Naughty Girls Commentary on Paper by Jackie L. Cohen

In response to Cohen's rich and evocative presentation of her case of Lisa, I offer some additional perspectives on the material. Labeling Lisa a “naughty girl,” I explore the relevance of Winnicott's notions of the antisocial tendency and of the pathology of self-sufficiency, something Corrigan and I have called the mind object. I have looked at the treatment in terms of the facilitation of regression to dependence and a child's reconnection to her body. Herzog's concept of father hunger leads me to an exploration of Lisa's finding the father in her therapist, which helps her separate from omnipotent internal objects and accept the individuality of the other. Finally, inspired by Cohen's characterization of her treatment of Lisa as “relational and action oriented,” I attempt to review what I believe is essential to child treatment and what is beautifully illustrated in Cohen's work.     

Group beliefs

It is argued in this paper that there can be both normative and nonnormative, merely factual group beliefs. The former involve the whole social group in question, while the latter only relate to the distributions of personal beliefs within the group. The paper develops a detailed theory, called the positional account of group beliefs, to explicate normative, group-involving group beliefs. Normative group beliefs are characterized within this approach in terms of joint acceptances of views by the group members — or their representatives — acting in their right positions and tasks, and in a sense creating group commitments for all the members to accept (and keep accepting) the view in question. Also aggregate accounts of group belief are considered in the paper, especially the shared we-belief approach. Such aggregate accounts purport to account for merely factual group beliefs.I wish to thank Kaarlo Miller and Philip Pettit for critical comments.     

Stakes and beliefs

The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant, though an exception is briefly described. The role of the assumption of stake-invariance in familiar accounts of degrees of belief is also discussed, and morals are drawn concerning finite and countable Dutch book arguments.     

Delusional verbalizations and beliefs

This study evaluated the intensity of delusional beliefs during the modification of delusional verbalizations with three chronically mentally ill inpatients. The multiple-baseline across responses design was used to evaluate the efficacy of a behavioral treatment package to modify delusional verbalizations. Results revealed that changes were obtained in delusional verbalizations to personal questions without corresponding changes in the subjects' delusional beliefs. Changes in delusional verbalizations were well-maintained for two subjects during a 6-month follow-up period. Mixed results were obtained for generalization probe interviews.     

Autonomy and false beliefs

The majority of current attention on the question of autonomy has focused on the internal reflection of the agent. The quality of an agent’s reflection on her potential action (or motivating desire or value) is taken to determine whether or not that action is autonomous. In this paper, I argue that there is something missing in most of these contemporary accounts of autonomy. By focusing overwhelmingly on the way in which the agent reflects, such accounts overlook the importance of what the agent is reflecting upon. Whichever of these current formulations of autonomy we accept, reflection could be undertaken in full accordance with the conditions set, and yet the action fail to be autonomous. This will occur, I argue, if the agent is mistaken about the object of her reflection. More precisely, if she has a particular kind of false belief about the action she is contemplating undertaking, then no amount of reflection can render that action autonomous. This suggests the need for externalist conditions to be incorporated into an account of autonomy.     

Irrational beliefs and personality

This study investigated the relationship between irrational beliefs and the nonpathological personality characteristics origence and intellectence described by Welsh (1972, 1975b). The Adjective Check List (ACL) and the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) were administered to 319 college students. Data were analyzed for the entire sample and for males and females separately. In each case, two combinations of scores yielding significant canonical correlation coefficients were produced. The results offer a refinement to Ellis' personality model and suggest that irrational beliefs are insufficient as indications of psychopathology.     

Disputing clients' irrational beliefs

This paper describes and illustrates a conceptual framework developed to assist novice REBT therapists with enlarging their disputational repertoire. First, four disputational strategies are described and illustrated. Then four disputational styles of presenting the strategies to the client are also described and illustrated. Then the disputational strategies and the disputational styles are combined within a conceptual framework to assist the developing REBT therapist in generating a variety of disputes for a single IB. Finally, the conceptual framework is applied to the IB of the case of Karen from Dryden and Digiuseppe'sPrimer on Rational Emotive Therapy to yield thirty-two separate disputes (sixteen disputes for the premise of the IB, and sixteen disputes for the derivative) of the IB.     

Inhibiting beliefs demands attention

Research across a variety of domains has found that people fail to evaluate statistical information in an atheoretical manner. Rather, people tend to evaluate statistical information in light of their pre-existing beliefs and experiences. The locus of these biases continues to be hotly debated. In two experiments we evaluate the degree to which reasoning when relevant beliefs are readily accessible (i.e., when reasoning with Belief-Laden content) versus when relevant beliefs are not available (i.e., when reasoning with Non-Belief-Laden content) differentially demands attentional resources. In Experiment 1 we found that reasoning with scenarios that contained Belief-Laden content required fewer attentional resources than reasoning with scenarios that contained Non-Belief-Laden content, as evidenced by smaller costs on a secondary memory load task for the former than the latter. This trend was reversed in Experiment 2 when participants were instructed to ignore their beliefs when reasoning with Belief-Laden and Non-Belief-Laden scenarios. These findings provide evidence that beliefs automatically influence reasoning, and attempting to ignore them comes with an attentional cost.     

Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs

Philosophical Studies - According to the Fragmentation Analysis, epistemic akrasia is a state of conflict between beliefs formed by the linguistic and non-linguistic belief-formation systems, and...     

Dysfunctional beliefs discriminate personality disorders

This study examines whether specific sets of dysfunctional beliefs are differentially associated with five personality disorders (PDs) as predicted by cognitive theory. Seven hundred fifty-six psychiatric outpatients completed the Personality Belief Questionnaire (PBQ) at intake and were assessed for PDs using a standardized clinical interview conducted by assessors who were blind to patients' PBQ responses. Findings showed that patients with avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive, narcissistic, and paranoid PDs preferentially endorsed PBQ beliefs theoretically linked to their specific disorders. The study results support the cognitive theory of personality disorders. Suggestions are made regarding the clinical utility of the PBQ with personality-disordered patients and future research on the PBQ.     

Irrational beliefs and bulimia symptoms

The psychological correlates of bulimia include affective disorder and emotional liability. In addition, emotional liability appears to precipitate binge-purge episodes. It has been proposed that emotional liability is a function of irrational beliefs regarding personal performance, interpersonal relationships and self-control. Irrational beliefs and bulimia symptoms were assessed with psychometrically valid self-report measures. Correlational analyses showed that the irrational beliefs of Anxious Overconcern, Problem Avoidance, Helplessness and Blame Proneness are separately correlated with bulimia symptoms. The implications for the psychological assessment and treatment of bulimia symptoms are discussed.Jeffrey M. Lohr, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Arkansas. His research interests are in the assessment of irrational beliefs and their association with dysphoric motivational states.Donna L. Parkinson, M.A., is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Psychology at the University of Arkansas. Her research interests are in the assessment of eating disorders.     

Irrational beliefs and conflict-handling orientations

Before a series of conflict-resolution and communication-skills workshops, measures were obtained on the dependent variables of conflict-handling orientations and on the independent variables of irrational beliefs. The population was rather general, i.e. nonstudent, nonclinical and non-volunteer, who were the managers and the engineers of three enterprises. Correlation analysis showed that irrational beliefs underlying anger, anxiety, frustration, guilt and other negative emotions were correlated with different conflict-handling orientations. On the basis of the obtained results a series of workshops was conducted in the format of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET).Mikhael I. Timofeev, Ph.D., is a senior lecturer at the Inter-Branch Institute of Advanced Training, St. Petersburg Technical University, Politechnicheskaya, 29, St. Petersburg, 195251, Russia.     

Irrational beliefs and psychological needs

Studied the relationship between irrational beliefs and 15 psychological needs described by Murray. The Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) and the Adjective Check List (ACL) were administered to 46 high school students and 50 adults. Results of stepwise multiple regression analyses indicated that five IBT scales and IBT Full-Scale were significantly associated with psychological needs. It was concluded that pathological behavior could not be readily predicted on the basis of irrational beliefs. It was further concluded that Ellis' model of personality obtained additional validating evidence.