TO SEE OR NOT TO SEE:

Abstract— When looking at a scene, observers feel that they see its entire structure in great detail and can immediately notice any changes in it. However, when brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced Identification of changes becomes extremely difficult, even when changes are large and made repeatedly. Identification is much faster when a verbal cue is provided showing that poor visibility is not the cause of this difficulty. Identification is also faster for objects considered to be important in the scene. These results support the idea that observers never form a complete, detailed representation of their surroundings. In addition, the results indicate that attention is required to perceive change, and the basis of high-level interest.     

CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: BACK TO THE FUTURE

In its many interwoven traditions, continental philosophy has a distinctive focus on what escapes the concept—experience, change, agency, responsibility, the future, the Other. The challenges that face us in the future are many: reaffirming and renewing what has already been thought and needs repeating, responding to emergent questions. None could be more urgent than the question of the animal and the fate of the planet. Addressing each of these requires that we suspend our normal conceptual assurances and think anew.     

RESPONSE TO WILLIAMS: SELFISHNESS IS NOT ENOUGH

Abstract. I agree with George Williams's most significant point: both questions and answers about our moral natures lie in our biological origins. He fails, however, to show that nature is morally evil and that therefore we should vigilantly resist it. The products of evolution are morally neutral, but the human moral sense is arguably a positive good. Morality is functional. It does not require ultimate justification in the sense of correspondence with or attack upon reality "out there." It is an adaptation "intended" to make us social, and sociality—with its sense of right and wrong—makes us fitter than otherwise     

PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE SURPRISE-EXAMINATION PARADOX*

In this paper I consider the surprise examination paradox from a practical perspective, paying special attention to the communicative role of the teacher's promise to the students. This perspective, which places the promise within a practice, rather than viewing it in the abstract, imposes constraints on adequate solutions to the paradox. In the light of these constraints. I examine various solutions which have been offered, and suggest two of my own.     

THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE TO THESCIENCE-RELIGION DIALOGUE

Abstract. Zygon and the Center for Advanced Study in Religionand Science have exhibited two foci: the theoretical, concernedwith questions of cosmology and human nature, and the practical, concerned with issues of morality and ritual. These foci overlap, but in recent years interest in the practical has increased. This hasimplications for science-religion dialogue: rather than simply dis-cussing theoretically points of identity, similarity, and differencebetween science and religion, focus on the practical leads to exa-mining how each functions in its own way to inform moral life.Increased interest in the practical is commendable, but theoreticalconcerns should not be excluded.     

HOW TO PREDICT FUTURE DURATION FROM PRESENT AGE

The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but we defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration.     

THE PSYCHOANALYST OF THE FUTURE: WISE ENOUGH TO DARE TO BE MAD AT TIMES3

What sort of patients do we have in psychoanalysis now, at the beginning of the third millennium, and what sort will we have in the future? In the author's clinical experience, the patients who are currently seeking help from the psychoanalyst use primitive defence mechanisms alongside neurotic ones. Most of them do not explicitly request psychoanalytic treatment, but this does not mean that they would not want it if they knew what it was. She argues that is the psychoanalyst's task to identify the latent request behind the ‘non‐request’. To conduct a psychoanalysis with such patients, the psychoanalyst has to identify and interpret both primitive and neurotic psychic mechanisms; moreover, he has to use not only language that speaks to patients but also language that ‘touches’ them, because these patients are difficult to reach through verbal symbolism. This implies that the psychoanalyst must be attentive to the bodily manifestations and bodily phantasies accompanying his countertransference feelings. The author shows through clinical examples what she means by ‘language that can touch patients’. The psychoanalyst gradually builds up this language while, at the same time, daring to discover in himself his own mad aspects and giving himself enough psychical freedom to accept them.     

BEYOND RELATIVISM AND FOUNDATIONALISM: A PROLEGOMENON TO FUTURE RESEARCH IN ETHICS

Abstract. This article examines the similarities between notions about the nature of reality held by some Christian mystics (Thomas Merton and the author of The Cloud of Unknowing) and those proposed by physicists David Bohm and Henry Margenau. My aim is to consider how the implications of certain metaphysical interpretations of modern physics may: (1) hold similarities with Christian mystical notions about reality, and (2) be important for guiding future research in ethics. I further look into the traditional approaches to ethical theory that come out of the foundationalist, relativist, and skeptical realist camps and argue that while skeptical realists such as Timothy Jackson are moving in the right direction, further consideration of what is meant by reality is necessary if we are to traverse the gap between foundationalists and relativists. It is here that Christian ethicists in particular have the opportunity to pick up the metaphysical batons carried by physicists like Margenau and Bohm and mystics like Merton and the author of The Cloud and begin investigating the possibility that ethical theory can be approached from a nondualistic perspective.