Opponent processes in human emotions? An experimental investigation of hedonic contrast and affective interactions

Three hypotheses of opponent process theory (e.g., Solomon, 1980) were examined: (1) Following the removal of emotionally charged stimuli, an emotional response opposite in hedonic tone to the initial affective response will occur; (2) this response occurs as a reaction to the initial affective response (and is not the result of perceptual processes or reinterpretations of the situation); and (3) when opponent affective processes cooccur, they tend to cancel each other's effects.Individuals were led to associate happiness and sadness with stimuli through hypnotic inductions; other stimuli were conditioned to the emotional responses that followed the offset of these stimuli. On both physiological and self-report measures, affective afterreactions were observed following the termination of a stimulus eliciting happiness in a context where this result could not be attributed to individuals' perceptions of the likelihood of future pleasant events or to changes in the individuals' adaptation levels. In agreement with previous findings, no afterreaction following the termination of a stimulus eliciting sadness was observed. Evidence that affective processes interact was also obtained. When opponent affective processes cooccur, they appear to interact and cancel. When two nonopponent affective processes are elicited simultaneously, they appear to add or average. This result supports the assumption, common to many theories of emotion, that affective processes interact to determine individuals' observed emotional states.It is my pleasure to thank Patricia Barchas, Gordon Bower, Nelson Donegan, Mary Rothbart, Roger Shepard, and Philip Zimbardo for their advice and encouragement, and to express a special thanks to Phoebe Ellsworth for her invaluable assistance.     

Effects of perceptual and conceptual similarity in semantic priming

Summary The study investigates the different contributions to semantic priming of two components of the semantic representation underlying a word. The two components are perceptually based information and conceptually based information. Perceptual information is based on physical attributes such as shape or color, while conceptual information consists of more abstract elements such as functional attributes. The question asked in this study was whether both components would produce an effect in semantic priming. Pairs of words either related because of a conceptual property (banana-apple), a perceptual property (ball-apple), or both because of a perceptual and conceptual property (cherry-apple) were presented as prime and target in a lexical decision and a word-naming task. The results showed independent contributions of perceptual and conceptual attributes to semantic priming.This research was supported by a grant from the Dutch Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO). All three authors are senior authors and have contributed to all parts of the project.     

Crosstalk between on-line and off-line processing of visual features

Three dual-task experiments were conducted to investigate the relation between immediate, on-line judgments about visual features and delayed, off-line judgments. One hypothesis (selective interference) predicted that dual-task performance would be challenged specifically within a visual dimension, as both tasks compete for the same resources. Another hypothesis (cost of switching) made the opposite prediction. In Experiment 1, participants performed either color or shape discriminations in the on-line and off-line visual tasks, with systematic variation of feature similarity between the on-line and off-line features. In Experiment 2, participants performed either color or shape discriminations in the off-line task and color discriminations in the on-line task, with no overlap between the on-line and off-line features. In Experiment 3, participants performed color discriminations in both the on-line and off-line tasks, with partially overlapping stimulus sets. Altogether, the data from the three experiments provided evidence in favor of the hypothesis of cost of switching. Stimulus–stimulus compatibility effects between features in the off-line task and those in the on-line task further underscored the perceptual nature of the crosstalk.     

A “halo”-model for multidimensional ratio scaling

A model for direct multidimensional ratio scaling is presented, based on the concepts common and difference of the halos of two percepts. Measures of halos and their differences are proportional to lengths of corresponding percept vectors and their distance in subjective space. Ekman type scaling judgements are assumed to reflect the ratio measure of the common/measure of the standard's halo. The model is supposed to yield results that are in line with the results of distance models of multidimensional ratio scaling since negative scalar products of percept vectors are admitted.     

Discrimination and matching within and between hues measured by reaction times: some implications for categorical perception and levels of information processing

Summary Same-different reaction times (RTs) were obtained for pairs of color samples ranging perceptually from blue to green. In Experiment 1, observers responded with same if both stimuli in a pair were from the same hue category (i.e., blue-blue or green-green) or different if the two stimuli were from different hue categories (i.e., blue-green or green-blue). RT for same responses was faster for pairs of physically identical stimuli (A-A) than for pairs of physically different stimuli (A-a) belonging to the same hue. RT for different responses was faster for larger physical differences across a boundary between hues (A-B 6 step) than for smaller physical differences (A-B 2 step). Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings: In one phase observers matched pairs of stimuli as same or different by categorical similarity as in Experiment 1, and in a second phase observers matched the same stimulus pairs, this time by physical similarity. Matching by categorical similarity replicated the pattern of results found in Experiment 1. Matching by physical similarity showed that RTs for different responses were equivalently fast independent of the physical difference between A-B pairs, but were faster for A-B than for A-a comparisons. Further, matching identity was faster under categorical match instructions than under physical match instructions. Results of the two experiments support a model of parallel processing of physical and categorical stimulus information in color perception. Further, these reaction-time data and their implications in color perception (for hues) parallel reaction-time data and their implications in speech perception (for phonemes).     

Many stimuli are frightening,but some are more frightening than others: The contributions of preparedness,dangerousness, and unpredictability to making a stimulus fearful

The nonrandom distribution of situational fears has been explained by evolutionary survival relevance of specific fears. Thirty-eight stimuli were taken from the literature on preparedness and were scored on fearfulness, objective dangerousness, and spatiotemporal unpredictability by three separate groups of students. The same items were scored on survival relevance by 15 biologists. Fearfulness of cues significantly correlated not only with survival relevance but also, and even more strongly, with dangerousness and unpredictability. While the fear/survival relevance association virtually disappeared when the unpredictability contribution was partialed out, the fear/unpredictability correlation was only marginally affected when controlling for survival relevance. This suggests that nonrandomness of feared stimuli may result from the spatiotemporal unpredictability that is attributed to these stimuli. The current practice of using snakes and spiders as phobia-relevant, and flowers and mushrooms as neutral, cues was not justified by the ratings of the 15 independent experts.This study was supported in part by a grant from the Dutch Organization for Fundamental Research (ZWO/Psychon, 560-268-001).     

Aspects of language pragmatics and the social perception of lying

Two experiments were conducted in order to examine the influence of linguistic and extralinguistic variables on the attribution of lying. In the first experiment, one of two tape recordings of a target person, who responded either true or false to a list of adjectives, was evaluated by 83 subjects. The subjects' task was to attempt to discover when the target person was not telling the truth. The stimulus tapes were constructed such that the time between the adjective and the target person's response was systematically varied and the adjectives varied on the likability of a person possessing that trait. Overall, it was found that if the target person responded either too quickly or too slowly the subjects attributed his response as a lie more often than if the delay was more intermediate in duration (p<0.01). The adjective likability value in combination with the true or false response of the target person also contributed to the attribution of lying (p<0.01). In the second experiment, the adjectives were rescaled on another dimension thought to influence the attribution of lying: the degree to which the adjective is true of the general population. The results suggest that this new scale is related to the degree to which lie attributions are made.This research was supported in part by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development under Research Grant 1 P01 HD-01762-01 and the National Institute of Mental Health under Research Grant MN 08260.     

Micro-economic models of problem choice in basic science

This paper describes the way in which a certain representation of basic scientific knowledge can be coupled with traditional microeconomic analysis to provide an analysis of rational research planning or agenda setting in basic science. Research planning is conceived as a resource allocation decision in which resources are being allocated to activities directed towards the solution of basic scientific problems. A structuralist representation of scientific knowledge is employed to provide a relatively precise characterization of a basic scientific problem.The research reported here was partially supported by a grant from the EXXON Foundation.     

Linear programming techniques for multidimensional analysis of preferences

This paper offers a new methodology for analyzing individual differences in preference judgments with regard to a set of stimuli prespecified in a multidimensional attribute space. The individual is modelled as possessing an ideal point denoting his most preferred stimulus location in this space and a set of weights which reveal the relative saliences of the attributes. He prefers those stimuli which are closer to his ideal point (in terms of a weighted Euclidean distance measure). A linear programming model is proposed for external analysisi.e., estimation of the coordinates of his ideal point and the weights (involved in the Euclidean distance measure) by analyzing his paired comparison preference judgments on a set of stimuli, prespecified by their coordinate locations in the multidimensional space. A measure of poorness of fit is developed and the linear programming model minimizes this measure overall possible solutions. The approach is fully nonmetric, extremely flexible, and uses paired comparison judgments directly. The weights can either be constrained nonnegative or left unconstrained. Generalizations of the model to consider ordinal or interval preference data and to allow an orthogonal transformation of the attribute space are discussed. The methodology is extended to perform internal analysis,i.e., to determine the stimuli locations in addition to weights and ideal points by analyzing the preference judgments of all subjects simultaneously. Computational results show that the methodology for external analysis is unbiased—i.e., on an average it recovers the true ideal point and weights. These studies also indicate that the technique performs satisfactorily even when about 20 percent of the paired comparison judgments are incorrectly specified.The authors wish to express their deep appreciation to J. Douglas Carroll and Joseph B. Kruskal for their most valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Time errors are perceptual

Summary Methods for the measurement of time-errors (TEs) in the comparison of successive stimulus magnitudes are discussed. Combining a Thurstonian scaling method with the assumption of a fixed subjective width of the equal category, independent of stimulus level, a ratio scale for subjective differences within pairs of successive stimuli is derived. In a tone duration comparison experiment, with the TE defined in the terms of these subjective duration differences, data from four experimental groups were compared, the groups using different modes of judging and responding. Only minor effects of this factor were found, and hence it is concluded that the TE is a true perceptual phenomenon rather than an effect of response bias, criterion bias, or mediating verbal responses to the absolute level of stimulation. The quantitative results are interpreted in terms of a general model for the comparison of successive stimuli, employing the concepts of adaptation and differential weighting of sensation magnitudes.This investigation was supported by grants to the author from the University of Stockholm and from the Swedish Office of Administrative Rationalization and Economy (for computer time), and by grants to Mats Björkman and Hannes Eisler from the Swedish Council for Social Science Research, whose free consultation service at the Department of Statistics, University of Stockholm, also benefited the author.     

Distance and fusion in Robinson Jeffers' “the purse-seine” and other poems

Distance and fusion are fundamental ideas in Bowenian thinking, especially as expressed in the dynamic of distancing and pursuing. In this paper I have used these ideas as a means to briefly examine a short selection of Robinson Jeffers' poetry, which provides us with a literary example of these concepts in action.My thanks to M. K. Lane and the anonymous reviewers of an earlier draft of this article for their many suggestions, especially to the reviewer who helped me better distinguish between distance and fusion, and intimacy and autonomy.     

Parental interpersonal perceptual style,child adjustment,and parent—Child interactions

This research examined relationships between parental interpersonal perceptual style (IPS)—the extent to which they are biased in their perceptions of children's behaviors—and (a) the adjustment of their own children and (b) parent-child interactions. In two studies, groups of parents first viewed a videotape of a male or female target child interacting with an adult in a playroom and then completed a behavior checklist about the target child that measured their IPS. In Study 1, parents' (especially fathers') IPS was found to be related to interaction between them and their 5-to7-year-old child; for example, the less negatively biased the father was, the more likely the child was to openly display antagonistic behavior toward his or her parents. In Study 2, fathers' (but not mothers') IPS was found to be related to the teacher- and peer-assessed level of psychosocial adjustment of their own third-grade child; fathers of problem children tended to be more negatively biased in their perceptions than were fathers of either adequate or highly adjusted children. Findings are discussed in terms of their implications for understanding the role that person perception processes play in family functioning and child development.This article is an adaptation of a paper presented as part of a symposium held during the 1977 meeting of the American Psychological Association. This research was supported by National Institute of Mental Health Grant No. 24250, Adult Perceptions and Child Behavior Dysfunctions.We wish to thank Linda Oiacomo and Phyllis Watts for their help. We also wish to thank the numerous students who provided invaluable assistance by collecting, coding, and scoring the data. The cooperation of the administration and staff of the Lansing, Michigan, School District, especially Eva Evans and Richard Benjamin, and the administration and staff of the East Lansing, Michigan, School District, especially Robert Docking and Warren Starr, is also very gratefully acknowledged.     

Attitudes,leprechauns and neutrinos: The ontology of behavioral science

Conclusion Although the historical dispute between introspective psychology and ontological behaviorism encourages the belief that attitudes do not exist, this belief is misguided. Even the Hacking test, suggested by someone with grave doubts about behavioral science, supports the claim that attitudes are just as real as neutrinos. Nevertheless, the progress of a science of attitudes may be severely limited by the influence of exogenous factors, factors including normative beliefs about how we should treat the people to whom attitudes are attributed. In so far as these beliefs prevent scientists from experimenting on people and their institutions, particle physics has resources unavailable to survey research. Thus a serious examination of behavioral science leads to some surprising conclusions as to which sciences are the hard ones and which ones are simply easier.Thanks are due to a number of people, particularly to Ted Jelen for invaluable advice and encouragement and editorial assistance and to Paul Teller, Dorothy Grover and my colleagues in the Indiana Philosophical Association for helpful and insightful comments. Research for this paper was supported by Faculty Development of DePauw University and the Humanities Division of Illinois Benedictine College.     

Objectively reliable subjective probabilities

Subjective Bayesians typically find the following objection difficult to answer: some joint probability measures lead to intuitively irrational inductive behavior, even in the long run. Yet well-motivated ways to restrict the set of reasonable prior joint measures have not been forthcoming. In this paper I propose a way to restrict the set of prior joint probability measures in particular inductive settings. My proposal is the following: where there exists some successful inductive method for getting to the truth in some situation, we ought to employ a (joint) probability measure that is inductively successful in that situation, if such a measure exists. In order to do show that the restriction is possible to meet in a broad class of cases, I prove a Bayesian Completeness Theorem, which says that for any solvable inductive problem of a certain broad type, there exist probability measures that a Bayesian could use to solve the problem. I then briefly compare the merits of my proposal with two other well-known proposals for constraining the class of admissible subjective probability measures, the leave the door ajar condition and the maximize entropy condition.The author owes special thanks to Kevin Kelly, for a number of helpful ideas for the proof of the Bayesian Completeness Theorem, as well as other aspects of the paper. Thanks also to Clark Glymour for some helpful suggestions for improvement of an earlier draft. Part of the work leading to this paper was funded by a Summer Research Grant from the University Research Institute of the University of Texas at Austin.     

The liar: What paradox?

Most philosophers believe that the Liar Paradox is semantical in character, and arises from difficulties in the predicate true. The author argues that the paradox is pragmatic, not semantic, and arises from violations of essential conditions that define statement-making speech acts. The author shows that his solution to the paradox will not only handle the classical Liar sentences that are necessarily or intrinsically paradoxical, but also sets of Kripke-sentences that are contingently paradoxical.     

The retrieval of scaled English consonants

Two scales of the perceptual differences among English consonants had been constructed earlier, one from pairs of aural syllables and one from pairs of viewed one-syllable English words. In both instances the pairs of stimuli differed only in the initial consonants. In the present work 276 pairs of syllables were assembled in sets of six. A set was viewed sequentially for 1.5 sec/slide. Then 25 subjects who worked in groups of 4–6 attempted to write one randomly chosen omitted member of each pair on an answer form; another 25 subjects were asked to supply the opposite syllables of each pair. This task was termed primary memory. Fifty additional subjects repeated the tasks but spent 10 sec counting backward by 3s before trying to recall and write the missing syllables, thus setting up a task of secondary memory. Response forms were scored for right, wrong, and omitted responses. All responses were then compared with each of the scales referred to above, and the mean value for each group of 50 subjects (25 who used the anser form in theab order+ 25 who used theba order) was computed. The difference between the scores for the two tasks was statistically significant, as was the difference between the scores yielded by the two scales. The visual scale appeared to fit the data better than the aural scale. The procedures employed and the assumptions that were made yielded results that would not justify an opinion that an error in recall is typically almost right. However, the data did reflect partial forgetting.     

The relationship between perceived surface-lightness and perceived illumination

Summary An attempt was made to specify the relationship between perceived surface lightness and perceived illumination under the stimulus conditions where different combinations of albedo and illuminance gave 10 approximately equal-luminance levels of a test field (TF) on three different (black-, gray- and white-appearing) backgrounds. Two types of category judgments for TF-lightness and overall illumination were made on the total of 94 TFs by 5 Ss. The results indicated that under the condition where achromatic surface colors appear, the perceptual scission which produces two different perceptual dimensions (lightness and perceived illumination) from one sort of stimulation (luminance) was clearly observed. The relation between the two judgments was consistent with the lightness-illumination invariance hypothesis: As lightness judgments (A) changed from darker to lighter, illumination judgments (I) shifted form brighter to dimmer, the sum of A and I being kept nearly invariant for a given luminance of the TF; the psychological relationship between lightness and illumination, A+I, changed as a linear function of the photometric combination of albedo and illuminance, log A+log I. It was also found that the albedo of the background was an important factor determining the extent of perceptual scission between lightness and illumination.     

“Anchor-range” results with “same” and “different” responses and similar and dissimilar stimuli

Summary Blocks of pairs of dissimilar (anchor-like) circles were unexpectedly followed by single pairs of similar circles and vice versa. The dissimilar circles were 3 and 10 mm in diameter, and the similar circles were 3 and 5 mm, 5 and 7 mm, and 7 and 10 mm in diameter. In a second experiment, the dissimilar and similar circles did not overlap in size (e.g., they were 1.5 and 5 mm and 7 and 10 mm, respectively). The same responses to the unexpected same pairs of similar circles were faster than the same responses to the identical pairs in the blocks. In contrast, the different responses to the unexpected different pairs of similar circles were slower than the different responses to the identical pairs in the blocks. Similar stimuli accelerate same responses and slow down different responses. So the time results (and the error results as well) suggest that the context of the block dissimilar circles increased the perceived similarity of the unexpected similar circles. These anchor-range results are not explained by Thurstonian theories, which are based on the absolute properties of stimuli. Instead, they imply that the relation between the similar circles in the context of the relation between the dissimilar circles affected performance.     

Attention and distractibility during reading in hyperactive boys

Nonhyperactive and clinically defined hyperactive boys were administered reading tasks under quiet and distracting conditions. Hyperactive boys were less attentive to task relevant stimuli and more attentive to task irrelevant stimuli than their controls. Our results demonstrate that the previous findings of inattentiveness among hyperactive boys on laboratory tasks can be generalized to more typical school activities such as reading.     

“Paramount reality” in Schutz and Gurwitsch

Conclusion Both Schutz and Gurwitsch describe reality as having a manifold character: Schutz speaks of multiple realities and Gurwitsch of orders of existence. Both hold that one realm of reality has a privileged status compared to the others: common everyday experience. However, in spite of this apparent convergence in their views, a closer reading of their various works reveal the important difference in what they understand under common everyday experience.For Schutz, it is the world of social action, characterized by him as paramount reality because of the constitutive processes of the experiences of time, space, sociality and meaning involved in action. For Gurwitsch, the realm of common everyday experience represents the counterpart and the origin of the constructed realm of science: therein lies its status of paramount reality. But what it really refers to is not ordinary experience, as most of his statements suggest, but pre-predicative experience, wherefrom the categories of the natural sciences, namely space and time, originate. Gurwitsch speaks of this pre-predicative experience, which he also calls primordial experience, as being essentially perceptual experience. However, he limits perceptual experience to sensory perception, leaving out the symbolic, social and action-related components of perception and becomes thus inconsistent with his adherence to the dismissal of the constancy hypothesis in his field theory of consciousness. The dismissal of the constancy hypothesis implies the recognition of the appresentational structures involving symbols, action and Others as inherent components of every perception. Schutz disagrees with Gurwitsch's reduction of the life-world Erlebnisse to sensory perception and this issue becomes the core of their debate on the phenomenon of paramount reality.