Concepts,Conceptual Schemes and Grammar

This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does not fall prey to Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears in the last writings: it is neither deliberately abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions in On Certainty or by the role accorded to agreement in judgement.     

Conceptual Role Semantics and the Reference of Moral Concepts

This paper examines the prospects for a conceptual or functional role theory of moral concepts. It is argued that such an account is well‐placed to explain both the irreducibility and practicality of moral concepts. Several versions of conceptual role semantics for moral concepts are distinguished, depending on whether the concept‐constitutive conceptual roles are (i) wide or narrow (ii) normative or non‐normative and (iii) purely doxastic or conative. It is argued that the most plausible version of conceptual role semantics for moral concepts involves only ‘narrow’ conceptual roles, where these include connections to motivational, desire‐like, states. In the penultimate section it is argued, contrary to what Wedgwood, Enoch and others have claimed, that such an account of moral concepts cannot plausibly be combined with the claim that moral concepts refer to robust properties.     

Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress

This essay concerns the question of how we make genuine epistemic progress through conceptual analysis. Our way into this issue will be through consideration of the paradox of analysis. The paradox challenges us to explain how a given statement can make a substantive contribution to our knowledge, even while it purports merely to make explicit what one’s grasp of the concept under scrutiny consists in. The paradox is often treated primarily as a semantic puzzle. However, in “Sect. 1” I argue that the paradox raises a more fundamental epistemic problem, and in “Sects.1 and 2” I argue that semantic proposals—even ones designed to capture the Fregean link between meaning and epistemic significance—fail to resolve that problem. Seeing our way towards a real solution to the paradox requires more than semantics; we also need to understand how the process of analysis can yield justification for accepting a candidate conceptual analysis. I present an account of this process, and explain how it resolves the paradox, in “Sect. 3”. I conclude in “Sect. 4” by considering the implications for the present account concerning the goal of conceptual analysis, and by arguing that the apparent scarcity of short and finite illuminating analyses in philosophically interesting cases provides no grounds for pessimism concerning the possibility of philosophical progress through conceptual analysis.     

Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism

Entitlement is conceived as a kind of positive epistemic status, attaching to certain propositions, that involves no cognitive or intellectual accomplishment on the part of the beneficiary—a status that is in place by default. In this paper I will argue that the notion of entitlement—or something very like it—falls out of an idea that may at first blush seem rather disparate: that the evidential support relation can be understood as a kind of variably strict conditional (in the sense of Lewis 1973). Lewis provided a general recipe for deriving what he termed inner modalities from any variably strict conditional governed by a logic meeting certain constraints. On my proposal, entitlement need be nothing more exotic than the inner necessity associated with evidential support. Understanding entitlement in this way helps to answer some common concerns—in particular, the concern that entitlement could only be a pragmatic, and not genuinely epistemic, status.     

Assessing Students' Misclassifications of Physics Concepts: An Ontological Basis for Conceptual Change

Physics novices and experts solved conceptual physics problems involving light, heat, and electric current and then explained their answers. Novices were ninth-grade students with no background in physics; experts were two postgraduates in physics and two advanced physics graduate students. Problems were multiple choice, with one correct response and three alternative responses representing possible misconceptions. For each conceptual physics problem, an isomorphic material-substance problem was constructed by imagining a materialistic conception of the physics topic and creating the resulting version of the problem. In each physics problem, one of the incorrect choices corresponded to the correct choice in the isomorphic material-substance problem. The empirical question was whether novices would reason about the physics problem as if it were conceptually similar to the substance isomorph. This question was addressed by comparing subjects' responses in the problem pairs, as well as by examining their explanations concerning all problems. A content analysis of subjects' explanations revealed that physics novices were strongly inclined to conceptualize physics concepts as material substances, whereas expert protocols revealed distinctly nonmaterialistic representations. A theory of conceptual change involving ontologically distinct categories is substantiated by these findings.     

The Limits of Conceptual Analysis

Abstract: A priori conceptual analysis is once again part of the philosophical mainstream. Unlike their verificationist predecessors, modern conceptual analysts deny that we have armchair access to the essential nature of the objects and properties we think about. Instead, they claim we have access to how the reference of our words and thoughts is fixed. This position seems to resolve the apparent tension between semantic externalism and privileged access to one's own meanings. However, I argue that our grasp of reference‐fixing conditions is as fallible as our understanding of essences.     

康德与弗雷格的分析性观念

历史上,康德第一次较为清晰地指出所有语句要么是分析语句要么是综合语句,同时给出了划分分析性语句与综合语句的依据,并明确认为分析性语句是不扩展知识的。康德给出的区分分析与综合语句的依据会带来明显的问题。弗雷格继承并发展了康德对于分析性观念的基本想法,在《算术基础》一书中给出了自己的对分析性命题的刻画,尝试论证算术真理是发展了的逻辑真理、是分析性命题相。相较于康德对分析性命题的刻画,弗雷格的刻画有明显的优点,克服了康德的定义带来的几个明显问题。同时,弗雷格也明确反对康德的分析命题并不扩展知识的这一想法,尝试着指出在一种意义上分析命题是扩展知识的。     

Conceptual Analysis and Analytical Definitions in Frege

Logical (or conceptual) analysis is in Frege primarily not an analysis of a concept but of its sense. Five Fregean philosophical principles are presented as constituting a framework for a theory of logical or conceptual analysis, which I call analytical explication. These principles, scattered and sometime latent in his writings are operative in Frege's critique of other views and in his constructive development of his own view. The proposed conception of analytical explication is partially rooted in Frege's notion of analytical definition. It may also be the basis of what is required of a reduction of one domain to another, if it is to have the philosophical significance many reductions allegedly have.     

Basic Concepts of Systems Analysis

… a system is simply the structure or organization of an orderly whole, clearly showing the interrelations of the parts to each other and to the whole itself. From this definition, these criteria emerge:

• 1 . There must be a structure or organization.
• 2 . The structure or organization must be conceptualized as a whole.
• 3 . The whole must be orderly.
• 4 . The whole must have parts.
• 5 . Parts can be shown clearly relating to each other.
• 6 . Parts can be shown clearly relating to the whole.

—Silvern [1972, pp. 1–3]     

Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Observations of Animal Minds

Philosophia - The relation between conceptual analysis and empirical observations when ascribing or denying concepts and beliefs to non-human animals is not straightforward. In order to reflect on...     

Operant Variability: A Conceptual Analysis

Some researchers claim that variability is an operant dimension of behavior. The present paper reviews the concept of operant behavior and emphasizes that differentiation is the behavioral process that demonstrates an operant relation. Differentiation is conceived as change in the overlap between two probability distributions: the distribution of reinforcement probability as a function of some response property (S distribution) and the probability distribution of the response property itself (R distribution). This concept implies that the differentiation process can be measured only if S distribution and R distribution are both established on the same response property. To determine whether the differentially reinforced behavioral variability fits the proposed concept of operant behavior, I examine the main procedures (lag n and threshold procedures) and the main dependent variable (U value) employed in the studies of operant variability. Because lag n and threshold procedures establish their S distributions on properties distinct from U value, differentiation cannot be measured over the change in U value. I conclude that studies of operant variability have failed to provide a direct demonstration that variability is an operant dimension of behavior. Hence, studies in which measures of variability provide a basis to measure differentiation can better support the claim that variability is an operant dimension of behavior.     

A Conceptual Analysis of Lambert,Ogles, and Masters's Conceptual Scheme for Outcome Assessment

For in psychology, there are experimental methods, and conceptual confusion. (Wittgenstein, 1968, p. 232)     

From Conceptual Analysis to Serious Metaphysics

Abstract

Habermas’s recent work in epistemology has been marked by a decisive rejection of his earlier epistemic conception of truth in which he understood truth as ‘what may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions’. Arguing that no ‘idealization of justificatory conditions’ can do justice to both human fallibility and the unconditional nature of truth, he has attempted to develop a realistic conception of truth that severs any conceptual link between truth and justification while respecting the epistemic relevance of justification for ascertaining the truth. But realizing this second goal has proved elusive for Habermas because he veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism in his epistemology. By contrast, Hilary Putnam’s recent turn to what he calls ‘natural realism’ is more successful in articulating a form of realism that, in taking its leave of an epistemic conception of truth, still manages to keep its distance from metaphysical realism.     

“随附性”概念辨析

The concept of supervenience advanced by D.Davidson to expound his anomolas monism is used to present both the dependent and independent relation between mental and physical properties. In Concepts of Supervenience,J.Kim claimed that there are three different concepts of supervenience:the weak,the strong and the global,and demonstrated that the strong supervenience is equivalent to the global one. One year later,J.Kim corrected an error in the earlier paper,and held that the strong supervenience is stronger...     

Developing a Conceptual Framework of Employee Well-Being (EWB) by Applying Goal Concepts and Findings from Personality-Social Psychology

This paper reports an attempt to develop a foundation of a theory of employee well-being (EWB) by borrowing concepts and findings from research in personality-social psychology. The proposed conceptual framework has four central principles: The principle of goal selection based on valence, the principle of goal selection based on expectancy, the goal implementation principle, and the goal attainment principle. These principles have corollaries expanding the logic of the proposed theoretical relationships. Specifically, the principle of goal selection based on valence has nine corollaries: Approach versus avoidance goals, goal meaningfulness, high- versus low-level goals, goals related to cultural norms, goals related to deprived needs, goals related to basic versus growth needs, intrinsic versus extrinsic goals, goals producing flow, and autonomy in goal setting. The principle of goal selection based on expectancy has five corollaries: Goal-motive congruence, goal-cultural value congruence, goal-resources congruence, goal conflict, and adapting goals to changes in circumstances. The principle of goal implementation has two corollaries: Goal concreteness and goal commitment. Finally, the goal attainment principle has three corollaries: Recognition of goal attainment, intensity versus frequency of positive feedback, and progress reports.     

Rational Passions and Intellectual Virtues,A Conceptual Analysis

Intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, clarity, intellectual honesty and the willingness to participate in rational discussions, are conceived as important aims of education. In this paper an attempt is made to clarify the specific nature of intellectual virtues. Firstly, the intellectual virtues are systematically compared with moral virtues. The upshot is that considering a trait of character to be an intellectual virtue implies assuming that such a trait can be derived from, or is a specification of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. Secondly, several (possible) misconceptions of intellectual virtues are avoided by making the required distinctions. For example, it is argued that our concept of an intellectual virtue should not be confused with a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness.