On the consistency of a three-valued logical calculus

[This résumé was published in English in Matematicheskii Sbornik along with the article.]The present paper contains an investigation of a three-valued logical calculus (the system) previously described by the author [Recueil Mathématique 4 (46), 2 (1938)].A constructive consistence proof is given for a part of this calculus rendering the results previously published concerning the Russell paradox. A method for a non-constructive completeness proof for the complete calculus is briefly indicated.     

A logical calculus with descriptions

Journal of Philosophical Logic -     

The logic of logical revision formalizing dummett's argument

Neil Tennant and Joseph Salerno have recently attempted to rigorously formalize Michael Dummett's argument for logical revision. Surprisingly, both conclude that Dummett commits elementary logical errors, and hence fails to offer an argument that is even prima facie valid. After explicating the arguments Salerno and Tennant attribute to Dummett, I show how broader attention to Dummett's writings on the theory of meaning allows one to discern, and formalize, a valid argument for logical revision. Then, after correctly providing a rigorous statement of the argument, I am able to delineate four possible anti-Dummettian responses. Following recent work by Stewart Shapiro and Crispin Wright, I conclude that progress in the anti-realist's dialectic requires greater clarity about the key modal notions used in Dummett's proof.     

A logical calculus for controlled monotonicity

In this paper we introduce a new deductive framework for analyzing processes displaying a kind of controlled monotonicity. In particular, we prove the cut-elimination theorem for a calculus involving series-parallel structures over partial orders which is built up from multi-level sequents, an interesting variant of Gentzen-style sequents. More broadly, our purpose is to provide a general, syntactical tool for grasping the combinatorics of non-monotonic processes.     

A sequent calculus for a logic of contingencies

We introduce a sequent calculus that is sound and complete with respect to propositional contingencies, i.e., formulas which are neither provable nor refutable. Like many other sequent and natural deduction proof systems, this calculus possesses cut elimination and the subformula property and has a simple proof search mechanism.     

An analytic tableau calculus for a temporalised belief logic

A tableau is a refutation-based decision procedure for a related logic, and is among the most popular proof procedures for modal logics. In this paper, we present a labelled tableau calculus for a temporalised belief logic called TML⁺, which is obtained by adding a linear-time temporal logic onto a belief logic by the temporalisation method of Finger and Gabbay. We first establish the soundness and the completeness of the labelled tableau calculus based on the soundness and completeness results of its constituent logics. We then sketch a resolution-type proof procedure that complements the tableau calculus and also propose a model checking algorithm for TML⁺ based on the recent results for model checking procedures for temporalised logics. TML⁺ is suitable for formalising trust and agent beliefs and reasoning about their evolution for agent-based systems. Based on the logic TML⁺, the proposed labelled tableau calculus could be used for analysis, design and verification of agent-based systems operating in dynamic environments.     

Cognitive maps as orienting schemata

A "point-to-unseen-targets" task was used to test two theories about the nature of cognitive mapping. The hypothesis that a cognitive map is like a "picture in the head" predicts that (a) the cognitive map should have a preferred orientation and (b) all coded locations should be equally available. These predictions were confirmed in Experiments 1 and 3 when targets were cities in the northeastern United States and learning was from a map. The theory that a cognitive map is an orienting schema predicts that the cognitive map should have no preferred orientation and that targets in front of the body should be localized faster than targets behind the body. These predictions were confirmed in Experiments 1 and 2 when targets were local landmarks that had been learned via direct experience. In Experiment 3, when cities in the Northeast were targets and geographical knowledge had been acquired, in part, by traveling in the Northeast, the observed latency profiles were not as predicted by either theory of cognitive mapping. The results suggest that orienting schemata direct orientation with respect to local environments, but that orientation with respect to large geographical regions is supported by a different type of cognitive structure.     

The logic of algebraic rules as a generalization of equational logic

In this paper we start an investigation of a logic called the logic of algebraic rules. The relation of derivability of this logic is defined on universal closures of special disjunctions of equations extending the relation of derivability of the usual equational logic. The paper contains some simple theorems and examples given in justification for the introduction of our logic. A number of open questions is posed.     

Quantum logic as a dynamic logic

We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some of his statements), our answer is a clear “no”. Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth’s proposal of applying Tarski’s semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories, with an empirical–experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operational- realistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of “the logic of yes–no experiments” (or “questions”). Technically, we use the recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results (Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the “non-classicality” of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic.     

On a three-valued logical calculus and its application to the analysis of the paradoxes of the classical extended functional calculus

A three-valued propositional logic is presented, within which the three values are read as ‘true’, ‘false’ and ‘nonsense’. A three-valued extended functional calculus, unrestricted by the theory of types, is then developed. Within the latter system, Bochvar analyzes the Russell paradox and the Grelling-Weyl paradox, formally demonstrating the meaninglessness of both.