(Math, Science, ?)

In science as in mathematics, it is popular to know little and resent much about category theory. Less well known is how common it is to know little and like much about set theory. The set theory of almost all scientists, and even the average mathematician, is fundamentally different from the formal set theory that is contrasted against category theory. The latter two are often opposed by saying one emphasizes Substance, the other Form. However, in all known systems of mathematics throughout history, mathematicians have moved fluidly between ideas conceived of as thing-like, property-like, and process-like. On the other hand one way to advance science is to better distinguish between thing, property, and process. All this constitutes a distracting background for those interested in, or distressed by, the possible application of category theory to science, and to mathematics as well.     

Linguistic Archipelago and (Its?) History

In this article I examine Jean–François Lyotard's conception of history, its philosophical presuppositions, and its implications. As his conception's most crucial implicit assumptions I consider Lyotard's account of language and his notion of agonistics and dissent. Concerning its implications, I consider the nominalist and relativist conclusions Lyotard's theory may engender if thought through to its end, as well as the possibilities it opens up for ethics and justice for alterity, or otherness, via a new notion of human history. My aim is to show how Lyotard advances philosophical thought about history and to examine whether he succeeds in delivering the goods he promises. I conclude with suggestions for an alternative approach. The main thesis of the article is that Lyotard's metacritique of past accounts of human history is pertinent and apposite but, because of some negative implications of certain implicit assumptions on which he relies to articulate this critique, it appears inadequate in some respects. I argue that it is possible to promote a critique of older notions of human history along Lyotardian lines and to preserve the merits of Lyotard's critique for a sensitive and nonlogocentric approach to otherness via another route, one that is not committed to Lyotard's agonistics and incommensurability of language games.     

Ideologies,Idols (and Graven Images?): Rejoinder to Gurman and Kniskern

Three major issues raised in Gurman and Kniskern's commentary are discussed. These are (a) the suitability of established research design criteria for studying the outcome of family therapy; (b) the impact of therapist relationship factors on therapy outcome; and (c) the place of concrete or objective change measures in psychotherapy outcome research. Areas of agreement and disagreement with Gurman and Kniskern's observations are identified.     

Blinding me with (queer) science: religion, sexuality, and (post?) modernity

This essay brings to bear insights from continental philosophers Michel Foucault and Judith Butler on the science of (homo)sexuality and, more importantly, the desire to use such science to resolve contemporary conflicts over homosexuality’s acceptability. So-called “queer science” remains deeply beholden to modern notions of sex, gender, and sexuality, the author argues, a schematic that its premodern (Christian) roots further denaturalize. The philosophical insights drawn from this analysis are then applied to the controversy over homosexuality within global Christianity that often pits the “backward” former colonies against the “modern” west.     

Ekstasis as (Beyond?) Jouissance: Sex,Queerness, and Apophaticism in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition

Ekstasis (ecstasy) is central to Eastern Orthodox theology, an encounter that sets the self on the way towards knowledge of and union with God. Ekstasis is fundamentally apophatic — achieved through the eschewal of cognitive knowledge, and experiential — precipitated by practices that foster self-renunciation and transcendence. This article examines how this notion of ecstasy, as narrated in the Orthodox theology of Staniloae and Lossky, can aid, and be aided by, queer theoretical claims regarding sex. Through examining Lacan's notion of jouissance and Bersani's utilization of it, as well as Williams's analysis of sex as “the body's grace,” this article explores how sex, particularly orgasm, can function as a spiritual resource, as a site of and practice towards ecstasy. This article concludes with a brief examination of the ethical implications of this frame.     

Explaining Religion (Away?)

In light of the advancements in cognitive science and the evolutionary psychology of religion in the past two decades, scientists and philosophers have begun to reflect on the theological and atheological implications of naturalistic—and in particular, evolutionary—explanations of religious belief and behaviour. However, philosophical naiveté is often evinced by scientists and scientific naiveté by philosophers. The aim of this article is to draw from these recent contributions, point out some common pitfalls and important insights, and suggest a way forward. This proposal avoids the genetic fallacy as well as misunderstandings of the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to religious belief. In the end, it may well be that the cognitive science of religion is atheologically and theologically ambiguous; traditional philosophers of religion on both sides of the debate still have work to do.     

Eliminativism and the ambiguity of ‘belief’

It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms theoretical and belief are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of theoretical that is of use to the eliminativist, and in this sense some kinds of belief (dispositional states, infra-conscious states and the Freudian unconscious) are indeed theoretical and hence possible candidates for elimination, while others (consciously occurring thoughts like judgements and perceptualGestalten) are not theoretical and hence not candidates for elimination.     

Empathy is interpretation (and who ever said it wasn't?)

Whenever the subject is explicitly addressed, all analysts agree that empathic perception is an attitude one takes toward making observations, not a privileged means of perception. Furthermore, analysts seem to agree that observations made with an empathic intention are interpretations like any other observations. Empathy is not a conduit to the patient's inner life. But despite these points of consensus, it often seems to be implied in the psychoanalytic literature, usually unintentionally, that empathy is a privileged means of knowing another person. This undercurrent is sometimes present even in the work of theorists who simultaneously state their opposition to this very point of view. In this paper, after presenting an example from the literature of this kind of contradiction, I, basing my argument in hermeneutics, offer the view that all observation, inside and outside psychoanalysis, is interpretation. Then, turning to the three papers of the symposium individually, I take the perspective that in one way or another they all portray empathic perception as a privileged means of observation. These portrayals are examples of the unconscious politics of theory.     

The life (and Death?) of a student counselling service

This is a case study of a Student Counselling Service in an English university - its historical antecedents, its seven-year We, and its apparent demise. The evidence, from documentary and survey sources, suggests that from the outset the service had to contend with a multiplicity of problems of a practical, organisational and ideological kind. These together militated against its becoming an accepted and integral part of the university organisation and left it exposed as one section of the institution which, as an economy measure, could conveniently be deemed expendable. The case study illustrates the potency of dangers anticipated by some authorities in the field of student counselling, and thus serves as a warning to other institutions of higher education and to professional counsellors who might be employed in them.     

The Nature (and Nurture?) of Plasticity in Early Human Development

ABSTRACT— The effect of early experience is a long-standing concern in developmental psychology. Gaining further insight into the nature of human plasticity is central to efforts to prevent problems in development from arising and promote positive functioning. Evolutionary reasoning suggests that children should vary in their susceptibility to environmental influences, including parenting. Evidence indicates that rather than some children, such as those with negatively emotional temperaments or certain genotypes, being simply more vulnerable to the adverse effects of negative experiences, as commonly assumed, they may actually be more susceptible to both positive and negative experiences. In addition to raising questions about the nature of plasticity in human development, this article highlights unknowns regarding the role of nature and nurture in shaping individual differences in plasticity, including whether recent research linking maternal stress during pregnancy with child behavior problems illuminates a process whereby fetal programming shapes the child's susceptibility to postnatal environmental influences. Throughout this article, we raise concern about the potentially distorting influence that psychology's disproportionate focus on the adverse effect of negative experiences on developmental problems has on our understanding of human plasticity, and we propose that researchers should pay more attention to the positive side of the plasticity equation.     

Can religious and secular belief be rationally combined?

Sometimes the cognitive part of the human mind is modelled in a simplified way by degrees of belief. E.g., in philosophy of science and in formal epistemology agents are often identified by their credences in a set of claims. This line of dealing with the individual mind is currently expanded to groups by attempts of finding adequate ways of pooling individual degrees of belief into an overall group credence or, more abstractly speaking, into a collective mind. In this paper, we model religious people’s minds as such a collective mind. Religious people are therein identified with a set of degrees of beliefs containing religious and secular credences. E.g., within a religious context a person may be sure that some statement is true, whereas the same person lacks non-religious support for such a credence and hence may doubt the truth of that statement within a secular context. We will also present two results on the adequacy of this model.     

Free love? On the relation between belief in free will,determinism, and passionate love

Is love possible if we are not free? Some philosophers consider that true love is necessarily free, while others think that the nature of love makes it incompatible with a certain type of freedom. Here, we explored the relationship between feelings of passionate love, belief in free will and determinism across three online studies. In Study 1 (N = 257), participants who believed strongly in free will (or determinism) expressed stronger passionate love. In Study 2 (N = 305), we again found a positive association between belief in free will (or determinism) and passionate love, although the passionate love-determinism relationship seems more conditional. Finally, Study 3 (N = 309) confirmed the relationship between belief in free will and passionate love but not between belief in determinism and passionate love. These findings, along with a meta-analysis, suggest that both beliefs in free will and determinism are compatible with passionate love.     

Moore’s paradox and the priority of belief thesis

Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such as Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailand are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. This assumption gives explanatory priority to belief over assertion. I show that the translation involved is much trickier than might at first appear. It is simplistic to think that Moorean absurdity in assertion is always a subsidiary product of the absurdity in belief, even when the absurdity is conceived as irrationality. Instead we should aim for explanations of Moorean absurdity in assertion and in belief that are independent even if related, while bearing in mind that some forms of irrationality may be forms of absurdity even if not conversely.     

Career adapt-abilities scale — Netherlands form: Psychometric properties and relationships to ability,personality, and regulatory focus

The Career Adapt-Abilities Scale (CAAS) — Netherlands Form consists of four scales, each with six items, which measure concern, control, curiosity, and confidence as psychosocial resources for managing occupational transitions, developmental tasks, and work traumas. Internal consistency estimates for the subscale and total scores ranged from satisfactory to excellent. The factor structure was quite similar to the one computed for the combined data from 13 countries. The Dutch version of the CAAS-Netherlands Form is identical to the International Form 2.0. The convergent validity of the CAAS-Netherlands was established with relating the CAAS subscales to self-esteem, Big Five personality measures, and regulatory focus. Relations between the subscales and these stable personality factors were largely as predicted. The discriminant validity of the CAAS-Netherlands was established by relating the CAAS scores to general mental ability; no significant relationship between career adaptability and general mental ability was found.     

Relationships between conspiracy mentality,hyperactive agency detection,and schizotypy: Supernatural forces at work?

We examined whether belief in conspiracy theories is predicted by an overactive tendency to perceive agency in the environment, and hypothesized that this association is especially robust among high-schizotypy individuals. Samples of undergraduates (n = 209) and conspiracist website visitors (n = 37) completed measures of conspiracy mentality, hyperactive agency detection, and schizotypy. Correlation analysis indicated significant positive relationships between all pairs of variables in both groups. Multiple regression analysis showed that schizotypy is incrementally predicted by conspiracy mentality and hyperactive agency detection, with chi-square analysis revealing a significant tendency for high-schizotypal individuals to score higher on both variables. Heightened uncertainty about causally ambiguous subjective experiences likely predisposes schizotypals to greater hyperactive agency detection, thereby increasing the probability of conspiracy thinking. Findings are linked to ideological and theoretical differences between secular and supernatural conspiracist beliefs, which are readily apparent in conspiracist literature and communities, and bring into question the homogeneity of the conspiracy mentality construct.