Bodies and other visual objects: the dialectics of reaching toward objects

Participants viewed video clips of a left or right-handed reach toward an object that was orientated with a handle to the left or right. They were required to classify the object by making a left or right-handed key-press and ignore the reach. These responses were, never-the-less, affected by the observed reach in ways which largely reflected the opportunities for complementary actions in the viewed scenes, given the simultaneous constraints of the object orientation combined with the direction and hand of reach. These influences are claimed to reflect the interdependency of the action possibilities that arise from a set of objects and agents in three-dimensional space that together determine behaviour.     

On haptic and motor incorporation of tools and other objects

This article presents a conceptual discussion on the phenomenon of incorporation of tools and other objects in the light of Maine de Biran’s philosophy of the relation between the body and the motor will. Drawing on Maine de Biran’s view of the body as that portion of the material world which directly obeys one’s motor will, as well as on his view (supported by studies in contemporary cognitive science) of active touch as the perceptual modality that is sensitive to objects as fields of forces resisting the perceiver’s movements, we discuss the phenomena of motor incorporation and haptic incorporation, as well as the relation between them. Motor incorporation occurs when something is integrated into the motor system, i.e. when practice enables one to animate an object as directly, effortlessly and fluently as one is able to animate one’s own body. The subject then has the experience of acting there, where the object is located, not at the body–object interface. In order to better understand the phenomenon of motor incorporation, we highlight the phenomenological difference between directly and indirectly moving something. Haptic incorporation occurs when something is integrated into the haptic system, i.e. when an object is used as an instrument for the haptic perception of other objects. Finally, we seek to shed light on the phenomenon of transparency, understanding the transparency acquired by the incorporated object as both a relational property and a matter of degrees.     

The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects

The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) quantify split solid objects

Recent research suggests that gorillas’ and orangutans’ object representations survive cohesion violations (e.g., a split of a solid object into two halves), but that their processing of quantities may be affected by them. We assessed chimpanzees’ (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos’ (Pan paniscus) reactions to various fission events in the same series of action tasks modelled after infant studies previously run on gorillas and orangutans (Cacchione and Call in Cognition 116:193–203, 2010b). Results showed that all four non-human great ape species managed to quantify split objects but that their performance varied as a function of the non-cohesiveness produced in the splitting event. Spatial ambiguity and shape invariance had the greatest impact on apes’ ability to represent and quantify objects. Further, we observed species differences with gorillas performing lower than other species. Finally, we detected a substantial age effect, with ape infants below 6 years of age being outperformed by both juvenile/adolescent and adult apes.     

How capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) quantify objects and substances

Humans and nonhuman animals appear to share a capacity for nonverbal quantity representations. But what are the limits of these abilities? Results of previous research with human infants suggest that the ontological status of an entity as an object or a substance affects infants' ability to quantify it. We ask whether the same is true for another primate species-the New World monkey Cebus apella. We tested capuchin monkeys' ability to select the greater of two quantities of either discrete objects or a nonsolid substance. Participants performed above chance with both objects (Experiment 1) and substances (Experiment 2); in both cases, the observed performance was ratio dependent. This finding suggests that capuchins quantify objects and substances similarly and do so via analog magnitude representations.     

Against representationalism (about conscious sensory experience)

Abstract

It is very natural to suppose that conscious sensory experience is essentially representational. However this thought gives rise to any number of philosophical problems and confusions. I shall argue that it is quite mistaken. Conscious phenomena cannot be constructed out of representational materials.     

Spatial encoding of hidden objects in dogs (Canis familiaris)

The authors investigated the type of spatial information that controls domestic dogs' (Canis familiaris) search behavior in a situation in which they have to locate a spatial position where they saw an object move and disappear. In Experiments 1 and 2, the authors manipulated all local and global sources of allocentric spatial information surrounding the hiding location. The results revealed that dogs relied on an egocentric frame of reference. Experiment 3 showed that dogs also encoded allocentric information when egocentric information was irrelevant. The authors conclude that dogs simultaneously encode both egocentric and allocentric spatial information to locate a spatial position, but they primarily base their search behavior on an egocentric frame of reference. The authors discuss under which natural conditions dogs might use these 2 sources of spatial information and detail the nature of spatial egocentric information and the circumstances underlying its use by dogs.     

My body and other objects: The internal limits of self‐ownership

Common practices such as donating blood or selling hair assume rights of disposal over oneself that are similar to, if not indistinguishable from, property rights. However, a simple view of self‐ownership fails to capture relevant moral differences between parts of a person and other objects. In light of this, we require some account of the continuity in the form of ownership rights a person has over herself and other objects, which also acknowledges the normative differences between constitutive parts of a person, on the one hand, and external objects, on the other. This paper provides such an account by arguing that there are reasons internal to a general justification of property rights to limit the extent of powers included in ownership of different kinds of object, depending on how the person is situated in relation to them. Rejecting a typical Hohfeldian view of property as a univocal, gradable concept allows us to make space for a new approach to property and self‐ownership: one which can make sense of various uses of the body as property without entailing that our relation to those parts is exhaustively characterised by an ordinary property right.     

The free will of corporations (and other collectives)

Moderate holists like French (Collective and corporate responsibility, 1984), Copp (J Soc Philos, 38(3):369–388, 2007), Hess (The Background of Social Reality – A Survey, 2013), Isaacs (Moral responsibility in collective contexts, 2011) and List and Pettit (Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents, 2011) argue that certain collectives qualify as moral agents in their own right, often pointing to the corporation as an example of a collective likely to qualify. A common objection is that corporations cannot qualify as moral agents because they lack free will. The concern is that corporations (and other highly organized collectives like colleges, governments, and the military) are effectively puppets, dancing on strings controlled by external forces. The article begins by briefly presenting a novel account of corporate moral agency and then demonstrates that, on this account, qualifying corporations (and similar entities in other fields) do possess free will. Such entities possess and act from their own “actional springs”, in Haji’s (Midwest Stud Philos, 30(1):292–308, 2006) phrase, and from their own reasons-responsive mechanisms. When they do so, they act freely and are morally responsible for what they do.     

Discrimination and categorization of photographs of natural objects by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Two experiments assessed the ability of four adult female chimpanzees to categorize natural objects. Chimpanzees were initially trained to match different color photographs of familiar objects from four possible categories. In training, all the comparison stimuli were from the same category in one condition, and from different categories in another condition. For all subjects, training performance was consistently better for the "different category" than for the "same category" trials. Probe trials were shown after training. In probe trials, the sample and positive comparison stimuli were different items from the same category, and the foils were selected from among the three other test categories. Individual performance was above chance in probe trials, suggesting that categorization by chimpanzees may transcend perceptual resemblance. These results were later replicated with novel stimulus items from the same four categories (experiment 2). Altogether, this research demonstrates that chimpanzees grouped perceptually different exemplars within the same category, and further suggests that these animals formed conceptual representations of the categories. Accepted after revision: 10 August 2001 Electronic Publication     

A primer on PRO (and other empty categories)

GB phrase markers are populated with empty categories that are hard to detect using current psycholinguistic techniques. What implications does this have for a grammatical theory that postulates them? How might these psycholinguistic facts be accommodated? Some modest proposals are offered for further consideration.     

Duration of cats' (Felis catus) working memory for disappearing objects

This study explored the duration of cats' working memory for hidden objects. Twenty-four cats were equally divided into four groups, which differed according to the type of visual cues displayed on and/or around the hiding boxes. During eight sessions, the four groups of cats were trained to locate a desirable object hidden behind one of the four boxes placed in front of them. Then, the cats were tested with retention intervals of 0, 10, 30 and 60 s. Results revealed no significant differences between the groups during training or testing. In testing, the cats' accuracy to locate the hidden object rapidly declined between 0 and 30 s but remained higher than chance with delays of up to 60 s. The analysis of errors also indicated that the cats searched as a function of the proximity of the target box and were not subjected to intertrial proactive interference. This experiment reveals that the duration of cats' working memory for disappearing objects is limited and the visual cues displayed on and/or around the boxes do not help the cats to memorize a hiding position. In discussion, we explore why the duration of cats' working memory for disappearing objects rapidly declined and compare these finding with those from domestic dogs. The irrelevance of visual cues displayed on and around the hiding boxes on cats' retention capacity is also discussed.     

Box for interaction with objects (BIO): A new device to synchronize the presentation of objects with electrophysiological recordings

Brain event-related potentials are a useful tool for investigating visual processing and action planning. This technique requires extremely accurate synchronization of stimulus delivery with recordings. The precision of the onset time of visual stimulus delivery is a major challenge when attempting to use real, three-dimensional objects as stimuli. Here, we present an innovative device, the “box for interaction with objects” (BIO), that is designed to synchronize the presentation of objects with electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings. To reach the required resolution of stimulus-onset timing, the BIO system features an interface with reflective glass and light-emitting diodes (LEDs). When the LEDs inside the BIO are turned on, the object inside becomes visible, and a synchronizing pulse is sent to the recording systems. The BIO was tested in a motivational study that focused on visual and motor event-related potentials. EEG signals were recorded during the presentation of an emotion-laden object that could be grasped and brought close to the participant’s chest. BIO successfully synchronized the appearance of a three-dimensional object with EEG recordings, which would allow for an analysis of visual and motor event-related potentials in the same experiment. The BIO device, through a high-quality psychophysiological approach, offers a new perspective for the study of the motivational factors that drive actions toward relevant stimuli.     

Contemporary Arguments Against Nonsexist Language: Blaubergs (1980) Revisited

Two studies investigated whether undergraduatesenrolled in sport management classes at a midwesternuniversity supported or resisted nonsexist language.Resistive statements were classified using arguments identified by Blaubergs (1980). In Study 1, 82primarily Caucasian students reacted to a videotapeabout language. Half (48%) supported nonsexist language;32% were ambivalent; 21% were opposed to nonsexist language. The negative comments fit 7 ofBlaubergs' 8 categories after 2 were modified; 2additional categories (Sexism is Acceptable andHostility toward Proponents of Change) emerged. In Study2, 164 primarily Caucasian undergraduates speculatedon why others resisted nonsexist language. Theircomments led to the addition of 2 more new categories:Tradition and Lack of Understanding. The finalmodification of Blaubergs' classic arguments contains 12categories that should be useful in studying resistanceto nonsexist language.     

Efficacy of objects,pictures and words in a simple learning task(1)

Adult subjects were required to memorise positions associated with twelve common objects, their pictures and their names. Both written and spoken names were used. It was found that learning was fastest with the objects and slowest with verbal symbols, and that pictures occupied an intermediate position. The data suggest that the errors observed are partly due to differential forgetting of various types of stimuli and partly perhaps to differential difficulty in making deductions from them.