Sexual Lying Among College Students in Close and Casual Relationships1

The current investigation examined the extent and nature of sexual lying in close and casual relationships. Participants were 790 undergraduates recruited from 2 institutions for 1 of 4 studies employing diverse methods—2 experiments, 4 surveys, and a recalled event. Participants tended to tell fewer sexual lies in closer relationships, and those lies tended to be relatively more other‐protective than self‐protective. Also, the more they engaged in sexual lying, the more sexual lying they believed their partners engaged in. Furthermore, individual sexual lying tendencies were consistent across situations. Finally, participants were generally quite honest with their sex partners, and they lied less about risk‐relevant sexual issues than about risk‐irrelevant matters. These findings have implications for safer sex interventions.     

LYING PERSON-TO-PERSON ABOUT LIFE EVENTS: A COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK FOR LIE DETECTION

Undetected lies of prospective or current employees cost business billions of dollars annually. The ability to detect these lies would be of immense benefit. Several recent reports have called for research on new, theoretically based methods of lie detection. In response, we tested the Activation-Decision-Construction Model of lying ( Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphreys, 2003 ) according to which response time is a cue to deception. Participants were tested person-to-person. In Experiment 1, half lied to questions probing recent episodic memories. The other half answered honestly. Liar-truth teller response time differences were observed between subjects. Discriminant analyses demonstrated the value of response time for uncovering deceit. Those highest in social skills were the quickest liars. In Experiment 2, lying was shown to take longer than truth telling within subjects, and within-subject response time standard deviations were shown to be converging cues to deception. Based on these data and the ADCM, a Time-Restricted Integrity Confirmation (Tri-Con) framework for lie detection is proposed that might one day provide cost effective lie detection for business.     

No need for an intention to deceive? Challenging the traditional definition of lying

According to the traditional definition of lying, somebody lies if he or she makes a believed-false statement with the intention to deceive. The traditional definition has recently been challenged by non-deceptionists who use bald-faced lies to underpin their view that the intention to deceive is no necessary condition for lying. We conducted two experiments to test whether their assertions are true. First, we presented one of five scenarios that consisted of three different kinds of lies (consistent bald-faced lies, conflicting bald-faced lies, and indifferent lies). Then we asked participants to judge whether the scenario at hand was a lie, whether the speaker intended to deceive somebody, and how they would judge the behavior in terms of morality. As expected, our results indicate that the intention to deceive is not a necessary condition for lying. Participants rated indifferent lies to be lies and judged that no intention to deceive was involved in these cases. In addition, all bald-faced lies were evaluated as lies. However, participants widely ascribed an intention to deceive to bald-faced lies, which thus might not apply as counterexamples against the traditional definition of lying. Besides, lies are judged as morally wrong regardless of an intention to deceive.     

Truthful yet misleading: Elementary second-order deception in school-age children and its sociocognitive correlates

In highly competitive contexts, deceptive intentions might be transparent, so conveying only false information to the opponent can become a predictable strategy. In such situations, alternating between truths and lies (second-order lying behavior) represents a less foreseeable option. The current study investigated the development of 8- to 10-year-old children’s elementary second-order deception in relation to their attribution of ignorance (first- and second-order ignorance) and executive functions (inhibitory control, shifting ability, and verbal working memory). An adapted version of the hide-and-seek paradigm was used to assess children’s second-order lie-telling, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either of their hands. Unlike the standard paradigm, the opponent did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children, so children needed to switch between telling simple lies and truths (elementary second-order lies about the coin location) to successfully deceive the recipient. The results showed that older children were less likely to tell elementary second-order lies. However, across the sample, when children decided to lie, this ability was positively related to their second-order ignorance attribution and their verbal working memory. Moreover, we obtained preliminary evidence for the presence of a habituation effect in second-order lying, with children being more accurate and having less variability in their truthful-to-deceive responses (this being the more frequently elicited response) than when telling lies to deceive. Our findings could have implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying children’s ability to alternate between truths and lies to deceive.     

Tell me sweet little lies: An event-related potentials study on the processing of social lies

In reading tasks, words that convey a false statement elicit an enhanced N400 brainwave response, relative to words that convey a true statement. N400 amplitude reductions are generally linked to the online expectancy of upcoming words in discourse. White lies, contrary to false statements, may not be unexpected in social scenarios. We used the event-related potential (ERP) technique to determine whether there is an impact of social context on sentence processing. We measured ERP responses to target words that either conveyed a social “white” lie or a socially impolite blunt truth, relative to semantic violations. Word expectancy was controlled for by equating the cloze probabilities of white lying and blunt true targets, as measured in previous paper-and-pencil tests. We obtained a classic semantic violation effect (a larger N400 for semantic incongruities relative to sense making statements). White lies, in contrast to false statements, did not enhance the amplitude of the N400 component. Interestingly, blunt true statements yielded both a late frontal positivity and an N400 response in those scenarios particularly biased to white lying. Thus, white lies do not interfere with online semantic processing, and they do not engage further reanalysis processes, which are typically indexed by subsequent late positivity ERP effects. Instead, an N400 and a late frontal positivity obtained in response to blunt true statements indicate that they were treated as unexpected events. In conclusion, unwritten rules of social communicative behavior influence the electrical brain response to locally coherent but socially inappropriate statements.     

Examining different types of comparison questions in a field study of CQT polygraph technique: Theoretical and practical implications

Two types of questions are most important in the CQT polygraph examination, relevant questions that deal directly with the case under query and comparison questions, which usually deal with past probable misdeeds of the examinees that they choose to deny. The simplistic core reasoning behind the CQT is that the risk of being detected for lying is a threatening situation and like any kind of threat, it automatically triggers the autonomic nervous system to respond with the “fight or flight” type of reaction. For the deceptive examinee, the relevant questions pose the main threat, whereas the truthful examinee, knowing that he is telling the truth on the relevant issue while probably lying to the comparison questions, perceives the latter as more threatening, considering his goal to appear truthful on the test. Accordingly, the deceptive examinee reactions are focused on the relevant questions, whereas the truthful focuses them on the comparison ones. Results of the current field study suggest that at least with truthful examinees, comparison questions, which do not incorporate any lies to be afraid of their exposure, or any lies at all, might function similarly to probable lie questions, by just increasing their salience in a manner that presumably creates some concerns about them. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed in line with the RIG strength notion (Ginton, 2009 ).     

Adults' ability to detect children's lying

Adults are poor deception detectors when examining lies told by adults, on average. However, there are some adults who are better at detecting lies than others. Children learn to lie at a very young age, a behavior that is socialized by parents. Yet, less is known about the ability to detect children's lies, particularly with regard to individual differences in the ability to detect this deception. The current study explored adult raters' ability to discern honesty in children who lied or told the truth about committing a misdeed. Results showed that adults are no better at detecting children's lies than they are with adult lies. In particular, adults were very poor at identifying children's honest statements. However, individual differences did emerge, suggesting that the ability to detect lying in children might be facilitated by relevant experience working with children. Implications for legal and mental health contexts are discussed.     

BALD-FACED LIES! LYING WITHOUT THE INTENT TO DECEIVE

Abstract:  Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved (the addressee, the general audience, bystanders, etc.). Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion: lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of our disapproval of non-deceptive lies is a rhetorical illusion.     

Looking Good and Lying to Do It: Deception as an Impression Management Strategy in Job Interviews

The present study investigated job applicants' use of deception. The study examined applicants' deception on written applications, as well as in a job interview; whether individuals would lie to conform to job requirements; and whether extraversion and self-monitoring are related to lying. Fifty-nine candidates completed an application and interview. After the interview, candidates were informed that they were actually participating in an experiment. They then watched a videotape of their interview and indicated any lies they told. As hypothesized, it was found that applicants lied both on the job applications and during the interview, primarily to appear to conform to job requirements. Furthermore, candidate extraversion was positively correlated with number of lies told, although self-monitoring was unrelated to lying.     

Is Lying Bound to Commitment? Empirically Investigating Deceptive Presuppositions,Implicatures, and Actions

Lying is an important moral phenomenon that most people are affected by on a daily basis—be it in personal relationships, in political debates, or in the form of fake news. Nevertheless, surprisingly little is known about what actually constitutes a lie. According to the traditional definition of lying, a person lies if they explicitly express something they believe to be false. Consequently, it is often assumed that people cannot lie by more indirectly communicating believed-false claims, for instance by merely conversationally implicating them. In this paper, we subject this claim to an empirical test. In a preregistered study of 300 participants, we investigate how people judge cases of implicit deceptions that would usually be excluded by the traditional definition of lying (i.e., conversational implicatures, presuppositions, and nonverbal actions). Our results show that people do in fact consider it possible to lie by indirect means, suggesting that people have a broader concept of lying than is usually assumed. Moreover, our findings indicate that lie judgments are closely tied to the extent to which agents are perceived as having committed themselves to the believed-false claims they have communicated. We discuss the implications of our results for the traditional definition of lying and propose a new commitment-based definition of lying that can account for the findings of our experiment.     

Lie,truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.     

Detecting Deception in Non‐Native English Speakers

The ability to accurately assess credibility is important in countless situations, including many in which individuals being assessed are not speaking their native language. There is reason to believe that native and non‐native speakers may behave differently when lying and that detectors may have a bias to believe non‐native speakers are lying. However, very little is known about detecting deception in non‐native speakers, and the few existing studies have not resulted in consistent findings. The current research compared the ability to detect lies and truths in native speakers with that in non‐native speakers and looked at differences in the cues displayed via the Psychologically Based Credibility Assessment Tool. Results from two samples with different demographic characteristics and backgrounds indicated that there was a bias to believe that non‐native speakers were lying. These results may have implications regarding the use of interpreters in settings where credibility is being assessed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lying in the name of the collective good: a developmental study

The present study examined the developmental origin of 'blue lies', a pervasive form of lying in the adult world that is told purportedly to benefit a collective. Seven, 9-, and 11-year-old Chinese children were surreptitiously placed in a real-life situation where they decided whether to lie to conceal their group's cheating behavior. Children were also assessed in terms of their willingness in hypothetical situations to endorse lying or truth-telling that benefits a collective but at the same time harms an individual. Results showed that as age increased, children became more inclined to endorse lying in the name of the collective good, and to tell lies for their group themselves. Furthermore, children's endorsement about blue lies in hypothetical situations predicted their actual lying behavior.     

儿童说谎行为的类型与研究范式

说谎行为是儿童社会化过程中的重要表现,儿童说谎行为的发展有利于其认知发展,促进其对社会道德规范的了解和学习,帮助其更好地适应社会的发展。回顾现有的儿童说谎的类型,包括反社会谎言和亲社会谎言,介绍儿童说谎的研究范式以更全面地了解儿童说谎的种类,包括被动说谎范式和主动说谎范式,并在以往研究基础上指出未来可研究方向,如修改范式、增加对亲社会谎言的研究和对特殊儿童的谎言研究等,可以更好地理解儿童说谎的发展过程及实践意义。     

在艾森克人格问卷L量表上说谎的语音频谱特征

本研究探索艾森克人格问卷说谎量表上说谎与不说谎的语音频谱差别。我们录下被试在做艾森克人格问卷时回答“是”或“不是”的声音。使用Praat语音分析软件对/bu/,/sh/、/i/的前三个共振峰频率和波段（F1、F2、F3、B1、B2、B3）进行分析。结果发现：说“是”时说谎和说真话在/sh/的F1、F3、B1上存在差异,说“不是”时在/sh/的F1、F2、F3上存在差异。本研究表明说谎和说真话在语音频谱上存在差异,同时说谎在不同音素上的效应可能不一样。     

Are Bald‐Faced Lies Deceptive after All?

According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you say something that you believe to be false and you intend to deceive someone into believing what you say. However, philosophers have recently noted the existence of bald‐faced lies, lies which are not intended to deceive anyone into believing what is said. As a result, many philosophers have removed deception from their definitions of lying. According to Jennifer Lackey, this is ‘an unhappy divorce’ because it precludes an obvious explanation of the prima facie wrongness of lying. Moreover, Lackey claims that there is a sense of deception in which all lies are deceptive. In this paper, I argue that bald‐faced lies are not deceptive on any plausible notion of deception. In addition, I argue that divorcing deception from lying may not be as unhappy a result as Lackey suggests.     

Truth,Lies, and Self‐Presentation: How Gender and Anticipated Future Interaction Relate to Deceptive Behavior1

The present study hypothesized that gender and expectation of future interaction affects the frequency and nature of lying. Male and female participants (208 undergraduates) were randomly assigned to same‐ or opposite‐gender partners and given the expectation they either would not meet again or would meet 3 additional times. Participants engaged in a 10‐min conversation that was videotaped covertly. Later, target participants evaluated the videotape identifying lies they told. During the conversation, 78% of participants lied, with females lying significantly more than males. Females, but not males, lied more when expecting future interaction than when expecting no future interaction. The nature of lies also varied between women and men. Findings suggest women and men differentially use deception as a self‐presentational tactic.     

Follow the liar: the effects of adult lies on children's honesty

Recent research shows that most adults admit they lie to children. We also know that children learn through modeling and imitation. To date there are no published studies that examine whether lying to children has an effect on children's honesty. We aimed to bridge the gap in this literature by examining the effects of adults' lies on elementary and preschool‐aged children's behavior using a modified temptation resistance paradigm, in which children are tempted to peek at a toy they have been told not to look at, and later given a chance to either admit peeking, or try to conceal their transgression by lying. Prior to being tested, half of the children were told a lie and half were not. We then measured both cheating (peeking) and lie‐telling behaviors. We hypothesized that lying to a child would increase the likelihood that they would both peek at the toy and lie about having done so. Results showed that school‐age children were more likely to peek if they had been lied to, and were also more likely to lie about peeking. In contrast with the school‐age children, there was no difference in peeking or lying for preschoolers who were and were not lied to. These results have important implications for parenting and educational settings.     

Sex and personality traits influence the difference between time taken to tell the truth or lie

A necessary component of lying is the withholding of a truthful response. Hence, lying may be conceptualised as involving the inhibition of an initial, automatic response (the truth) while an alternative response (the lie) is generated. We investigated response times to visually and auditorially presented questions probing recent episodic memory, when subjects answered questions truthfully or with lies. We also investigated whether the absolute response times or difference between time taken to tell the truth or lie was affected by participants' sex or correlated with personality scores on the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised-Short Scale. 61 subjects answered the same 36 questions five times. The first time involved answering all questions truthfully, which allowed post hoc analysis of whether subjects had been consistent in their lying and truth-telling on the following four occasions. These latter four occasions involved answering all questions (one each with 'truth' or 'lie') for both types of presentation. Regardless of type of presentation or subjects' sex, subjects took approximately 200 msec. longer to lie than to tell the truth in response to each question (p<.001). There were significant correlations between truthful response times to auditorially presented questions and Eysenck 'Neuroticism' scores. There was also a significant correlation for women between mean individual lie-minus-truth time to auditorially presented questions and Eysenck 'Lie' scores. These preliminary data suggest that response time is systematically longer when telling a lie and that personality variables may play a part in this process.     

Cross-cultural differences in children's choices, categorizations, and evaluations of truths and lies

This study examined cross-cultural differences and similarities in children's moral understanding of individual- or collective-oriented lies and truths. Seven-, 9-, and 11-year-old Canadian and Chinese children were read stories about story characters facing moral dilemmas about whether to lie or tell the truth to help a group but harm an individual or vice versa. Participants chose to lie or to tell the truth as if they were the character (Experiments 1 and 2) and categorized and evaluated the story characters' truthful and untruthful statements (Experiments 3 and 4). Most children in both cultures labeled lies as lies and truths as truths. The major cultural differences lay in choices and moral evaluations. Chinese children chose lying to help a collective but harm an individual, and they rated it less negatively than lying with opposite consequences. Chinese children rated truth telling to help an individual but harm a group less positively than the alternative. Canadian children did the opposite. These findings suggest that cross-cultural differences in emphasis on groups versus individuals affect children's choices and moral judgments about truth and deception.