Can you forgive? It depends on how happy you are

This paper examined how individual group status and happiness influence forgiveness. In Study 1, happiness was treated as a trait difference: highly happy people, compared with very unhappy people, were found to be more willing to forgive murderers. More important, an interaction effect between happiness and group status on forgiveness was found, that is, highly happy people tended to be more forgiving when either ingroup or outgroup members were killed; unhappy people, however, tended to be less forgiving about murder when ingroup rather than outgroup members were killed. In Study 2, happiness was treated as an emotional state difference: happiness, rather than sadness, was found to bring greater forgiveness. Moreover, consistent with the interaction effect displayed in Study 1, happy participants tended to forgive more when ingroup or outgroup members were hurt; sad participants tended to forgive less when ingroup members rather than outgroup members were hurt. Implications for connections between happiness, group membership, and forgiveness are discussed.     

Morality shifting in the context of intergroup violence

We propose morality shifting as a mechanism through which individuals can maintain a moral image of the ingroup. We argue that a shift from the moral principles of harm and fairness to those of loyalty and authority occurs when assessing a potentially threatening event, particularly among high ingroup glorifiers. Three studies confirmed this hypothesis using three different methodologies. Study 1 compared the use of language related to four moral foundations formulated in moral psychology in response to ingroup‐ and outgroup‐committed wrongdoings. Results showed that loyalty‐ and authority‐related words were used more, whereas harm‐ and fairness‐related words were used less in response to ingroup‐ compared with outgroup‐committed wrongdoings. Study 2 replicated this effect with regards to the cognitive accessibility of these moral principles. Study 3 confirmed that morality shifting is a motivated response to social identity threat, rather than a response to mere activation of social identity. Finally, as predicted, Study 3 demonstrated the effect of morality shifting to be moderated by ingroup glorification but not ingroup attachment. Implications and consequences for intergroup and individual wrongdoings, as well as for intergroup relations, are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceptions of social influence when messages favour ‘us’ versus ‘them’: A closer look at the social distance effect

The third‐person effect (TPE) is the tendency for individuals to assume that persuasive communications have a stronger effect on other people than on themselves. In turn the social distance effect (SDE) is the tendency for this TPE to increase with the psychological distance between self and comparator. Two experiments showed that the SDE is moderated by whether the message favours the ingroup or the outgroup, holding all other content constant. In Study 1, male and female participants read a message arguing that either women were better drivers than men or vice versa, and then indicated how much they thought themselves, ingroup members, outgroup members and society would be influenced. The results indicate that for the pro‐outgroup message the SDE was found. However, for the pro‐ingroup message the SDE was reversed with ingroup members perceived as more influenced than all other targets, including the self. Study 2 replicated this finding using minimal groups, which eliminated the effects of prior stereotypes about male and female drivers. Across both studies the self was perceived as relatively invulnerable to influence regardless of message bias. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why group apologies succeed and fail: intergroup forgiveness and the role of primary and secondary emotions

It is widely assumed that official apologies for historical transgressions can lay the groundwork for intergroup forgiveness, but evidence for a causal relationship between intergroup apologies and forgiveness is limited. Drawing on the infrahumanization literature, we argue that a possible reason for the muted effectiveness of apologies is that people diminish the extent to which they see outgroup members as able to experience complex, uniquely human emotions (e.g., remorse). In Study 1, Canadians forgave Afghanis for a friendly-fire incident to the extent that they perceived Afghanis as capable of experiencing uniquely human emotions (i.e., secondary emotions such as anguish) but not nonuniquely human emotions (i.e., primary emotions such as fear). Intergroup forgiveness was reduced when transgressor groups expressed secondary emotions rather than primary emotions in their apology (Studies 2a and 2b), an effect that was mediated by trust in the genuineness of the apology (Study 2b). Indeed, an apology expressing secondary emotions aroused no more forgiveness than a no-apology control (Study 3) and less forgiveness than an apology with no emotion (Study 4). Consistent with an infrahumanization perspective, effects of primary versus secondary emotional expression did not emerge when the apology was offered for an ingroup transgression (Study 3) or when an outgroup apology was delivered through an ingroup proxy (Study 4). Also consistent with predictions, these effects were demonstrated only by those who tended to deny uniquely human qualities to the outgroup (Study 5). Implications for intergroup apologies and movement toward reconciliation are discussed.     

Sources of respect: the effects of being liked by ingroups and outgroups

We investigated the effects of ingroup and outgroup sources of respect, defined as positive social evaluations of self, on group members' emotional reactions and collective self‐esteem. We used both natural group memberships (Studies 1 and 2) and laboratory groups (Study 3). We expected that the positive effects of respect derived from an ingroup would not hold when derived from an outgroup source. In Study 1 (N = 294) respect was manipulated as deriving either from ingroup or outgroup. Although respect produced a positive emotional reaction irrespective of source, collective self‐esteem was only enhanced by an ingroup source. In Study 2 (N = 248), we investigated the concurrent effects of ingroup respect and outgroup respect. As in Study 1, ingroup and outgroup respect both produced positive emotional reactions, but collective self‐esteem was only affected by ingroup respect. Additionally, outgroup respect intensified the shame people experienced due to lack of ingroup respect. In Study 3 (N = 66), participants were immersed in experimental groups and ingroup and outgroup respect were manipulated orthogonally. Interactive effects of the two sources of respect indicated that high outgroup respect could not compensate for low ingroup respect, and if anything had an adverse effect. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups

According to the psychological essentialism perspective, people tend to explain differences between groups by attributing them different essences. Given a pervasive ethnocentrism, this tendency implies that the human essence will be restricted to the ingroup whereas outgroups will receive a lesser degree of humanity. Therefore, it is argued that people attribute more uniquely human characteristics to the ingroup than to the outgroup. The present article focuses on secondary emotions that constitute such characteristics. Study 1 showed that members of high‐ and low‐status groups attribute more positive secondary emotions to the ingroup than to the outgroup. Study 2 verified that the differential attribution extended also to negative secondary emotions. No exemplars of emotions were provided in Study 3. Instead, participants had to estimate the means of two distributions of numbers that supposedly represented characteristics of the ingroup and of the outgroup. The results of this third experiment illustrated the reluctance to attribute secondary emotions to the outgroup. The findings are discussed from the perspective of psychological essentialism. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of trustors' social identity complexity on interpersonal and intergroup trust

Although previous literature has revealed the effect of a single social identity on trust, only few studies have examined how multiple social identities affect trust in others. The present research examined the effects of trustors' social identity complexity on their level of trust toward another person (interpersonal trust), outgroup members (outgroup trust), and ingroup members (ingroup trust). Study 1, which was a correlational study, indicated that trustors' social identity complexity was positively related to their interpersonal and outgroup trust. Three experimental studies were performed to identify causal relationships. Study 2 found that activating trustors' high social identity complexity produced high levels of interpersonal trust, and Studies 3 and 4 found that this effect was more pronounced when the trustee was an outgroup member (outgroup trust) rather than an ingroup member (ingroup trust). The implications of these results for social harmony are discussed.     

Reaction in action: intergroup contrast in automatic behavior

Whereas previous research has shown automatic behavior conforming to outgroup stereotypes, the authors demonstrate automatic behavioral contrast away from a stereotype/trait associated with an outgroup (Study 1 and 2) and point to the importance of an "us-them" intergroup comparison in this process. In Study 1, participants colored pictures more messily when neatness was associated with an outgroup rather than the ingroup. In Study 2, using a different behavior, participants primed with busy business people reacted faster than controls (assimilation) but became slower when their student ingroup identity was activated (contrast). Subliminally priming an "us-them" intergroup comparison set undermined the accessibility of outgroup stereotypic words (Study 3), especially for those higher in prejudice (Study 4). This suggests that people automatically distance themselves from outgroup attributes when intergroup antagonism is cued or chronic. Implications for the role of self and comparison processes in automatic behavior are discussed.     

“I'm Moderna,what are you?” Evidence that people favor those who received their same brand COVID-19 vaccine

In two studies, we investigated the extent to which people are biased toward people with the same COVID-19 vaccine brand using a monetary allocation task. Informed by theoretical approaches to intergroup bias and the minimal-groups paradigm, we expected that, when deciding how to allocate financial resources among three different people—each with an equal need for assistance but a different COVID-19 vaccine brand—people would allocate more money, on average, to those who received the same versus different vaccine brand than participants personally received. We found in Study 1 (N = 94) that people given a hypothetical $10.00 experimental endowment allocated an average of $2.00 more when a person was a member of their vaccine ingroup than to those from their vaccine brand outgroup. We replicated this effect in Study 2 (N = 219), finding that people continued to allocate more money ($1.42) to a person from their vaccine brand ingroup versus those from their vaccine brand outgroup. Taken together, this work suggests that, among vaccinated people, the brand of another person's vaccine meaningfully influences the allocation of monetary resources and that people are biased toward people with the same COVID-19 vaccine brand. Implications for social identity theories are discussed.     

When group members admit to being conformist: the role of relative intragroup status in conformity self-reports

Five studies examined the hypothesis that people will strategically portray the self as being more group influenced the more junior they feel within the group. Among social psychologists (Study 1), ratings of self-conformity by group members were greater when the status of the participant was low than when it was high. These effects were replicated in Studies 2, 3, and 4 in which relative intragroup status was manipulated. In Study 3, the authors found junior group members described themselves as more conformist than senior members when they were addressing an ingroup audience, but when they were addressing an outgroup audience the effect disappeared. Furthermore, junior members (but not senior members) rated themselves as more conformist when they were led to believe their responses were public than when responses were private (Study 5). The discussion focuses on the strategic processes underlying low-status group members' self-reports of group influence and the functional role of conformity in groups.     

Embracing Humanity in the Face of Death: Why Do Existential Concerns Moderate Ingroup Humanization?

People humanize their ingroup to address existential concerns about their mortality, but the reasons why they do so remain ambiguous. One explanation is that people humanize their ingroup to bolster their social identity in the face of their mortality. Alternatively, people might be motivated to see their ingroup as more uniquely human (UH) to distance themselves from their corporeal “animal” nature. These explanations were tested in Australia, where social identity is tied less to UH and more to human nature (HN) which does not distinguish humans from animals. Australians attributed more HN traits to the ingroup when mortality was salient, while the attribution of UH traits remained unchanged. This indicates that the mortality-buffering function of ingroup humanization lies in reinforcing the humanness of our social identity, rather than just distancing ourselves from our animal nature. Implications for (de)humanization in intergroup relations are discussed.     

Ingroup and outgroup stereotypes and selective processing

The main concern of the two studies presented here is to investigate whether the different nature of ingroup and outgroup stereotypes is reflected in different selective processing of ingroup and outgroup information. It was predicted that when processing ingroup information people will preferentially encode stereotype-inconsistent information as compared to stereotype-consistent information, whereas the reverse pattern will hold when people process outgroup information. In addition to selective processing, response bias due to stereotyping was studied. To measure selective processing and response bias, recognition memory measures derived from the theory of signal detection were used. Results of the two studies confirmed our main prediction. Also, response bias was demonstrated. ©1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

We Are the World—and They Are Not: Prototypicality for the World Community,Legitimacy, and Responses to Global Inequality

The relation between developed and developing countries is characterized by inequalities that sometimes hinder actions against worldwide problems. The current research presents an intergroup approach, based on the ingroup projection model, towards an analysis of psychological processes that perpetuate global inequality on a social group level. Precisely, we argue that people from developed countries perceive their group as more prototypical for the world population than they perceive people from developing countries. These perceptions of ingroup prototypicality should in turn relate to legitimacy beliefs and predict unfavorable behavioral intentions towards developing countries. We present two studies that corroborate our hypotheses: In Study 1, participants from a developed country perceived their ingroup as more prototypical for the superordinate group (i.e., world population) than the outgroup (i.e., developing countries), which in turn was related to beliefs that global inequality is legitimate. This finding was replicated in Study 2, and the predicted effect of ingroup prototypicality on behavioral intentions was mediated by legitimacy beliefs. These findings demonstrate that intergroup processes can contribute to perpetuating global inequality.     

Striving for difference: On the spontaneous preference for ingroup members who maximize ingroup positive distinctiveness

Previous research demonstrated that individuals spontaneously prefer ingroup members who display ingroup favoritism rather than egalitarian behaviors (Castelli, Tomelleri, & Zogmaister, 2008). In the current work, we explored what specific strategies toward ingroup favoritism are spontaneously preferred. Results from four studies showed that ingroup members who made it possible for the ingroup to achieve a positive intergroup differentiation were preferred as compared to ingroup members who maximized the absolute gain for the ingroup. Study 5 further demonstrated that in the search for positive distinctiveness people are sensitive to the ratio between the gains of the ingroup and outgroup. Study 6 ruled out a possible alternative explanation. Overall, the current findings indicate that group members who set the difference from an outgroup elicit the most positive spontaneous responses demonstrating that the search for a positive intergroup distinctiveness automatically affects intragroup perception. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Expectation of outgroup behaviour: can you trust the outgroup?

Outgroups are usually viewed with suspicion and expected to discriminate against the ingroup. The present study demonstrated that ingroup members attributed past discriminatory behaviour committed by individuals of unknown group membership more to outgroup members than to either ingroup members or members of a neutral group. In contrast, past egalitarian behaviour was attributed less to outgroup members than to members of a neutral group. Ingroup members also expected more discrimination from a future outgroup allocator than from a future neutral group allocator. Finally, the study showed that ingroup members' own behaviour in allocating money became more biased in favour of ingroup members vis-á-vis outgroup members when the future allocator was from an outgroup rather than from a neutral group and when they had witnessed the discriminatory behaviour of an allocator in the past.     

The threat of moral transgression: The impact of group membership and moral opportunity

When other ingroup members behave immorally, people's motivation to maintain a moral group image may cause them to experience increased threat and act defensively in response. In the current research, we investigated people's reactions to others' misconduct and examined the effect of group membership and the possible threat‐reducing function of moral opportunity—the prospect of being able to re‐establish the group's moral image. In Study 1, students who were confronted with fellow students' plagiarism and who received an opportunity to improve their group's morality reported feeling less threatened than students who did not receive such opportunity. In Study 2, students reacted to a recent academic fraud case, which either implicated an ingroup (scholar in their own discipline) or an outgroup member (scholar in another discipline). Results indicated that participants experienced more threat when an ingroup (versus an outgroup) member had committed the moral transgression. However, as hypothesized, this was not the case when moral opportunity was provided. Hence, the threat‐reducing effect of moral opportunity was replicated. Additionally, participants generally were more defensive in response to ingroup (versus outgroup) moral failure and less defensive when moral opportunity was present (versus absent). Together, these findings suggest that the reduction of threat due to moral opportunity may generally help individuals take constructive action when the behavior of fellow group members discredits the group's moral image.     

Sharing moral values: anticipated ingroup respect as a determinant of adherence to morality-based (but not competence-based) group norms

This research examines how moral values regulate the behavior of individual group members. It argues that group members behave in line with moral group norms because they anticipate receiving ingroup respect when enacting moral values that are shared by ingroup members. Data from two experimental studies offer evidence in support. In Study 1 (N = 82), morality-based (but not competence-based) ingroup norms determined whether members of a low-status group opted for individual versus collective strategies for status improvement. This effect was mediated by anticipated ingroup respect and emerged regardless of whether group norms prescribed collectivistic or individualistic behavior. These effects were replicated in Study 2 (N = 69), where no comparable effect was found as a result of moral norms communicated by a higher status outgroup. This indicates that social identity implications rather than interdependence or more generic concerns about social approval or importance of cooperation drive these effects.     

Group Status and Hierarchy Legitimacy Effects on Effort Versus Ability Attributions for Ingroup and Outgroup Failures

Previous research has shown that people have a tendency to explain various outcomes in ways that favour their ingroup. However, there is also some evidence that this tendency may be moderated by perceptions of group status and hierarchy legitimacy. In this study, we experimentally test the combined effects of group status and hierarchy legitimacy on effort and ability attributions for ingroup and outgroup failures. It was predicted that participants assigned to an illegitimately low status condition would attribute ingroup but not outgroup failure more to a lack of effort than ability. Conversely, participants assigned to a legitimately high status group were expected to attribute ingroup but not outgroup failure more to a lack of effort than ability. Results supported these predictions and also showed outgroup failure was attributed more to a lack of effort than ability when ingroup status was either legitimately low or illegitimately high. We conclude that intergroup attributions are constrained by perceptions about relative group status and the legitimacy of the status hierarchy.     

Why did you choose that person over me? Ingroup rejection and attributions to discrimination

The present research examined the attributions that people make when an individual rejects a member of his or her own group in favor of a member of an outgroup (i.e., ingroup rejection). Study 1 showed that Latinos rejected by an ingroup member (perpetrator) made more attributions to discrimination than Whites under similar circumstances. Study 2 showed that Latinos made more attributions to discrimination for ingroup rejection when the perpetrator was Latino as compared to when the perpetrator was White, whereas Whites' attributions to discrimination were relatively low regardless of perpetrator's ethnicity. Study 3 showed that priming loyalty norms increased attributions to discrimination among Latinos in response to ingroup rejection, but not in response to outgroup rejection. This research brings a new perspective to discrimination research by focusing on intragroup rejection and nonprototypical cases of discrimination.     

What children remember about ingroup and outgroup peers: effects of stereotypes on children's processing of information about group members

Three studies are reported about children's memory for stereotypic behaviors attributed to ingroup and outgroup members. According to research and theory in social cognition, cues present in the situation make cultural representations about group members accessible, and once primed, influence all phases of the information processing sequence. In Study 1, Euro Canadian and Native Canadian children (N=98) recalled stereotypic behaviors attributed to ingroup and outgroup members. In Study 2 (N=87), the influence of individual difference variables was explored. In Study 3 (N=32), the memory of Native Canadian children living on a First Nation reserve for behaviors attributed to ingroup and outgroup members was studied. Biases in recall were found in Studies 1 and 2, but in Study 3, outgroup favoritism, typically found among low status group members, was reversed among children attending a heritage school. Among the individual difference measures examined, age and level of cognitive development predicted what was remembered about group members. Older Euro Canadian children recalled more negative behaviors about outgroup members than did younger children, and more cognitively mature children recognized more information about ingroup than outgroup members. Results were discussed in terms of cognitive and situational factors influencing children's processing of group-relevant information and the challenges children in low status groups face in maintaining a sense of cultural identity.