Karl Popper and Albert Ellis: Their ideas on psychology and rationality compared

This paper considers leading ideas of Albert Ellis on psychological theory and therapy in relation to ideas of the celebrated philosopher, Karl Popper. The aim is to indicate striking similarities in their views on learning, the genesis of emotional disturbance and, in particular, rationality. Discussion commences with Popper's early, and little studied, work on psychology. His philosophy of science is then surveyed along with the theory of rationality that he analogically extends from it. After tracing the evolution of Ellis' thought, we note the central roles he assigns to irrational thinking in explaining emotional disturbance and to rational thinking in its treatment. Different senses of rationality are distinguished in his work, one of them associated with criticism, which provides a most important similarity to Popper's view of rationality.For helpful comments on draft versions of this paper the author is indebted to Barry Butcher.Drs. Jocelyn Dunphy and Albert Ellis, and an anonymous reviewer for this journal.Studies of Popper on psychology have only begun to appear in recent years. The most detailed is (Berkson & Wettersten, 1984).     

The biographical approach in Karl Jaspers’ work: From philosophy of life to autobiography

This study considers the origins and characteristics of Karl Jaspers’ biographical approach. Specifically, we analyse how this approach manifests itself in Jaspers’ work, namely, in his understanding of psychology, his psychology of worldviews, his views on the history of philosophy and his philosophical method. The biographical approach was a central strategy in Jaspers’ work as an appeal to life and was closely linked with how Jaspers understood both philosophy and his thought. For Jaspers, biography could restore mental unity and reveal the existence behind creativity.     

Karl Popper,Psychology and Philosophy

This paper intends to re-emphasize the relationship among Psychology, Popper and his Philosophy. Popper, who is often considered as one of the most important philosophers of science, had associations with the discipline of psychology in his early years. Popper was associated with Würzburg school of psychology, especially the psychologies of Külpe, Selz and Bühler. However, there was a change in Popper’s interest from the psychology of discovery to an objectivist epistemology—that is, to the logic of discovery, which he himself acknowledged (1976, p. 55). Popper, not only turned away from psychology, as early as 1930 or thereabouts, he later became one of the most outspoken opponents of a psychological approach to science. This antipathy has worked both ways! Very few psychologists study and discuss Popper. His place in the history of psychology, certainly remains inadequate. But why should psychologists ignore Popper? Instead of turning away from Popper, Psychologists’ efforts should be directed towards bringing into focus Popper, his works and association with psychology. This paper argues and tries to discuss the relationships among Popper, his training in psychology and his philosophy.     

What did Popper learn from Lakatos?

The canonical version of the history of twentieth century philosophy of science tells us that Lakatos was Popper’s disciple, but it is rarely mentioned that Popper would have learned anything from Lakatos. The aim of this paper is to examine Lakatos’ influence on Popper’s philosophical system and to argue that Lakatos did have an important, yet somewhat unexpected, impact on Popper’s thinking: he influenced Popper’s evolutionary model for ‘progress’ in science. And Lakatos’ influence sheds new light on why and how Popper continually revised one of the central claims of his philosophy of science: the evolutionary account of scientific theory change.     

The idea of a moral psychology: The impact of psychoanalysis on philosophy in Britain1

In this paper the author addresses the question of the significance of psychoanalysis for moral psychology via a more specific question: the impact of psychoanalysis on British philosophy in the twentieth century. He argues that there has been no influence of any real significance, and offers intellectual reasons why not. However, he also argues that there has recently emerged the possibility for a future engagement between psychoanalysis and philosophy, and he offers a history of the emergence of this possibility. In particular, the author discusses how the emerging interest within philosophy to work out a satisfying approach to naturalist moral psychology leads it to a concern with internal mental structure and, most importantly, to transformations of intrapsychic structures. He believes that this will lead philosophy to take a greater interest in psychoanalysis.     

Psychoanalyzing Historicists?: The Enigmatic Popper

The paper shows how Karl Popper’s critique of ‘historicism’ is permeated by psychoanalytic discourse regardless of his critique that psychoanalysis is one of the exemplars of pseudoscience. Early on, when he was formulating his philosophy of science, Popper had an apparently stringent criterion, viz. falsifiablity, and painstaking analysis. The central argument of this paper is that despite his representation of psychoanalysis as the principal illustration of the category he dubs as ‘pseudoscience’, Popper’s analysis has been infused with psychoanalysis when it comes to his social and political philosophy. Besides, not only was his interpretation of the proponents of ‘historicism’ and the ‘closed’ society mediated by the very concepts of a field which he indicted as pseudoscientific but also he frequently slipped into vacuous and unverifiable accusations forgetting the jurisdiction he formerly accorded to empirical adequacy and logical consistency when examining and assessing theories.     

The Twofold Life of the Word: Karl Barth's Critical Reception of the Extra Calvinisticum

Though the extra Calvinisticum has played an historically important role for Christology, the doctrine has been criticized not only by Lutherans and modern Christologies ‘from below’ but by some Reformed thinkers as well. This article examines the place of the extra in dogmatic thinking about the incarnation: specifically, Karl Barth's critical response to his own tradition. After examining the differences between Lutheran and Reformed construals of the relationship of the Logos asarkos to the Logos ensarkos I take up Barth's views on the extra, which over the course of his career moved from enthusiastic affirmation to a sharp critique. Finally, I suggest that Barth's mature Christology retains the best of both Protestant positions by correcting a critical inconsistency in Reformed thought. He does not reject the doctrine of the Logos asarkos, but he does suggest a way in which this is related to the life of the Logos ensarkos that marginalizes the former. Barth is right not to discard the extra, but also that it has been misused in how it is deployed in dogmatic theology.     

Politics and naturalism in the 20th century psychology of Alfred Binet

Alfred Binet is internationally recognized as the "father" of the first intelligence test as well as the most faithful French representative of laboratory experimentalism. A historical analysis of his work is therefore necessary to get to a thorough comprehension of 20th century psychology. The present article, starting from Binet's intellectual path and from the suggestions of the previous historical literature, aims at providing fresh insights into Binet's work by trying to capture the intersections between Binet, his naturalistic culture and the political context in which he worked in the early 20th century, when he actively tried to apply experimental psychology to the pedagogical area. In fact, it is possible to underline, with reference to those years, an evident turn towards applications in Binet's psychological production. The article reconstructs the political and institutional background of Binet's research and shows how the naturalism and experimentalism he promoted were complementary to the solidarist conceptions that were particularly prevalent among those who supported his work during the Third Republic.     

Can Science Cope with More Than One World? A Cross-Reading of Habermas, Popper, and Searle

The purpose of this article is to critically assess the ‘three-world theory’ as it is presented—with some slight but decisive differences—by Jürgen Habermas and Karl Popper. This theory presents the philosophy of science with a conceptual and material problem, insofar as it claims that science has no single access to all aspects of the world. Although I will try to demonstrate advantages of Popper’s idea of ‘the third world’ of ideas, the shortcomings of his ontological stance become visible from the pragmatic point of view in Habermas’s theory of communicative acts. With regard to the critique that the three-world theory has met in both its pragmatic and ontological versions, I will take a closer look at John Searle’s naturalistic counter-position. By teasing out some problematic implications in his theory of causation, I aim to show that Searle’s approach is, in fact, much closer to Popper’s than he might think. Finally, while condoning Habermas’s distinction between the natural world and the lifeworld, I will opt for a pragmatically differentiated view of ‘the real’, rather than speaking of different worlds.     

A Stale Challenge to the Philosophy of Science

In his article “Is psychology based on a methodological error?” and based on a quite convincing empirical basis, Michael Schwarz offers a methodological critique of one of mainstream psychology’s key test theoretical axioms, i.e., that of the in principle normal distribution of personality variables. It is characteristic of this paper—and at first seems to be a strength of it—that the author positions his critique within a frame of philosophy of science, particularly positioning himself in the tradition of Karl Popper’s critical rationalism. When scrutinizing Schwarz’s arguments, however, we find Schwarz’s critique profound only as an immanent critique of test theoretical axioms. We raise doubts, however, as to Schwarz’s alleged ‘challenge’ to the philosophy of science because the author not at all seems to be in touch with the state of the art of contemporary philosophy of science. Above all, we question the universalist undercurrent that Schwarz’s ‘bio-psycho-social model’ of human judgment boils down to. In contrast to such position, we close our commentary with a plea for a context- and culture sensitive philosophy of science.     

FUNCTIONALISM, FALLIBILISM, AND ANTI–FOUNDATIONALISM IN WIEMAN'S EMPIRICAL THEISM

Abstract. Empirical philosophy of religion is usually appraised in light of its theological uses, rather than in terms of its relation to philosophical forms of empiricism. The present paper examines the empirical theism of Henry Nelson Wieman by relating it to Carl Hempel's critique of functionalism, Karl Popper's use of falsifiability, and the growth of post–empiricist anti–foundationalism in epis–temology. It is concluded that Wieman's argument commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent; that his theistic perspective nevertheless offers an important heuristic device in line with fal–libilism, and that his radical empiricism anticipates recent anti–foundationalist trends.     

The Philosopher and the Revolutionary State: How Karl Popper’s Ideas Shaped the Views of Iranian Intellectuals

The present paper is an attempt to explore the impact of Karl Popper’s ideas on the views of a number of intellectual groups in post‐revolutionary Iran. Throughout the text, we have tried to make use of original sources and our own personal experiences. The upshot of the arguments of the paper is that the Viennese philosopher has made a long‐lasting impression on the intellectual scene of present‐day Iran in that even those socio‐political groups which are not in favour of his ideas, especially his model of critical rationalism, have felt the urgent need to make themselves familiar with them. Moreover, many of Popper’s ideas have directly or indirectly influenced the thinking of the decision‐makers in Iran since 1978.     

Descartes's Regulae, mathematics, and modern psychology: "the Noblest example of all" in Light of Turing's (1936) On computable Numbers

There are surprisingly strong connections between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of mathematics. One particular important example can be seen in the Regulae (1628) of Descartes. In "the noblest example of all," he used his new abstract understanding of numbers to demonstrate how the brain can be considered as a symbol machine and how the intellect's algebraic reasoning can be mirrored as operations on this machine. Even though his attempt failed, it is illuminating to explore it because Descartes launched 2 traditions--mechanistic philosophy of mind and abstract mathematics--that would diverge until A. Turing (1936) approached symbolic reasoning in a similar "symbol machine-existence proof" way. Descrates's and Turing's thought experiments, which mark the beginning of modern psychology and cognitive science, respectively, indicate how important the development of mathematics has been for the constitution of the science of mind.     

Popper versus Wittgenstein on Truth, Necessity, and Scientific Hypotheses

Most philosophers of science maintain Confirmationism's central tenet, namely, that scientific theories are probabilistically confirmed by experimental successes. Against this dominant (and old) conception of experimental science, Popper's well-known, anti-inductivistic Falsificationism (’Deductivism’) has stood, virtually alone, since 1934. Indeed, it is Popper who tells us that it was he who killed Logical Positivism. It is also pretty well-known that Popper blames Wittgenstein for much that is wrong with Logical Positivism, just as he despises Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian philosophers for abdicating philosophy's true mission. What is not well-known, however, especially because Popper neglected to tell us in 1934, is that Wittgenstein is very much an ally. It was Wittgenstein who rejected induction in the strongest possible terms as early as 1922, and it was Wittgenstein who similarly rejected Confirmationism approximately four years prior to Popper. The aims of this paper are to illuminate the substantial agreements between Popper and Wittgenstein and, by doing so, to clarify their important disagreement regarding the status of “strictly universal,” scientific theories (or hypotheses). This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

How Pierre Janet used pathological psychology to save the philosophical self

According to traditional French historiography, French scientific psychology was born when it differentiated itself from philosophy. This split between the two disciplines is attributed to Taine and Ribot, who, consequently, are considered to be the "founding fathers" of French psychology. In this paper we shall examine the case of Pierre Janet, who, at the turn of the century, was recognized worldwide as the most important French psychologist. It is generally said that he was the follower of Ribot and of Charcot. However, he was also Paul Janet's nephew. Paul Janet was a very well known and influential philosopher of the so-called French "spiritualistic" school, for which psychology was central to philosophy. In 1889, Pierre Janet published his doctoral dissertation, L'Automatisme psychologique, which was immediately considered to be a classic in psychology. We shall argue that this book is as much indebted to the old spiritualistic psychology, which claimed the substantial unity of the self, as to the new psychology at the time, which questioned it. With Pierre Janet, the split between psychology and philosophy in France was reconsidered. It would be more accurate to speak in terms of a compromise between philosophy and the "new" physiological and pathological psychology.     

Moral philosophy and moral psychology in Mencius

This paper defends both an interpretation of Mencius’ moral theory and that theory itself against alternative interpretive defences. I argue that the ‘virtue ethics’ reading of Mencius wrongly sees him as denying the distinction between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Virtue ethics is flawed, because it makes such a denial. But Mencius’ moral theory, in spite of Mencius’ obvious interest in moral psychology, does not have that flaw. However, I argue that Mencius is no rationalist. Instead, I show that he upholds a coherentist moral theory, in which reason and psychology both have a role. The final third of the paper compares my interpretation with the work of various important Mencius scholars. I point out that the issue of the difference between moral philosophy and moral psychology is quite important in contemporary Western moral theory.     

Christfried Jakob's late views (1930-1949) on the psychogenetic function of the cerebral cortex and its localization: culmination of the neurophilosophical thought of a keen brain observer

This article follows the culmination of the scientific thought of the neurobiologist Christfried Jakob (1866-1956) during the later part of his career, based on publications from 1930 to 1949, when he was between 64 and 83 years of age. Jakob emphasized the necessity of bridging philosophy to the biological sciences, neurobiology in particular. Thus, we consider him as one of the early protagonists in the emergence of neurophilosophy in the 20th century. The topics that occupied his mind were the foundations for a future philosophy of the brain, and the 'neurobiogenetic', 'neurodynamic', and 'neuropsychogenetic' problems in relation to how consciousness emerges. Jakob's views have many elements in common with great thinkers of philosophy and psychology, including Immanuel Kant, William James, Edmund Husserl, Henri Bergson, Jean Piaget and Willard Quine. A common denominator can also be discerned between Jakob's dynamic approach and certain aspects of cybernetics and neurophenomenology. Jakob propounded the interdisciplinarity of sciences as an indispensable tool for ultimately solving the enigma of consciousness.     

Two Senses of Justice: Confucianism,Rawls, and Comparative Political Philosophy

This paper argues that a comparative study of the idea of a sense of justice in the work of John Rawls and the early Chinese philosopher Kongzi is mutually beneficial to our understanding of the thought of both figures. It also aims to provide an example of the relevance of moral psychology for basic questions in political philosophy. The paper offers an analysis of Rawls’s account of a sense of justice and its place within his theory of justice, focusing on the features of this capacity and how it develops. It then provides an account of the sense of justice in Kongzi’s thought as it is seen in the Analects. Finally, it shows how examining the similarities and differences between the two accounts can deepen our understanding of both views, as well as our appreciation for the importance of understanding how a sense of justice develops.