Dynamic doxastic logic: why,how, and where to?

We investigate the research programme of dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) and analyze its underlying methodology. The Ramsey test for conditionals is used to characterize the logical and philosophical differences between two paradigmatic systems, AGM and KGM, which we develop and compare axiomatically and semantically. The importance of Gärdenfors’s impossibility result on the Ramsey test is highlighted by a comparison with Arrow’s impossibility result on social choice. We end with an outlook on the prospects and the future of DDL.     

What of the clients-eye view? A response to the millennium review

The BJGC 's (2000) symposium on guidance, psychotherapy and counselling reviewed the developments of these activities in the United Kingdom in the past and present, and then looked to the future at the turn of this millennium.The picture emerged of professionally dominated enterprises in which the client's point-of-view is obscure. This article explores why this is the case and how the client's perspective can reinforce the political as well as the therapeutic value of counselling, psychotherapy and guidance.     

Measuring aggressiveness and anger,but not aggression? A response to the CAAS critique

ObjectivesThe Competitive Aggressiveness and Anger Scale (CAAS) was developed to measure antecedents of aggression in sport. The critique attacks the CAAS on three points: (1) the definition of aggression in sport adopted, (2) the “one size fits all” element in the thinking behind the scale's development, (3) the nature of the CAAS Anger and Aggressiveness items. The objectives of this response is to address misunderstandings in the critique.MethodsWe identified a number of false assumptions that undermine the validity of the critique and attempt to clarify our position with respect to the criticisms made.Results(1) The CAAS is being criticised for a definition that it did not use. (2) We accepted that the CAAS may not be suitable for everyone in our limitations section and fully accept the limitations of any scale. We have since undertaken a large research project to establish whether the scale is valid across and within specific sports. (3) The fundamental misunderstanding inherent throughout the critique is that the CAAS was designed as a measure of aggression, rather than anger and aggressiveness, rendering the critique of its items redundant.ConclusionsThe critique misrepresents the authors of the CAAS and fails to present a coherent argument against its use. We hope to clarify our position here. The evidence to date suggests that the CAAS is a valid measure of anger and aggressiveness in many sports and that these concepts reliably differentiate players who admit unsanctioned aggression from those who do not.     

Cochlear implants and the claims of culture? A response to Lane and Grodin

Because I reject the notion that physical characteristics constitute cultural membership, I argue that, even if the claim were persuasive that deafness is a culture rather than a disability, there is no reason to fault hearing parents who choose cochlear implants for their deaf children.     

What is quantum logic?

The paper describes in detail the procedure of identification of the inner language and an inner logico of a physical theory. The procedure is a generalization of the original ideas of J. von Neuman and G. Birkhoff about quantum logic.     

What is non-fregean in the semantics of Wittgenstein'sTractatus and why?

From J.M. Bocheski's Rady starego filozofa [Advice of the old philosopher]: 6. Pytaj sie Zawsze (i) co to znaczy? i (ii) dlaczego? [Ask always (i) what does it mean? and (ii) why?]     

What is Genetic Information,and why is it Significant? A Contextual,Contrastive, Approach

abstract Is genetic information of special ethical significance? Does it require special regulation? There is considerable contemporary debate about this question (the ‘genetic exceptionalism’ debate). ‘Genetic information’ is an ambiguous term and, as an aid to avoiding conflation in the genetic exceptionalism debate, a detailed account is given of just how and why ‘genetic information’ is ambiguous. Whilst ambiguity is a ubiquitous problem of communication, it is suggested that ‘genetic information’ is ambiguous in a particular way, one that gives rise to the problem of ‘significance creep’ (i.e., where claims about the significance of certain kinds of genetic information in one context influence our thinking about the significance of other kinds of genetic information in other contexts). A contextual and contrastive methodology is proposed: evaluating the significance of genetic information requires us to be sensitive to the polysemy of ‘genetic information’ across contexts and then examine the contrast in significance (if any) of genetic, as opposed to nongenetic, information within contexts. This, in turn, suggests that a proper solution to the regulatory question requires us to pay more attention to how and why information, and its acquisition, possession and use, come to be of ethical significance.     

What is conditionalization,and why should we do it?

Philosophical Studies - Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to...     

Infant imitation and the self—A response to Welsh

Talia Welsh (2006 Welsh, T. 2006. Do neonates display innate self-awareness? Why neonatal imitation fails to provide sufficient grounds for innate self and other awareness. Philosophical Psychology, 19: 221–238. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff's (1996) application of neonatal imitation research is insufficient grounds for their claim that neonates are born with a primitive body image and thus an innate self-awareness. Drawing upon an understanding of the self that is founded upon a “theory of mind,” Welsh challenges the notion that neonates have the capacity for self-awareness and charges the supposition with an essentialism which threatens to disrupt more social constructionist understandings of the self. In this paper, I initially defend Gallagher and Meltzoff's (1996) application of infant imitation to understandings of neonatal self-awareness by explaining how body image schemas can be understood as non-representational embodied cognitive phenomena that challenge “theory of mind” theory. I then further develop the claim that neonates are born self-aware with reference to my own work in fetal development. I conclude that Welsh's political concerns are unfounded by showing how the conclusion that a neonate is self-aware does not signal a return to an essentialist understanding of self-awareness, but rather introduces into philosophical and psychological discourse possible alternate understandings of an embodied sense of self that are embedded within intersubjective contexts.     

What do epistemic logic and cognitive science have to do with each other?

Epistemic logic is a multi-faceted theory aimed at targeting notions such as knowledge, belief, information, awareness, memory and other propositional attitudes, by means of logical and semantical tools. These concepts ought to be in the spotlight of cognitive science too, but the two have not yet seriously been explored in cooperation. In this paper, it is shown that a number of possibilities is opened up by attempting to answer the question of what epistemic logic and cognitive science have to do with each other. Among the proposed answers are: (i) new quantified versions of multi-agent epistemic logic capture locutions involving object identification, giving rise to applications in representing knowledge in multi-agent systems and parallel processing. (ii) The framework of game-theoretic semantics for the ensuing logics enjoys increased cognitive plausibility as the true semantics for epistemic notions. (iii) Several recent findings in cognitive neuroscience pertaining to the notions of awareness and explicit versus implicit processing contribute to logical studies. These three connections are explored here from both logical and cognitive perspectives. Reflecting neuroscientific research, new extensions of epistemic logic are defined, increasing formal understanding of unconscious and unaware information processing in the brain, and making the formalism thus amenable to knowledge representation in multi-agent configurations.     

What's the problem? A response to "secular humanism and scientific psychiatry"

Notwithstanding the interest and importance of Szasz's position, it neglects the phenomena, the real problems which take people to the clinic seeking treatment, and the conditionality of the notion of individual responsibility.     

What is wrong with religious education? A response to Philip Barnes

This article reviews Philip Barnes’ account of problems with religious eEducation (RE), and explores the practical implications of his position. Acknowledging his compelling logic – that RE is premised on an acceptance of all religions as equally theologically true – this article argues for optimism: with controversy and ambiguity moving to centre stage, a re‐orientation of RE’s attainment targets could focus RE curricula and provide a measure of direction for future progress. Equally, a focus on developing individual values for life in a plural democracy – where personal destinies often conflict both culturally and existentially – would likewise give RE a more potent purpose and the foundations for a normative agenda. Inspired by J.S. Mill, this article concludes that such RE may have to move beyond the classroom to achieve its potential as a critical, inclusive, relevant and progressive subject with coherent social and educational aims.     

How context-independent is the outgroup homogeneity effect? A response to Bartsch and Judd

Bartsch and Judd (1993) argue that outgroup homogeneity effects occur independently of any tendency for members of minority groups to see their ingroup as more homogeneous than the majority outgroup. This argument is based on evidence of an underlying outgroup homogeneity effect in a study which purports to unconfound the roles of judged group size and ingroup–outgroup judgement by presenting subjects first with a small or large ingroup (or outgroup) and then a small comparison outgroup (or ingroup). However, from the perspective of self-categorization theory (SCT), such a procedure actually introduces a confound as SCT predicts that when an ingroup is judged first it should be perceived as relatively heterogeneous due to the intragroup nature of this judgemental context. Close examination of Bartsch and Judd's data bears this point out: the tendency to see the ingroup as less homogeneous than the outgroup when the ingroup was judged first was extinguished when the ingroup was judged second even when the judged groups were of equal size. Consistent with SCT, this re-analysis suggests that manifestations of outgroup homogeneity are not independent of contextual factors which determine the relative appropriateness of category-based perception of ingroup and outgroup.