Philosophical dialogues as paths to a more ‘positive psychology’

Although family support programmes have been in place for several decades in Greece very little attention has been paid to evaluating the effectiveness of such endeavours, the techniques that influence their outcomes and the receptiveness to their messages. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of research findings collected during the first qualitative research phase of a community mental health promotion project. The research was conducted in order to delineate programme outcomes and the characteristics that had an impact on the participants' lives. The 3‐month family support programme intended to introduce ‘philosophical dialogues’ as means to developing personal and communal understandings of what makes life worth living. The programme was developed and implemented on Crete under the auspices of a non‐profit community organization appropriately named ‘The Lyceum for Women’. The features of the programme that contributed and enhanced the participants' tendencies to become not passive targets but active partners and stakeholders in the process will be clarified, as will the conceptualization and approach. Of the 45 evaluation protocols that were analysed the following themes were most important for the participants: ‘Group as‐a‐whole process’—the sense of sharing and development understandings in a ‘parea’ (in‐group); ‘relational outcomes’—feeling of belonging, ‘reciprocated kindness’, and giving of self to others; personal and emotional outcomes‐self‐efficacy and empowerment; knowledge outcomes‐learning about positive emotions and enjoying the simple things in life; and group facilitator outcomes‐sharing stories, ‘gives of self to the community’. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Findings in recent research on the ‘conjunction fallacy’ have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content‐blind—in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content‐blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we first show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term ‘probability’ in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term ‘frequency’ narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of ‘probability’ down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact—rather than the presence or absence of ‘extensional cues’—accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassified as fallacies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uncertainty and preference for ‘ambiguous’ figures, ‘impossible’ figures and the drawings of M. C. Escher1

With regard to two kinds of dependent response measures, number of one s exposures and verbal ratings of interestingness and pleasingness, preference was greater for unaltered ‘ambiguous’ figures, drawings of M. C. Escher and ‘impossible’ figures, characterized by greater complexity and uncertainty, than for altered versions of these stimuli. Furthermore, preference increased over the three types of unaltered slides while remaining fairly constant across altered ones. Lastly, number of exposures and ratings of interestingness diminished for unaltered pictures when preceded by their altered versions. The findings were interpreted using Berlyne's notions regarding aesthetic preference, uncertainty, and response conflict.     

‘I don't think racism is that bad any more’: Exploring the ‘end of racism’ discourse among students in English schools

In this paper, we present findings on lay constructions of racism from a focus group study (11 groups, n = 72) with a mixed sample of secondary‐school students in England. We show that racism was, on the whole, ‘othered’: It was located in other times, places, and people or was denied altogether. We show that this way of talking about racism had different uses depending on the identity stakes involved in different interactional contexts. Even in the cases where racism was constructed as common, participants worked hard to make an ‘irrefutable’ argument, which suggests that they were anticipating reputational damage by making a claim for the persistence of racism. We discuss these findings with regard to the different levels of analysis involved in constructions of racism (micro‐interactional, local and broader normative context) and with regard to an ‘end of racism’ discourse that appeared to provide the normative framework for participants' accounts.     

Ambiguous probabilities: when does p=0.3 reflect a possibility,and when does it express a doubt?

Verbal phrases denoting uncertainty are usually held to be more vague than numerical probability statements. They are, however, directionally more precise, in the sense that they are either positive, suggesting the occurrence of a target outcome, or negative, drawing attention to its non‐occurrence. A numerical probability will, in contrast, sometimes be perceived as positive and sometimes as negative. When asked to complete sentences such as ‘The operation has a 30% chance of success, because’ some people will give reasons for success (‘the doctors are expert surgeons’), whereas others will give reasons for failure (‘it is a difficult operation’). It is shown in two experiments that positive reasons are given more often than negative ones, even for p values below 0.5, especially when the probability is higher than expected, and the target outcome is non‐normal, undesirable, and phrased as a negation. We conclude that the directionality of numerical probabilities (as opposed to verbal phrases) is context‐dependent, but biased towards a positive interpretation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

In search of the ‘Aha!’ experience: Elucidating the emotionality of insight problem‐solving

Although the experience of insight has long been noted, the essence of the ‘Aha!’ experience, reflecting a sudden change in the brain that accompanies an insight solution, remains largely unknown. This work aimed to uncover the mystery of the ‘Aha!’ experience through three studies. In Study 1, participants were required to solve a set of verbal insight problems and then subjectively report their affective experience when solving the problem. The participants were found to have experienced many types of emotions, with happiness the most frequently reported one. Multidimensional scaling was employed in Study 2 to simplify the dimensions of these reported emotions. The results showed that these different types of emotions could be clearly placed in two‐dimensional space and that components constituting the ‘Aha!’ experience mainly reflected positive emotion and approached cognition. To validate previous findings, in Study 3, participants were asked to select the most appropriate emotional item describing their feelings at the time the problem was solved. The results of this study replicated the multidimensional construct consisting of approached cognition and positive affect. These three studies provide the first direct evidence of the essence of the ‘Aha!’ experience. The potential significance of the findings was discussed.     

Rational model and justification model in ‘outcome bias’

The authors of this study suggest that the harm‐punishment link (‘outcome bias’) can be explained by the activation of different judgment processes depending on the outcome severity of an offense: (1) a rational model for mild outcomes in which punishment is necessarily linked to responsibility of the perpetrator; (2) a justification model for severe outcomes in which punishment and responsibility are linked only when assessment order allows the latter to rationalize the former. Participants (126 university students) considered an unintentional road accident with mild or severe outcomes and made judgments of responsibility, punishment, and perceived seriousness of the offense. The results support the authors' hypothesis. In the discussion, the authors suggest different motives of punishment (preventive or compensative justice) which explain why responsibility and punishment are not necessarily linked. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From ‘Virgin Births’ to ‘Octomom’: Representations of Single Motherhood via Sperm Donation in the UK News

The use of sperm donation by single women has provoked public, professional and political debate. Newspapers serve as a critical means of both broadcasting this debate and effecting a representation of this user group within the public sphere. This study uses the theory of social representations to examine how single motherhood by sperm donation has been represented in the UK news over time. The study sampled news coverage on this topic in eight British newspapers during three 4‐year periods between the years 1988 and 2012. The dataset of news reports (n = 406) was analysed using a qualitative approach. Findings indicated that UK media reports of single women using donor sperm are underpinned by conventional categories of the ‘personal’, the ‘traditional’ and the ‘natural’ that when paired with their corollaries produce a representation of this user group as the social ‘other’. The amount of coverage on this topic over time was found to vary according to the political orientation of different media sources. Using key concepts from social representations theory, this article discusses the relationship between themata and anchoring in the maintenance of representations of the social ‘other’ in mass mediated communication. Findings are explained in relation to theoretical conceptions of the mass media and its position within the public sphere. It is argued that the use of personal narratives in news reports of single mothers by sperm donation may have significant implications for public understandings of this social group. © 2016 The Authors. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

‘Unconscious transference’ can be an instance of ‘change blindness’

Three experiments investigated the role of ‘change blindness’ in mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent bystanders to a simulated crime. Two innocent people appeared briefly in a filmed scene in a supermarket. The ‘continuous innocent’ (CI) walked down the liquor aisle and passed behind a stack of boxes, whereupon the perpetrator emerged and stole a bottle of liquor, thereby resulting in an action sequence promoting the illusion of continuity between perpetrator and innocent. The ‘discontinuous innocent’ (DI) was shown immediately afterward in the produce aisle. Results revealed that: (1) more than half of participants failed to notice the change between the CI and the perpetrator, (2) among those who failed to notice the change, more misidentified the ‘CI’ than the ‘DI’, a pattern that did not hold for those who did notice the change. Participants were less likely to notice the change when they were distracted while watching the video. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children’s causal reasoning: Counterfactual thinking occurs for ‘negative’ outcomes only

Harris, German and Mills (Children’s use of counterfactual thinking in causal reasoning. Cognition, 61 (1996), 223–259), following Mackie, argue that children make explicit use of counterfactual thinking in arriving at causal judgments. They showed that children as young as 3, in explaining simple mishap events, made reference to courses of action that a protagonist had rejected, when that course of action would have prevented the observed outcome. It is hypothesized here that such counterfactual thinking might have been invoked by the ‘negative’ mishaps rather than as part of the causal reasoning process. Although the generation of counterfactuals in explanation was replicated using mishap outcomes such as those used by Harris et al., counterfactual thinking was not evident in children’s explanations of ‘positive’ outcomes. These results undermine the view that a counterfactual thinking process, as indexed by reference to possible actions rejected by a protagonist, is necessary for causal reasoning. Alternative characterizations of the relationship between causals and counterfactuals are discussed.     

‘Pre‐discursive’ racism

This paper makes the case that discourse analytic approaches in social psychology are not adequate to the task of apprehending racism in its bodily, affective and pre‐symbolic dimensions. We are hence faced with a dilemma: if discursive psychology is inadequate when it comes to theorizing ‘pre‐discursive’ forms of racism, then any attempts to develop an anti‐racist strategy from such a basis will presumably exhibit the same limitations. Suggesting a rapprochement of discursive and psychoanalytic modes of analysis, I argue that Kristeva's theory of abjection provides a means of understanding racism as both historically/socially constructed and as existing at powerfully embodied, visceral and subliminal dimensions of subjectivity. Kristeva's theory of abjection provides us with an account of a ‘pre‐discursive’ (that is, a bodily, affective, pre‐symbolic) racism, a form of racism that ‘comes before words’, and that is routed through the logics of the body and its anxieties of distinction, separation and survival. This theory enables us, moreover, to join together the expulsive reactions of a racism of the body to both the personal racism of the ego and the broader discursive racisms of the prevailing social order. Moreover, it directs our attention to the fact that discourses of racism are always locked into a relationship with ‘pre‐discursive’ processes which condition and augment every discursive action, which escape the codifications of discourse and which drive the urgency of its attempts at containment. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Positioning a ‘mature’ self in interactive practices: How adolescent males negotiate ‘physical attraction’ in group talk

This article presents a discursive psychological approach in examining the ways that adolescent boys (ages 12–15 years) accomplish a sense of ‘maturity’ by bringing off and managing certain features of ‘heterosexuality’ in group interaction. We focus on and analyse moments when the boys negotiate implicit challenges, make evaluations and offer assessments concerning their physical and sexual attraction to girls' looks. These moments are highly important for negotiating their peer status, for working toward a distinction between ‘childhood’ and ‘adolescence’, and for marking a normatively heterosexual self within the burgeoning institution of adolescence. We will specifically show how ‘heterosexual desire’ is carefully managed in group discussions where the boys participate in normative heterosexuality, but in ways that are nevertheless designed to appear mature and knowing, rather than shallow, naïve or sexist. Three discursive methods of negotiation are identified and described in detail: (1) underscoring the non‐literality of actions by appealing to motives, (2) denials with built‐in concessions, and (3) differentiation through caricature. Couched within the proposed discursive framework, we are reversing the traditional logic of developmental approaches to ‘maturation’. Rather than viewing maturation as the effect of resolving developmental tasks, we argue that ‘maturity’ comes to existence in the way talk is accomplished; that is, as highly flexible and fragile projections of identity that involve a continuous refinement of ‘finely tuned positioning skills'.     

Practice Makes (Nearly) Perfect: Solving ‘Students‐and‐Professors’‐Type Algebra Word Problems

Three experiments with university students (Ns = 40, 36, and 36) who were non‐math majors explicitly examined whether repetition in performing ‘students‐and‐professors’‐type algebra word problems, which have been shown in the past to be vexingly difficult even for more advanced students, would spontaneously lead to higher rates of correct answers. Word order and situation model specificity were also examined to determine their effects on the rate of improvement. The strongest predictor of students producing correct equations (i.e., not producing the typical ‘reversal error’) was practice: In all experiments, participants spontaneously improved in equation accuracy almost to ceiling levels as they progressed, despite receiving no feedback. Tentative support is provided for the pedagogical value of repetition in solving problems, along with varying the wording of the problems. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Everyday antiracism in interpersonal contexts: Constraining and facilitating factors for ‘speaking up’ against racism

Everyday conversations among non‐Indigenous Australians are a significant site in which racism towards Indigenous Australians is reproduced and maintained. This study explores the possibilities of everyday antiracism by asking how people negotiate racist discourses in interpersonal contexts. Twelve first year psychology students (10 female, 2 male, aged 18–50) who had completed a compulsory Indigenous studies course were recruited as participants. Semi‐structured interviews were thematically analysed for the constraints and facilitators for responding to racism in everyday contexts. As constraints against speaking up, participants offered ‘social expectations to fit in’, ‘fear of provoking aggression and conflict’, assessments of ‘the type of relationship’, whether they ‘could make a difference’ and the ‘type of racism’. As a facilitator for speaking up, participants reported they were confident in challenging erroneous statements when they felt well informed and authoritative about the facts. The research suggests that everyday antiracism requires a preparedness to deal with possible discomfort and ‘bad feeling’ which participants reported avoiding. The paper concludes with suggestions for stimulating critical thinking and intergroup dialogue in relation to everyday antiracism. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reconsidering the ‘heresy’ of using treatment manuals

Some argue that the medical model and the experimental design that underlies the use of treatment manuals to prove the efficacy of a psychotherapeutic treatment clashes with the theoretical basis of family therapy. From the point of view of the empirically supported treatments (ESTs) movement, treatment manuals are the operationalization of the independent variable in a clinical trial; the therapist is only part of the procedure and the therapeutic relationship is a confounding variable. Applying that logic to the practice of family therapy might be considered a heresy. This article argues that paradoxically, this heresy has a lot to offer the practice of family therapy. Research is the best way to answer questions like ‘how does family therapy work?’ ‘What makes ‘good therapy’ good?’ ‘Do therapists do what they say they do'? This article recommends an alternative framework for integrating ESTs into practice by proposing empirically informed guides to practice which, being less formulaic, encourage process‐outcome research, are coherent with the systemic model and do not constrain the therapist's creativity. Such guidelines allow therapists to use manuals flexibly so that they deepen the understanding of the process of therapy. We encourage you to listen to the JFT Editor, Mark Rivett, as he interviews the author on Manuals in the Practice and Research of Family Therapy. Available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467‐6427/homepage/jft_podcast_series.htm .     

The sandwich model: The ‘music and dance’ of therapeutic action

My premise is that a ‘layered’ approach is necessary to understand the process of exchanges that result in therapeutic change. I imagine these processes occurring in three layers – although the number of domains in which change is taking place is actually infinite – such as in a sandwich. The top layer, or top slice of bread of the sandwich, represents a broad view of the change process; it is non‐linear and includes the feature of uncertainty, a general principle of dynamic systems theory. The middle layer, or the meat of the sandwich, is explained by theories that are immediately and clinically useful to a therapist, such as psychoanalytic theories. These are primarily linear theories and use language and symbols to ‘tell a story of what happened’. The bottom layer, or bottom slice of bread of the sandwich, is the micro‐process; this layer includes the moment‐to‐moment patterns of coordinated rhythms that both communicate meaning and provide the essential scaffold for all higher‐level change processes. The micro‐process also requires a non‐linear theory to make sense of its variability and emergent properties. Taking a bite out of the sandwich will include a ‘polysemic bundle of communicative behaviors’ (Harrison and Tronick, 2011). I will illustrate the ‘sandwich model’ with the clinical case of the analytic treatment of a 5 year‐old boy.     

Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.     

Against Pogge's ‘Cosmopolitanism’

Thomas Pogge labels the idea that each person owes each other person equal respect and concern ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ and correctly states that it is a ‘non‐starter’. He offers as an allegedly more convincing cosmopolitan alternative his ‘social justice cosmopolitanism’. I shall argue that this alternative fails for pretty much the same reasons that ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ fails. In addition, I will show that Pogge's definition of cosmopolitanism is misleading, since it actually applies to ethical cosmopolitanism and not to social justice cosmopolitanism. This means that cosmopolitanism as defined by Pogge is wrong in the light of his own arguments and that Pogge is not even a cosmopolitan in the sense of his own definition. I will further show that he is also not a cosmopolitan if cosmopolitanism is defined as a philosophical position involving the claim that state borders have no fundamental moral significance.