale of the Piers-Harris Children’s Self-Concept Scale 2 (Piers-Harris 2) [Piers, E. V., & Herzberg, D. S. (2002). Manual for the Piers-Harris Children’s Self-Concept Scale, 2nd ed. Los Angeles: Western Psychological Services]. Estimates of children’s temperament, popularity, and physical appearance included parents’ ratings, individual items on the Piers-Harris 2, and three domain scales from the Piers-Harris 2: the Freedom From Anxiety Subscale, Popularity Subscale, and Physical Appearance and Attributes Subscale. Children’s happiness was correlated with and predicted by ratings of their temperament, popularity, and appearance. Demographic variables did not account for appreciable variance in children’s happiness. The results parallel the common finding that internal factors (e.g., personality), but not external factors (e.g., demographics), predict adults’ happiness.     

But is it sociology of knowledge? Wilhelm Jerusalem’s “sociology of cognition” in context

This paper considers the charge that??contrary to the current widespread assumption accompanying the near-universal neglect of his work??Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854?C1923) cannot count as one of the founders of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. In order to elucidate the matter, Jerusalem??s ??sociology of cognition?? is here reconstructed in the context of his own work in psychology and philosophy as well as in the context of the work of some predecessors and contemporaries. It is argued that while it shows clear discontinuities with the present-day understanding of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge, Jerusalem??s sociology of cognition was not only distinctive in its own day but also anticipated in nuce a much-discussed theme in current history of science.     

Darwin’s solution to the species problem

Biologists and philosophers that debate the existence of the species category fall into two camps. Some believe that the species category does not exist and the term ‘species’ should be eliminated from biology. Others believe that with new biological insights or the application of philosophical ideas, we can be confident that the species category exists. This paper offers a different approach to the species problem. We should be skeptical of the species category, but not skeptical of the existence of those taxa biologists call ‘species.’ And despite skepticism over the species category, there are pragmatic reasons for keeping the word ‘species.’ This approach to the species problem is not new. Darwin employed a similar strategy to the species problem 150 years ago.     

Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem

This article proposes a new theory of rational decision, distinct from both causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT). First, some intuitive counterexamples to CDT and EDT are presented. Then the motivation for the new theory is given: the correct theory of rational decision will resemble CDT in that it will not be sensitive to any comparisons of absolute levels of value across different states of nature, but only to comparisons of the differences in value between the available options within states of nature; however, the correct theory will also resemble EDT in that it will rely on conditional probabilities (not unconditional probabilities). The new theory gives a prominent role to the notion of a “benchmark” for each state of nature, by comparison with which the value of the available options in that state of nature are measured, and so it has been called the Benchmark Theory (BT). It is argued that BT gives the right verdict on the cases that seem to be counterexamples to CDT and EDT. Finally, some objections to BT are considered and answered.     

Soul–life–knowledge: The young Mannheim’s way to sociology

This essay discusses a less known period of Karl Mannheim’s life, namely the period he spent in Hungary. I attempt to point out that the career of the young Mannheim, starting from a philosophical interest and continuing with a sociological one, is continuous. His first published works and letters prove that in the period preceding his emigration to Germany in 1919 he was concerned with questions that received their mature form in his sociology of knowledge. They include primarily the question of culture, that of perspective-boundedness (relativity) of cognition, interpretation and the problem of intellectuals. Despite changing disciplines from philosophy to sociology, the continuity of his oeuvre can be shown.     

Reichenbach’s cubical universe and the problem of the external world

This paper is a sympathetic critique of the argument that Reichenbach develops in Chap. 2 of Experience and Prediction for the thesis that sense experience justifies belief in the existence of an external world. After discussing his attack on the positivist theory of meaning, I describe the probability ideas that Reichenbach presents. I argue that Reichenbach begins with an argument grounded in the Law of Likelihood but that he then endorses a different argument that involves prior probabilities. I try to show how this second step in Reichenbach’s approach can be strengthened by using ideas that have been developed recently for understanding causation in terms of the idea of intervention.     

Children’s rights and the non-identity problem

Abstract

Can appealing to children’s rights help to solve the non-identity problem in cases of procreation? A number of philosophers have answered affirmatively, arguing that even if children cannot be harmed by being born into disadvantaged conditions, they may nevertheless be wronged if those conditions fail to meet a minimal standard of decency to which all children are putatively entitled. This paper defends the tenability of this view by outlining and responding to five prominent objections that have been raised against it in the contemporary literature: (1) the identifiability objection; (2) the non-existence objection; (3) the waiving of rights objection, (4) the lack of legitimate complaint objection; and (5) the unfairness objection.     

Wittgenstein’s reconsideration of the transcendental problem

The transcendental problem that obsessed the great Western philosophers such as Kant and Husserl should be, according to Wittgenstein, conceived as a matter of understanding a process of reasoning in which a conclusion follows necessarily from stated rules. Once these rules, regarded as a priori categories by Kant and as eidos and eidetic relations by Husserl, are demonstrated to be no more than the language usages or rules of language-games related to our forms of life, Kant’s transcendental idealism and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology no longer have a leg to stand on. Translated by Chen Xin and Zhang Qingxiong from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2006, (10): 68–76     

Remembering Deese’s 1959 articles: The Zeitgeist, the sociology of science, and false memories

Two contemporaneous reports by J. Deese—one concerned with correct recall (1959a), the other with recall intrusions (1959b)-have differed dramatically in their citations to date. The differences represent an unusually compelling instance of the operation of the scientific Zeitgeist. The article dealing with correct recall was congruent with the Zeitgeist of memory research when it was published. Hence it flourished. Just the opposite was true of the article on intrusions, which by the mid 1970s had gone into eclipse. A markedly different Zeitgeist in the 1990s, however, led two investigators simultaneously and independently to adapt Deese’s intrusion method to the investigation of false memories.     

Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder and the problem of defining harm to nonsentient organisms

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - This paper criticizes Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of disorder by arguing that the conceptual linkage it establishes between the...     

The defeater version of Benacerraf’s problem for a priori knowledge

Paul Benacerraf’s argument that mathematical realism is apparently incompatible with mathematical knowledge has been widely thought to also show that a priori knowledge in general is problematic. Although many philosophers have rejected Benacerraf’s argument because it assumes a causal theory of knowledge, some maintain that Benacerraf nevertheless put his finger on a genuine problem, even though he didn’t state the problem in its most challenging form. After diagnosing what went wrong with Benacerraf’s argument, I argue that a new, more challenging, version of Benacerraf’s problem can be constructed. The new version—what I call the Defeater Version—of Benacerraf’s problem makes use of a no-defeater condition on knowledge and justification. I conclude by arguing that the best way to avoid the problem is to construct a theory of how a priori judgments reliably track the facts. I also suggest four different kinds of theories worth pursuing.     

Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill’s problem)

Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution. However, I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution. Rather, I will argue that a solution has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume’s account of inductive inferences shows that, contrary to Goodman’s opinion, it embodies a correct solution of the paradox. Moreover, the account even includes a correct answer to Mill’s question of why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for a complete induction, since Hume gives a well-supported explanation of this reliability phenomenon. The discussion also suggests that Bayesian theory by itself cannot explain this phenomenon. Finally, we will see that Hume’s explanation of the reliability phenomenon is surprisingly similar to the explanation given lately by a number of naturalistic philosophers in their discussion of the Goodman paradox.     

Where’s the problem? Considering Laing and Esterson’s account of schizophrenia,social models of disability,and extended mental disorder

In this article, I compare and evaluate R. D. Laing and A. Esterson’s account of schizophrenia as developed in Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964), social models of disability, and accounts of extended mental disorder. These accounts claim that some putative disorders (schizophrenia, disability, certain mental disorders) should not be thought of as reflecting biological or psychological dysfunction within the afflicted individual, but instead as external problems (to be located in the family, or in the material and social environment). In this article, I consider the grounds on which such claims might be supported. I argue that problems should not be located within an individual putative patient in cases where there is some acceptable test environment in which there is no problem. A number of cases where such an argument can show that there is no internal disorder are discussed. I argue, however, that Laing and Esterson’s argument—that schizophrenia is not within diagnosed patients—does not work. The problem with their argument is that they fail to show that the diagnosed women in their study function adequately in any environment.     

Parents’ reactions to children’s stuttering and style of coping with stress

PurposeThe aim of the research was to determine: (a) how parents react to their child’s stuttering, (b) what stress coping strategies they utilise, as well as (c) whether stress coping style depends on parents’ reaction to their child’s stuttering.MethodsThe research involved 23 mothers and 23 fathers of children who stutter (CWS) at the age of three to six years old. The Reaction to Speech Disfluency Scale (RSDS), developed by the authors, was used in the research. To determine the parents’ coping the Coping Inventory in Stressful Situations (CISS) by N.S. Endler and D.A Parker was applied.ResultsThe strongest reactions are observed on the cognitive level. Stronger cognitive, emotional and behavioural reactions are observed in the mothers towards their disfluently speaking sons and in the fathers towards their daughters. Having analysed the profiles of coping styles, it can be noticed that the task-oriented coping is most frequently adapted by the fathers. The mothers most often use the avoidance-oriented coping. No relevant correlation was observed between the fathers’ coping style and their reactions to the child’s disfluent speech. As far as the mothers are concerned, it has been proved that an increase in behavioural reactions correlates with the avoidance-oriented coping.ConclusionThe cognitive reactions of the parents’ towards their child’s stuttering were most frequent, while the emotional ones were the least frequent. Confronted with a stressful situation, the fathers most often adapt the task-oriented coping, whereas the mothers use the avoidance-oriented coping. Educational objectives: the reader will be able to (1) learn what the key reactions of parents to their children’s stuttering are, (2) describe stuttering as a stress factor for the parents, (3) describe the factors which influence parents’ reactions to their child’s stuttering and their coping style.     

Sosa’s theory of knowledge

Synthese - This paper is a critical discussion of Ernest Sosa’s recent analysis of reflective knowledge.     

On the Expression of Emotions in Rembrandt’s Art

Rembrandt has been characterized as "the master of the passions of the soul". His painting production has always elicited the viewers' strong emotional responses. Τhese responses raise the question regarding why Rembrandt's work has been singled out as the quintessential example of the expression of emotions both during the 17th century, as well as in recent times. I will try to approach the issue through two different yet interconnected routes. First, I will explore the tools and terms through which the question of the expression of emotions in Rembrandt's oeuvre can be approached. Ancient rhetorical topoi, as well as ideas stemming from Dutch theater writers, drama and art theorists, scholars and art connoisseurs on the rendition of the emotions provide useful points of view. Secondly, I will approach the question by addressing certain stylistic and compositional solutions that Rembrandt suggested, which can be tied to current notions about lifelikeness and the beholder's empathy. Foremost among Rembrandt's aesthetic choices was his handling of light and of paint which accounts for a great deal of unfavorable criticism to his work during the 17th century. I would like to suggest that this handling of light and paint serves as Rembrandt's most important emotive vehicle and furthermore that it introduces us to the idea of wonder and the concept of the sublime in terms of which his depiction of emotions may be understood. Accordingly, I will try to establish an intellectual network in the 17th-century Netherlands for the sublime.     

The underdetermination of theory by data and the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge

Advocates of the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge have argued that, because scientific theories are “underdetermined” by data, sociological factors must be invoked to explain why scientists believe the theories they do. I examine this argument, and the responses to it by J.R. Brown (1989) and L. Laudan (1996). I distinguish between a number of different versions of the underdetermination thesis, some trivial, some substantive. I show that Brown's and Laudan's attempts to refute the sociologists' argument fail. Nonetheless, the sociologists' argument falls to a different criticism, for the version of the underdetermination thesis that the argument requires, has not been shown to be true.     

Ross’s place in the history of analytic philosophy

With the recent revival of moral intuitionism, the work of W. D. Ross has grown in stature. But if we look at some recent well-regarded histories, anthologies and companions of analytic philosophy, Ross is noticeably absent. This discrepancy of assessments raises the question of Ross’s place in the history of analytic philosophy. Hans-Johann Glock has recently claimed that Ross is not an analytic philosopher at all, but is instead a ‘traditional philosopher’. In this article, I will identify several undeniable features of analytic philosophy that Ross’s work bears: a focus on linguistic analysis, great respect for pre-theoretical thoughts, the conviction that philosophy is a collaborative, piecemeal enterprise and so on. Such an investigation, I claim, reveals two historically significant results: Ross was the first ethicist to fully draw from commonsense beliefs about morality in light of characteristic analytic considerations to secure his theory. Two, concerning the matter of whether the notions ‘right’ and ‘good’ are reducible to other notions, Ross appears to have been right: ‘right’ and ‘good’ are irreducible notions. The classical analytic metaethicists, who based their entire research programme on the promise of finding suitable reductive semantic analyses of ‘right’ and ‘good’, were wrong. These results, I believe, suffice to secure W. D. Ross a high place in the history of analytic philosophy.