Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium: Comparing What with What,and in What Respect?

Comparison is fundamental to the practice and subject-matter of philosophy, but has received scant attention by philosophers. This is even so in “comparative philosophy,” which literally distinguishes itself from other philosophy by being “comparative.” In this article, the need for a philosophy of comparison is suggested. What we compare with what, and in what respect it is done, poses a series of intriguing and intricate questions. In Part One, I offer a problematization of the tertium comparationis (the third of comparison) by examining conceptualizations of similarity, family resemblance, and analogy, which it is sometimes argued can do without a tertium comparationis. In Part Two, I argue that a third of comparison is already required to determine what is to be compared, and insofar as that determination precedes the comparison that tertium may be called “pre-comparative.” This leads me to argue against incomparability and to show how anything can indeed be compared to anything. In Part Three, I relate my arguments to what is today commonly labelled “comparative philosophy.” Finally, I raise some questions of ontology and politics in order to demonstrate the relevance of a philosophy of comparison.     

Tosh Demands and Generative Thinking: What Changes and What Remains the Same?

Generative thinking can be characterized as the development of novel instantiations of existing concepts. Using this framework, the present study examined the impact of three conditions on the way subjects generated ideas about imaginary extraterrestrials. Control subjects developed alien animals but were given no special instructions. Those in the Wildly Different Condition were asked to generate creatures that were as wildly different from Earth animals as they could be. Both groups were highly and equally likely to imagine creatures that were symmetric and possessed standard senses and appendages, but the latter introduced significantly more novel variations, particularly on the number of sense organs and appendages. A third group was asked to imagine and describe things that might live on another planet, but were not initially instructed to provide drawings or limit themselves to considering living things that would be considered to be animals. This last group also preserved symmetry, but was significantly more likely to develop creatures without standard senses and appendages. Even so, 75% of this group developed creatures with standard senses and appendages. The results are discussed in terms of constraints on innovation, ways of overcoming those constraints, and the general tendency for new ideas to preserve many of the central properties of existing concepts.     

What is Classical and Non-Classical Knowledge?

Mamardašvili’s ‘classical’ paradigm of knowledge is seen to be minimally based on extrapolations from Descartes’ classical philosophy to which Mamardašvili attributes features that rather anticipate his own post-classical ontology. The latter is oriented towards the primacy of perception as a subjective process, in which the self-conscious subject constructs the world, not as illusion, but as a ‘picture’ or ‘model’ (Wittgenstein’s Bild). By examining Mamardašvili’s definition of the ‘phenomenon’ against the␣background of Husserl’s ‘reduction’, Wittgenstein’s ‘object’ and the Freudian and post-structuralist psychoanalytic model of subjectivity, the paper arrives at the inference that Mamardašvili is essentially a post-Structuralist thinker who appropriates concepts from various critical and philosophical disciplines to construct his own multi-disciplinary theory of consciousness and perception.     

Variables and Quantity: What Else?

The article aims to comment Toomela’s (Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 42(3):245–265, 2008) paper on variables and quantitative psychology. Topics as the choice of variables, their measurement and statistical analysis, the deductions based on data, are briefly reviewed. All variables can be misleading if used in a misleading way, but the Author contends that the psychology based on the variables has not the possibility to represent selected samples of inner processes and contents. Quantitative analyses based on linear causality and probabilistic inference pose many problems, but some alternative approaches devised to cope with these problems are indicated. An hermeneutic approach aware of the constructivist ground of the scientific knowledge is proposed.

What Can Be Given? What Can Be Found? A Therapist and Supervisor Consider What It Is to Hold and Let Go

This paper is a companion to Simone Hidary’s paper. It gives a supervisor’s perspective on the process of a student therapist’s development. The therapist was particularly interested in defining for herself the meaning of a holding environment.     

Different Realities: What Is Reality and What Difference Does It Make?

Consciousness does not exist apart from psyche; it reflects it. Different realities are not interchangeable with other manifestations of psychic reality. “Borderland consciousness” is the term I have conceived for people who, in one way or another, have a living dynamic connection to and relationship with nature. Given this understanding, the oral traditional and Native American cultures manifest a reciprocity psyche, and are today the closest manifestation of the psychic reality in Genesis, pre-expulsion from Eden. Navajo language contains no words for religion, guilt, human, inanimate, psyche, or ego. The Western psyche manifests a dominion psyche; that is, a binary consciousness borne as a result of the expulsion in Genesis, and wedded to logic as an uncompromising characteristic of sanity and health. This kind of consciousness too often crushes the spirit dimension, which is transrational. An awareness of borderland consciousness is entering into the Western cultural collective. This is the telos of the Garden of Eden expulsion, and itself represents the dominion psyche and the reciprocity psyche in dialogue. This dialogue offers a critical counterbalance to the rogue behavior of the overspecialized Western ego of the dominion psyche. This article urges Jungians to develop new methods of connecting with borderland consciousness since the dominion psyche and its technology alone cannot save our species in the face of the threat of a global climate change disaster.     

What can philosophy offer counselling and psychotherapy?

The big questions about life and its meaning belong to, and must be explored within, our culture as a whole and not just to groups of medical or counselling specialists. Talking treatments would therefore benefit by drawing from broader and deeper intellectual and artistic traditions. Philosophers, for example, have considered questions about identity, meaning and purpose for millennia. Given that moral development has in no way kept pace with technological progress in the 20th century, we would be unwise to draw only from contemporary thinkers in making sense of our predicament. We cannot escape from philosophy: when people say that they do not know any philosophy, what is really meant is that they know only one philosophy, but they have no means of locating or assessing it. As a result, it structures everything they do and care about. It also prevents them from considering alternatives or placing immediate preoccupations into a larger perspective.     

What is Happening With Bill and Jane?

In this comment I applaud Goldner’s ability to capture couple experience and dynamics while emphasizing that coupling involves more than attachment. In my view, couple conflict and therapy involves attending not only to attachment, which involves closeness and the threat of separation, but also to issues of identity, self-definition, and shame. I point out how some of the interactions and dynamics in the case discussed involve a threat to identity through invalidation more than to attachment by abandonment. As Goldner notes, mutual recognition between people is the cornerstone of the relational ideal, and it is for recognition through being seen, and validated for which Bill and Jane fight so hard, not closeness. In my view not everything in couples is about regulating attachment; rather everything is probably about regulating affect. Attachment is one, but only one, of the ways couples regulate their affect.     

Barth and Darwin: What is Humanity?

Abstract

Karl Barth proposed that secular texts including scientific theories could be understood as parables of aspects of the revealed truth not as such available to natural science. I explore that suggestion, seeking to understand what human biology in succession to the work of Charles Darwin has to contribute alongside Barth's doctrine of the human person.     

What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?

Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed – “true statements correspond to the way things are in the world,” or implausible – “true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality.” I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call ldquo;modest” correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, various kinds of reconstrual projects. This, I argue, is in contrast to the approaches suggested by deflationism and coherence, and thus modest correspondence theories are appropriately distinct from rivals     

What is the ethical in fear and trembling?

James Bogen misinterprets what Kierkegaard (or more accurately, Johannes de Silentio) meant by the ethical in Fear and Trembling (see Inquiry, 5 [1962], pp. 305–17). Kierkegaard did not intend to depict morality as a system of duties where moral duties derive from the particular position(s) one holds in society. Kierkegaard thought that moral duties were based on universal principles that were divine commands. Although Kierkegaard thought that it was necessary for an action to be moral that it be done in accord with such universal principles, he did not think that this was sufficient. In order to be a moral action, the action must be done not only in accord with certain universal principles but in a certain way. Kierkegaard notes the appropriate way by saying the agent must reveal himself in his action. Thus revelation by the agent and acting in accordance with certain principles are jointly sufficient and singly necessary conditions for an action to be moral.     

What Is Conventionalism about Moral Rights and Duties?

A powerful objection against moral conventionalism says that it gives the wrong reasons for individual rights and duties. The reason why I must not break my promise to you, for example, should lie in the damage to you—rather than to the practice of promising or to all other participants in that practice. Common targets of this objection include the theories of Hobbes, Gauthier, Hooker, Binmore, and Rawls. I argue that (1) the conventionalism of these theories is superficial; (2) genuinely conventionalist theories are not vulnerable to the objection; and (3) genuine moral conventionalism is independently plausible.     

What Is a Fact? Eva Rosenfeld and Historiography

Historians have disputed excessive speculative claims made on behalf of psychoanalytic interpretations. As psychoanalytic theory evolved, theorists sought to communicate the higher aspects of ego functioning which adapt our inner world to outer realities. Roazen's article discusses the question of what is a fact within the context of the history of analysis. He does this through the examples of Eva Rosenfeld's correspondences which explore the nature of historiography itself.     

Age and ageing: What do they mean?

This article provides a philosophical overview of different approaches to age and ageing. It is often assumed that our age is determined by the amount of time we have been alive. Here, I challenge this belief. I argue that there are at least three plausible, yet unsatisfactory, accounts to age and ageing: the chronological account, the biological account, and the experiential account. I show that all of them fall short of fully determining what it means to age. Addressing these problems, I suggest the Two‐tier principle of age: whenever the three accounts of age contradict, combine the two accounts that differ the least, and reject the third. However, while this principle does solve some difficulties, it is itself vulnerable to problems; therefore I propose we should jettison it. I conclude that there are no accounts to ageing that are satisfactory; they all come with a bullet to bite.     

Religion and Science: What Is at Stake?

Abstract : “Religion and Science: What Is at Stake” looks at the latest information available on global warming from the International Panel on Climate Change and puts it in the context of the current culture war between progressives and conservatives. We worry that the science will become captive to ideological concerns that are theological, economic, and therefore political. The ideological domination of science may make a sustainable response to global warming even more difficult. It is vitally important that Christian theologians learn enough about the science to be articulate and support the scientists in their endeavors to promote our care of the creation.     

What is personality? Two myths and a definition

This article addresses the longstanding problem that the field of personality psychology remains in need of a consensus formulation of its core subject matter, that of the nature of “personality” itself. Part 1 of the article presents some reminders about the traditional pre-empirical status of concepts in science. Part 2 introduces and calls into question two widely accepted but nonetheless questionable propositions about the nature of personality: (a) that the term refers to an underlying causal entity within a person, and (b) that the study of personality is the study of the whole person. Part 3 presents a definition of “personality”, discussion elaborating and clarifying this definition, and an explication of the ways in which it differs from previous definitions. Part 4 discusses some benefits that accrue both to having a consensus definition in general, and to acceptance of the present definition in particular.     

Forecasting and Ethical Decision Making: What Matters?

This study examined how the number and types of consequences considered are related to forecasting and ethical decision making. Undergraduate participants took on the role of the key actor in several ethical problems and were asked to forecast potential outcomes and make a decision about each problem. Performance pressure was manipulated by ostensibly making rewards contingent on good problem-solving performance. The results indicated that forecast quality was associated with decision ethicality, and the identification of the critical consequences of the problem and consequences for others were associated with both higher quality forecasts and more ethical decisions. In addition, the identification of a larger number of consequences was negatively associated with ethical decision making. Performance pressure did not impact forecast quality or ethicality of decisions. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Categorization and action: What about object consistence?

Categorization studies have focused on the importance of a variety of perceptual properties (shape, size, weight). The present study explored whether the softness or hardness of an object might influence the way we categorize and consider category members. Of additional interest was whether information on consistence is automatically activated and whether it is modulated by the kind of task and of response modality. Three experiments demonstrated that information on consistence is automatically activated, and it helps us to distinguish between artefacts and natural objects. Interestingly, the results are in agreement with the simulation hypothesis; namely, when we consider artefacts, we simulate using them and information on their consistence is activated; this simulation is modulated by the task. The way we differently process artefacts and natural objects across the experiments confirms the simulation hypothesis and our sensitivity to the response modality.