Bi-Heyting algebras,toposes and modalities

The aim of this paper is to introduce a new approach to the modal operators of necessity and possibility. This approach is based on the existence of two negations in certain lattices that we call bi-Heyting algebras. Modal operators are obtained by iterating certain combinations of these negations and going to the limit. Examples of these operators are given by means of graphs.     

Creativity and Psychopathology: Categories,Dimensions, and Dynamics

The scientific method may be of limited value when investigating topics such as religion, spirituality, or aesthetic matters. A novel, hybrid approach is described that uses a supported philosophical-deductive methodology. This involves seeking scientific evidence to corroborate or refute the "alternative" premise in each of a series of deductive arguments. To test this, the notion that musical appreciation is an innate gift was pitted first against the alternative that it is a learned phenomenon and, second, that music has survival value and could therefore be explained purely in terms of evolution theory. So far, research to date failed to fully confirm either of the alternative propositions, thus leaving open the possibility that the ability to appreciate music is an innate gift for our aesthetic pleasure. The proposed approach could encourage investigations that otherwise might falter at an early stage, due to the constraints of conventional scientific methodology.     

Categories and Dimensions

ABSTRACT— The distinction between categories and dimensions has important consequences for basic and applied science in many areas of psychological research. Decisions as to whether individuals should be assigned to groups or located along one or more continua often are based on personal preferences or discipline-specific measurement traditions, which can lead to the creation, use, or reification of spurious categories or dimensions. Methods for evaluating the latent structure of psychological constructs, using powerful and informative tests between competing models, are available. Rather than choosing on a priori grounds, investigators can perform structural research to evaluate the strength and consistency with which results tease apart categorical and dimensional models. Here, we review why researchers should make this distinction empirically, briefly discuss methods available for doing so, and describe the breadth of areas ripe for exploiting the largely untapped potential of structural research.     

Compositionality, Context, Categories and the Indeterminacy of Translation

The doctrine that meanings are entitieswith a determinate and independent reality is often believed tohave been undermined by Quine's thought experiment of radicaltranslation, which results in an argument for the indeterminacy oftranslation. This paper argues to the contrary. Starting fromQuine's assumption that the meanings of observation sentences arestimulus meanings, i.e., set-theoretical constructions of neuronalstates uniquely determined by inter-subjectively observable facts,the paper shows that this meaning assignment, up to isomorphism,is uniquely extendable to all expressions that occur inobservation sentences. To do so, a theorem recently proven byHodges is used. To derive the conclusion, one only has to assumethat languages are compositional, abide by a generalized contextprinciple and by what I call the category principle. Theseassumptions originating in Frege and Husserl are coherent withQuine's overall position. It is concluded that Quine'snaturalistic approach does not justify scepticism with regard tomeaning, but should rather result in a view that affiliatessemantics with neuroscience.     

Categories, prototypes and memory systems in Alzheimer's disease

Recent studies indicate that category learning is mediated by multiple neuronal systems. It has been shown that patients with marked impairments in executive functions, explicit memory and procedural learning can categorize the exemplars and prototype of a previously trained category. Simple, self-organizing neuronal networks can explain prototype learning and related dysfunctions in Alzheimer's disease, and provide a model of how prototype learning is mediated by circumscribed mechanisms in the visual cortex.     

Gender and Other Categories

In my discussion of Bordo's paper I leave aside the particulars of her detailed critique of Grimshaw and the issue of the “maleness” of philosophy and focus instead on some questions raised by her analysis of heterogeneity and generality. I find this analysis very persuasive, particularly her counterarguments to the “theoretics of heterogeneity.” However, 1 am less persuaded by her concluding points and suggestions for future directions.     

Categories and Levels of Reality

The discussion of the relation of levels of reality to categories is important because categories have often been interpreted as constituting levels of reality. This article explores whether this view is correct, and argues it is not. Categories as such should not be understood to constitute levels of reality, although particular categories may. The article begins with a discussion of levels of reality and then turns to specific questions about categories and how they are related to these levels.     

Aesthetic Terms,Metaphor, and Categories: a Reply to De Clercq

In his paper, “Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor and the Nature of Aesthetic Properties”, Rafael De Clercq claims to (i) offer a category-based explanation of the metaphorical uninterpretability of aesthetic terms, and (ii) establish that the concept of an aesthetic property is fully analyzable in non-aesthetic terms. Both would be interesting and noteworthy achievements if accomplished. However, I argue in this discussion piece that he fails to achieve either goal.     

Categories of Competition

In the first part of this paper, I argue that philosophers of sport have mistakenly privileged a specific psychology and purpose in their definitions of competition. The result of this mistake has been that philosophers of sport make generalisations about competition as such which in fact only hold for some competitions. In the second and third parts of the paper, I articulate an alternative approach: rather than search for a single psychology and purpose that underlies all competition, I argue that we should begin by acknowledging four distinctly different competitive formats, and only then enquire as to which psychologies and purposes are more or less appropriate to each format. This method allows us to capture the richness and diversity of competition, and helps to ensure that we do not confuse part and whole when defining it.     

Categories We Live By: Reply to Alcoff,Butler, and Roth

The author of Categories We Live By replies to critics Linda Martín Alcoff, Judith Butler, and Abraham Sesshu Roth.     

Categories,subcategories, and the attenuation of proactive inhibition in free recall

In two experiments, “proactive inhibition” was observed in the free recall of a succession of 15-word lists. Recall performancc declined across lists when all lists were drawn from the same taxonomic category (e.g., occupations). But this decline did not appear when the successive lists were drawn from discrete subcategories (such as “professional” and “skilled manual” occupations). The findings clarify the conditions in which proactive inhibition effects in free recall are likely to occur. Specifically, when the set of items on any one list is more homogeneous than the set of items from all lists taken together, “proactive inhibition” will be attenuated.     

Efficient sets,decision heuristics,and single-peaked preferences

The origins of single-peaked preferences in multiattribute choice behavior are analyzed. The starting point is (a), (b), 16, 261–266) theory which explains single-peakedness as the joint effect of task and behavior characteristics. Whereas the task conditions—so-called efficient sets—are retained, and their importance is even more stressed, it is argued that Coombs and Avrunin's behavioral assumptions—classical marginally decreasing preference functions—may not be representative of actually displayed choice behavior. Rather, the information processing approach to decision research has shown that multiattribute choices are often based on simplifying heuristic rules which, due to their possible intransitivity, are inconsistent with Coombs and Avrunin's behavioral requirements. Tversky's (Psychological Review, 1969, 76, 31–48) additive difference model is used as an algebraic framework for analyzing such so-called attribute-based choice rules. Sufficient (and in the continuous case also necessary) conditions are presented which guarantee that the additive difference model will also be single-peaked on efficient sets. These conditions show that the behavioral principles yielding single-peaked preferences are far more general than Coombs and Avrunin assumed and include most of the empirically substantiated forms of attribute-based choice rules. Further, a necessary and sufficient condition is derived which insures that elimination rules, like the conjunctive rule, for instance, and generalizations thereof are single-peaked. Finally, making use of a result by Edgeworth, (Mathematical Psychics, London, Paul, 1881), it is shown that efficient sets per se may originate in quite different ways. It is concluded that the phenomenon of single-peakedness is mainly a function of the task rather than of some specific behavior.