Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value

Adopting a dispositional theory of value promises to deliver a lot of theoretical goodies. One recurring problem for dispositional theories of value, though, is a problem about nonconvergence. If being a value is being disposed to elicit response R in us, what should we say if it turns out that not everybody is disposed to have R to the same things? One horn of the problem here is a danger of the view collapsing into an error theory—of it turning out, on account of the diversity of agents' relevant dispositions, that nothing is really a value, since nothing is disposed to elicit R in everybody. Alternatively, there is a danger of an objectionable fragmentation of value, according to which there is no such thing as a value simpliciter, but only values_me and values_you, values_us and values_them. I advocate a de se relativist version of a dispositional theory of value. If we go for this sort of de‐se‐ified dispositional theory, we get to keep our theoretical goodies, but we avoid the problem of nonconvergence that leads to a danger of either collapse into an error theory, or else talking‐past, and a loss of common subject matter.     

Dispositional Theories of Color and the Claims of Common Sense

Philosophical Studies -     

Hume's Dispositional Account of the Self

This paper will argue that Hume's notion of the self in Book 2 of the Treatise seems subject to two constraints. First, it should be a succession of perceptions [THN 2.2.1.2, 2.1.2.3]. Second, it should be durable in virtue of the roles that it plays with regard to pride and humility, as well as to normativity. However, I argue that these two constraints are in tension, since our perceptions are too transient to play these roles. I argue that this notion of self should be characterized as a bundle of dispositions to our perceptions, such that these dispositions are durable and counterfactual-supporting. I argue that Hume confused his ‘philosophical’ notion of dispositions, as nothing above and beyond their effects, with the thicker notion of dispositions to which the passions respond—which explains his mistaken commitment to the durability constraint.     

Novel Colours and the Content of Experience

Abstract: I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation.     

Dispositional Interferers and the Metaphysics of Superheroes

Axiomathes - Many recently released Hollywood films feature superheroes like Superman, Ironman, the Hulk, Optimus Prime, and so on who possess amazing superpower and defeat supervillains with...     

On the dimensionality of the Dispositional Hope Scale

The Dispositional Hope Scale (DHS; C. R. Snyder et al., 1991) consists of two subsets of items measuring Agency and Pathways. The authors used bifactor analysis to evaluate the dimensionality structure of the scale. Data from 676 persons (295 psychiatric patients, 112 delinquents, and 269 students) were analyzed. The authors conclude that although the Pathway items seem to explain some additional variance when the Hope scale variance is partionalized out, the DHS allows unidimensional measurement.     

Dispositional forgiveness among adolescents

The study examined whether the four constructs of forgivingness found in adults—propensity to lasting resentment, sensitivity to circumstances, willingness to forgive, and willingness to avenge—were already in place among adolescents. It also examined the differences in propensity to forgive and related constructs between young adolescents and older adolescents. More than 500 adolescents (124 sixth graders, 170 seventh graders, 135 eighth graders, and 78 ninth graders) were presented with a slightly modified version of the Forgivingness Scale (Mullet, Barros, Frongia, Usai, Neto, & Rivière-Shafighi, 2003 Mullet, E., Barros, J., Frongia, L., Usai, V., Neto, F. and Rivière-Shafighi, S. 2003. Religious involvement and the forgiving personality. Journal of Personality, 71: 1–19. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). The same four-factor structure that was found among adults was also found among adolescents. Scores regarding sensitivity to circumstances and willingness to forgive were lower among older adolescents than among younger adolescents. Scores regarding lasting resentment and willingness to avenge were higher among older adolescents than among younger adolescents.     

Dispositional accounts of evil personhood

It is intuitively plausible that not every evildoer is an evil person. In order to make sense of this intuition we need to construct an account of evil personhood in addition to an account of evil action. Some philosophers have offered aggregative accounts of evil personhood, but these do not fit well with common intuitions about the explanatory power of evil personhood, the possibility of moral reform, and the relationship between evil and luck. In contrast, a dispositional account of evil personhood can allow that evil is explanatory, that an evil person can become good, and that luck might prevent evil persons from doing evil or cause non-evil persons to do evil. Yet the dispositional account of evil personhood implies that some evil persons are blameless, which seems to clash with the intuition that evil persons deserve our strongest moral condemnation. Moreover, since it is likely that a large proportion of us are disposed to perform evil actions in some environments, the dispositional account threatens to label a large proportion of people evil. In this paper I consider a range of possible modifications to the dispositional account that might bring it more closely into alignment with our intuitions about moral condemnation and the rarity of evil persons. According to the most plausible of these theories, S is an evil person if S is strongly disposed to perform evil actions when in conditions that favour S’s autonomy.     

Dispositional empathy and the hierarchical structure of personality

Personality psychology has recognized a fundamental 5-factor structure that has integrated and organized theory and research. Nevertheless, personality-like differences beyond that structure have been identified. In heretofore unrelated research, dispositional empathy has been an essential construct in understanding human development, behavior, and interpersonal relationships. Addressing a gap in the literature, we map multidimensional dispositional empathy into 2 versions of the 5-factor space. Empathic concern is closely related to agreeableness, and personal distress is closely related to neuroticism. Perspective taking has complex, interstitial relationships with the 5 factors. In contrast, fantasy is not well explained by the 5 factors. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding dispositional empathy and for understanding the 5-factor structure, its correlates in emotional processes and experiences, and its limits.     

Dispositional implementation solves the superfluous structure problem

Consciousness supervenes on activity; computation supervenes on structure. Because of this, some argue, conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. If true, this would present serious difficulties for computationalist analyses of consciousness (or, indeed, of any domain with properties that supervene on actual activity). I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem (SSP) by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. On a dispositional theory, the activity of computation depends entirely on changes in the intrinsic properties of implementing material. As extraneous structure is not required for computation, a system can implement a program running on some but not all possible inputs. Dispositional computationalism thus permits episodes of computational activity that correspond to potential episodes of conscious awareness. The SSP cannot be motivated against this account, and so computationalism may be preserved.     

Colours experienced in dreams.

Colours seen in dreams by six observers were recorded from memory and plotted on a CIE u, v, chromaticity diagram. Only about half the dreams recorded contained colour, and in those in which colour appeared the more saturated purples, blues and blue greens were absent. It is suggested that during achromatic dreams the areas of the visual cortex which seem to respond only to colour may be inoperative. The paucity of blue in dreams could be anatomically related to the small population of blue units in the colour areas of the cortex.     

Dispositional Influences on Pay Preferences

This study tested whether individual measures of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and positive and negative affect predict a job seeker's attraction to organizations offering merit pay, skill-based pay, or broad banding. Intrinsic motivation was found to predict a decision for merit pay while extrinsic motivation did not. Hierarchical regression analysis results suggested that job seekers who were intrinsically motivated or experienced positive affect were attracted to pay plans that offer high levels of personal involvement. Individuals who were extrinsically motivated or experienced negative affect were attracted to pay plans that offer higher than average starting salaries.     

Causal Necessitation and Dispositional Modality

Philosophia - Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford have recently defended a new kind of modality, which they call ‘dispositional modality’. The key reason to adopt dispositional...     

Dispositional Optimism and Marital Adjustment

Research showing the distinct influence of positive attributes on relationships has been growing. This study examined the impact of husbands’ and wives’ dispositional optimism on their own and partner’s relationship satisfaction, consensus, and cohesion using data from the National Survey of Families and Households. Results indicate that wives’ optimism influences their own later marital satisfaction as well as their husbands’ later marital satisfaction. However, husbands’ optimism did not appear to influence their own nor their wives’ later satisfaction. Potential interventions for increasing optimism in the therapeutic setting are discussed.