The world and image of poetic language: Heidegger and Blanchot

This essay engages ways in which the manifestation of ??world?? occurs in poetry specifically through images, and how we can conceive of the imagination in this regard without reducing the imagination to a mimetic faculty of consciousness subordinate to cognition. Continental thought in the last century offers rich resources for this study. The notion of a ??world?? is related to the poetic image in ways fundamental to the Heidegger??s theory of language, and may be seen in Continental poetics following Heidegger, including Blanchot??s examination of poetry in his account of the space of literature. By means of images, I shall demonstrate, poetic language is exemplary in relation to ??world?? in two ways. (1) Images, poetically arranged, generate and open up a sense or experience of a world, specific to that poem, for its reader. Poetic images then, exhibit a generative evocation of world. (2) Through images, a poem may evoke the way in which space and time are inhabited as a world of human dwelling in an ontologically or existentially meaningful way. The relation of images to world is, then, an illumination or a disclosure of world. The first of these relations remains, to a large extent, immanent to the poem, but may be seen as an analogue of the essentially human experience of inhabiting a world. The second relation transcends the poem and relates the poem immediately to the existential framework of human dwelling.     

Plotinus’ Account of the Cognitive Powers of the Soul: Sense Perception and Discursive Thought

This paper focuses on Plotinus?? account of the soul??s cognitive powers of sense perception and discursive thought, with particular reference to the treatises 3. 6 [26], 4. 4 [28] and 5. 3 [49] of the Enneads. Part 1 of the paper discusses Plotinus?? direct realism in perception. Parts 2 and 3 focus on Plotinus?? account of knowledge in Enneads 5. 3 [49] 2?C3. Plotinus there argues that we make judgements regarding how the external world is by means of discursive reasoning. This latter claim, however, is in tension with what Plotinus argues elsewhere regarding our perceptual apprehension of the external world (3. 6 [26] 1; 4. 4 [28] 23). This puzzle is addressed in Part 3 of the paper, which investigates Plotinus?? view that there exist some sense perceptions of which we are unaware. Finally, Part 4 looks at Plotinus?? understanding of Plato??s famous wax block analogy, in 5. 3 (49). The overall conclusion of the paper is that Plotinus?? account of knowledge is radically different from that of the Cartesian tradition.     

The ‘theory theory’ of mind and the aims of Sellars’ original myth of Jones

Recent proponents of the ??theory theory?? of mind often trace its roots back to Wilfrid Sellars?? famous ??myth of Jones?? in his 1956 article, ??Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind??. Sellars developed an account of the intersubjective basis of our knowledge of the inner mental states of both self and others, an account which included the claim that such knowledge is in some sense theoretical knowledge. This paper examines the nature of this claim in Sellars?? original account and its relationship to more recent debates concerning ??theory of mind??, in particular the theory theory. A close look reveals that Sellars?? original view embodied several distinctions that would enable more recent theory theorists to accommodate certain phenomenological objections that have been raised against that outlook. At the heart of the philosophical issue is an overlooked complexity involved in Sellars?? account of the ??theory/observation?? distinction, involving a conception of the distinction that is both independently plausible and a key to the issue in dispute.     

How we know what we intend

How do we know what our intentions are? It is argued that work on self-knowledge has tended to neglect the attitude of intention, and that an epistemological account is needed that is attuned to the specific features of that state. Richard Moran??s ??Authorship?? view, on which we can acquire self-knowledge by making up our minds, offers a promising insight for such an account: we do not normally discover what we intend through introspection. However, his formulation of the Authorship view, developed primarily with the attitude of belief in mind, is found wanting when applied to intention. An alternative account is proposed for knowledge of one??s own intentions that gives a central role to the mental act of deciding what to do. It is argued that we can come to know what we intend by making a decision about what to do and self-ascribing the content of that decision as our intended action.     

Exemplarization and self-presentation: Lehrer and Meinong on consciousness

Alexius Meinong??s specific use of the term ??self-presentation?? had a significant influence on modern epistemology and philosophical psychology. To show that there are remarkable parallels between Meinong??s account of the self-presentation of experiences and Lehrer??s account of the exemplarization of experiences is one of this paper??s main objectives. Another objective is to put forward some comments and critical remarks to Lehrer??s approach. One of the main problems can be expressed by the following: The process of using a particular experience as a sample, that is, an exemplar that we use to stand for and refer to a plurality of experiences, Lehrer calls ??exemplarization??. As concrete experiences are multifarious (red and round, for example), how can we single out a specific sort of experiences (the red ones) by the process of exemplarization when we use such a multifarious experience as a sample?     

Relational Education: Applying Gergen’s Work to Educational Research and Practice

This article sketches the implications of Gergen??s relational approach for educational research and practice. Gergen suggests that we envision education as a set of processes intended to enhance relationships. This is a radical departure from most mainstream educational research and practice, which is designed to enhance the individual??s mind. We first examine three key assumptions about individuals and about knowledge that undergird mainstream educational research and practice??an emphasis on the individual as separate from the world, an account of knowledge as decontextualized and a tendency towards hierarchies which favor purified knowledge over lesser forms. We then describe three alternative assumptions from Gergen??s relational account of education??an emphasis on individuals as woven into contexts and knowledge as produced in relations, a view of knowledge as contextualized, and a view of knowledge and action as heterogeneous, not pure. We provide examples from current educational research and practice that illustrate these three assumptions about relational education.     

Intentionality and Presence: On the Intrinsic Of-ness of Consciousness from a Transcendental-Phenomenological Perspective

This paper discusses the nature of consciousness?? intrinsic intentionality from a transcendental-phenomenological viewpoint. In recent philosophy of mind the essentially intentional character of consciousness has become obscured because the latter is predominantly understood in terms of ??qualia?? or the ??what-it-is-like-ness?? of mental states and it is hard to see why such subjective ??feels??, of all things, could bestow states with objective reference. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, this is an inadequate understanding of consciousness, which should instead be defined in terms of presence. Consciousness essentially takes place as presence-of, i.e., consists in something coming to appearance. This presence-of is not only a fundamental, irreducible phenomenon, but also in a radical sense un-naturalisable. Naturalism only knows ??nature??, as the world of objects, and the question of intentionality then seems to be how certain inner-worldly objects can be ??representations?? of other inner-worldly objects. In fact, no object is ever intrinsically ??about?? anything. This is exclusively the nature of subjectivity qua consciousness, which is not an object alongside other objects but rather exists as the manifestation of objects.     

Exemplarization: a solution to the problem of consciousness?

In recent publications, Keith Lehrer developed the intriguing idea of a special mental process??exemplarization??and applied it in a sophisticated manner to different phenomena such as intentionality, representation of the self, the knowledge of ineffable content (of art works) and the problem of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I am primarily concerned with the latter issue. The target of this paper is to analyze whether exemplarization, besides explaining epistemic phenomena such as immediate and ineffable knowledge of experiences, can also solve the ontological problem of consciousness. In particular, Lehrer suggests that if we consider exemplarization, zombies cannot provide an argument for anti-physicalism. I argue that exemplarization offers neither a physicalist explanation of the conceivability of zombies nor an elucidating physicalist account of their impossibility. Therefore, exemplarization cannot offer a physicalist solution to the ??hard problem?? of consciousness.     

Looking Through Ulanowicz’s “Third Window”

After a ??very personal?? introduction, and a reference to how accurate indeed is the use of the ??new window?? metaphor by Ulanowicz and about what ??can be seen through it??, the article dwells into the evolution of our understanding about the most general sources??material and/or non-material??of change and transformation; in order to examine further the item about the ways through which ??information?? can be a source of change and transformation also in pre-biotic processes, where commonly it is not taken into account. Thus, the article argues the convergence between Ulanowicz??s and the Author??s treatments of??non only biotic??networks of configuration of processes (a central theme in Ulanowicz??s book). Finally, the article pays attention to how Ulanowicz??s vision through his ??new Third Window??, can indeed help us transcend the non desirable division of contemporary culture into two isolated compartments (science and technology versus the humanities and ethics), which has contributed not only to the globalization of communications, transactions, knowledge and so on, but also to the globalization of multiple crisis of different sort that need to be solved if we want ??a better world to be possible??.     

Positive Aging Through Reading Our Lives

The same turn toward ??narrative?? that has been making its way across psychology, sociology, and related disciplines is influencing how gerontologists view the inner experience of aging??inside aging, as it were: subjective aging or biographical aging. In sympathy with Kenneth and Mary Gergen??s vision of ??positive aging??, and in contrast to the biomedical paradigm that dominates societal perceptions of aging in general, a narrative gerontology appreciates that lives are in many ways ??texts?? that are socially constructed - and co-authored??amid our relationships with others within a wide range of narrative environments, larger stories, and master narratives??families, friendships, cultures, creeds, etc.. In this way, it opens up a theoretical space for appreciating the poetic complexity of later life and for seeing aging as a process, potentially, of growing old and not just getting old. This paper explores how a poetic or narrative perspective sheds light on the intimate links between memory, meaning, wisdom, and spirituality; moreover, how learning to ??read our lives?? can aid us in developing resilient, robust stories??of self, other, and world??with which to meet the many challenges of later life.     

The Art of Being Human: A Project for General Philosophy of Science

Throughout the medieval and modern periods, in various sacred and secular guises, the unification of all forms of knowledge under the rubric of ??science?? has been taken as the prerogative of humanity as a species. However, as our sense of species privilege has been called increasingly into question, so too has the very salience of ??humanity?? and ??science?? as general categories, let alone ones that might bear some essential relationship to each other. After showing how the ascendant Stanford School in the philosophy of science has contributed to this joint demystification of ??humanity?? and ??science??, I proceed on a more positive note to a conceptual framework for making sense of science as the art of being human. My understanding of ??science?? is indebted to the red thread that runs from Christian theology through the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment to the Humboldtian revival of the university as the site for the synthesis of knowledge as the culmination of self-development. Especially salient to this idea is science??s epistemic capacity to manage modality (i.e. to determine the conditions under which possibilities can be actualised) and its political capacity to organize humanity into projects of universal concern. However, the challenge facing such an ideal in the twentyfirst century is that the predicate ??human?? may be projected in three quite distinct ways, governed by what I call ??ecological??, ??biomedical?? and ??cybernetic?? interests. Which one of these future humanities would claim today??s humans as proper ancestors and could these futures co-habit the same world thus become two important questions that general philosophy of science will need to address in the coming years.     

Meaning and Cognition in Plato’s Cratylus and Theaetetus

For Plato, the crucial function of human cognition is to grasp truths. Explaining how we are able to do this is fundamental to understanding our cognitive powers. Plato addresses this topic from several different angles. In the Cratylus and Theaetetus, he attempts to identify the elemental cognitions that are the foundations of language and knowledge. He considers several candidates for this role, most notably, perception and simple meaning-bearing concepts. In the first section, we will look at Plato??s worries about semantic instability and its epistemic consequences. The central role of basic cognitions in Plato??s account of knowledge in the Theaetetus will be explored in the second section. In the final section, the relevance of Plato??s conception of cognition to modern discussions in the philosophy of language and epistemology will be noted.     

Putting knowledge in its place: virtue, value, and the internalism/externalism debate

Traditionally, the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists has centered on the value of knowledge and its justification. A ??value pluralist,?? virtue-theoretic approach to epistemology allows us to accept what I shall call the ??insight of externalism?? while still acknowledging the importance of internalists?? insistence on the value of reflection. Intellectual virtue can function as the unifying consideration in a study of a host of epistemic values, including understanding, wisdom, and what I call ??articulate reflection.?? Each of these epistemic values is a good internal to inquiry. Thus, an inquiry-based conception of virtue is particularly well suited to help us account for a wide variety of epistemic goods, without reducing the value of those many goods to their contribution to the value of knowledge. Moreover, an inquiry-based conception of virtue can function as the unifying consideration in a general study of value, the scope of which is not restricted to epistemic value.     

Women’s anger, epistemic personhood, and self-respect: an application of Lehrer’s work on self-trust

I argue in this paper that the work of Keith Lehrer, especially in his book Self-Trust has applications to feminist ethics; specifically care ethics, which has become the leading form of normative sentimentalist ethics. I extend Lehrer??s ideas concerning reason and justification of belief beyond what he says by applying the notion of evaluation central to his account of acceptance to the need for evaluation of emotions. The inability to evaluate and attain justification of one??s emotions is an epistemic failure that leads one not to act on one??s own aspirations and desires and treat those desires as if they did not exist. I argue that this is a common condition among women in patriarchal societies because patriarchy can cause women to believe that they are not worthy of their trust concerning what they accept, specifically acceptance of their anger over their own mistreatment. As a result, many women are unable to realize the self-protective role of their anger. All of this reflects a lack of what I shall call epistemic personhood, a concept based on Lehrer??s theory concerning the keystone role of self-trust in the epistemic arch of rationality, justification and knowledge. Lastly, I use this concept of epistemic personhood to develop a care ethical account of self-respect that counters the Kantian account.     

Justified inference

This paper proposes a general account of the epistemological significance of inference. This account rests on the assumption that the concept of a ??justified?? belief or inference is a normative concept. It also rests on a conception of belief that distinguishes both (a) between conditional and unconditional beliefs and (b) between enduring belief states and mental events of forming or reaffirming a belief, and interprets all of these different kinds of belief as coming in degrees. Conceptions of ??rational coherence?? and ??competent inference?? are then formulated, in terms of the undefeated instances of certain rules of inference. It is proposed that (non-accidental) rational coherence is a necessary and sufficient condition of justified enduring belief states, while competent inference always results in a justified mental event of some kind. This proposal turns out to tell against the view that there are any non-trivial cases of ??warrant transmission failure??. Finally, it is explained how these proposals can answer the objections that philosophers have raised against the idea that justified belief is ??closed?? under competent inference.     

Embodying the False-Belief Tasks

Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition??in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others?? thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion of a joint mental state, but that doing so will require taking a less antagonistic attitude towards mainstream cognitive approach.     

Laws and constrained kinds: a lesson from motor neuroscience

In this paper, I want to explore the question of whether or not there are laws in psychology. Jaegwon Kim has argued (Supervenience and mind. MIT press, Cambridge; 1993; Mind in a physical world. MIT press, Cambridge 1998) that there are no laws in psychology that contain reference to multiply realized kinds, because statements about such kinds fail to be projectible. After reviewing Kim??s argument for this claim, I show how his conclusion hinges on a hidden assumption: that a kind can only feature in a projectible statement if it is defined by an internal physical property. This assumption, however, is false: constrained kinds can feature in projectible statements, and yet they are not defined by any set of internal physical properties. I suggest that many mental terms actually refer to constrained kinds, and give an example from motor neuroscience of a constrained kind that is multiply realizable and ??projectible??: the intention to move voluntarily in a specific direction.     

Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics and Right Action: A Reassessment

My question in this paper concerns what eudaimonist virtue ethics (EVE) might have to say about what makes right actions right. This is obviously an important question if we want to know what (if anything) distinguishes EVE from various forms of consequentialism and deontology in ethical theorizing. The answer most commonly given is that according to EVE, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances. However, understood as a claim about what makes particular actions right, this is not especially plausible. What makes a virtuous person??s actions right must reasonably be a matter of the feature, or features, which she, via her practical wisdom, appreciates as ethically relevant in the circumstances, and not the fact that someone such as herself would perform those actions. I argue that EVE instead should be understood as a more radical alternative in ethical philosophy, an alternative that relies on the background assumption that no general account or criterion for what makes right actions right is available to us: right action is simply too complex to be captured in a ??finite and manageable set of??moral principles?? (McKeever and Ridge, Principled ethics, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 139). This does not rule out the possibility that there might be some generalizations about how we should act which hold true without exception. Perhaps there are some things which we must never do, as well as some features of the world which always carry normative weight (even though their exact weight may vary from one context to another). Still, these things are arguably few and far between, and what we must do to ensure that we reliably recognize what is right in particular situations is to acquire practical wisdom. Nothing short of that could do the job.