Assumption,Union and Sanctification: Some Clarifying Distinctions

In this article I engage with the notion that Christ ought to be understood to have a fallen human nature because Christ sanctifies human nature, and it is fallen humanity that needs sanctifying. In opposition to this line of thought, I argue that the Son of God assumed an unfallen nature, but with the powers of fallenness operative within it, and that this notion is consistent with a distinct account of sanctification. In support of these claims, I develop distinctions between a conjoining union and a transferring union, and between the Chalcedonian union at the incarnation and the extension of that union on the cross. At the assumption a conjoining union occurred, not a transferring union. Christ sanctified his own nature, prior to a transferring union.     

On the Vicarious Humanity of Christ

In the recent literature there has been a spate of essays, articles and books discussing the question of whether Christ had a ‘fallen’ human nature. This article offers a new argument for the conclusion that Christ had a fallen but not sinful human nature that was ‘healed’ of its fallenness at the moment of assumption by the Word – what we shall call, the vicarious humanity of Christ view. This account concedes to the defender of Christ's ‘fallen’ humanity that his human nature is generated in a fallen state (and immediately cleansed of fallenness in the act of assumption). And it concedes to the defender of Christ's sinlessness the claim that Christ is without sin from the first moment of incarnation. This represents an important via media in the contemporary debate about this vexed christological topic.     

Fallen or Unfallen? Christ's Human Nature and the Ontology of Human Sinfulness

Abstract: Because Christ's sinlessness is a matter of virtual consensus among Christians, debates over whether the human nature he assumed was fallen or unfallen turn on the ontological conditions of his being ‘without sin’ (Heb. 4:15). The claim that Christ assumed a fallen nature can be defended by distinguishing between fallenness and sinfulness as properties of nature and hypostasis, respectively. Moreover, by highlighting the peculiar place of the will in human nature, this christological analysis helps counter the charge that an Augustinian understanding of original sin entails a dualism inconsistent with belief in the goodness of creation and human moral accountability.     

The End of the Incarnation: John Owen,Trinitarian Agency and Christology

Recent interpreters of John Owen incorrectly argue that Owen's trinitarian theology undermines the doctrine of inseparable operations (Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa). On the contrary, this article argues Owen upheld this doctrine like his Reformed Orthodox contemporaries, using the incarnation as a test case. Owen maintained the incarnation was an undivided act of the Trinity, which had its appropriative terminus on the Son alone – a pattern of thought he extended to the Spirit's work on the Son's humanity. Owen's creative use of the tradition is an example for contemporary theologians who would emphasize the Spirit's role in Christology.     

Nature and Grace: Two Participations in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards

Christian theologians are increasingly interested in both ontological and soteriological forms of participation theology. Paul Gavrilyuk challenges scholars to be more precise in how these relate to each other. This article contributes to the need for further precision by engaging with the thought of Jonathan Edwards. Edwards employed both types of participation, but did not embed one within the other. Ontological participation, dubbed ‘common participation’, undergirds created nature and is a methexis in God for being. Soteriological participation, dubbed ‘special participation’, explains special grace and is a relational koinonia in the love between the Father and the Son. These two participations are complementary and facilitate a clear distinction between nature and grace.     

Deep Incarnation and Kenosis: In,With, Under,and As: A Response to Ted Peters

In this response to Ted Peters, I relate the proposal of deep incarnation to Luther's theology of the real presence of the humanity of Christ in creation. Based on a typology of four distinctive models of kenosis, I furthermore argue that a kenotic view of incarnation and divine creativity does not necessarily imply a divine absence and withdrawal from creation, as presupposed by Professor Peters. Deep incarnation is consistent with a compatibilist view of kenosis, but not with ideas of divine abdication, or metamorphosis. Finally I situate the view of deep incarnation to Scandinavian creation theology and to research programs at the Centre for Naturalism and Christian Semantics, Copenhagen University.     

The Devil's Envy: On Christ as Angelic Justifier and Demonic Stumbling Block

At least since Augustine, Christian theology, especially but not only in the Latin West, has been dominated by an account of angelic origins in which the Incarnation was a response to humanity’s fall, itself occasioned by the prior angelic fall, whose cause in turn was the proud desire to be like God. (We’ll call this the ‘pride-account’). Nonetheless, that Augustinian view has been balanced from the beginning by an ‘envy-account’, which stresses instead Wisdom’s claim, ‘Through the Devil’s envy, death entered the world’ (Wisd. 2:24). The earliest extra-biblical versions of the envy-account – developed in the Latin, Syriac, and Arabic ‘Life of Adam and Eve’ traditions – take the object of Satan’s envy to have been Adam in particular. In the thirteenth century, however, Robert Grosseteste, as part of his extended defense of the idea that the Son would have been incarnate even without sin, argued instead that the Devil and his angels fell in rejecting the to-be-incarnate Christ, whose merits serve to ‘justify’ not only unfallen humanity, but even the holy angels. On this view, which arguably has biblical roots in Hebrews 1 and Revelation 12, and which reached its apogee in Milton’s Paradise Lost, ‘the Devil’s envy’ was directed at the God-man in particular.     

Did Christ have a Fallen Human Nature?

Abstract: Recently, it has become common to claim that the human nature assumed by the Son was ‘fallen’, although sinless. This seems a difficult thing to say with a traditional understanding of original sin. This article explores this difficulty, proposes a possible solution, and then shows that the solution proposed also faces logical difficulties. The article thus argues that it is not possible to make logical sense of the notion that Christ's humanity was fallen.     

“天人”如何“合一”?——用思想史的逻辑推演

<正>"天人合一"是当今汉语中最常用的短语之一,十分流行、时尚;它被看作是关于中华文明、中国思想的关键词,表达了中国独有的思想和智慧。①然而,"天人合一"的意思究竟是什么?颇为流行的解释,是把"天人合一"的"天"解释为"大自然"或"世界万物","天人合一"就是人与大自然合一;与此相对,则把西方思想和观念概括为"天人对立"或"主客二分",中西思     

“Make no provision for the flesh”: recognizing the incarnation in and after Augustine

This article argues for the importance of the intelligibility of the sexed body to incarnational theology. Building on Mark Jordan's reading of Augustine, I focus on the paradox of the incarnation as both the bodily sign (signa) of God and God Godself as the thing that the sign signifies (res). Through an analysis of the debates around Leo Steinberg's work on the meaning of Christ's genitals in Renaissance art, I explore the ways in which depicting the incarnation is a paradoxical exercise of depicting God's fully human body. I argue that attention to the paradox of the incarnation as both sign and thing can disrupt ideologies of sexual difference that force bodies to be intelligible as unambiguously sexed, while the question of sexual difference can work within incarnational theology to disturb the equivalence of full humanity and unambiguous maleness.     

Beyond Stewardship? Dietrich Bonhoeffer on Nature

This article questions whether the model of stewardship is helpful in considering Christian responsibility towards non‐human nature and proposes a different way of treating the issue of care of the environment. In an extended engagement with the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the article argues that human relations to non‐human nature are best understood by seeing humanity as historical, political and natural. In theological formulation, humanity must be understood asimago dei, imago civitatis andimago mundi. Therefore the place of humanity cannot properly be understood without reference to both God and nature. Humanity, nature and God thereby constitute a ‘common realm’. A new test of Christian responsibility towards non‐human nature is introduced: of primary interest is how historical, political and natural humanity acts in ways which either reveal or obscure the ‘common realm of God, nature and humanity’. At this point, theological self‐understanding moves beyond the model of stewardship.     

The Son's Assumption of a Human Nature: A Call for Clarity

This article seeks to bring some clarity to the controversial question of whether the Son of God assumed a fallen or unfallen human nature. We briefly survey conflicting historical assessments and continuing perplexity related to this question. Next we argue that much contemporary confusion can only be removed by first noting how John Calvin and Reformation catechisms tended to understand the idea of Jesus' sinlessness. In conclusion, from the vast literature on the subject we outline seven points which may serve contemporary reflection on this question by showing where the two views agree, disagree, or show internal divisions.     

God's Triunity and Self-Determination: A Conversation with Karl Barth, Bruce McCormack and Paul Molnar

Abstract: A recent disagreement between Bruce McCormack and Paul Molnar highlights some of the issues involved in discussing the relationship between God's triunity and determination to be God‐with‐us. Can we say that God's determination to be with us is the basis of God's triunity? Must we identify the Son's being as eternally toward‐incarnation? How does God's freedom relate to God's eternal decision to be God‐with‐humanity? In this article I argue (contra McCormack) that God's triunity logically precedes God's determination to be with us, but (contra Molnar) that this logical precedence entails neither that the pre‐incarnate Son is utterly unknown to us nor that God retains some freedom to be God‐without‐humanity.     

Eschatology and Theology of Hope: The Impact of Gaudium et Spes on the Thought of Edward Schillebeeckx

Before the Second Vatican Council, Edward Schillebeeckx O.P. (1914–2009) had begun to reassess and the role and nature of eschatology as a discipline within Catholic theology. He began to formulate an early theology of hope in the 1950s which he would later develop quite extensively. His reflections during the Council on the famous draft of Gaudium et Spes, and on the finished document reveal the urgency of rethinking the essential relationship between ‘church’ and ‘world’. This article examines the impact of Gaudium et Spes on Schillebeeckx's work in two aspects. First, the way that it helped to orient his eschatological thought towards an emphasis on the ‘future’. The distance between the ‘already’ and the ‘not yet’, coupled with the essential place of creation as the site of God's salvific activity in history, began to push Schillebeeckx towards an eschatological and primarily future‐oriented understanding of Christian praxis and preaching. Second, this article will examine the anthropology that Schillebeeckx reads from Gaudium et Spes and the way in which a ‘new image’ of humanity, in light of a future‐oriented eschatology, contributed to his attempts to rethink the tension between ‘church’ and ‘world’.     

God Takes our Place: A Religious-Philosophical Approach to the Concept of Stellvertretung

What does it mean to say, theologically, that God takes our (human beings') place (Stelle)? In himself becoming human (the incarnation), does God enter into joys and needs, into the possibilities and the limitations of the human, in such a way as to take them all to himself? Or does he, specifically, take the blame of all people? Or only that of those who believe? Or is it something else again that is meant? What does it mean to say that ‘God stands up for us’ is the event of salvation– a claim which the church has in mind with its central dogma of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ? How is human Stellvertreten, occurring in different forms, connected with the divine Stellvertreten? What does the word ‘Stelle’ (of humans) mean at all?     

A critique of Confucius’ philosophy

Throughout the millennia since the composition of the Analects, orthodox scholars have maintained that Confucius faithfully passed down the thought of early eras, particularly those of Yao and Shun: ‘I transmit but do not create ideas.’ This paper shows that Confucius actually subverted the essence of orthodox thought represented mainly by Yao and Shun. His subversion of orthodox thought compels perforce the idea of ‘ren (humanity),’ which concerns itself with the human world, to stand out with the near exclusion of otherworldliness in his teaching. As a result of the misunderstanding of Confucius’ heritage, scholars in the past tended to equate Confucius’ idea of ‘ren’ with specific moral attributes. Again taking exception to the interpretations of bygone eras, this essay demonstrates that humanity in Confucius’ theory signifies a dynamic process rather than a specific attribute or a static rule, changing constantly with different people, different places, and different times.     

The German Rabelais? Foul words and the Word in Luther

Abstract

Luther is infamous for his use of scatological language, but Luther scholars (with the notable exception of Heiko Oberman) have not attempted to relate his use of scatology to his theology. This contrasts strongly with Rabelais scholarship, in which the theological significance of the Frenchman's scatology is widely acknowledged. Suggested is a number of ways in which the ‘problem’ of Luther's scatological coarseness could be explained on non-theological grounds (by attributing it to the exaggerations of Roman Catholic polemic, or to the angry ravings of Luther's painfully afflicted and disillusioned dotage, or to an anally-fixated psychology, or to the coarseness of the age in which he lived), but the conclusion is that none is completely successful. After a brief comparison with relevant work on Rabelais that provides a theoretical context, a review of the state of the question in Luther scholarship shows that the nature and function of Luther's scatological language in polemical contexts has been convincingly elucidated by Mark Edwards and Heiko Oberman. However, the author suggests that an investigation of Luther's unexpected use of such language in pastoral contexts (in letters of spiritual counsel and in several Table Talk fragments) demonstrates more directly how his scatology relates to the key themes in his theology. Here Luther recommends scatological outbursts as an efficacious remedy against diabolically inspired attacks of melancholy (depression). These outbursts are shown to be based on his doctrine of creation, his doctrine of incarnation, and his doctrine of justification by faith alone. A concluding comparison reveals that, while the scatology of Rabelais the humanist emphasized the importance of perceiving a harmonious balance between one's higher and lower natures, Luther's emphasized the tension inherent in this life of being simul iustus et peccator.     

Jonathan Edwards, God, and “particular minds”

Although philosophical theologians have sometimes claimed that human beings are necessarily dependent on God, few have developed the idea with any precision. Jonathan Edwards is a notable exception, providing a detailed and often novel account of humanity’s essential ontological, moral, and soteriological dependence on God.     

Introduction

Abstract

The introduction to the special issue situates the five following essays in the context of historical and contemporary theological reflection on maternality. It addresses the fraught connection between sexuality and maternality in the Christian theological imagination and argues that the maternal body has often functioned as a bridge between the opposed arenas of Word and flesh, God and humanity, and eternity and time. The introduction concludes by using the figure of the Virgin Mary as a lens to consider the theological themes of birth, grief, the incarnation, sacrifice, and Eucharist. Mary’s body, site of the incarnation, allows connection, mediation, contiguity, and congress to occur. As such, it also functions as a bridge between theology and sexuality.