The role of necessity in cognitive development

There seem to be two kinds of nonconservers—those who think their response might change on another occasion and those who think their response would always be the same. After training in conservation, the former (called nonconservers without necessity) show no detectable gains in conservation, while the latter (called nonconservers with necessity), surprisingly, show significant gains in conservation.In the present study, nonconservers with necessity were more likely than the nonconservers without necessity to think the classic conservation arguments (e.g., identity, negation, and compensation) were good and correct reasons and that the typical nonconservation reasons were poor and wrong.In sum, the nonconservers who can support their conclusions with the deductive force of necessity, even though they are wrong in their conclusion, appear to be more developmentally advanced than other nonconservers who do not offer necessity as part of the justification for their nonconservation conclusion.     

Spatial cognition in apes and humans

The debate on whether language influences cognition is sometimes seen as a simple dichotomy: cognitive development is governed either by innate predispositions or by influences of language and culture. In two recent papers on spatial cognition, Haun and colleagues break new ground in bringing together a comparative cognition approach with a cross-linguistic framework to arrive at a third position: that humans begin with the same spatial reference frames as our near relatives, the great apes, and diverge later owing to the influence of language and culture.     

The role of socio-communicative rearing environments in the development of social and physical cognition in apes

The cultural intelligence hypothesis (CIH) claims that humans’ advanced cognition is a direct result of human culture and that children are uniquely specialized to absorb and utilize this cultural experience ( Tomasello, 2000 ). Comparative data demonstrating that 2.5‐year‐old human children outperform apes on measures of social cognition but not on measures of physical cognition support this claim ( Herrmann et al., 2007 ). However, the previous study failed to control for rearing when comparing these two species. Specifically, the human children were raised in a human culture whereas the apes were raised in standard sanctuary settings. To further explore the CIH, here we compared the performance on multiple measures of social and physical cognition in a group of standard reared apes raised in conditions typical of zoo and biomedical laboratory settings to that of apes reared in an enculturated socio‐communicatively rich environment. Overall, the enculturated apes significantly outperformed their standard reared counterparts on the cognitive tasks and this was particularly true for measures of communication. Furthermore, the performance of the enculturated apes was very similar to previously reported data from 2.5‐year‐old children. We conclude that apes who are reared in a human‐like socio‐communicatively rich environment develop superior communicative abilities compared to apes reared in standard laboratory settings, which supports some assumptions of the cultural intelligence hypothesis.     

The role of the frontal lobes in the regulation of cognitive development.

Between the ages of 1.5 and 5 years, and again between the ages of 5 and 10 years, a sequence of changes takes place in children's behavior which indicates a fundamental reorganization of their attentional, executive, and self-reflexive processes. In the present article, these changes are summarized, and evidence is adduced to support the claims (1) that these changes are frontally mediated and (2) that the underlying mechanism that generates them is similar to the one that generates the changes in EEG coherence during the same time period. The psychological model that has been hypothesized to explain the cycles of cognitive development (Case, 1992) is then compared to the physiological model that has been proposed to explain cycles of EEG development (Thatcher, 1992). It is shown that the two models are complementary, both in the underlying developmental sequence that they postulate and in the recursive dynamic they propose for producing movement through this sequence. A number of implications and predictions are derived, which follow from the proposition that the two sets of changes are different manifestations of a common underlying process.     

Environmental stimulation, parental nurturance and cognitive development in humans

The effects of environmental stimulation and parental nurturance on brain development have been studied extensively in animals. Much less is known about the relations between childhood experience and cognitive development in humans. Using a longitudinally collected data set with ecologically valid in-home measures of childhood experience and later in-laboratory behavioral measures of cognitive ability, we were able to test hypotheses concerning the effects of environmental stimulation and parental nurturance. A double dissociation was found: On the one hand, there was a selective relation between parental nurturance and memory development, consistent with the animal literature on maternal buffering of stress hormone effects on hippocampal development. On the other hand, there was a selective relation between environmental stimulation and language development. The relevance of these findings to socioeconomic gradients in cognitive ability is discussed.     

Social influences on cognitive strategies and cognitive development: The role of communication and instruction

Cognitive strategy training has been shown empirically to be extremely effective in enhancing learning and memory performance in retarded individuals. However, the theoretical status and applied utility of the strategy concept has been subjected to increasing criticism, particularly regarding the lack of definition and specificity in its use, when it is involved in instructional procedures applied to typical learning and information processing tasks. Extensions of research in language and communication provide a social basis for analyzing instruction, in terms of communication theory and pragmatics, and a possible approach to more general studies of the skills and strategies of information processing. The question arises whether rather disparate views of cognitive processing systems can be synthesized, or, by their mutual consideration, at least provide a basis for clearer articulation of research issues. A synthesis of prominent usages of the “strategic processing” construct derived from the social basis of communication theory is advanced.     

Experiences that motivate moral development: The role of cognitive dissonance

It has been found in previous research concerning Kohlberg's stages of moral development that engagement in a “real-life” moral dilemma sometimes leads to an advance in an individual's level of moral thought. It is argued in this study that such moral growth is often motivated by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance, which, it is suggested, frequently accompanies choice and commitment in moral contexts. Subjects in the present study delivered counterattitudinal messages that contained arguments that were either 1 stage higher or 1 stage lower than their characteristic level of moral reasoning. Half of the subjects freely chose to deliver these messages, and half did not. Afterwards, subjects' attitudes toward the issues discussed in their messages and their tendency to conceptualize moral issues in terms of the higher or lower levels of reasoning contained in their messages were assessed. The subjects who (a) had freely chosen to deliver the message, and (b) had delivered the message containing higher level arguments used significantly more advanced moral reasoning after their counterattitudinal advocacy than they had before it. These subjects showed greater change in their attitudes regarding the topic discussed in their message than other subject groups. These results suggest that moral behavior will be likely to promote moral growth (a) if it occurs under circumstances that promote cognitive dissonance (e.g., free choice) and (b) if advanced moral ideas are made salient during the dissonance reduction process.     

The role of orthography in speech production revisited

The language production system of literate adults comprises an orthographic system (used during written language production) and a phonological system (used during spoken language production). Recent psycholinguistic research has investigated possible influences of the orthographic system on the phonological system. This research has produced contrastive results, with some studies showing effects of orthography in the course of normal speech production while others failing to show such effects. In this article, we review the available evidence and consider possible explanations for the discrepancy. We then report two form-preparation experiments which aimed at testing for the effects of orthography in spoken word-production. Our results provide clear evidence that the orthographic properties of the words do not influence their spoken production in picture naming. We discuss this finding in relation to psycholinguistic and neuropsychological investigations of the relationship between written and spoken word-production.     

The role of falsification in the development of cognitive architectures: insights from a lakatosian analysis

It has been suggested that the enterprise of developing mechanistic theories of the human cognitive architecture is flawed because the theories produced are not directly falsifiable. Newell attempted to sidestep this criticism by arguing for a Lakatosian model of scientific progress in which cognitive architectures should be understood as theories that develop over time. However, Newell's own candidate cognitive architecture adhered only loosely to Lakatosian principles. This paper reconsiders the role of falsification and the potential utility of Lakatosian principles in the development of cognitive architectures. It is argued that a lack of direct falsifiability need not undermine the scientific development of a cognitive architecture if broadly Lakatosian principles are adopted. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the Lakatosian concepts of positive and negative heuristics for theory development and of general heuristic power offer methods for guiding the development of an architecture and for evaluating the contribution and potential of an architecture's research program.     

The cognitive failures questionnaire revisited: dimensions and correlates

The authors reexamined the factor structure of the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (D. E. Broadbent, P. F. Cooper, P. Fitzgerald, & K. R. Parkes, 1982) and its correlates. The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire was designed to assess a person's likelihood of committing an error in the completion of an everyday task. A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation yielded 4 internally consistent, interpretable factors. These factors were labeled Memory, Distractibility, Blunders, and (memory for) Names. This study lends partial support for the factor analytic solution proposed by L. K. Pollina, A. L. Greene, R. H. Tunick, and J. M. Puckett (1992). In addition, it extends previous findings by providing initial evidence for the construct validity of the factors established by correlating factor scores with measures of other related constructs (i.e., boredom proneness, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, Type A behavior pattern).     

The role of the feedforward paradigm in cognitive psychology

Feedforward control is a process adjusting behaviour in a continuative way. Feedforward takes place when an equilibrium state is disrupted and the system has to automatically retrieve the homeostatic stable state. It also occurs when a perturbation is previewed and must be eliminated in order to achieve a desired goal. According to the most general definition, a feedforward process operates by fixing the future representation of the desired state, the achieving of which stops the process. Then, feedforward works by means of the refinement determined by successive comparisons between the actual and target products. In its applications, a feedforward process is thought to be modulated by the subject’s purpose and the environmental state. Over the years, the feedforward process has assumed different connotations in several contests of cognitive psychology. An overview of the research fields in psychology that significantly progressed with the introduction of a feedforward paradigm is provided by: (a) reviewing models in which the feedforward concept plays a fundamental role in the system control; (b) examining critical experiments related to the interaction of feedforward and feedback processes; (c) evidencing practical applications for some of the presented feedforward-based architectures.     

The role of cognitive factors in the rod-and-frame effect

We compared the contribution and the effectiveness of modulating the orientation perception of two types of visual information: the visual frame and the visual polarity of objects. In experiment 1, we examined the effect of a square frame, a mouse, an elephant, and a map of France on the apparent vertical. In the upright position, despite the presence of tilted individual component features, the visual objects had no illusory visual tilt effects. When tilted, these objects had a substantial effect on the direction that appeared to be vertical. However, rod-setting errors were smaller in the inducing objects than when observed with the frame display. In the second experiment, the results of experiment 1 were replicated with a meaningful circular contour--a porthole and a clock. The presence of the external circular contour did not abolish the illusion on the apparent vertical. Moreover, in experiment 3, a clock whose numbers were displaced and not tilted--to avoid the possible tilt influence of visual cues--was also able to deflect the subjective visual vertical. This finding suggests that through top-down processing shapes can act as a framework which serves as a reference influencing the perceived orientation of the inner objects.     

The nature of cognitive development

Theories of cognitive development have led to enduring and fierce arguments that have been long on rhetoric but short on evidence. Constructivist theory has roots in Piagetian notions of cognitive development as proceeding from self-directed action during infancy. Nativist theories subsequently became popular by producing claims of cognitive precocity, but left open many central questions concerning mechanisms of development. Now, a new view of constructivism is experiencing a renaissance, having achieved greater psychophysical, computational and neural plausibility.     

The descent of cognitive development

A constructivist theory of the evolution of cognitive development is proposed. Seven propositions are posed plus supporting evidence. Constructing fundamental physical and logicomathematical conceptual universals underlies the development of cognition in primate phylogeny, ontogeny and history. Nevertheless, diverging onset and offset ages, velocity, extent, sequencing and organization mark the evolution of cognitive development in primate phylogeny. Thus, the evolution is heterochronic, not simply recapitulatory. Converging origins followed by diverging development of primates' conceptual constructions insures species‐specific cognitive specializations. Some specializations (e.g. recursive classifying) evolved in great ape development but not in monkey development; while others (e.g. hierarchically integrated classifying) evolved in human development only. Human enculturation and language (symbolic) rearing fosters quantitative but not qualitative progress in most of chimpanzees’ developing cognition. Heterochronic evolution provided humans with the widest and most synchronic ontogenetic window of opportunity for progressive cognitive development. The descendant cognitive development – humans’ precocial, integrated and extended intellectual constructions – bridges the evolution and history of ideas.     

Monkeys perform as well as apes and humans in a size discrimination task

Whether the cognitive competences of monkeys and apes are rather similar or whether the larger-brained apes outperform monkeys in cognitive experiments is a highly debated topic. Direct comparative analyses are therefore essential to examine similarities and differences among species. We here compared six primate species, including humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas (great apes), olive baboons, and long-tailed macaques (Old World monkeys) in a task on fine-grained size discrimination. Except for gorillas, subjects of all taxa (i.e. humans, apes, and monkeys) were able to discriminate three-dimensional cubes with a volume difference of only 10 % (i.e. cubes of 50 and 48 mm side length) and performed only slightly worse when the cubes were presented successively. The minimal size discriminated declined further with increasing time delay between presentations of the cubes, highlighting the difficulty to memorize exact size differences. The results suggest that differences in brain size, as a proxy for general cognitive abilities, did not account for variation in performance, but that differential socio-ecological pressures may better explain species differences. Our study highlights the fact that differences in cognitive abilities do not always map neatly onto phylogenetic relationships and that in a number of cognitive experiments monkeys do not fare significantly worse than apes, casting doubt on the assumption that larger brains per se confer an advantage in such kinds of tests.     

The cognitive reflection test revisited: exploring the ways individuals solve the test

Individuals’ propensity not to override the first answer that comes to mind is thought to be a crucial cause behind many failures in reasoning. In the present study, we aimed to explore the strategies used and the abilities employed when individuals solve the cognitive reflection test (CRT), the most widely used measure of this tendency. Alongside individual differences measures, protocol analysis was employed to unfold the steps of the reasoning process in solving the CRT. This exploration revealed that there are several ways people solve or fail the test. Importantly, 77% of the cases in which reasoners gave the correct final answer in our protocol analysis, they started their response with the correct answer or with a line of thought which led to the correct answer. We also found that 39% of the incorrect responders reflected on their first response. The findings indicate that the suppression of the first answer may not be the only crucial feature of reflectivity in the CRT and that the lack of relevant knowledge is a prominent cause of the reasoning errors. Additionally, we confirmed that the CRT is a multi-faceted construct: both numeracy and reflectivity account for performance. The results can help to better apprehend the “whys and whens” of the decision errors in heuristics and biases tasks and to further refine existing explanatory models.     

The role of emotional maltreatment and looming cognitive style in the development of social anxiety symptoms in late adolescents

Background: Social looming constitutes a specific cognitive vulnerability that acts as a danger schema and biases the processing of threat-related information associated with the development of social anxiety disorder. This model characterizes early negative experiences as critical to the formation of looming cognitive style. Furthermore, research has found links between parental emotional abuse and peer victimization and social anxiety. Design: A three-wave longitudinal design was used to analyze the role of parents’ emotional abuse and peer victimization in the onset of social anxiety symptoms through the development of this cognitive style. Methods: The final sample was made up of 307 females and 243 males (M_age?=?16.97, SD_age?=?.81). Perceived parents’ emotional abuse and peer victimization by participants were measured at Time 1, social looming was measured at Time 1 and 2, and social anxiety symptoms were measured at Times 1, 2, and 3. Results: Parents’ emotional abuse and peer victimization were related to social anxiety cross-sectionally. Longitudinally, social looming acted as a mediator in the relationship between parents’ emotional abuse and social anxiety. Conclusions: These findings highlight the need to better understand the mechanisms through which emotional abuse and peer victimization impact social looming and contribute to social anxiety.     

The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.