Revising psychological tests: lessons learned from the revision of the MMPI

Some types of psychological tests become dated and require more frequent and more extensive revision than others. Because of the formidable effort that is required in a test revision, the goals and scope of the revision need to be carefully staked out before a revision is undertaken. The revision team needs to develop a generally agreed-upon guiding philosophy for the test revision in the beginning of the project and incorporate broad input into the changes that are likely to be required. Factors important to consider in a test revision are discussed, and the parameters of personality test revision illustrated from the extensive program to revise the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) are included. Recommendations for gauging acceptance of the revision are suggested along with steps that revisers and publishers might take to make a test revision both more research based and more acceptable to test users.     

Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision

This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend on the reference sentence (although the posterior belief state does depend on it). Bounded revision satisfies the Darwiche–Pearl (DP) axioms for iterated belief change. If the reference sentence is fixed to be a tautology or a contradiction, two well-known one-dimensional revision operations result. Bounded revision thus naturally fills the space between conservative revision (also known as natural revision) and moderate revision (also known as lexicographic revision). I compare this approach to the two-dimensional model of ‘revision by comparison’ investigated by Fermé and Rott (Artif Intell 157:5–47, 2004) that satisfies neither the SBC nor the DP axioms. I conclude that two-dimensional revision operations add substantially to the expressive power of qualitative approaches that do not make use of numbers as measures of degrees of belief.     

Teaching Children About Revision in Writing

We investigated effects of instruction in the process of revision on children's knowledge of the revision process, on their ability to make revisions on paper, and on the quality of their writing. Fifteen sixth graders received instruction in the process of revision; 15 controls read good literature. After instruction, each child wrote a story, was interviewed about potential revisions, and was given an opportunity to make changes on the first copy and then write another draft. The main variables for knowledge of the revision process were number of spots suggested for revision and average specificity of suggested changes. The main variable for ability to make revisions on paper was total number of revisions made. A quality score was obtained for the first and final drafts. Instruction did affect knowledge of the revision process, and it enhanced revision efforts. Quality judgments tended to increase across drafts for the revision group, whereas they remained stable for the controls.     

Revocable Belief Revision

Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the requirements are for revocable belief revision. By this we not merely mean recovering belief in non-modal propositions, as in the recovery principle for belief contraction, but recovering belief in modal propositions: beliefs about beliefs. These requirements are almost never met, a surprising result.     

A Characterization of Probability-based Dichotomous Belief Revision

Studia Logica - This article investigates the properties of multistate top revision, a dichotomous (AGM-style) model of belief revision that is based on an underlying model of probability revision....     

How to give it up: A survey of some formal aspects of the logic of theory change

The paper surveys some recent work on formal aspects of the logic of theory change. It begins with a general discussion of the intuitive processes of contraction and revision of a theory, and of differing strategies for their formal study. Specific work is then described, notably Gärdenfors' postulates for contraction and revision, maxichoice contraction and revision functions and the condition of orderliness, partial meet contraction and revision functions and the condition of relationality, and finally the operations of safe contraction and revision. Verifications and proofs are omitted, with references given to the literature, but definitions and principal results are presented with rigour, along with discussion of their significance.     

Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs

We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any such nested conditional can be reduced to acceptance tests for unnested conditionals. Thus, iterated revision can be accomplished in a virtual manner, using uniterated revision.     

Practical and ethical issues pertaining to test revisions

Revisions of clinical psychological tests are occurring at more frequent intervals than in the past. These revisions involve such practical issues as the goals of the revision, the economic considerations relating to the revision, the methodology of the revision, and the degree to which the revision meets the available scientific and ethical standards governing the use of these tests in individual assessment. A tension between practical and ethical issues in the test revision process is inevitable and demands the best of psychologists in their decision making. Test developers, psychologists, patients, and consumers of the test interpretations and recommendations have legitimate interests and a stake in seeing that test revisions are applied with maximal effectiveness and fairness in the broadest sense.     

Revising what readers know: Updating text representations during narrative comprehension

Reading comprehension involves not just encoding information into memory, but also updating and revising what is already known or believed. For example, as narrative plots unfold, readers often must revise the expectations they have constructed from earlier portions of text to successfully comprehend later events. Evidence suggests that such revision is by no means guaranteed. In three experiments, we examined conditions that influence readers' revision of trait-based models for story characters. Trait models are particularly relevant for examining such revision because they demonstrate resistance to change. We specifically assessed whether task instructions and content-driven refutations of earlier information would enhance the likelihood of revision. In Experiment 1, instructions to carefully consider the appropriateness of story outcomes generally facilitated revision. In Experiment 2, we removed those instructions; revision occurred only when refutations included sufficient explanation to suggest that updating was necessary. Experiment 3 further supported the influence of instructions on readers' propensities to revise. These results are informative with respect to the mechanisms that guide readers' moment-by-moment comprehension of unfolding narratives.     

Self-regulation during a single performance episode: Mood-as-information in the absence of formal feedback

This investigation used a daily diary methodology to examine goal revision and effort allocation processes over a single, 2-weeks performance episode in which individuals prepared for a course exam. Growth curve modeling revealed that daily goal exhibited a curvilinear trend in which it was stable and relatively high at the beginning of the time period, but rapidly declined as the exam approached. Daily effort exhibited a trend opposite of the goal trend, remaining low and relatively stable at the beginning and increasingly rapidly as the exam approached. Current mood predicted daily goal revision, with positive mood being positively related to goal revision and negative mood being negatively related to goal revision. The traits of behavioral activation system (BAS) sensitivity and behavioral inhibition system (BIS) sensitivity moderated within-person relationships of positive and negative mood with goal revision. Simultaneous and lagged relationships among mood, goals, and daily effort were also examined.     

Inter-Definability of Horn Contraction and Horn Revision

There have been a number of publications in recent years on generalising the AGM paradigm to the Horn fragment of propositional logic. Most of them focused on adapting AGM contraction and revision to the Horn setting. It remains an open question whether the adapted Horn contraction and Horn revision are inter-definable as in the AGM case through the Levi and Harper identities. In this paper, we give a positive answer by providing methods for generating contraction and revision from their dual operations. Noticeably, we cannot apply the Levi and Harper identities directly in such methods as the Horn fragment does not fully support negation. To overcome this difficulty, a Horn approximation technique called Horn strengthening is used. We show that Horn contraction generated from Horn revision is always plausible whereas Horn revision generated from Horn contraction is, in general, implausible and, to regain plausibility, the generating contraction has to be properly restricted.     

Replacement—A Sheffer Stroke for Belief Change

By replacement is meant an operation that replaces one sentence by another in a belief set. Replacement can be used as a kind of Sheffer stroke for belief change, since contraction, revision, and expansion can all be defined in terms of it. Replacement can also be defined either in terms of contraction or in terms of revision. Close connections are shown to hold between axioms for replacement and axioms for contraction and revision. Partial meet replacement is axiomatically characterized. It is shown that this operation can have outcomes that are not obtainable through either partial meet contraction or partial meet revision.     

Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-consistency and Iterated Revision

We study belief change in the branching-time structures introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007). First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent (when the set of states is finite) to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, we provide a set of modal axioms that characterize the class of AGM-consistent frames within the modal logic introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007). Third, we introduce a generalization of AGM belief revision functions that allows a clear statement of principles of iterated belief revision and discuss iterated revision both semantically and syntactically.     

Selective Revision

We introduce a constructive model of selective belief revision in which it is possible to accept only a part of the input information. A selective revision operator ο is defined by the equality K ο α = K * f(α), where * is an AGM revision operator and f a function, typically with the property ⊢ α → f(α). Axiomatic characterizations are provided for three variants of selective revision. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Belief Revision And Epistemology

Postulational approaches attempt to understand the dynamics of belief revision by appealing to no more than the set of beliefs held by an agent and the logical relations between them. It is argued there that such an approach cannot work. A proper account of belief revision must also appeal to the arguments supporting beliefs, and recognize that those arguments can be defeasible. If we begin with a mature epistemological theory that accommodates this, it can be seen that the belief revision operators on which the postulational theories are based are ill-defined. It is further argued that there is no way to repair the definitions so as to retain the spirit of those theory. Belief revision is better studied from within an independently motivated epistemological theory.     

Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account

The expansion or revision of false theories by true evidence does not always increase their verisimilitude. After a comparison of different notions of verisimilitude the relation between verisimilitude and belief expansion or revision is investigated within the framework of the relevant element account. We are able to find certain interesting conditions under which both the expansion and the revision of theories by true evidence is guaranteed to increase their verisimilitude.     

Proposed Draft of Revised APGA Ethical Standards

The following is a rough draft of the proposed revision of the APGA Ethical Standards; it is not the final copy. Permission to print the draft in this issue of JEC was granted by Dr. George Gazda, chairman of the committee that is working on the revision. Your reaction to this revision and any other comments or suggestions are invited by Dr. Gazda, 212 Baldwin Hall, Athens, Georgia 30601.     

Partial monotonicity and a new version of the Ramsey test

We introduce two new belief revision axioms: partial monotonicity and consequence correctness. We show that partial monotonicity is consistent with but independent of the full set of axioms for a Gärdenfors belief revision sytem. In contrast to the Gärdenfors inconsistency results for certain monotonicity principles, we use partial monotonicity to inform a consistent formalization of the Ramsey test within a belief revision system extended by a conditional operator. We take this to be a technical dissolution of the well-known Gärdenfors dilemma.In addition, we present the consequential correctness axiom as a new measure of minimal revision in terms of the deductive core of a proposition whose support we wish to excise. We survey several syntactic and semantic belief revision systems and evaluate them according to both the Gärdenfors axioms and our new axioms. Furthermore, our algebraic characterization of semantic revision systems provides a useful technical device for analysis and comparison, which we illustrate with several new proofs.Finally, we have a new inconsistency result, which is dual to the Gärdenfors inconsistency results. Any elementary belief revision system that is consequentially correct must violate the Gärdenfors axiom of strong boundedness (K^*8), which we characterize as yet another monotonicity condition.This work was supported by the McDonnell Douglas Independent Research and Development program.     

The role of feedback, casual attributions, and self-efficacy in goal revision

An important issue in work motivation is how, when, and why individuals revise their goals up or down over time. In the current study, the authors examine feedback, causal attributions, and self-efficacy in this process. Although self-efficacy has frequently been suggested as a key explanatory variable for goal revision, its role has yet to be directly evaluated. Additionally, although attributions have been shown to influence goal revision following failure, the extent to which attributions influence goal revision following success remains unclear. In the current study, the authors address these issues by experimentally manipulating goal progress via performance feedback and tracking the resulting changes in self-efficacy and goal revision over time. In so doing, the authors also address several interpretive ambiguities present in the existing research. Results support the hypothesized model, finding that performance feedback and attributions interactively influenced self-efficacy, which in turn influenced goal revision. These results suggest that interventions targeting attributions, and self-efficacy more directly, may have meaningful influences on goal setting and pursuit, particularly following feedback.     

The Relevance of Logic to Reasoning and Beleif Revision: Harman on 'Change in View'

In Change of View: Principles of Reasoning , Gilbert Harman argues that (i) all genuine reasoning is a matter of belief revision, and that, since (ii) logic is not "specially relevant" to belief revision, (iii) logic is not specially relevant to reasoning, either. Thus, Harman suggests, what is needed is a "theory of reasoning"–which, incidentally, will be psychologistic, telling us both how we do and how we should reason. I argue that Harman fails to establish the need for such a theory, because (a) reasoning is not always a matter of belief revision, and (b) logic is, in fact, of the utmost relevance to both reasoning and belief revision.