First impressions and last resorts: how listeners adjust to speaker variability

Perceptual theories must explain how perceivers extract meaningful information from a continuously variable physical signal. In the case of speech, the puzzle is that little reliable acoustic invariance seems to exist. We tested the hypothesis that speech-perception processes recover invariants not about the signal, but rather about the source that produced the signal. Findings from two manipulations suggest that the system learns those properties of speech that result from idiosyncratic characteristics of the speaker; the same properties are not learned when they can be attributed to incidental factors. We also found evidence for how the system determines what is characteristic: In the absence of other information about the speaker, the system relies on episodic order, representing those properties present during early experience as characteristic of the speaker. This "first-impressions" bias can be overridden, however, when variation is an incidental consequence of a temporary state (a pen in the speaker's mouth), rather than characteristic of the speaker.     

Concept empiricism: a methodological critique

Thanks to Barsalou's, Damasio's, Glenberg's, Prinz' and others' work, neo-empiricism is gaining a deserved recognition in the psychology and philosophy of concepts. I argue, however, that neo-empiricists have underestimated the difficulty of providing evidence against the amodal approach to concepts and higher cognition. I highlight three key problems: the difficulty of sorting out amodal predictions from neo-empiricist predictions, the difficulty of finding experimental tasks that are not best solved by imagery and the difficulty of generalizing findings concerning a given cognitive process in a given context to other cognitive processes or other contexts. Finally, solutions to these three problems are considered.     

Reduction and emergence: a critique of Kim

In a recent critique of the doctrine of emergentism championed by its classic advocates up to C. D. Broad, Jaegwon Kim (Philosophical Studies 63:31–47, 1999) challenges their view about its applicability to the sciences and proposes a new account of how the opposing notion of reduction should be understood. Kim is critical of the classic conception advanced by Nagel and uses his new account in his criticism of emergentism. I question his claims about the successful reduction achieved in the sciences and argue that his new account has not improved on Nagel’s and that the critique of emergentism he bases on it is question-begging in important respects.     

Acute stress disorder: a synthesis and critique

The diagnosis of acute stress disorder (ASD) was introduced to describe initial trauma reactions that predict chronic posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This review outlines and critiques the rationales underpinning the ASD diagnosis and highlights conceptual and empirical problems inherent in this diagnosis. The authors conclude that there is little justification for the ASD diagnosis in its present form. The evidence for and against the current emphasis on peritraumatic dissociation is discussed, and the range of biological and cognitive mechanisms that potentially mediate acute trauma response are reviewed. The available evidence indicates that alternative means of conceptualizing acute trauma reactions and identifying acutely traumatized people who are at risk of developing PTSD need to be considered.     

Hardiness and health: a critique and alternative approach

Recent research has suggested that individual differences in the personality variable of hardiness are related to health and illness. Despite some success at predicting health outcomes, there are several theoretical and empirical problems that must be addressed before research on this topic can proceed. Most critical are (a) how hardiness is to be measured; (b) whether hardiness should be treated as a unitary phenomenon or as three separate phenomena associated with commitment, control, and challenge; and (c) whether hardiness has direct effects on health or indirect effects by virtue of buffering the impact of stressful life events. After reviewing the literature and presenting our own study of the psychometric properties of the Hardiness Scale and its subcomponents, we draw the following conclusions: (a) Hardiness is not a unitary phenomenon, but should be treated as involving three separate phenomena; (b) of the three subcomponents of hardiness, only commitment and control have adequate psychometric properties and are systematically related to health outcomes; (c) lack of control and lack of commitment have direct effects on health because they are psychologically stressful; and (d) if there are buffering effects of commitment and control, they are in addition to these direct effects and are situation specific. Such a systematic consideration of the problems and prospects of the hardiness literature should facilitate research on this important topic.     

Salkovskis on obsessional-compulsive neurosis: a critique

Salkovskis (Behav. Res. Ther. 23, 571–583. 1985) offers of cognitive-behavioural analysis of obsessional-compulsive disorder and the treatment implications of the analysis are discussed by Salkovskis (1985) and Salkovskis and Warwick (Behav. Psychother. 13, 243–255, 1985). A number of criticisms and objections to this work are set out.     

Kohut's method of interpretation: a critique

To cope with the obscure, complexly overdetermined, and unstable nature of unconscious meanings, Freud developed a pluralistic methodology that employs a wide variety of interpretive strategies and procedures. Conversely, Kohut proposed a radically abbreviated interpretive approach based on the single, subjective method of empathy. This report reevaluates Kohut's monistic interpretive methodology: (1) The principal features of Kohut's interpretive method are reviewed and evaluated. (2) Case material and interpretations from Kohut's final book are used to compare his unidimensional approach with the pluralistic methodology of traditional interpretation. (3) The epistemologic liabilities of Kohut's interpretive method are delineated and discussed. (4) Methodologically more appropriate strategies for improving clinical interpretation are presented.