African American adolescent mothers and grandmothers: A multigenerational approach to parenting

This study is an adaptation and extension of Apfel and Seitz’s (Family Relations, 40(4), 421–429, 1991) models of adolescent parenting and adolescent-grandmother relationships to a sample of 148 African American, first-time adolescent mothers and their 6-month-old infants. The Parental Supplemental model, in which adolescent mothers and grandmothers shared caregiving, described 63% of Apfel and Seitz’s (1991) sample and 66% of the current sample. Shared caregiving was not associated with conflict in the adolescent mother–grandmother relationship. Adolescent mothers who had caregiving responsibilities and a supportive adolescent-grandmother relationship also reported competence in their parenting role. Findings provide support for Apfel and Seitz’s Parental Apprentice model, in which young mothers gain competence through direct caregiving experience in the context of a supportive relationship.     

A stochastic lie detector

Surveys on sensitive issues provide distorted prevalence estimates when participants fail to respond truthfully. The randomized-response technique (RRT) encourages more honest responding by adding random noise to responses, thereby removing any direct link between a participant’s response and his or her true status with regard to a sensitive attribute. However, in spite of the increased confidentiality, some respondents still refuse to disclose sensitive attitudes or behaviors. To remedy this problem, we propose an extension of Mangat’s (Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B, 56, 93–95, 1994) variant of the RRT that allows for determining whether participants respond truthfully. This method offers the genuine advantage of providing undistorted prevalence estimates for sensitive attributes even if respondents fail to respond truthfully. We show how to implement the method using both closed-form equations and easily accessible free software for multinomial processing tree models. Moreover, we report the results of two survey experiments that provide evidence for the validity of our extension of Mangat’s RRT approach.     

Rawlsian social-contract theory and the severely disabled

Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory in order to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled—or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability—for the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum’s interpretive claims about Rawls’s view, one can simply see how the Rawlsian framework can work in application to this issue. Following Rawls’s lead, the paper utilizes the idealized “initial choice situation” as an analytic and comparative device for examining alternative principles of justice, developing three different interpretations of the initial choice situation that each correspond to a different set of principles that apply to people of all levels of disability. One of these sets of principles is a simple extension of Rawls’s, one is very close to what Nussbaum herself recommends, and the third is a kind of hybrid. In this way, it is shown not only that Rawls’s social-contract device can usefully be applied to these issues, but also that it is helpful for exploring the deep commitments underlying each of these competing sets of principles. This extension to Rawls’s device clearly departs to some extent from his intentions; but the paper argues that the ideal of reciprocity, which might be thought to pose the biggest obstacle to applying his social-contract device to issues pertaining to the severely disabled (those who are not capable of being cooperative members of society), is not an independently essential commitment of his mature social-contract view, central though it was to Rawls’s thought in the 1950s.     

Object permanence in adult common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus): not everything is an “A-not-B” error that seems to be one

In this paper, we describe a behaviour pattern similar to the “A-not-B” error found in human infants and young apes in a monkey species, the common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). In contrast to the classical explanation, recently it has been suggested that the “A-not-B” error committed by human infants is at least partially due to misinterpretation of the hider’s ostensively communicated object hiding actions as potential ‘teaching’ demonstrations during the A trials. We tested whether this so-called Natural Pedagogy hypothesis would account for the A-not-B error that marmosets commit in a standard object permanence task, but found no support for the hypothesis in this species. Alternatively, we present evidence that lower level mechanisms, such as attention and motivation, play an important role in committing the “A-not-B” error in marmosets. We argue that these simple mechanisms might contribute to the effect of undeveloped object representational skills in other species including young non-human primates that commit the A-not-B error.     

Evaluating Child Coping Competence: Theory and Measurement

Much of the research on children’s coping styles is based on a downward extension of adult coping theories. In a departure from this approach, coping competence theory seeks to account for children’s ability to cope with daily challenges on the basis of developmental research. The theory, which states that challenges call for distinct coping skills in the affective, social, and achievement domains, was evaluated with an ethnically diverse sample of preschoolers. The study relied on confirmatory factor analysis of a parent-completed measure of coping to test the 3-factor model underlying the theory, and related those factors to parent and teacher measures of child functioning. Results supported the 3-factor model of coping competence and showed that each domain of coping was negatively correlated with parent and teacher ratings of child disruptive behavior. Coping competence theory held across child sex and age. Findings provide support for a 3-factor model of coping competence in early childhood and for the validity of the new parent-completed measure of children’s coping styles refined in this study.     

The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics

According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a relativized notion of extension. The resulting contextualist semantics for ‘true’ construes circularity as a pragmatic phenomenon.     

A defense of contingent logical truths

A formula is a contingent logical truth when it is true in every model M but, for some model M, false at some world of M. We argue that there are such truths, given the logic of actuality. Our argument turns on defending Tarski’s definition of truth and logical truth, extended so as to apply to modal languages with an actuality operator. We argue that this extension is the philosophically proper account of validity. We counter recent arguments to the contrary presented in Hanson’s ‘Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth’ (Philos Stud 130:437–459, 2006).     

Bare-Boned Demonstratives

This essay proposes a novel semantic account of demonstratives, aimed at clarifying the sense in which demonstratives are semantically dependent on demonstrations. Its first two sections summarize the main views currently on the market. Section 3 argues that they are all vitiated by the same shortcomings, and yield incorrect results of ‘truth in virtue of character’ and entailment. Section 4 proposes a different account of the relationships between demonstratives and demonstrations, grounded on the idea of truth-conditionally irrelevant aspects of the meaning of certain expressions. The resulting view of demonstratives is consonant with the so-called ‘bare boned’ account of their truth-conditional role, but is also in the position to recognize that the dependence of a demonstrative on a demonstration is, in some sense of the term, meaning-governed. The final section of this essay discusses the distinction between ‘vacuous’ and ‘incomplete’ uses of demonstratives, and cases involving multiple occurrences of these expressions.     

Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic

The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis, 65, 165–183, 2006). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision. While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision has only been dealt with in the metalanguage approach in which AGM was originally presented. In this paper, I show how to model interrogative belief revision in a modal object language using a class of operators for questions. In particular, the solution I propose will be shown to capture the notion of K-truncation, a method for agenda update in the case of expansion constructed by Olsson & Westlund. Two case studies are conducted: first, an interrogative extension of Krister Segerberg’s system DDL, and then a similar extension of Giacomo Bonanno’s modal logic for belief revision. Sound and complete axioms will be provided for both of the resulting logics.     

The “Non-cuttable” Space in Between: Context,Boundaries and Their Natural Fluidity

The inherent open-ended nature of socio-cultural phenomena makes it necessary to create new theoretical frameworks that enable us to understand the fluidity of the relations between different parts of the dynamic system. Recent advance in modern biology seems to provide a set of heuristic concepts useful to investigate the complexity and fluidity of the relationship between different contexts. One of these is the Rayner’s logic of natural inclusionality. According whit Rayner’s evolutionary standpoint any living system is constantly in dialogue with its natural neighbourhood on the basis of an interdependent and co-evolutive process involved both the context and the organism. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the model proposed by Rayner in light of contextual perspective in development and educational psychology arguing as the space in between is neither a cuttable and divisible presence into discrete things, nor a mere “nothing” that could be cut off our conceptualization. Rather, it’s a ground (for a figure) in which flow and counter-flow in a fluid interplay amidst a distinct bounded context takes place.The interest for the boundary conditions calls for focusing on what happened on the border. By adopting a simultaneous perspective from two standpoints we are able to constantly focus on both aspects—what happens inside and outside different social settings—we became aware that the “walls” of the context of our living are much more permeable than has been until now theorized by psychological research.     

Williamson’s Woes

This is a reply to Timothy Williamson’s paper ‘Tennant’s Troubles’. It defends against Williamson’s objections the anti-realist’s knowability principle based on the author’s ‘local’ restriction strategy involving Cartesian propositions, set out in The Taming of the True. Williamson’s purported Fitchian reductio, involving the unknown number of books on his table, is analyzed in detail and shown to be fallacious. Williamson’s attempt to cause problems for the anti-realist by means of a supposed rigid designator generates a contradiction with arithmetic right away, upon instantiating the obviously relevant theorem that every natural number is provably odd or provably even. The paper also explains and formulates a globally restricted knowability principle, which likewise blocks the attempted reductio.     

Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments*

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently presented a series of papers in which they argue against what has come to be called the ‘new wave’ moral realism and moral semantics of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, and a number of other philosophers. The central idea behind Horgan and Timmons’s criticism of these ‘new wave’ theories has been extended by Sean Holland to include the sort of realism that drops out of response-dependent accounts that make use of an analogy between moral properties and secondary qualities. This paper argues that Holland’s extension depends crucially on the fact that his target is a direct response-dependent account of moral value. His argument does not work against such accounts of more basic normative notions such as ‘harm’ or ‘benefit’. And these more basic notions may then serve as the basic normative building blocks for an indirectly response-dependent moral theory. * Thanks to Mark Timmons for helpful and friendly comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also to an audience at the 2003 Pacific APA, and to the reviewers for this journal.     

Blurred vision: Marion on the ‘possibility’ of revelation

In this paper I challenge Merold Westphal’s claim that Jean-Luc Marion’s hermeneutical phenomenology is especially useful for theology. I argue that in spite of his explicit allegiance to Husserl’s “principle of all principles,” Marion fails to embody a commitment to phenomenological seeing in his analyses of revelation. In the sections of Being Given where he discusses revelation, Marion allows faith-based claims to bleed into his phenomenological analyses, resulting in what I call his ‘blurred vision’—the pretension that phenomenological seeing can be extended to theological matters. This pretension undermines Marion’s phenomenological aspirations, because it invests his analyses with a theological content that phenomenological intuition cannot account for or clarify. At the same time, this blurring of the line between theology and phenomenology also makes Marion’s work theologically ineffective. For it furnishes the theologian and believer with the false assurance that faith-based commitments can be grounded in phenomenological knowledge—a claim that he simply cannot make good on. In light of these problems, I propose an alternative Heideggerian approach that maintains the boundary between philosophical and theological discourse and thereby safeguards the integrity of both.     

Maternal Perceptions of Competence and Children’s Academic Adjustment: Longitudinal Relations across Early Elementary School

Children’s perceptions of their academic ability play an important role in their academic adjustment, but relatively little research has examined the factors affecting academic self perceptions of young children, especially the role of parents. Seventy-seven children and their mothers were followed longitudinally from kindergarten to fourth grade to assess the association between mothers’ early perceptions of children’s academic abilities in reading and math and children’s later academic adjustment. Mothers’ perceptions of children’s reading ability in kindergarten were associated with children’s later self-perceptions of academic competence and later achievement, above and beyond kindergarten achievement. However, mothers’ perceptions of math ability in kindergarten were not significantly associated with later outcomes. In reading, mothers’ perceptions of children’s natural talent were positively associated with later self-perceptions and mothers’ perceptions of children’s difficulty in school were negatively associated with later self-perceptions. Additionally, mothers’ perceptions of children’s reading competence were positively associated with later reading achievement. This was the youngest sample in which these relations have been examined to date. Longer-term implications for early parental perceptions are discussed.     

Normative Naturalism and the Relativised <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Priori</Emphasis>

Summary  In this paper I address some shortcomings in Larry Laudan’s normative naturalism. I make it clear that Laudan’s rejection of the “meta-methodology thesis”, or MMT is unnecessary, and that a reformulated version MMT can be sustained. I contend that a major difficulty that attends Laudan’s account is his contention that a naturalistic philosophy of science cannot accommodate any a priori justification of methodological rules, and consider what sort of naturalism might best replace Laudan’s. To do this, I discuss Michael Friedman’s account of a relativised a priori and show that it is consistent with naturalistic philosophy of science and that it can help form the basis of a plausible normative naturalism. In particular, this discussion shows that Laudan’s rejection of any a priori justification of methodological rules is unjustified and inconsistent with scientific practice. Finally, I point the way to a version of normative naturalism that includes MMT and accounts for the role of constitutive a priori principles within science.     

God’s silence

Vagueness manifests itself (among other things) in our inability to find boundaries to the extension of vague predicates. A semantic theory of vagueness plans to justify this inability in terms of the vague semantic rules governing language and thought. According to a supporter of semantic theory, the inability to find such a boundary is not dependent on epistemic limits and an omniscient being like God would be equally unable. Williamson (Vagueness, 1994) argued that cooperative omniscient beings adequately instructed would find a precise boundary in a sorites series and that, for this reason, the semantic theory misses its target, while Hawthorne (Philosophical Studies 122:1–25, 2005) stood with the semantic theorists and argued that the linguistic behaviour of a cooperative omniscient being like God would clearly demonstrate that he does not find a precise boundary in the sorites series. I argue that Hawthorne’s definition of God’s cooperative behaviour cannot be accepted and that, contrary to what has been assumed by both Williamson and Hawthorne, an omniscient being like God cannot be a cooperative evaluator of a semantic theory of vagueness.     

Conscientisation in Castalia: A Freirean Reading of Hermann Hesse’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Glass Bead Game</Emphasis>

This paper considers Hermann Hesse’s novel, The Glass Bead Game, in the light of Paulo Freire’s educational philosophy. The Glass Bead Game is set in Castalia, a “pedagogical province” of the 23rd century. It is argued that the central character in the book, Joseph Knecht, undergoes a complex process of conscientisation. Knecht develops an increasingly critical understanding of Castalian society, questioning some of its most cherished assumptions while nonetheless deepening his appreciation of the beauty of the Glass Bead Game. He becomes less certain of his certainties as he grows older, and eventually decides to give away his prestigious post as Magister Ludi (Master of the Glass Bead Game) to pursue a quiet life as a tutor. Dialogue plays a key role in the development of Knecht’s critical consciousness. Freirean theory is seen to provide a robust framework for the analysis of key themes in Hesse’s text. At the same time, The Glass Bead Game is helpful in demonstrating the meaning and significance of conscientisation and dialogue for educational lives.     

The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ Argument, and The Prospects for the Theory of Denoting Concepts

Russell’s new theory of denoting phrases introduced in “On Denoting” in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell’s new theory is the so-called ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts (analogous to Frege’s theory of senses) promoted by Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then the proposition is not about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument does not exhaust Russell’s ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts, Russell’s new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting concepts is unproblematic once the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument is blocked.     

Understanding (in) Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation

In this essay, I attempt to assess Henk de Regt and Dennis Dieks recent pragmatic and contextual account of scientific understanding on the basis of an important historical case-study: understanding in Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and Huygens’ reception of universal gravitation. It will be shown that de Regt and Dieks’ Criterion for the Intelligibility of a Theory (CIT), which stipulates that the appropriate combination of scientists’ skills and intelligibility-enhancing theoretical virtues is a condition for scientific understanding, is too strong. On the basis of this case-study, it will be shown that scientists can understand each others’ positions qualitatively and quantitatively, despite their endorsement of different worldviews and despite their convictions as what counts as a proper explanation.