Calibration of Subjective Probability Judgments in a Naturalistic Setting

Results of previous calibration studies are used to identify features of the decision maker and the decision environment which might be expected to result in good calibration. Racetrack bettors and, in particular, the UK parimutuel betting market are identified as possessing such characteristics. In order to explore calibration in this setting, an analysis is undertaken of bets placed on 19,396 horses. A close correlation is observed between the subjective probability judgments of horses' success, implicit in the bettors' wagering activities, and the objective probability of success of the horses concerned. Explanations for the results are offered in terms of characteristics of racetrack bettors and the naturalistic setting, with particular reference to the operation of the betting market. The results contribute to an emergent school of thought which advocates naturalistic enquiry as a complement to laboratory-based experiments in further developing the understanding of decision making.     

The Role of Numeracy and Intelligence in Health‐Risk Estimation and Medical Data Interpretation

Despite ample evidence that numeracy is an important influence on patient understanding and use of health‐related information, there is a dearth of studies examining the concept's relationship to other individual differences measures that may underlie complex judgments in the health domain. In this study, we compared the relative contributions of selected extant numeracy measures and general intelligence and other measures to varied judgment and decision‐making outcomes. Two hundred participants completed numeracy items, subscales of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales, the need for cognition scale, and four relevant outcome measures including risk estimation and medical data interpretation. A numeracy scale constructed using item response and confirmatory factor analyses was consistently the strongest predictor across all outcome measures and accounted for unique variance over and above general intelligence. The results support the concept of numeracy as an independent construct that merits consideration in patient communication. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

判断与决策研究纵观:基于模糊痕迹理论的视角(英文)

模糊痕迹理论是用于解释记忆、判断与决策的综合性理论,该理论的提出和发展主要基于对信息存储、表征、提取和加工过程的研究。本文首先介绍了模糊痕迹理论的基本原则,在此基础上重点讨论了其要义(gist)如何发挥核心作用,使得模糊痕迹理论有别于其他传统的决策模型。该理论将高级直觉与原始冲动性进行了区分,并且预测决策误差来源于判断与决策的各种不同成分,如背景知识、信息表征、提取和加工过程等。模糊痕迹理论不仅可以解释诸如框架效应、合取谬误等传统决策与判断文献中常讨论的误差现象,同时基于该理论的研究还得到了一些与传统决策理论相悖的新发现。此外,对脑与行为如何发育性变化的研究为我们了解成人的认知过程提供了至关重要的新视角,这些对脑与行为的发育性研究和对特殊人群的研究结果也都支持了模糊痕迹理论对要义加工依赖的预测。     

Evaluating Effort: Influences of Evaluation Mode on Judgments of Task‐specific Efforts

The claim that humans adapt their actions in ways that avoid effortful processing (whether cognitive or physical) is a staple of various theories of human behavior. Although much work has been carried out focusing on the determinants of such behaviors, less attention has been given to how individuals evaluate effort. In the current set of experiments, we utilized the general evaluability theory to examine the evaluability of effort by examining subjective value functions across different evaluation modes. Individuals judged the anticipated effort of four task‐specific efforts indexed by stimulus rotation, items to be remembered, weight to be lifted, and stimulus degradation across joint (i.e., judged comparatively) and single evaluation modes (i.e., judged in isolation). General evaluability theory hypothesizes that highly evaluable attributes should be consistently evaluated (i.e., demonstrate similar subjective value functions) between the two modes. Across six experiments, we demonstrate that the perceived effort associated with items to be remembered, weight to be lifted, and stimulus degradation can be considered relatively evaluable, while the effort associated with stimulus rotation may be relatively inevaluable. Results are discussed within the context of subjective evaluation, internal reference information, and strategy selection. In addition, methodological implications of evaluation modes are considered. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The long and short of it: physical anchoring effects

Attempts to reconstruct the magnitude of recently encountered physical stimuli were influenced by the provision of physical anchors. Whether estimating length, weight, or loudness, those increasing the magnitude of a relatively small (short, light, or quiet) physical anchor produced estimates that were reliably lower than did those decreasing the magnitude of a relatively large (long, heavy, or loud) anchor. Estimates produced without an anchor were also low, suggesting that when people physically adjust upwards from a self‐selected starting point, “no anchor” may, in fact, act as a very low anchor. Physical anchors appear to influence estimates of recently encountered physical stimuli, much as numerical anchors influence estimates of more abstract numerical quantities. Implications for processes underlying anchoring, adjustment, and related tasks are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Fuzzy Topsis Method for Prioritized Aggregation in Multi‐Criteria Decision Making Problems

Aggregation in a decision making environment requires the fusion of opinions of a group of decision makers. The group of decision makers are required to analyse a set of interrelated criteria that are usually measured on a linguistic scale. This process requires, in many instances, to capture experts experience, intuition and thinking that are traditionally expressed in a linguistic fashion rather than a numerical fashion. Furthermore, the necessity of considering the relationship between the criteria to the overall decision must be considered by the group of decision makers. This paper extends the application of fuzzy numbers, fuzzy relative importance scores (FRIS), fuzzy relative weights (FRW) and the fuzzy technique of order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) in prioritized aggregation. This extension provides a mean to systematically aggregate a group of decision makers' views for a set of interrelated criteria that are measured on a linguistic scale. First, an overview of the application of fuzzy numbers and the characteristics of aggregating fuzzy numbers in multi‐criteria decision making problems are presented. Then, the application of TOPSIS in fuzzy environments is presented. Next, past research is highlighted to present prioritized aggregation and the different aggregation operators' classes. Subsequently, a new prioritized aggregation method is presented. This method utilizes fuzzy TOPSIS with prioritized aggregation in fuzzy environments. Finally, the fuzzy prioritized aggregation method presented in this paper is applied on an actual case study. According to the results, the method presented in this paper provides a systematic approach to capture the uncertainty and imprecision associated with quantifying linguistic measurements in multi‐criteria decision making problems. Furthermore, it considers the relationship between the set of linguistically measured criteria undergoing prioritized aggregation in a fuzzy environment. Lastly, findings, conclusions and future work are presented. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

影响乳腺癌诊疗过程的临床决策因素分析

多种因素可以影响乳腺癌的临床决策。本文从四个方面进行探讨,期望探索出适合我国国情的乳腺癌临床诊疗模式。首先,多专科的良好协作是乳腺癌临床决策的前提;其次,陈旧的乳腺癌诊疗观念限制了科学的临床决策;第三,防御性医疗行为降低了乳腺癌临床决策的质量;第四,要考虑到社会心理因素在诊疗决策中的影响。     

Aging and decision‐making competence: an analysis of comprehension and consistency skills in older versus younger adults considering health‐plan options

Older adults need to maintain strong decision‐making capabilities as they age. However, we know little about how age‐related physical and psychological changes affect older adults' judgment and decision processes. This paper reports the results of research comparing older versus younger adults' performance on evaluation and choice tasks about health‐plan options. In particular, comprehension and consistency in judgments (across separate versus joint evaluation contexts) were examined. Results indicated that increasing age was related to greater comprehension errors and inconsistent preferences, even when covariates (education, income, gender, self‐perceived skill and health, decision style, and attitude toward delegation) were taken into account. Discussion of the results emphasizes difficulties in interpreting the meaning of age differences in performance on decision tasks and the need for research that ascertains the seriousness of the consequences of age differences in real‐life tasks. The implications for providing decision‐aiding interventions for older adults are highlighted. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the advancement and software support of decision‐making in focused ultrasound therapy

Focused ultrasound therapy (FUS) is a modern and promising way for minimally invasive cancer treatment. Recent advances in treatment technology, bio‐physical models, and numerical simulation methods have given rise to a significant curative potential. However, clinical routine of FUS still features classical planning approaches, which widely fail in exploiting this potential. The structure of FUS planning problems strongly suggests interactive multi‐criteria decision‐making concepts in order to improve treatment quality. This research work introduces an multi‐criteria decision‐making approach to FUS planning and explains how to bridge the conceptual gap between the clinical state of the art and this new planning paradigm.     

Bringing (Contingent) Loss Aversion Down to Earth — A Comment on Gal & Rucker's Rejection of “Losses Loom Larger Than Gains”

Although we disagree with some of Gal and Rucker's (2018 – this issue) specific evidence and with their overstated conclusion regarding loss aversion, their overarching message makes a worthwhile contribution. In particular, loss aversion is less robust and universal than has been assumed while its most prominent empirical support — the endowment effect and the status quo bias — is susceptible to multiple alternative explanations. Instead of accepting loss aversion as true unless proven otherwise, we should treat it like other decision properties and psychological accounts that are contingent on various moderators and call for an analysis of psychological mechanisms. In this commentary, we suggest that gatekeepers, such as reviewers, tend to favor loss aversion and other widely accepted tendencies, while demanding a much higher support‐threshold for alternative or newer accounts. Although building on prior theories and concepts is of course important, the bias in favor of incumbent assumptions can impede scientific progress, bar new ideas from the literature, and reinforce well‐established but contingent notions that may apply under some conditions but not others.     

Subjective and Objective Risks of Carrying a BRCA1/2 Mutation in Individuals of Ashkenazi Jewish Descent

This repeated measures study examines (1) the change in subjective risk of mutations pre- to postcounseling, (2) the accuracy of BRCAPRO estimates of mutations, and (3) the discrepancy between subjective risk and BRCAPRO estimates of mutations before and after genetic counseling. Ninety-nine Ashkenazi Jewish individuals pursued testing for BRCA1/2 mutations. Most had a personal cancer history (N = 51; family only: N = 48); and received uninformative negative results (N = 66; positives: N = 23; informative negative: N = 10). The coping strategy of defensive pessimism predicts that individuals will believe the worst case scenario to better cope with a potential negative outcome. Consistent with this, most felt they would have a mutation, if not mutations in both genes. The BRCAPRO model appeared to overestimate risk of having a mutation in this sample (p < .001). BRCAPRO overestimates notwithstanding, genetic counseling increased accuracy of subjective risk (p < .01). Individuals with a family-only cancer history had the least accurate estimates of risk (p < .05) and may need further intervention to either manage anxiety or improve knowledge.     

On undesirable consequences of thinking: framing effects as a function of substantive processing

Three studies investigate the impact of effortful constructive processing on framing effects. The results replicated previous findings: Participants avoided the risky option when the scenario was framed in terms of gains, but preferred this option when the scenario was framed in terms of losses. Importantly, framing effects were most pronounced when conditions allowed for an effortful constructive processing style (i.e., substantive processing). This impact of decision frames varied when decision time served as an indicator for the elaboration extent (Study 1), and also when processing motivation (accountability; Study 2) and processing ability (decision time; Study 3) were manipulated. Moreover, effortful processing did not increase framing effects when contextual cues reduced the necessity for constructive thinking (Study 1). We suggest that decision frames may take on very different roles as a function of the ambiguity of the decision problem, and the degree and style of processing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fit between decision mode and processing style predicts subjective value of chosen alternatives

Intuition is associated with a global processing style, whereas deliberation is associated with a local processing style. Drawing on previous research on the effects of decisional fit on the subjective value attached to chosen alternatives, we examined the possibility that a fit between processing style and decision mode results in greater subjective value than a lack of fit. In three experiments employing various combinations of naturally occurring and experimentally manipulated processing styles and decision modes, we found that when congruence was high (i.e., global processing style and intuitive judgment, or local processing style and deliberative judgment), participants judged their chosen item to be more expensive than when congruence was low. These findings indicate that increased fit resulted in higher estimated value. We discuss implications for judgment and decision‐making.     

An investigation of the role of scale values in the DS/AHP method of multi‐criteria decision making

DS/AHP is a method of multi‐criteria decision making based on the Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence and the analytic hierarchy process. Central to the utilization of DS/AHP is the composing of preference judgements on identified groups of decision alternatives (DA) across a number of criteria against all the DA present in the problem in question. This paper exposits a series of results whose objectives are to aid in the development of an effective set of preference scale values for use within DS/AHP. These results relate directly to the concomitant level of ignorance (uncertainty) with the judgements made on a single criterion. Two particular directions of investigation are undertaken, firstly in determining the necessary number of scale values available and secondly finding the necessary differences between scale values, dependent on whether an arithmetic or geometric progression is the basis for the scale values. Through an example, the implications and utilization of these results within DS/AHP are illustrated. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A quantum probability account of order effects in inference

Order of information plays a crucial role in the process of updating beliefs across time. In fact, the presence of order effects makes a classical or Bayesian approach to inference difficult. As a result, the existing models of inference, such as the belief-adjustment model, merely provide an ad hoc explanation for these effects. We postulate a quantum inference model for order effects based on the axiomatic principles of quantum probability theory. The quantum inference model explains order effects by transforming a state vector with different sequences of operators for different orderings of information. We demonstrate this process by fitting the quantum model to data collected in a medical diagnostic task and a jury decision-making task. To further test the quantum inference model, a new jury decision-making experiment is developed. Using the results of this experiment, we compare the quantum inference model with two versions of the belief-adjustment model, the adding model and the averaging model. We show that both the quantum model and the adding model provide good fits to the data. To distinguish the quantum model from the adding model, we develop a new experiment involving extreme evidence. The results from this new experiment suggest that the adding model faces limitations when accounting for tasks involving extreme evidence, whereas the quantum inference model does not. Ultimately, we argue that the quantum model provides a more coherent account for order effects that was not possible before.     

Rough approximation of pairwise comparisons described by multi‐attribute stochastic dominance

Given a finite set A of actions evaluated by a set of attributes, preferential information is considered in the form of a pairwise comparison table including pairs of actions from subset B⊂A described by stochastic dominance relations on particular attributes and a total order on the decision attribute. Using a rough sets approach for the analysis of the subset of preference relations, a set of decision rules is obtained, and these are applied to a set A\B of potential actions. The rough sets approach of looking for the reduction of the set of attributes gives us the possibility of operating on a multi‐attribute stochastic dominance for a reduced number of attributes. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exploring the rabbit hole of possibilities by myself or with my group: The benefits and liabilities of activating counterfactual mind‐sets for information sharing and group coordination

The current experiment explored the effect of activating a counterfactual mind‐set on the discussion of unique information and group judgment accuracy. Evidence suggests that a counterfactual mind‐set is characterized by a focused, analytic mental state and, when activated at the group level, improves group judgment accuracy in the murder mystery paradigm (a hidden profile task). We hypothesized that the beneficial effect of the counterfactual mind‐set would only help group problem‐solving tasks if the mind‐set had been activated at the group level, allowing the analytical mind‐set to play out in an atmosphere of synergistic coordination. In contrast, if this highly focused mental state is activated at the individual level, it could impair group judgment quality because inwardly focused analytical individuals may fail to coordinate their behavior with other group members. Consistent with our hypothesis, activating a counterfactual mind‐set at the individual level had a debilitating effect on the group judgment task, whereas activating a counterfactual mind‐set at the group level had a facilitative effect, increasing information sharing, synergistic coordination and judgment accuracy. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Primary care decision making in response to psychological complaints: the influence of patient race

Eighteen general practitioners indicated diagnostic and treatment decisions in response to patient vignettes. Results indicated that White patients were more likely to be correctly diagnosed as having anxiety than any other complaint. Asians were just as likely to receive a physical diagnosis as they were to receive one of anxiety. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.