Surprises: low probabilities or high contrasts?

Outcome expectations can be expressed prospectively in terms of probability estimates, and retrospectively in terms of surprise. Surprise ratings and probability estimates differ, however, in some important ways. Surprises are generally created by low-probability outcomes, yet, as shown by several experiments, not all low-probability outcomes are equally surprising. To account for surprise, we propose a contrast hypothesis according to which the level of surprise associated with an outcome is mainly determined by the extent to which it contrasts with the default, expected alternative. Three ways by which contrasts can be established are explored: contrasts due to relative probabilities, where the obtained outcome is less likely than a default alternative; contrasts formed by novelty and change, where a contrast exists between the obtained outcome and the individual's previous experience; and contrasts due to the perceptual or conceptual distance between the expected and the obtained. In all these cases, greater contrast was accompanied by higher ratings of surprise.     

Cognitive task transformations

The difficulty facing an agent performing a familiar task is one of satisfactory performance rather than one of figuring out how the task is to be performed. In this paper I describe and exemplify a number of principal ways in which the physical form of tools and working environments can reduce the cognitive burden of performing routine tasks. Starting from the commonly held assumption that tools transform the structure of the tasks in which they figure, I explore some basic ways in which tools can reshape tasks to circumvent excessive demands on attention, working memory and motor control, and the need to perform the kinds of cognitive operations at which we lack proficiency. The principal task transformations that are identified include: removing superfluous actions; delegating problematic parts of a task to other people or artefacts; substituting less demanding parts of a task for parts that are cognitively difficult; rearranging a task to avoid conflict between actions; and increasing the tolerance of a task environment to sub-optimal task performance. For each transformation an account is given of the change to the task from the perspective of an agent and how this improves the cognitive congeniality of the task. For each transformation I also give an example drawn from the everyday experience of the reader of a particular tool that may be said to bring about or facilitate the transformation in question, and explain in what way the tool is able to achieve the transformation whilst still ensuring that task demands are met.     

Texture discrimination and the analysis of proximity.

A major theory of early visual processing has recently been proposed by Marr, which considers a number of aspects of visual perception in great detail, including grouping and texture discrimination. New phenomena associated with texture discrimination are described and experiments reported which allow a preliminary comparison of Marr's theory, as it applies to texture discrimination, with more established theories such as that due to Julesz. One experiment produced results which are clearly consistent with Marr's account, but the ability of his theory to deal with additional data on region suppression is not established. The theory of the analysis of proximity relations proposed by Fox offers a broadly satisfactory account of many texture perception results, while relying on the more fundamental parts of Marr's theory of primitive visual processes to deal with the remainder. A further attraction of proximity analysis is that it may shed new light on the classical paradox of symmetry perception. Some ways in which the preliminary proximity analysis model is incomplete are discussed, and it is concluded that development of the model may be profitable for theories of early visual processing.     

JUSTICE AS INHERENT RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS

The critical comments by my fellow symposiasts on my book, Justice: Rights and Wrongs , have provided me with the opportunity to clarify parts of my argument and to correct some misunderstandings; they have also helped me see more clearly than I did before the import of some parts of my argument. In his comments, Paul Weithman points out features of the right order conception of justice that I had not noticed. They have also prodded me to clarify in what way rights are trumps; and both his comments and Bernstein's have prodded me to clarify certain aspects of the theistic account of human rights that I offered. Attridge's comments lead me to see that I was perhaps over-zealous in emphasizing the objective aspects of the semantic range of dikaiosunê as used in the New Testament and downplaying the subjective aspects. And O'Donovan's comments have provided me with the opportunity to make clear that my account of rights is not an immunities account that presupposes nominalism, and to emphasize the ways in which it is not an asocial individualistic account.     

Can linguistics contribute to the study of verbal behavior?

A number of publications during the last decade reveal a growing interest in linguistics and psycholinguistics among some radical behaviorists, who have proposed a direct rapprochement between a formal analysis of language and a functional account. It is argued that whereas function has to do with the circumstances under which verbal behavior is emitted, structure has to do with its "internal organization," the ways in which sentences or parts thereof are presumably interrelated. These are said to be different dimensions of verbal behavior; together they should lead toward a coherent psychology of language. But psychologists bent on incorporating techniques from linguistics should be aware of its underlying assumptions, lest their work be deflected in essentially unproductive directions. The line between rapprochement and subservience is thin indeed, as the extant literature shows. This paper traces the development of mainstream contemporary psycholinguistics and examines the linguist's assumptions about the subject matter in the light of a behavioral analysis. The possibility of an effective reconciliation seems to be a long way off.     

ON TWO ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION: A RESPONSE TO DAVID GRIFFIN

Abstract. In responding to David Griffin's critique of my book, Issues in Science and Religion , I suggest that most of the points which he initially presents as differences between us concerning reduction and emergence are resolved in the second half of his article. I spoke of the emergence of higher-level "properties" and "activities," rather than "entities," but my analysis of whole and parts is similar to his, although it was perhaps not always clearly articulated. We agree also that Alfred North Whitehead's God is involved in every event in ways which avoid the problems of the supernatu-ralist "God of the gaps," but we differ as to whether God's action might be taken into account in a new "post-modern" science.     

Unformulated experience,dissociation, and Nachträglichkeit

The paper is divided into two parts. The first part is an interpersonal/relational psychoanalytic account of some relationships between dissociation, time, and unformulated experience. Trauma, and the dissociation to which trauma leads, freezes time, which makes it impossible to formulate certain kinds of new experience. Instead, potential new meanings remain unformulated. The route of clinical access to frozen time is the interpersonal field: to thaw time and allow new experience, the ways in which the interpersonal field is itself frozen need to be addressed. A clinical illustration of these ideas is offered. The second part of the paper presents and explores a point of confluence between the views in Part 1 and certain aspects of French psychoanalysis, with particular reference to the concept of Nachträglichkeit in the work of Jean Laplanche and Haydée Faimberg.     

Reference in Conceptual Realism

A conceptual theory of the referential and predicable concepts used in basic speech and mental acts is described in which singular and general, complex and simple, and pronominal and nonpronominal, referential concepts are given a uniform account. The theory includes an intensional realism in which the intensional contents of predicable and referential concepts are represented through nominalized forms of the predicate and quantifier phrases that stand for those concepts. A central part of the theory distinguishes between active and deactivated referential concepts, where the latter are represented by nominalized quantifier phrases that occur as parts of complex predicates. Peter Geach's arguments against theories of general reference in Reference and Generality are used as a foil to test the adequacy of the theory. Geach's arguments are shown to either beg the question of general as opposed to singular reference or to be inapplicable because of the distinction between active and deactivated referential concepts.     

Two senses of narrative unification

In this paper I seek to clarify the role of narrative in personal unity. Examining the narrative self-constitution view developed by Marya Schechtman, I use a case of radical personal change to identify a tension in the account. The tension arises because a narrative can be regarded either to capture a continuing agent with a loosely coherent, consistent self-conception – or to unify over change and inconsistency. Two possible ways of responding, by distinguishing senses of identity or distinguishing identity and autonomy, are examined, but I argue that neither precisely maps this tension. I then develop a distinction between two ways in which narrative can unify: through “bottom-up” processes related to the connection between agency and self-conception; and “top-down” processes related to self-interpretative activity. The account provides ways to resolve some criticisms of narrative theories of identity, in particular in better accounting for the role of repudiated characteristics in narrative identity.     

Normative Objectivity Without Ontological Commitments?

Several non-naturalist philosophers look for ways to maintain the objectivity of morals without making any (robust) ontological commitments. Recently Derek Parfit proposed an account of non-ontologically existing irreducible moral properties. My first aim in this paper is to outline that such an account is doomed to fail. My second aim in this paper is to argue that irreducible moral properties can be integrated with adaptions into an ontological framework such as E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology. If it can be shown that irreducible moral properties have a proper place in such an ontology, then there is no need to distinguish between an ontological and non-ontological mode of existence, which, in turn helps to eschew the obscurities that this distinction brings in its wake.     

Noise,Economy, and the Emergence of Information Structure in a Laboratory Language

The acceptability of sentences in natural language is constrained not only grammaticality, but also by the relationship between what is being conveyed and such factors as context and the beliefs of interlocutors. In many languages the critical element in a sentence (its focus) must be given grammatical prominence. There are different accounts of the nature of focus marking. Some researchers treat it as the grammatical realization of a potentially arbitrary feature of universal grammar and do not provide an explicit account of its origins; others have argued, however, that focus marking is a (grammaticalized) functional solution to the problem of efficiently transmitting information via a noisy channel. By adding redundancy to highlight critical elements in particular, focus protects key parts of the message from noise. If this information‐theoretic account is true, then we should expect focus‐like behavior to emerge even in non‐linguistic communication systems given sufficient noise and pressures for efficiency. We tested this in an experiment in which participants played a simple communication game in which they had to click cells on a grid to communicate one of two line figures drawn across the grid. We manipulated the noise, available time, and required effort, and measured patterns of redundancy. Because the lines in many cases overlapped, meaning that only some parts of each line could be used to distinguish it from the other, we were able to compare the extent to which effort was expended on adding redundancy to critical (non‐overlapping) and non‐critical (overlapping) parts of the message. The results supported the information‐theoretic account of focus and shed light on the emergence of information structure in language.     

My body and other objects: The internal limits of self‐ownership

Common practices such as donating blood or selling hair assume rights of disposal over oneself that are similar to, if not indistinguishable from, property rights. However, a simple view of self‐ownership fails to capture relevant moral differences between parts of a person and other objects. In light of this, we require some account of the continuity in the form of ownership rights a person has over herself and other objects, which also acknowledges the normative differences between constitutive parts of a person, on the one hand, and external objects, on the other. This paper provides such an account by arguing that there are reasons internal to a general justification of property rights to limit the extent of powers included in ownership of different kinds of object, depending on how the person is situated in relation to them. Rejecting a typical Hohfeldian view of property as a univocal, gradable concept allows us to make space for a new approach to property and self‐ownership: one which can make sense of various uses of the body as property without entailing that our relation to those parts is exhaustively characterised by an ordinary property right.     

Interactions between area and numerosity

Summary The concept of filled area, i.e. the impressionistic ensemble of parts of a stimulus field occupied by dots, is used to account for various kinds of numerosity illusions due to perceptual interaction between a number of dots and their spatial arrangement. A measure of filled area is derived from a model for the perceptual clustering of dots on the basis of relative proximity. It is shown that the quantified concept of filled area successfully predicts illusion data from earlier studies. Subsequently, a two-alternatives forced-choice numerosity experiment is reported, the data of which gave further evidence of the predictive power of the filled-area hypothesis. Our approach is discussed with respect to spatial features of dot stimuli that might be in rivalry with the filled-area factor in numerosity-estimation tasks.     

Global and local precedence: selective attention in form and motion perception

This study explores the perception of stimuli at two levels: local parts and the wholes that comprise these parts. Previous research has produced contradictory results. Some studies (e.g., Pomerantz & Sager, 1975) show local precedence, in which the local parts are more difficult to ignore in selective attention tasks. Other studies (e.g., Navon, 1977) have shown the opposite effect, global precedence. The present five experiments trace the causes of this discrepancy by exploring the effects of the relative discriminabilities of the local and global levels of the stimuli and the differences between two different measures of selective attention, namely, Stroop-type interference (attributable to incongruity on the irrelevant dimension) and Garner-type interference (attributable to variability on the irrelevant dimension). The experiments also examine whether the precedence effects previously examined in form perception generalize to motion perception. The results show that (a) some cases of global precedence are due solely to the greater perceptual discriminability of the global level and thus demonstrate only that more discriminable stimuli are harder to ignore; (b) instances of both local and global precedence can be demonstrated for certain types of stimuli, even when the discriminabilities of their local and global levels have been equated; and (c) the Stroop and Garner measures of selective attention are not equivalent but instead measure different types of interference. In addition, a distinction is made between two fundamentally different types of part-whole relationships that exist in visual configurations, one based only on the positions of the parts (Type P) and one based also on the nature of the parts (Type N). Previous research has focused on Type P, which appears to be irrelevant to the broader questions of Gestalt and top-down effects in perception. It is concluded that bona fide cases of both local and global precedence have been amply documented but that no general theory can account for why or when these effects will appear until we better understand both the nature of part-whole relationships and the perceptual processes that are tapped by different measures of selective attention.     

On the consistency of intramodal intensity matching in olfaction

Magnitude matchings of odor intensity were obtained for three chemical compounds (hydrogen sulfide, pyridine, and dimethyl disulfide) in four experiments. An equal-sensation function in the form of a power function described the data well. This equation can be written neglecting the multiplicative constant, Ф_i = Ф_k ^b _ik, where i and k represent two different odorants. The exponent b_ik, where the first index stands for matching continuum and the second index for reference continuum, was fairly well predicted according to the formulae, (ie, 264, 2) where i, j, and k are three different odorants. The results validate the equal-sensation function and indicate implicitly that intensity matchings between different intramodal continua are approximately transitive and symmetric with respect to odor.     

Feeling and thinking: An affect‐as‐cognitive‐feedback account

Despite the abundance of evidence demonstrating a dedicated link between positive and negative affect and specific ways of thinking, not all findings are consistent with this view. New research suggests that the relationship between affect and thinking can be altered and often reversed, by varying the mental context in which affect is experienced. The affect‐as‐cognitive‐feedback account can explain a wide range of phenomena, including both prior findings and this more recent research, and generate new predictions. According to this account, affective reactions confer value on accessible information processing strategies (e.g., global vs. local processing) and other mental content that happens to be accessible at the time. This view underscores that the relationship between affect and cognition is not fixed but instead is highly malleable. We present evidence that supports this account, along with new findings that suggest a malleable influence of specific affective states on cognition.     

The Consolations of Boethius

The paper considers the account of happiness given in Boethius＇s Consolations of Philosophy. This account claims that happiness requires security of possession, and argues from this requirement to the conclusion that worldly goods, which of their nature cannot be securely possessed, cannot provide happiness. This argument is shown to depend on assuming a life-driven account of human motivation, rather than a goods-driven account of human motivation. The life-driven account, according to which voluntary actions are ultimately motivated by the pursuit of a certain kind of life, is defended against the goods-driven account, according to which actions are motivated by the pursuit of goods the enjoyment of which can only be episodes in a human life. It is claimed that Boethius is right in holding a life-driven account, and that his account of happiness follows from it.     

Inhomogeneous surrounds, conflicting frameworks, and the double-anchoring theory of lightness

The empirical question of whether or not the lightness of a region is accounted for purely by the average luminance of its surround has a complex answer that depends on whether such a region is an increment, a decrement, or intermediate relative to the luminances of the contiguous surfaces. It is shown here that a new model of lightness, based on anchoring principles, predicts and clarifies such intricacies. In this model, the luminance of the target region determines its lightness in two ways: indirectly, by causing it to group with parts of its surround and thus defining the nested frameworks to which it belongs; and directly, by anchoring it to the highest luminance and to the average surround luminance in each of these frameworks. Inter- and intraindividual differences in lightness assessment are shown to emerge under grouping conditions that create unstable, conflicting frameworks.     

TOWARD AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE A PRIORI TRUTHS

Abstract: This article explains and motivates an account of one way in which we might have substantive a priori knowledge in one important class of domains: domains in which the central concepts are response-dependent. The central example will be our knowledge of the connection between something's being harmful and the fact that it is irrational for us to fail to be averse to that thing. The idea is that although the relevant responses (basic aversion in the case of harm, and a kind of interpretive failure in the case of irrationality) are produced by independent psychological mechanisms, they have distal causes that turn out to be related in ways that—once language enters the picture—yield epistemically accessible necessary connections between the referents of their corresponding terms.     

Mellor and Dennett on the Perception of Temporal Order

I discuss theories about the way in which we determine the precedence ofperceived events. I examine Mellor's account, which claims that it is thetiming of our perceptions of events that enables us to determine their order,and Dennett's criticism of this. Dennett cites psychological experimentswhich suggest that it is the content of our perceptions, rather than theirtiming, which allows us to determine the order of the events perceived. Iargue that by distinguishing between two different ways of construing'perception' we can see not only that the two accounts are compatible, but that Dennett's account presupposes Mellor's.