Ludwik Fleck and the concept of style in the natural sciences

Ludwik Fleck is a pioneer of the contemporary social constructionist trend in scientific theory, where his central concept of thinking style has become standard fare. Yet the concept is too often misunderstood and simplified with serious consequences not only for Fleck studies. My essay situates Fleck??s concept of thinking style in the historical context of the 1920s and ??30s, when the notion of style was first applied to the natural sciences, in order to illustrate the uniqueness of Fleck??s concept among the uses of style by his contemporaries and, finally, to examine the epistemological, methodological, and political consequences of this distinction.     

Stabilizing and Changing Phenomenal Worlds: Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn on Scientific Literature

In the work of both Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn the scientific literature plays important roles for stability and change of scientific phenomenal worlds. In this article we shall introduce the analyses of scientific literature provided by Fleck and Kuhn, respectively. From this background we shall discuss the problem of how divergent thinking can emerge in a dogmatic atmosphere. We shall argue that in their accounts of the factors inducing changes of scientific phenomenal worlds Fleck and Kuhn offer substantially different approaches, and we shall discuss in which respects their approaches may be compatible. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Michael Polanyi: the anthropology of intellectual history

Scientific and political developments of the early twentieth century led Michael Polanyi to study the role of the scientist in research and the interaction between the individual scholar and the surrounding conditions in community and society. In his concept of “personal knowledge” he gave the theory and history of science an anthropological turn. In many instances of the history of sciences, research is driven by a commitment to beliefs and values. Society plays the role of authority and communicative backdrop that presupposes individual liberty. As a system of beliefs science is rooted in community and also in history. However, as soon as fellow humans become the objects of research, their appeal transcends the researcher. Consequently, the history of human endeavor reveals a “firmament” of standards and obligations which represent an ontological reality, for which Polanyi invokes Teilhard de Chardin’s notion of noosphere.     

PERSONAL PARTICIPATION: Michael Polanyi, Eric Voegelin, and the Indispensability of Faith

In this paper I focus on the central role faith plays in the thought of Polanyi and Voegelin. I begin by indicating how both find the modern conception of scientific knowing seriously wanting. What Polanyi terms “objectivism” and Voegelin calls “scientism” is the modern tendency to reduce knowledge to only that which can be scientifically demonstrated. This errant view of knowledge does not occur in a vacuum, though, and both men draw a connection between this and the political pathologies of the twentieth century. I then show the complementary ways in which these two thinkers believe recovery is possible: an epistemological solution encompassed in Polanyi's personal knowledge and an ontological reorientation that is the core of Voegelin's insistence that we must recover an awareness of human participation in transcendent reality.     

Lucky achievement: virtue epistemology on the value of knowledge

Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief.     

Attending to hidden realities: contributions from the work of Michael Polanyi to supervision in pastoral care and counseling

In this article, the author suggests that concepts from the work of Michael Polanyi--such as the tacit dimension, subsidiary awareness, and commitment to a yet unrevealed, hidden reality--provide a theoretical basis for understanding the unique formation involved in pastoral care and counseling supervision.     

The politics of situating knowledge: An exercise in social epistemology

This essay forges links between Popperians and feminists by considering the connections between Donna Haraway's situated knowledge and Karl R. Popper's situational logic. It is concerned with the political commitments behind methodological issues, with the degree to which there can be a Popperian contribution to the feminist vision of a successor science, and with ways of dealing with, while not resolving, the political differences between socialist feminists and libertarian Popperians.     

Not yet human: implicit knowledge, historical dehumanization, and contemporary consequences

Historical representations explicitly depicting Blacks as apelike have largely disappeared in the United States, yet a mental association between Blacks and apes remains. Here, the authors demonstrate that U.S. citizens implicitly associate Blacks and apes. In a series of laboratory studies, the authors reveal how this association influences study participants' basic cognitive processes and significantly alters their judgments in criminal justice contexts. Specifically, this Black-ape association alters visual perception and attention, and it increases endorsement of violence against Black suspects. In an archival study of actual criminal cases, the authors show that news articles written about Blacks who are convicted of capital crimes are more likely to contain ape-relevant language than news articles written about White convicts. Moreover, those who are implicitly portrayed as more apelike in these articles are more likely to be executed by the state than those who are not. The authors argue that examining the subtle persistence of specific historical representations such as these may not only enhance contemporary research on dehumanization, stereotyping, and implicit processes but also highlight common forms of discrimination that previously have gone unrecognized.     

Perception of epistemic authority and attribution for its choice as a function of knowledge area and age

Three age groups of children and adolescents (9–10, 13–14, and 17–18 years old) were asked to indicate sources of information which serve as their epistemic authority in nine knowledge areas and to attribute reasons for their choices. In general, the results showed that children and adolescents differentiate among sources and select their epistemic authorities according to knowledge areas. It was found that while the perception of parents as epistemic authorities decreases with age, the perception of self increases considerably and becomes an important epistemic authority. In spite of the decrease in the perception of parents as epistemic authorities, they continue to be a significant source of knowledge. In addition, the perception of friends as epistemic authority increases relatively in social knowledge areas. With regard to causal explanation, it was found that children and adolescents use various reasons to explain their selection of epistemic authority. They differentiated among their reasons on the basis of the selected source. Knowledge-denotating source expertise was used as the most important reason. The selection of oneself was mainly attributed to familiarity, and helpfulness was used to explain the selection of mother, friend and father as epistemic authorities. Friend was also selected because of similarity. Age differences with regard to use of reasons reflected changes in source selection. This line of research sheds light on the interpersonal nature of knowledge acquisition.     

Personal epistemology and theory of mind: deciphering young children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing

The beliefs that individuals hold about knowledge and knowing have been the focus of a growing body of work on “personal epistemology.” There has been general agreement among researchers about a developmental trajectory of epistemological understanding that takes place in adolescence and adulthood. Rarely has this research included children, however, and we know little about the origins of epistemological awareness or its early development. A separate group of researchers have investigated children's “theory of mind,” or the ability to understand others’ beliefs, actions, and desires, with primary attention to the onset of this cognitive achievement between the ages of 3 and 5. This article reviews the theoretical foundation for a proposed relation between these constructs, and reports on an exploratory investigation with 3–5 year olds, in which epistemological level was significantly related to theory of mind ability. Results are discussed in relation to a general timeline depicting the development of children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing, a process that involves an ongoing tension between objective and subjective perspectives. We propose that the trajectory of epistemological development be expanded to include an initial period of egocentric subjectivity that characterizes epistemological thinking prior to the achievement of theory of mind.     

Understanding unfamiliar words: the influence of processing resources, vocabulary knowledge, and age

In a 2-experiment design, the authors assessed the role of age and ability in defining unfamiliar words from context. In Experiment 1, 60 adults aged 18-33 and 60 adults aged 61-96 read passages with cues to the meaning of rare words, then defined them. Older adults produced fewer components of the words' meanings and were more likely to produce generalized interpretations of the precise meaning. In Experiment 2, 726 adults aged 30-97 selected definitions from 4 choices: the exact definition, a generalized interpretation of the exact definition, a generalized interpretation of the story, and definition-irrelevant information from the story. Adults over age 75 selected fewer precise definitions and more generalized interpretations of the story than younger ones. Findings suggest that older adults may have special difficulties in deriving the meaning of unfamiliar words from context.