Children's linguistic intuitions about factive presuppositions

Third and sixth graders' understanding of factive presupposition was investigated via two tasks: One required an abstract truth value judgment of the verb complement; the other called for a more informal judgment of consistency (or contradiction) between the target sentence and the negation of its complement. When compared with corresponding adult data, the present results indicate that the development of factive presupposition continues through late childhood. A further task examined a nonlogical pragmatic variable related to factive meaning. The final task investigated whether children's judgments of overall certainty are governed by factive or pragmatic aspects of meaning. Comparisons across the four tasks indicate that factive presupposition only gradually emerges as a distinct logical component of verb meaning. It is argued that young children's initial discriminations between factive and nonfactive verbs reflect the subjective confidence conveyed by the verb rather than the logical property of factivity, but that later in acquisition, factivity acquires a status superseding that of other facets of meaning.     

The effect of factivity on lexical retrieval and postlexical processes during eye fixations in reading

Subjects were required to read short passages of text while their eye movements were monitored. Each experimental passage contained a critical factive or nonfactive verb that was followed by a false complement. In half of the trials, subjects' reading was unimpaired; in the remainder of the trial, a central visual pattern mask, which moved in synchrony with the eyes, was applied. The results showed that (1) factive and nonfactive verbs did not receive different amounts of fixation time during the reading text. However, (2) false complements that followed nonfactive verbs. On the basis of this, it is concluded that individual word characteristics, such as factivity, are encoded automatically while sentence interpretation requires effort to be completed.     

The processing of presuppositional information contained in sentences: electrophysiological correlates.

In an attempt to observe how the brain processes presuppositional information, event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded from 12 scalp electrodes placed over the left and right hemispheres of 10 adult subjects as they listened to sentences that contained either factive or nonfactive verbs. The stimulus sentences had been time-compressed to a duration of less than 1.25 sec, allowing ERPs to be recorded over their entire length. A Principal Components Analysis/Analysis of Variance procedure provided evidence that the brain responses could discriminate between factive and nonfactive conditions. It was concluded that the processing of presupposition represents a multidimensional phenomenon that changes across cortical space and time.     

Validating presupposed versus focused text information

There is extensive evidence that readers continually validate discourse accuracy and congruence, but that they may also overlook conspicuous text contradictions. Validation may be thwarted when the inaccurate ideas are embedded sentence presuppositions. In four experiments, we examined readers’ validation of presupposed (“given”) versus new text information. Throughout, a critical concept, such as a truck versus a bus, was introduced early in a narrative. Later, a character stated or thought something about the truck, which therefore matched or mismatched its antecedent. Furthermore, truck was presented as either given or new information. Mismatch target reading times uniformly exceeded the matching ones by similar magnitudes for given and new concepts. We obtained this outcome using different grammatical constructions and with different antecedent–target distances. In Experiment 4, we examined only given critical ideas, but varied both their matching and the main verb’s factivity (e.g., factive know vs. nonfactive think). The Match × Factivity interaction closely resembled that previously observed for new target information (Singer, 2006). Thus, readers can successfully validate given target information. Although contemporary theories tend to emphasize either deficient or successful validation, both types of theory can accommodate the discourse and reader variables that may regulate validation.     

Semantic context influences memory for verbs more than memory for nouns

Three experiments revealed that memory for verbs is more dependent on semantic context than is memory for nouns. The participants in Experiment 1 were asked to remember either nouns or verbs from intransitive sentences. A recognition test included verbatim sentences, sentences with an old noun and a new verb, sentences with an old verb and a new noun, and entirely new sentences. Memory for verbs was significantly better when the verb was presented with the same noun at encoding and at retrieval. This contextual effect was much smaller for nouns. Experiments 2 and 3 replicated this effect and provided evidence that context effects reflect facilitation from bringing to mind the same meaning of a verb at encoding and at retrieval. Memory for verbs may be more dependent on semantic context because the meanings of verbs are more variable across semantic contexts than are the meanings of nouns.     

The role of the verb in sentence memory

Investigators have frequently found that nouns are more important than verbs in the memory representation of sentences. This pattern of results is incompatible with recent theories of sentence memory that have emphasized the verb and with the results of sentence comprehension studies that have demonstrated the importance of the verb. The four experiments reported here were designed to reexamine the role of the verb in sentence memory. Linguistic variables other than sentence function were held constant in three studies. Verbs were recalled as well and were as effective retrieval cues as nouns in these experiments. The to-be-remembered sentences were presented in the context of paragraphs in the fourth experiment. This reduced the difference in level of recall between subjects, verbs, and objects. The conclusion was drawn that the verb is no less important than sentence nouns in the memory representation.     

Lexical complexity and fixation times in reading: Effects of word frequency,verb complexity,and lexical ambiguity

Two experiments investigated whether lexical complexity increases a word’s processing time. Subjects read sentences, each containing a target word, while their eye movements were monitored. In experiment 1, mean fixation time on infrequent words was longer than on their more frequent controls, as was the first fixation after the Infrequent Target. Fixation Times on Causative, factive, and negative verbs and ambiguous nouns were no longer than on their controls. Further analyses on the ambiguous nouns, however, suggested that the likelihood of their various meanings affected fixation time. This factor was investigated in experiment 2. subjects spent a longer time fixating ambiguous words with two equally likely meanings than fixating ambiguous words with one highly likely meaning. The results suggest that verb complexity does not affect lexical access time, and that word frequency And the presence of two highly likely meanings may affect lexical access and/or postaccess integration.     

Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children’s false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children’s false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children’s understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ (“falsely think”) predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.     

Infants use known verbs to learn novel nouns: Evidence from 15- and 19-month-olds

Fluent speakers’ representations of verbs include semantic knowledge about the nouns that can serve as their arguments. These “selectional restrictions” of a verb can in principle be recruited to learn the meaning of a novel noun. For example, the sentence He ate the carambola licenses the inference that carambola refers to something edible. We ask whether 15- and 19-month-old infants can recruit their nascent verb lexicon to identify the referents of novel nouns that appear as the verbs’ subjects. We compared infants’ interpretation of a novel noun (e.g., the dax) in two conditions: one in which dax is presented as the subject of animate-selecting construction (e.g., The dax is crying), and the other in which dax is the subject of an animacy-neutral construction (e.g., The dax is right here). Results indicate that by 19 months, infants use their representations of known verbs to inform the meaning of a novel noun that appears as its argument.     

Imageability and distributional typicality measures of nouns and verbs in contemporary English

Dissociations between noun and verb processing are not uncommon after brain injury; yet, precise psycholinguistic comparisons of nouns and verbs are hampered by the underrepresentation of verbs in published semantic word norms and by the absence of contemporary estimates for part-of-speech usage. We report herein imageability ratings and rating response times (RTs) for 1,197 words previously categorized as pure nouns, pure verbs, or words of balanced noun-verb usage on the basis of the Francis and Ku?era (1982) norms. Nouns and verbs differed in rated imageability, and there was a stronger correspondence between imageability rating and RT for nouns than for verbs. For all word types, the image-rating-RT function implied that subjects employed an image generation process to assign ratings. We also report a new measure of noun-verbtypicality that used the Hyperspace Analog to Language (HAL; Lund & Burgess, 1996) context vectors (derived from a large sample of Usenet text) to compute the mean context distance between each word and all of thepure nouns andpure verbs. For a subset of the items, the resulting HAL noun-verb difference score was compared with part-of-speech usage in a representative sample of the Usenet corpus. It is concluded that this score can be used to estimate the extent to which a given word occurs in typical noun or verb sentence contexts in informal contemporary English discourse. The item statistics given in Appendix B will enable experimenters to select representative examples of nouns and verbs or to compare typical with atypical nouns (or verbs), while holding constant or covarying rated imageability.     

Parafoveal pragmatics revisited

The results of two experiments are reported, examining eye movements as participants read the initial sentence in a sentence‐matching task. The sentences employed had a NP1‐verb‐NP2 construction and the pragmatic plausibility of the relationship between the verb and the two nouns was independently manipulated. The aim of the first experiment was to investigate the claim that the plausibility of a NP1‐verb relationship influences reading time on NP1 even before the verb is directly inspected. The data confirm the existence of such “parafoveal pragmatic” effects, but suggest that sublexical properties of the particular nouns employed may also exert a parafoveal effect on foveal processing. Experiment 2 was carried out as a control. A contingent presentation procedure ensured that the critical verb remained masked until it was directly inspected. Parafoveal‐on‐foveal effects exerted by the verb were removed by this procedure, although effects relating to properties of the nouns remained. The results confirm the presence of processing interactions involving sublexical properties of the two nouns, even though these were quite widely separated. Overall, the results of the two experiments suggest that, for this task, there is a genuine parafoveal‐on‐foveal effect attributable to purely pragmatic relationships involving the initial noun and verb in the sentences employed. In addition, there is evidence of longer range parafoveal‐on‐foveal effects of orthographic properties of the words employed.     

Memory for general and specific sentences

Cued recall indicated that memory was better for sentences containing specific verbs (e.g., scratched) than for sentences containing general verbs (e.g., injured). When synonymic verb responses were included, however, the general-specific difference was eliminated. Also, for complete sentence recall, subject nouns were better retrieval cues than verbs or object nouns. nt]mis|This research was supported by National Science Foundation Research Grant GB-22664 to L. Starling Reid and by a grant to the author from the Denison University Faculty Development Activities Program. Thanks are due Bill Stehle and Larry Giordano, who assisted in data collection and analysis.     

句子结构与控制动词类型对题元角色指派的影响

扩展论元依存模型认为：语序固定语言的题元角色指派依赖论元的语序线索; 论元线索与动词论元表征不一致时, 题元角色再分析会产生额外的加工负荷。为检验该模型, 本研究采用眼动记录方法, 实验为2 (句子结构：居中、前置) × 2 (控制动词类型：主语控制、宾语控制)被试内设计。通过操纵句子结构, 考察汉语读者对语序线索的依赖性; 通过操纵控制动词类型, 考察汉语论元线索与动词论元表征的一致性对题元角色指派的影响。结果发现：(1)前置结构的句子在名词1、名词2和动词区域的阅读时间和回视次数多于居中结构的句子; (2)宾语控制动词条件在动词和动词后区域的第二遍阅读时间和总回视次数多于主语控制动词条件; (3)在居中结构中, 宾语控制动词条件在名词2和动词区域的阅读时间和回视次数多于主语控制动词条件; 在前置结构中, 宾语控制动词条件在动词后区域的阅读时间多于主语控制动词条件。结果支持扩展论元依存模型。     

Two-year-olds compute syntactic structure on-line

Syntax allows human beings to build an infinite number of new sentences from a finite stock of words. Because toddlers typically utter only one or two words at a time, they have been thought to have no syntax. Using event-related potentials (ERPs), we demonstrated that 2-year-olds do compute syntactic structure when listening to spoken sentences. We observed an early left-lateralized brain response when an expected verb was incorrectly replaced by a noun (or vice versa). Thus, toddlers build on-line expectations as to the syntactic category of the next word in a sentence. In addition, the response topography was different for nouns and verbs, suggesting that different neural networks already underlie noun and verb processing in toddlers, as they do in adults.     

Semantic weight and verb retrieval in aphasia

Individuals with agrammatic aphasia may have difficulty with verb production in comparison to nouns. Additionally, they may have greater difficulty producing verbs that have fewer semantic components (i.e., are semantically "light") compared to verbs that have greater semantic weight. A connectionist verb-production model proposed by Gordon and Dell (2003) learns through error correction to "divide the labor" between syntax and semantics. Verbs that are semantically heavier come to depend less on syntax and more on semantics. For lighter verbs, the reverse is true. We performed this study to clarify the role of semantic weight in aphasic verb production and to test the prediction from Gordon and Dell that a brain lesion that impairs the syntactic input to verb retrieval will impair lighter verbs more than heavier ones. Consistent with this prediction, we found that the decrement for lighter verbs was present in a group with agrammatic aphasia but not in a matched group without agrammatism.     

Predicted errors in children's early sentence comprehension

Children use syntax to interpret sentences and learn verbs; this is syntactic bootstrapping. The structure-mapping account of early syntactic bootstrapping proposes that a partial representation of sentence structure, the set of nouns occurring with the verb, guides initial interpretation and provides an abstract format for new learning. This account predicts early successes, but also telltale errors: Toddlers should be unable to tell transitive sentences from other sentences containing two nouns. In testing this prediction, we capitalized on evidence that 21-month-olds use what they have learned about noun order in English sentences to understand new transitive verbs. In two experiments, 21-month-olds applied this noun-order knowledge to two-noun intransitive sentences, mistakenly assigning different interpretations to "The boy and the girl are gorping!" and "The girl and the boy are gorping!". This suggests that toddlers exploit partial representations of sentence structure to guide sentence interpretation; these sparse representations are useful, but error-prone.     

Epistemic contextualism can be stated properly

It has been argued that epistemic contextualism faces the so-called factivity problem and hence cannot be stated properly. The basic idea behind this charge is that contextualists supposedly have to say, on the one hand, that knowledge ascribing sentences like “S knows that S has hands” are true when used in ordinary contexts while, on the other hand, they are not true by the standard of their own context. In my paper, I want to show that the argument to the factivity problem fails because it rests on the mistaken premise that contextualists are committed to the truth of particular ordinary knowledge attributions.     

Knowledge,Presupposition, and Pragmatic Implicature

It is widely accepted that knowledge is factive, but two different understandings of ＂factivity＂ should be distinguished, namely, the implication version and the presupposition version. While the former only takes the truth of P as a necessary requirement for ＂S knows that P,＂ the latter considers it also necessary for ＂S does not know that P.＂ In this paper, I argue against presupposition and defend implication. More specifically, I argue against Wang and Tai＇s defense of the presupposition version as presented in a recent paper and propose a pragmatic response to the ＂persistence problem＂ of implication. In other words, my positive proposal is an account of implication plus pragmatic implicature. To conclude, I use my version to analyze Wang and Tai＇s distinction between inner skepticism and outer skepticism. My conclusion is that, after abandoning presupposition, we can identify two types of intermediate skepticism between Wang and Tai＇s inner and outer skepticism.