共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 125 毫秒
1.
Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
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Patricia SheridanEmail: |
2.
Emotional expressions of moral value 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Julie Tannenbaum 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):43-57
In “Moral Luck” Bernard Williams describes a lorry driver who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child, and feels “agent-regret.”
I believe that the driver’s feeling is moral since the thought associated with this feeling is a negative moral evaluation
of his action. I demonstrate that his action is not morally inadequate with respect his moral obligations. However, I show
that his negative evaluation is nevertheless justified since he acted in way that does not live up to his moral values. I
then use this distinctive negative moral evaluation to distinguish agent-regret from guilt and mere regret.
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Julie TannenbaumEmail: |
3.
Adam Kadlac 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(1):35-52
This paper explores Descartes’s work with an eye towards abiding issues in moral epistemology. In so doing, I focus on the
role played by the so-called provisional morality that surfaces in “Discourse on the Method”. What I argue is that despite
the tenuousness with which it seems to be held, Descartes remained committed to the truth of this morality even in the midst
of his most strenuous philosophical reflections. Put in the contemporary epistemological terms which provide the context of
my discussion, I argue that Descartes believed in the goodness of his provisional morality as opposed to merely accepting
its maxims.
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Adam KadlacEmail: |
4.
Scott Hill 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):277-283
Toomas Karmo claims that his taxonomy of ethical sentences has the result that there does not exist a sound argument with
all non-ethical premises and an ethical conclusion. In a recent paper, Mark T. Nelson argues against this claim. Nelson presents
a sound argument that he takes to be such that (i) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s single premise as non-ethical
and (ii) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s conclusion as ethical. I attempt to show that Nelson is mistaken about
(ii). For any possible world at which the premise of Nelson’s argument is true, Karmo’s taxonomy classifies the conclusion
of Nelson’s argument as non-ethical.
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Scott HillEmail: |
5.
Anders Schinkel 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):267-277
Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed
cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only
difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue
that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts,
and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings
from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality
of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.
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Anders SchinkelEmail: |
6.
Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):567-574
In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired
debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued
that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different
answers.
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Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
7.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
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Jeff WisdomEmail: |
8.
The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments.
Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons.
We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of
moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative
mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions.
We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
相似文献
Jeanette KennettEmail: |
9.
Joel Thomas Tierno 《Sophia》2008,47(2):223-230
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning
the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately
explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques,
is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free
will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.
相似文献
Joel Thomas TiernoEmail: |
10.
Rauprich O 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(1):43-71
The notion of common morality plays a prominent role in some of the most influential theories of biomedical ethics. Here,
I focus on Beauchamp and Childress’s models in the fourth and fifth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics as well as on a revision that Beauchamp proposed in a recent article. Although there are significant differences in these
works that require separate analysis, all include a role for common morality as starting point and normative framework for
theory construction in combination with a coherence theory of moral justification. I defend to some extent the existence and
empirical significance of common morality, as delineated by Beauchamp and Childress in different versions, but criticize its
normative role. It is neither convincing as a moral foundation nor well compatible with a standard coherentist justification.
I suggest that the authors should give up the foundational account for a more modest account of common morality as resource
of well-established moral insights and experiences, which have proved generally valid but neither sufficient nor infallible.
Beauchamp’s latest proposal appears as a step in this direction; indeed, it may be the beginning of the end of his common-morality
theory.
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Oliver RauprichEmail: |
11.
Mark E. Jonas 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(2):153-169
In this paper, I argue that Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of self-overcoming has been largely misinterpreted in the philosophy
of education journals. The misinterpretation partially stems from a misconstruction of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and leads
to a conception of self-overcoming that is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s educational ideals. To show this, I examine some
of the prominent features of the so-called “debate” of the 1980s surrounding Nietzsche’s conception of self-overcoming. I
then offer an alternative conception that is more consistent with Nietzsche’s thought, and provides a more nuanced understanding
of Nietzsche’s “anti-democratic” pedagogy. Ultimately, I argue that while Nietzsche’s educational philosophy is not egalitarian,
it can be effectively utilized in “democratic” classrooms, assuming his concept of self-overcoming is properly construed.
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Mark E. JonasEmail: |
12.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):1-19
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents
any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could
have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct
Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing
counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.
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Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
13.
Pamela Hieronymi 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):19-30
In his In Praise of Blame, George Sher aims to provide an analysis and defense of blame. In fact, he aims to provide an analysis that will itself yield
a defense by allowing him to argue that morality and blame “stand or fall together.” He thus opposes anyone who recommends
jettisoning blame while preserving (the rest of) morality. In this comment, I examine Sher’s defense of blame. Though I am
much in sympathy with Sher’s strategy of defending blame by providing an analysis that shows its connection to our commitment
to morality, I question his execution of this strategy. Sher hopes to defend our blaming practices by showing our dispositions
to them to be a merely contingent consequence of a belief–desire pair that is itself justified by whatever justifies our commitment
to morality. I doubt our blaming practices can be defended in this way. In explaining my doubts, I provide a short comparison
of Sher’s approach with that of P. F. Strawson in “Freedom of Resentment.” I suggest that we might do better by exploring
the connection between our commitment to morality and our blaming practices themselves.
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Pamela HieronymiEmail: |
14.
The Argument from Moral Experience 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Don Loeb 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):469-484
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality,
has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according
to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according
to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in
this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically
claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact,
we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I
take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B)
epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I
argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
相似文献
Don LoebEmail: |
15.
Chad Kleist 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):257-266
An inverse akratic act is one who believes X, all things considered, is the correct act, and yet performs ~X, where ~X is
the correct act. A famous example of such a person is Huck Finn. He believes that he is wrong in helping Jim, and yet continues
to do so. In this paper I investigate Huck’s nature to see why he performs such acts contrary to his beliefs. In doing so,
I explore the nature of empathy and show how powerful Huck’s empathic feelings are. Drawing from Martin L. Hoffman, I show
the relationship between empathy and a principle of justice. This relationship leads to Huck acting virtuously, as Rosalind
Hursthouse maintains.
相似文献
Chad KleistEmail: |
16.
Imtiaz Moosa 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):159-182
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical
claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing
how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent
conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not.
My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
相似文献
Imtiaz MoosaEmail: |
17.
Hardt JJ 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(3):151-160
This article critically evaluates the conception of conscience underlying the debate about the proper place and role of conscience
in the clinical encounter. It suggests that recovering a conception of conscience rooted in the Catholic moral tradition could
offer resources for moving the debate past an unproductive assertion of conflicting rights, namely, physicians’ rights to
conscience versus patients’ rights to socially and legally sanctioned medical interventions. It proposes that conscience is
a necessary component of the moral life in general and a necessary resource for maintaining a coherent sense of moral agency.
It demonstrates that an earlier and intellectually richer conception of conscience, in contrast with common contemporary formulations,
makes the judgments of conscience accountable to reason, open to critique, and protected from becoming a bastion for bigotry,
idiosyncrasy, and personal bias.
相似文献
John J. HardtEmail: |
18.
Edmund Wall 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):237-249
19.
David Phillips 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):457-468
I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
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David PhillipsEmail: |
20.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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Phillip MontagueEmail: |