Wide-angle memories of close-up scenes

We report a picture-memory phenomenon in which subjects' recall and recognition of photographed scenes reveal a pronounced extension of the pictures' boundaries. After viewing 20 pictures for 15 s each, 37 undergraduates exhibited this striking distortion; 95% of their drawings included information that had not been physically present but that would have been likely to have existed just outside the camera's field of view (Experiment 1). To determine if boundary extension is limited to recall and drawing ability, Experiment 2 tested recognition memory for boundaries. Eighty-five undergraduates rated targets and distractors on a boundary-placement scale. Subjects rated target pictures as being closer up than before and frequently mistook extended-boundary distractors as targets. Results are discussed in terms of picture comprehension and memory. In addition to its theoretical value, discovery of the phenomenon demonstrates the importance of more widespread use of open-ended tests in picture-memory methodology.     

How children remember neutral and emotional pictures: boundary extension in children's scene memories

Boundary extension is the tendency to remember more of a scene than was actually shown. The dominant interpretation of this memory illusion is that it originates from schemata that people construct when viewing a scene. Evidence of boundary extension has been obtained primarily with adult participants who remember neutral pictures. The current study addressed the developmental stability of this phenomenon. Therefore, we investigated whether children aged 10-12 years display boundary extension for neutral pictures. Moreover, we examined emotional scene memory. Eighty-seven children drew pictures from memory after they had seen either neutral or emotional pictures. Both their neutral and emotional drawings revealed boundary extension. Apparently, the schema construction that underlies boundary extension is a robust and ubiquitous process.     

Full scenes produce more activation than close-up scenes and scene-diagnostic objects in parahippocampal and retrosplenial cortex: an fMRI study

We used fMRI to directly compare activation in two cortical regions previously identified as relevant to real-world scene processing: retrosplenial cortex and a region of posterior parahippocampal cortex functionally defined as the parahippocampal place area (PPA). We compared activation in these regions to full views of scenes from a global perspective, close-up views of sub-regions from the same scene category, and single objects highly diagnostic of that scene category. Faces were included as a control condition. Activation in parahippocampal place area was greatest for full scene views that explicitly included the 3D spatial structure of the environment, with progressively less activation for close-up views of local scene regions containing diagnostic objects but less explicitly depicting 3D scene geometry, followed by single scene-diagnostic objects. Faces did not activate parahippocampal place area. In contrast, activation in retrosplenial cortex was greatest for full scene views, and did not differ among close-up views, diagnostic objects, and faces. The results showed that parahippocampal place area responds in a graded fashion as images become more completely scene-like and include more explicit 3D structure, whereas retrosplenial cortex responds in a step-wise manner to the presence of a complete scene. These results suggest scene processing areas are particularly sensitive to the 3D geometric structure that distinguishes scenes from other types of complex and meaningful visual stimuli.     

Seeking the boundary of boundary extension

Boundary extension (BE) is a remarkably consistent visual memory error in which participants remember seeing a more wide-angle image of a scene than was actually viewed (Intraub & Richardson, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 15:179–187, 1989). Multiple stimulus factors are thought to contribute to the occurrence of BE, including object recognition, conceptual knowledge of scenes, and amodal perception at the view boundaries (Intraub, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 3:117–127, 2012). In the present study, we used abstract scenes instead of images of the real world, in order to remove expectations based on semantic associations with objects and the schematic context of the view. Close-angle and wide-angle scenes were created using irregular geometric shapes rated by independent observers as lacking any easily recognizable structure. The abstract objects were tested on either a random-dot or a blank background in order to assess the influence of implied continuation of the image beyond its boundaries. The random-dot background conditions had background occlusion cues either present or absent at the image border, in order to test their influence on BE in the absence of high-level information about the scenes. The results indicate that high-level information about objects and schematic context is unnecessary for BE to occur, and that occlusion information at the image boundary also has little influence on BE. Contrary to previous studies, we also found clear BE for all conditions, despite using scenes depicting undetailed objects on a blank white background. The results highlighted the ubiquitous nature of BE and the adaptability of scene perception processes.     

Induced false memories of having heard the unspoken: a demonstration.

In a mock public survey situation, many students who had been led to expect to be asked to name their academic majors or home towns later declared that they had been asked for that information even though they had not. Such illusory memories were even more common among subjects who had spontaneously volunteered the unasked-for information during the interview. Both results have important implications for reality-monitoring processes and errors.     

Displacement in depth: Representational momentum and boundary extension

Memory for targets moving in depth and for stationary targets was examined in five experiments. Memory for targets moving in depth was displaced behind the target with slower target velocities (longer ISIS and retention intervals) and beyond the target with faster target velocities (shorter ISIS and retention intervals), and the overall magnitude of forward displacement for motion in depth was less than the overall magnitude of forward displacement for motion in the picture plane. Memory for stationary targets was initially displaced away from the observer, but memory for smaller stationary targets was subsequently displaced toward the observer and memory for larger stationary targets was subsequently displaced away from the observer; memory for the top or bottom edge of a stationary target was displaced inside the target perimeter. The data are consistent with Freyd and Johnson's (1987) two-component model of the time course of representational momentum and with Intraub et al.'s (1992) two-component model of boundary extension.     

The role of context on boundary extension

Boundary extension (BE) is a memory error in which observers remember more of a scene than they actually viewed. This error reflects one’s prediction that a scene naturally continues and is driven by scene schema and contextual knowledge. In two separate experiments we investigated the necessity of context and scene schema in BE. In Experiment 1, observers viewed scenes that either contained semantically consistent or inconsistent objects as well as objects on white backgrounds. In both types of scenes and in the no-background condition there was a BE effect; critically, semantic inconsistency in scenes reduced the magnitude of BE. In Experiment 2 when we used abstract shapes instead of meaningful objects, there was no BE effect. We suggest that although scene schema is necessary to elicit BE, contextual consistency is not required.     

Take a closer look: emotion modifies the boundary extension effect

Evidence has accumulated showing that central aspects of negative emotional scenes are remembered better than equivalent aspects of nonemotional scenes. Previous work, and an attentional account of these findings, led the authors to predict that anxiety-prone individuals would remember extremely negative emotional pictures as if seen from a closer perspective (i.e., with a less extended background) than other pictures. Findings showed that boundary extension was indeed reduced in high-trait-anxious individuals for very negative scenes, and this was more generally true for arousing scenes, with the exception of those with positive content. These findings are taken to be support for the view that attending to central aspects of emotionally arousing scenes can restrict the usual extended impression of surrounding space.     

Misremembering pictured objects: people of all ages demonstrate the boundary extension illusion

In the boundary extension illusion, subjects recollect more of a photographed scene than was originally shown. In this study, first- and fifth-grade children, young adult college students, and older adults studied 4 one-object or 4 two-object picture stimuli for 15 s each. Immediately after each visual scene was shown, the subjects drew it from memory inside a rectangle that was the same size as the previous picture. This study demonstrated that all age groups, from young children to older adults, were susceptible to the boundary extension illusion. This finding is discussed in terms of Intraub's perceptual schema hypothesis and Johnson's source-monitoring hypothesis.     

Interactive scaling: A demonstration

Described is one of the new techniques that interactive scaling algorithms make possible.     

Fixating picture boundaries does not eliminate boundary extension: Implications for scene representation

Observers frequently remember seeing more of a scene than was shown (boundary extension). Does this reflect a lack of eye fixations to the boundary region? Single-object photographs were presented for 14–15 s each. Main objects were either whole or slightly cropped by one boundary, creating a salient marker of boundary placement. All participants expected a memory test, but only half were informed that boundary memory would be tested. Participants in both conditions made multiple fixations to the boundary region and the cropped region during study. Demonstrating the importance of these regions, test-informed participants fixated them sooner, longer, and more frequently. Boundary ratings (Experiment 1) and border adjustment tasks (Experiments 2–4) revealed boundary extension in both conditions. The error was reduced, but not eliminated, in the test-informed condition. Surprisingly, test knowledge and multiple fixations to the salient cropped region, during study and at test, were insufficient to overcome boundary extension on the cropped side. Results are discussed within a traditional visual-centric framework versus a multisource model of scene perception.     

Understanding boundary extension: Normalization and extension errors in picture memory among adults and boys with and without Asperger's syndrome

Boundary extension is the tendency for people to “remember” information that fell outside a picture's boundaries. We used a novel test of boundary extension to provide absolute estimates of the magnitude of extension errors and of the degree to which people are influenced by the way a picture is presented at the time of testing. Participants were shown photographs on a computer and subsequently allowed to adjust their magnification to match the size they remembered. The test produced reliable boundary extension of around 11% in adults and large influences of initial test size. In a second experiment we tested boys diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome and matched controls. Both groups demonstrated boundary extension comparable to that observed in adults but greater effects of initial test size. High performance IQ in Asperger's was linked with high levels of boundary extension, while for the matched control group the opposite pattern was obtained.     

Understanding boundary extension: Normalization and extension errors in picture memory among adults and boys with and without Asperger's syndrome

Boundary extension is the tendency for people to “remember” information that fell outside a picture's boundaries. We used a novel test of boundary extension to provide absolute estimates of the magnitude of extension errors and of the degree to which people are influenced by the way a picture is presented at the time of testing. Participants were shown photographs on a computer and subsequently allowed to adjust their magnification to match the size they remembered. The test produced reliable boundary extension of around 11% in adults and large influences of initial test size. In a second experiment we tested boys diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome and matched controls. Both groups demonstrated boundary extension comparable to that observed in adults but greater effects of initial test size. High performance IQ in Asperger's was linked with high levels of boundary extension, while for the matched control group the opposite pattern was obtained.     

Recovering memories of trauma: A view from the laboratory

The controversy over the validity of repressed and recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) has been extraordinarily bitter. Yet data on cognitive functioning in people reporting repressed and recovered memories of trauma have been strikingly scarce. Recent laboratory studies have been designed to test hypotheses about cognitive mechanisms that ought to be operative if people can repress and recover memories of trauma or if they can form false memories of trauma. Contrary to clinical lore, these studies have shown that people reporting CSA histories are not characterized by a superior ability to forget trauma-related material. Other studies have shown that individuals reporting recovered memories of either CSA or abduction by space aliens are characterized by heightened proneness to form false memories in certain laboratory tasks. Although cognitive psychology methods cannot distinguish true memories from false ones, these methods can illuminate mechanisms for remembering and forgetting among people reporting histories of trauma.     

Keeping memories at an arm's length: vantage point of trauma memories

This study investigated the relationship between memory vantage point and avoidance following trauma. Sixty trauma survivors with differing levels of avoidance were interviewed about the vantage point of their memory for trauma, a positive memory, and a neutral memory. Avoidant individuals were more likely to remember their trauma from an observer perspective than individuals with a lower level of avoidance. Avoidance did not influence vantage point for positive or neutral memories. These data support the proposal that adoption of the observer vantage point for trauma memories may serve an avoidant function for people affected by trauma.     

Mood and memories of parental rearing styles: A comparison of mood effects on questionnaire-cued and free recall of autobiographical memories

The relationship between memories of childhood experiences (e.g., adverse parenting) and adult depression often found raises questions of interpretation. On the one hand, both laboratory studies and clinicians' experiences suggest that subjects in a depressed mood frequently show a negative bias in perceptions and memories. Negative childhood memories in depressed persons might, therefore, be interpreted as epiphenomena of depressed mood instead of etiological factors. On the other hand, memories of childhood experiences seem remarkably stable across changes in depressed mood, especially when memories are elicited by means of standardized questionnaires. In the mood and memory literature several explanations for this stability are offered. For one thing, highly structured cues to elicit memories (such as in questionnaires) are hypothesized to be less susceptible to mood bias than unstructured memory cues (such as in free recall procedures). On the other hand, resource allocation theorists suggest that childhood memories, being well established and rehearsed, are relatively impervious to mood bias no matter how they are elicited. In this study we examined whether different methods of eliciting childhood memories (i.e., free recall and questionnaire-cued) are differentially susceptible to mood bias. To this aim, we used a mood induction procedure to induce depressed, neutral, and elated mood and assessed childhood memories both before and after the mood induction using both questionnaires and free recall to elicit memories. Results suggested that memories elicited by means of free recall as well as by means of questionnaire-cued recall were susceptible to depressed and elated mood bias. The implications for research addressing the link between childhood experiences and depression are discussed.     

Recognizing dynamic scenes: influence of processing orientation

From face recognition studies, it is known that instructions are able to change processing orientation of stimuli, leading to an impairment of recognition performance. The present study examined instructional influences on the visual recognition of dynamic scenes. A global processing orientation without any instruction was assumed to lead to highest recognition performance, whereas instructions focusing participants' attention on certain characteristics of the event should lead to a local processing orientation with an impairment of visual recognition performance as a direct consequence. Since the pattern of results provided evidence for this hypothesis, theoretical contributions were discussed.     

A novel study: Investigating the structure of narrative and autobiographical memories

In two experiments we assessed the degree to which memory for events are similar or differ depending on whether they were narrative or autobiographical events. Consistent with previous research on autobiographical memory, memories for events captured the sequential order of events. However, in contrast to autobiographical memory research, ratings of importance did not appear to be related to retrieval speed. An analysis of causal connectivity of the recalled events was significantly related to retrieval speed. Issues of narrative comprehension and memory, autobiographical memory, and their overlap are discussed.