伦理与道德之辨正

伦理与道德两个概念的内涵及其相互关系在许多研究者那里是比较模糊的。本文试图从词源学的角度并结合黑格尔在《法哲学原理》中的相应观点对二者的内涵加以区别界定并对二者的关系加以厘定:道德是个体对自身完满性的价值追求,具有主体性与私人性;而伦理则是基于社会成员之间的互动交往而形成的规范体系,具有“互主体性”与公共性。道德是伦理的基础,伦理是道德的提升。笔者认为,对伦理与道德加以区分和厘定将有助于伦理冲突的化解、伦理关系的协调以及伦理秩序的维护。     

Impartial Morality and Practical Deliberation as First‐Personal

Bernard Williams questioned whether impartial morality “can allow for the importance of individual character and personal relations in moral experience.” Underlying his position is a distinction between factual and practical deliberation. While factual deliberation is about the world and brings in a standpoint that is impartial, practical deliberation is, he claims, radically first‐personal; it “involves an I that [is] intimately the I of my desires.” While it may be thought that Williams's claim implies an unpalatable Humean subjectivism, the present article argues that this does not follow: That first‐person practical deliberation is directed both by the “I of my desires” and by the world. Drawing on Peter Winch's argument against the universalizability of moral judgments and D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, the article argues that practical deliberations involve discovering value in the world, but that what is revealed about the world depends constitutively on the first‐person deliberations and decisions of particular agents.     

A Feminist Ethic and the New Romanticism Mothering as a Model of Moral Relations

This paper claims that recent attempts to draw on the maternal experiences of women in order to articulate an ethic of care and compassion is a new romanticism. Like earlier romantic views, it is both attractive and potentially dangerous. The paper examines the basic claims of this new romanticism in order to identify both its strengths and weaknesses. I conclude that there are at least two versions of this new romanticism, one that relies primarily on the experiences of child-bearing in grounding” an ethic of care and compassion, and a second that relies primarily on child-rearing. I suggest that the former version of the new romanticism is deeply flawed be-cause such a view ought to be unacceptable to women and will be inaccessible to men.     

Live Kidney Donations and the Ethic of Care

In this paper, we seek to re-conceptualize the ethical framework through which ethicists and medical professionals view the practice of live kidney donations. The ethics of organ donation has been understood primarily within the framework of individual rights and impartiality, but we show that the ethic of care captures the moral situation of live kidney donations in a more coherent and comprehensive way, and offers guidance for practitioners that is more attentive to the actual moral transactions among donors and recipients. A final section offers guidelines for the practice of live kidney transplants that emerge from an ethic of care.     

尊严平等与关怀:女性主义生命伦理学

女性主义生命伦理学试图从根本上颠覆男尊女卑的传统伦理观念,倡导从制度层面确保女性独立的社会地位,捍卫女性权利与尊严.女性主义生命伦理学还以其特有的关怀主义特征,呼吁性别平等,强调人文关怀,注重社会公平,成为构建和谐社会的重要理论思潮.     

Impartial welfarism and the concept of a person

This paper examines some work in welfare economics based upon generalized social welfare function (GSWFs). Impartial welfarism consists in a set of apparently quite weak moral axioms concerning GSWFs. Using that framework, welfare economists have derived both utilitarian and Rawlsian doctrines. These results would seem to be of great importance to moral philosophy. I argue, however, that applying them presupposes a view of persons as mere place holders for preferences, thereby limiting the theorems' appeal for moral philosophers. I propose a more satisfactory view of impartial welfarism by replacing the term person by the more general welfare recipient, but this still fails to make the doctrine available to all moral philosophers.     

Affirmation and Care: A Feminist Account of Bullying and Bullying Prevention

Despite the amount of attention that activists, educators, psychologists, and the media place on bullying and bullying prevention, there has been no sustained philosophical reflection on bullying, nor has there been a feminist analysis of the growing literature on bullying. This essay seeks to satisfy those two needs. The first section is a broad introduction to the literature on bullying. I define bullying and distinguish it from teasing, sassing, roughhousing, and other more benign interactions. I also outline two common solutions to bullying: zero‐tolerance policies and “ecological” interventions. The second section uses feminist ethics of care to analyze the effectiveness of each approach. I argue that ecological approaches to bullying are preferable to zero‐tolerance policies because they operate on a relational model of the self and identity‐formation. I elaborate a notion of affirmation as the mechanism that stabilizes and solidifies our sense of self across time. I then use affirmation to analyze three things: why people bully one another, the specific harm inflicted by bullying, and why ecological approaches are more effective in reducing bullying. The third section uses my account of affirmation to critique the scientism and troublingly gendered assumptions that underlie much of the work on bullying.     

Building Bridges with Accessible Care: Disability Studies,Feminist Care Scholarship,and Beyond

This article uses elements of autoethnography to theorize an in/formal support relationship between a friend with a physical disability, who uses attendant services, and me. Through thinking about our particular “frien‐tendant” relationship, I find the common scholarly orientations toward “care” are inadequate. Starting from the conversations between feminist and disability perspectives on care, I build on previous work to further develop the theoretical framework of accessible care. Accessible care takes a critical, engaged approach that moves beyond understanding “accessibility” as merely concrete solutions to create more inclusive forms of care. Care, in this context, is positioned as an unstable tension among competing definitions, including that it is a complex form of oppression. Accessible care draws on feminist disability perspectives and the feminist political ethic of care to build bridges in four areas: from daily experiences of disability and support to theoretical discussions; across feminist care research and disability perspectives; across divisions and anxieties within disability communities; and from the local to transnational applications. These bridges do not aim to resolve debates but allow us to travel back and forth between differing perspectives and demonstrate the tenuous possibility of accessible practices and concepts of care.     

公正与正义

公正是指用同一原则或标准评价相同的人与事 ,或是等利 (害 )交换的行为 ;正义指公正的、有利于人民的 (道理 )。公正与正义显然是属种关系 ,正义的一定公正 ,公正的未必正义 ,不公正的一定不正义 ,不正义的未必不公正。区别公正与正义具有重要的理论与实践意义。     

女性主义关怀伦理学视角下的代孕探析

近年来代孕现象频频发生,由此代孕引发的纠纷越来越多.女性主义关怀伦理学是近年来刚刚兴起的新思潮,从女性主义关怀伦理学这一独特的视角对代孕问题进行探析,强调同情、关怀的价值,注重从情境、情感和经验分析,并从包容角度去看待代孕现象.从女性主义关怀伦理学的角度对代孕现象引发的伦理问题进行探析,并在此基础上提出合理的代孕伦理规约,旨在合理利用代孕手段,使其能真正为不孕不育者带来生育的希望,避免出现伦理道德和社会的混乱.     

The Ethic of Care vis-â-vis the Ethic of Rights: A Problem for Contemporary Moral Theory

Carol Gilligan has delineated two ethics, the ethic of rights and the ethic of care. In this article I argue that the two ethics are part of one overall system, the ethic of care functioning as a necessary base for the ethic of rights. 1 also argue that the system is seriously flawed. Because women are held accountable to both ethics and because the two ethics frequently conflict, women recurrently find themselves in a moral double bind.     

Beyond Just Justice – Creating Space for a Future‐Care Ethic

Distributive justice relies on metaphors about spatial distribution. Modelling cross‐temporal relations on cross‐spatial relations in this way obscures how earlier groups become the later ones. Procedural justice metaphors rely on metaphors of (contemporaneous) contract and thereby on impartial reasoning. Their dominance is already problematic in the case of contemporary relations, but is even more so in the case of relations across time, where the conditions for later parties are controlled and created by earlier ones. Future generations should not be thought of as a distinct group living at a different temporal “location,” but as who we will become. Thus, the frame of “justice” is much less appropriate for our relations to them than the frame of “care”.     

The Compatibility of Hegelian Recognition and Morality with the Ethics of Care

I draw connections between Hegel’s concepts of recognition and morality and demonstrate how they are compatible with an ethic of care. I explore Hegel’s Sittlichkeit and demonstrate the role that intersubjective recognition plays in the development and sustainment of ethical communities. I demonstrate how his emphasis on the community and interpersonal relationships play an important role in his moral theory. I then contrast Hegelian and Kantian views of morality and argue that Hegel’s account places greater emphasis on attending to the needs of others and showing genuine concern for their well-being. By highlighting the intersubjective nature of recognition between self-consciousnesses, and the interconnectedness of agents in an ethical community, I maintain Hegel’s morality is compatible with an ethic of care because it emerges out of intersubjective mutual recognition and its foundation is built upon responding to the needs of particular others and protecting the bonds of the community.     

Adventures of a Feminist

No abstract available for this article.