Eyeheight-scaled information about affordances: a study of sitting and stair climbing

Previous work has shown that both the perceived and actual critical (maximum) heights of surfaces that afford "sitting on " and "climbing on" can be expressed as constant proportions of each actor's leg length. The current study provides evidence that these judgments of critical action boundaries are based on an existing source of size and distance information that is already scaled with reference to the actor's eyeheight. In Experiment 1 changes in judgments of "perceived eyeheight" (an index of the intrinsic scalar) as a function of viewing distance were shown to be highly correlated with changes in the maximum height that was perceived to afford sitting on or climbing on. In Experiments 2 and 3 observers wore 10-cm blocks and made judgments about whether the heights of various surfaces afforded sitting or climbing. The use of eyeheight-scaled information as the basis for their estimates predicted the obtained pattern of errors in these judgments. With a modicum of experience wearing the blocks, however, observers were able to retune accurately their critical action boundary to a degree that would not have been predicted from their consistent overestimation of the height of the block on which they were standing. These results have implications for understanding how observers obtain information about their specific action boundary.     

Visual guidance of walking through apertures: body-scaled information for affordances

A necessary condition for visually guided action is that an organism perceive what actions are afforded by a given environmental situation. Warren (1984) proposed that an affordance such as the climbability of a stairway is determined by the fit between properties of the environment and the organism and can be characterized by optimal points, where action is most comfortable or efficient, and critical points, where a phase transition to a new action occurs. Perceiving an affordance, then, implies perceiving the relation between the environment and the observer's own action system. The present study is an extension of this analysis to the visual guidance of walking through apertures. We videotaped large and small subjects walking through apertures of different widths to determine empirically the critical aperture-to-shoulder-width ratio (A/S) marking the transition from frontal walking to body rotation. These results were compared with perceptual judgments of "passability" under static and moving viewing conditions. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that such judgments are based on intrinsic or body-scaled information specifying aperture width as a ratio of the observer's eyeheight. We conclude (a) that the critical point in free walking occurs at A/S = 1.30, (b) that static monocular information is sufficient for judging passability, and (c) that the perception of passability under such conditions is based on body-scaled eyeheight information.     

Carrying the height of the world on your ankles: encumbering observers reduces estimates of how high an actor can jump

The authors investigated how changes in action capabilities affect estimation of affordances for another actor. Observers estimated maximum jumping-reach height for themselves and another actor. Half of the observers wore ankle weights that reduced their jumping ability. The ankle weights reduced estimates of maximum jumping-reach height that observers made for themselves and for the other actor, but only after observers had the opportunity to walk while wearing the weights. Changes in estimates closely matched changes in actual jumping-reach ability. Results confirm and extend recent investigations that indicate that perception of the spatial layout of surfaces in the environment is scaled to an observer's capacity to act, and they link that approach to another embodied cognition perspective that posits a link between one's own action capabilities and perception of the actions of other agents.     

Carrying the height of the world on your ankles: Encumbering observers reduces estimates of how high an actor can jump

The authors investigated how changes in action capabilities affect estimation of affordances for another actor. Observers estimated maximum jumping-reach height for themselves and another actor. Half of the observers wore ankle weights that reduced their jumping ability. The ankle weights reduced estimates of maximum jumping-reach height that observers made for themselves and for the other actor, but only after observers had the opportunity to walk while wearing the weights. Changes in estimates closely matched changes in actual jumping-reach ability. Results confirm and extend recent investigations that indicate that perception of the spatial layout of surfaces in the environment is scaled to an observer's capacity to act, and they link that approach to another embodied cognition perspective that posits a link between one's own action capabilities and perception of the actions of other agents.     

The influence of athletic experience and kinematic information on skill-relevant affordance perception

Humans can perceive affordances both for themselves and for others, and affordance perception is a function of perceptual–motor experience involved in playing a sport. Two experiments investigated the enhanced affordance perception of athletes. In Experiment 1, basketball players and nonbasketball players provided perceptual reports for sports-relevant (maximum standing-reach and reach-with-jump heights) and non-sports-relevant (maximum sitting height) affordances for self and other. Basketball players were more accurate at perceiving maximum reach-with-jump for another person than were nonbasketball players, but were no better at perceiving maximum reach or sitting heights. Experiment 2 investigated the informational basis for this enhanced perceptual ability of basketball players by evaluating whether kinematics inform perceivers about action-scaled (e.g., force-production dependent), but not body-scaled (i.e., geometrically determined), affordances for others, and whether basketball experience enhances sensitivity to kinematic information. Only basketball players improved at perceiving an action-scaled affordance (maximum reach-with-jump), but not body-scaled affordances (maximum standing-reach and sit) with exposure to kinematic information, suggesting that action-scaled affordances may be specified by kinematic information to which athletes are already attuned by virtue of their sport experience.     

The influence of athletic experience and kinematic information on skill-relevant affordance perception

Humans can perceive affordances both for themselves and for others, and affordance perception is a function of perceptual-motor experience involved in playing a sport. Two experiments investigated the enhanced affordance perception of athletes. In Experiment 1, basketball players and nonbasketball players provided perceptual reports for sports-relevant (maximum standing-reach and reach-with-jump heights) and non-sports-relevant (maximum sitting height) affordances for self and other. Basketball players were more accurate at perceiving maximum reach-with-jump for another person than were nonbasketball players, but were no better at perceiving maximum reach or sitting heights. Experiment 2 investigated the informational basis for this enhanced perceptual ability of basketball players by evaluating whether kinematics inform perceivers about action-scaled (e.g., force-production dependent), but not body-scaled (i.e., geometrically determined), affordances for others, and whether basketball experience enhances sensitivity to kinematic information. Only basketball players improved at perceiving an action-scaled affordance (maximum reach-with-jump), but not body-scaled affordances (maximum standing-reach and sit) with exposure to kinematic information, suggesting that action-scaled affordances may be specified by kinematic information to which athletes are already attuned by virtue of their sport experience.     

Tuning in to another person's action capabilities: perceiving maximal jumping-reach height from walking kinematics

Three experiments investigated the ability to perceive the maximum height to which another actor could jump to reach an object. Experiment 1 determined the accuracy of estimates for another actor's maximal reach-with-jump height and compared these estimates to estimates of the actor's standing maximal reaching height and to estimates of the perceiver's own maximal reaching and reach-with-jump height. Perception of another actor's maximum reach-with-jump height was less accurate than the other estimates, but still accurate to within 8% error. The actor's reach-with-jump height was modified in Experiment 2 by attaching weights around the actor's ankles. Perceivers, who were explicitly aware of the manipulation, adjusted their maximum reach-with-jump estimates for the actor accordingly. In Experiment 3, perceivers were not explicitly aware of the weight manipulation, but provided significantly lower maximum reach-with-jump estimates after watching the actor walk while wearing the weights compared to estimates obtained after watching the actor walk while not wearing the weights. The results suggest that the actor's walking pattern was informative about the actor's capacity to produce a different action, jumping to reach an object.     

Priming of reach trajectory when observing actions: Hand-centred effects

When another person's actions are observed it appears that these actions are simulated, such that similar motor processes are triggered in the observer. Much evidence suggests that such simulation concerns the achievement of behavioural goals, such as grasping a particular object, and is less concerned with the specific nature of the action, such as the path the hand takes to reach the goal object. We demonstrate that when observing another person reach around an obstacle, an observer's subsequent reach has an increased curved trajectory, reflecting motor priming of reach path. This priming of reach trajectory via action observation can take place under a variety of circumstances: with or without a shared goal, and when the action is seen from a variety of perspectives. However, of most importance, the reach path priming effect is only evoked if the obstacle avoided by another person is within the action (peripersonal) space of the observer.     

Attribution of movement: Potential links between subjective reports of agency and output monitoring

According to agency memory theory, individuals decide whether “I did it” based on a memory trace of “I am doing it”. The purpose of this study was to validate the agency memory theory. To this end, several hand actions were individually presented as samples, and participants were asked to perform the sample action, observe the performance of that action by another person, or imagine performing the action. Online feedback received by the participants during the action was manipulated among the different conditions, and output monitoring, in which participants were asked whether they had performed each hand action, was conducted. The rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action was higher when visual feedback was unaltered than when it was altered (Experiment 1A), and this tendency was observed across all types of altered feedback (Experiment 1B). The observation of an action performed by the hand of another person did not increase the rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action unless the participants actually did perform the action (Experiments 2A and 2B). In Experiment 3, a relationship was observed between the subjective feeling that “I am the one who is causing an action” and the memory that “I did perform the action”. These experiments support the hypothesis that qualitative information and sense of “self” are tagged in a memory trace and that such tags can be used as cues for judgements when the memory is related to the “self”.     

The role of haptic exploration of ground surface information in perception of overhead reachability

The authors performed an experiment in which participants (N = 24) made judgments about maximum jump and reachability on ground surfaces with different elastic properties: sand and a trampoline. Participants performed judgments in two conditions: (a) while standing and after having recently jumped on the surface in question and (b) while standing on a third control surface, eliminating haptic exploration of the surface in question. There was a high correlation between perceived maximum reachable height and actual maximum reachable height in all conditions. Judging performance on the basis of visual and haptic exploration of ground surface information was slightly overestimated, whereas performance on the basis of visual information alone was underestimated and variable for the different surfaces. The authors discuss possible causes for the observed errors. They emphasize that there is a considerable nonvisual aspect to the nature of the information specifying affordances for overhead reach and jumping and that perceptual performance is degraded when spontaneous exploratory movement is restricted.     

Nested prospectivity in perception: perceived maximum reaching height reflects anticipated changes in reaching ability

Perception of possibilities for behavior is a necessarily prospective (i.e., forward-looking) act. Such prospectivity is highlighted by the fact that, in general, behaviors are nested within behaviors over a number of spatial and temporal scales. Participants reported their maximum vertical reaching height when they expected to walk across the room and (1) reach for an object while standing on the floor, (2) step up on a step stool and then reach for the object, and (3) pick up a plastic rod and use it to reach for the object. The results show that perception of maximum reaching height was action scaled both when participants expected to perform a nested behavior that would change their action capabilities and when they expected to perform a nested behavior that would not do so. Moreover, the results suggest that nested behaviors that change reaching ability in functionally equivalent ways may bring about functionally equivalent changes in perception of maximum reaching height.     

When far becomes near: shared environments activate action simulation

It has been proposed that one means of understanding a person's current behaviour and predicting future actions is by simulating their actions. That is, when another person's actions are observed, similar motor processes are activated in the observer. For example, after observing a reach over an obstacle, a person's subsequent reach trajectory is more curved, reflecting motor priming. Importantly, such motor states are only activated if the observed action is in near (peripersonal) space. However, we demonstrate that when individuals share action environments, simulation of another person's obstacle avoiding reach path takes place even when the action is in far (extrapersonal) space. We propose that action simulation is influenced by factors such as ownership. When an "owned" object is a potential future obstacle, even when it is viewed beyond current action space, simulations are evoked, and these leave a more stable memory capable of influencing future behaviour.     

Do action goals mediate social inhibition of return?

Social inhibition of return is the phenomenon whereby an individual is slower to reach to locations to which another individual has recently responded. Although this suggests that an observer represents another person's action, little is known about which aspects of the action are encoded. The present work describes a series of three experiments examining whether social inhibition of return represents the endpoint goal of the action, i.e., is 'goal based'. Pairs of participants sat opposite to one another and alternated responses to a cued or non-cued object presented on a table top. Importantly, either the two participants performed the same interaction with the object or a different interaction. Although all our experiments showed social inhibition of return, the size of the effect was not modulated according to whether each participant had the same or different goal. We conclude that although the mechanisms giving rise to social inhibition of return do encode some aspects of a response they do not code for terminal action goals.     

On the influence of causal beliefs on the feeling of agency

The sense of agency is the experience of being the origin of a sensory consequence. This study investigates whether contextual beliefs modulate low-level sensorimotor processes which contribute to the emergence of the sense of agency. We looked at the influence of causal beliefs on ‘intentional binding’, a phenomenon which accompanies self-agency. Participants judged the onset-time of either an action or a sound which followed the action. They were induced to believe that the tone was either triggered by themselves or by somebody else, although, in reality, the sound was always triggered by the participants. We found that intentional binding was stronger when participants believed that they triggered the tone, compared to when they believed that another person triggered the tone. These results suggest that high-level contextual information influences sensorimotor processes responsible for generating intentional binding.     

When far becomes near: Shared environments activate action simulation

It has been proposed that one means of understanding a person's current behaviour and predicting future actions is by simulating their actions. That is, when another person's actions are observed, similar motor processes are activated in the observer. For example, after observing a reach over an obstacle, a person's subsequent reach trajectory is more curved, reflecting motor priming. Importantly, such motor states are only activated if the observed action is in near (peripersonal) space. However, we demonstrate that when individuals share action environments, simulation of another person's obstacle avoiding reach path takes place even when the action is in far (extrapersonal) space. We propose that action simulation is influenced by factors such as ownership. When an “owned” object is a potential future obstacle, even when it is viewed beyond current action space, simulations are evoked, and these leave a more stable memory capable of influencing future behaviour.     

Self and social judgments of ability: beyond distributional information

In a given domain, low-skill individuals typically evaluate the ability level of other people more favorably than high-skill individuals. The current study tests whether this tendency continues to occur even when people have unambiguous distributional information available through which to judge others. Students received distributional information detailing their percentile rank in a statistics course and the percentile rank of another student in the course. Then, students were asked to evaluate their own and the other students' statistics ability. Students evaluated the other person's ability more favorably when their own rank in the course was low rather than high. Therefore, people may use themselves as a standard of comparison when they judge others even when more diagnostic sources of information are available.     

Behavioural coordination of dogs in a cooperative problem-solving task with a conspecific and a human partner

The process of domestication has arguably provided dogs (Canis familiaris) with decreased emotional reactivity (reduced fear and aggression) and increased socio-cognitive skills adaptive for living with humans. It has been suggested that dogs are uniquely equipped with abilities that have been identified as crucial in cooperative problem-solving, namely social tolerance and the ability to attend to other individuals’ behaviour. Accordingly, dogs might be hypothesised to perform well in tasks in which they have to work together with a human partner. Recently, researchers have found that dogs successfully solved a simple cooperative task with another dog. Due to the simplicity of the task, this study was, however, unable to provide clear evidence as to whether the dogs’ successful performance was based on the cognitive ability of behavioural coordination, namely the capacity to link task requirements to the necessity of adjusting one’s actions to the partner’s behaviour. Here, we tested dogs with the most commonly used cooperative task, appropriate to test behavioural coordination. In addition, we paired dogs with both a conspecific and a human partner. Although dogs had difficulties in inhibiting the necessary action when required to wait for their partner, they successfully attended to the two cues that predicted a successful outcome, namely their partner’s behaviour and the incremental movement of rewards towards themselves. This behavioural coordination was shown with both a conspecific and a human partner, in line with the recent findings suggesting that dogs exhibit highly developed socio-cognitive skills in interactions with both humans and other dogs.     

Action experience alters 3-month-old infants' perception of others' actions

An intervention facilitated 3-month-old infants' apprehension of objects either prior to (reach first), or after (watch first) viewing another person grasp similar objects in a visual habituation procedure. Action experience facilitated action perception: reach-first infants focused on the relation between the actor and her goal, but watch-first infants did not. Infants' sensitivity to the actor's goal was correlated with their engagement in object-directed contact with the toys. These findings indicate that infants can rapidly form goal-based action representations and suggest a developmental link between infants' goal directed actions and their ability to detect goals in the actions of others.