Do we have to be Realists about Colour in order to be able to attribute Colour Perceptions to Other Persons?

One of the main targets of Barry Stroud’s criticism in his recent book ‚The Quest for Reality. Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour’ are eliminativist theories of colour which he regards as a version of the metaphysical project of the unmasking of colours (Stroud, 2000). According to this view, no physical objects have any of the colours we see them or believe them to have. However, although this error theory describes all our colour perceptions as illusory, and all our colour beliefs as false, it cannot deny that we actually perceive colours and that we do believe that physical objects are coloured. Therefore, it has to account for these psychological facts without relying on any assumptions about the colours of things. Thus, the central question for the unmasking project is whether it is possible to acknowledge someone’s perceiving a certain colour or having beliefs about the colours of things without holding that anything anywhere has any colour at all. Contrary to Stroud, this paper defends the view that we can acknowledge that people believe in colours without having ourselves to accept their existence.     

Rotational kinematics influence multimodal perception of heaviness

Perceived heaviness has been shown to be specific to an object’s rotational inertia (I ), its resistance to rotational acceleration. According to the kinematic specification of dynamics (KSD) principle, we hypothesized that I is optically specified by rotational kinematics. Using virtual depictions of wielded objects, we investigated whether the visually detected rotational kinematics of wielded objects would influence perceived heaviness in a manner consistent with the inertial model of heaviness perception. We scaled the virtual object’s movement so that it rotated more or less than its wielded counterpart, specifying lower and higher I, respectively. Perceived heaviness was inversely related to the rotational scaling factor, consistent with a KSD interpretation of the inertial model.     

Vague Objects Without Ontically Indeterminate Identity

The supporter of vague objects has been long challenged by the following ‘Argument from Identity’: 1) if there are vague objects, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3) there are no vague objects. Some supporters of vague objects have argued that 1) is false. Noonan (Analysis 68: 174–176, 2008) grants that 1) does not hold in general, but claims that ontically indeterminate identity is indeed implied by the assumption that there are vague objects of a certain special kind (i.e. vague objects*). One can therefore formulate a ‘New Argument from Identity’: 1′) if there are vague objects*, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3′) there are no vague objects*. Noonan’s strategy is to argue that premiss 1′) is inescapable, and, as a consequence, that Evans’s alleged defence of 2) is a real challenge for any supporter of vague objects. I object that a supporter of vague objects who grants the validity of Evans’s argument allegedly in favour of 2) should reject premiss 1′). The threat of the New Argument from Identity is thus avoided.     

Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence?

Puzzles about persistence and change through time, i.e., about identity across time, have foundered on confusion about what it is for ‘two things’ to be have ‘the same thing’ at a time. This is most directly seen in the dispute over whether material objects can occupy exactly the same place at the same time. This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against several arguments to the contrary. Distinguishing a temporally relative from an absolute sense of ‘the same’, we see that the intuition, ‘this is only one thing’, and the dictum, ‘two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time’, are individuating things at a time rather than absolutely and are therefore compatible with coincidence. Several other objections philosophers have raised ride on this same ambiguity. Burke, originating what has become the most popular objection to coincidence, argues that if coincidence is possible there would be no explanation of how objects that are qualitatively the same at a time could belong to different sorts. But we can explain an object’s sort by appealing to its properties at other times. Burke’s argument to the contrary equivocates on different notions of ‘cross-time identity’ and ‘the statue’. From a largely negative series of arguments emerges a positive picture of what it means to say multiple things coincide and of why an object’s historical properties explain its sort rather than vice versa – in short, of how coincidence is possible.     

Prospective object search in dogs: mixed evidence for knowledge of <Emphasis Type="Italic">What</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Where</Emphasis>

We investigated whether two dogs that had been specially trained to retrieve objects by their names were able to integrate information about the identity (What) as well as the location (Where) of those objects so that they could plan their search accordingly. In a first study, two sets of objects were placed in two separate rooms and subjects were asked to retrieve the objects, one after the other. Both dogs remembered the identity of the objects as they reliably retrieved the correct objects. One of the dogs was also able to integrate information about the object’s location as he chose the correct location in which the object had been placed. Further investigation of the second dog’s behavior revealed that she followed a more stereotyped search strategy. Despite this variation in performance, this study provides evidence for the memory of What and Where in a domestic dog and shows the prospective use of such information in a search task.     

Monkey business: Children’s use of character identity to infer shared properties

Children’s toys provide a rich arena for investigating conceptual flexibility, because they often can be understood as possessing an individual identity at multiple levels of abstraction. For example, many dolls (e.g., Winnie-the-Pooh) and action figures (e.g., Batman) can be construed either as characters from a fictional world or as physical objects in the real world. In two experiments, 72 4- and 5-year-olds took part in a property extension task, the results of which provide evidence of an understanding that (1) two representations of a character share certain properties in virtue of their shared character identity, and this sharing does not stem simply from having the same name, and (2) one representation of a character is more likely to share properties with another representation of the character if the properties were acquired by the character than if they were acquired by the representation. Children’s understanding of a representational object’s abstract character identity thus enabled them to transcend using its unique spatio-temporal history as a sole basis for inferring its idiosyncratic properties.     

Vision-for-action: The effects of object property discrimination and action state on affordance compatibility effects

When a person views an object, the action the object evokes appears to be activated independently of the person’s intention to act. We demonstrate two further properties of this vision-to-action process. First, it is not completely automatic, but is determined by the stimulus properties of the object that are attended. Thus, when a person discriminates the shape of an object, action affordance effects are observed; but when a person discriminates an object’s color, no affordance effects are observed. The former, shape property is associated with action, such as how an object might be grasped; the latter, color property is irrelevant to action. Second, we also show that the action state of an object influences evoked action. Thus, active objects, with which current action is implied, produce larger affordance effects than passive objects, with which no action is implied. We suggest that the active object activates action simulation processes similar to those proposed in mirror systems.     

Biased competition and visual search: the role of luminance and size contrast

The biased-competition theory of attention proposes that objects compete for cortical representation in a mutually inhibitory network; competition is biased in favor of the attended item. Here we test two predictions derived from the biased-competition theory. First we assessed whether increasing an object’s relative brightness (luminance contrast) biased competition in favor of (i.e., prioritized) the brighter object. Second we assessed whether increasing an object’s size biased competition in favor of the larger object. In fulfillment of these aims we used an attentional capture paradigm to test whether a featural singleton (an item unique with respect to a feature such as size or brightness) can impact attentional priority even when those features are irrelevant to finding the target. The results support the prediction that a singleton with respect to luminance contrast receives attentional prioritization and extend the biased-competition account to include size contrast, because a large singleton also receives attentional prioritization.     

Memory for action events in the bottlenosed dolphin

We investigated whether a bottlenosed dolphin’s ability to recall and repeat actions on command would immediately generalize to actions performed with specified objects. The dolphin was tested on her ability to repeat 18 novel behaviors performed with potentially interchangeable objects specified using an artificial gestural language. Such “action events” were correctly repeated at above chance levels, indicating that the dolphin had access to memories of those events. Performance levels were, however, lower than in previous tests. The dolphin appeared to have difficulty recalling which object an action was performed with. Previous research has demonstrated that animals can recall features of their environment and features of their actions independently of one another. The results of this study demonstrate (1) that the dolphin’s concept of repeating extends beyond simply accessing memories of movement patterns, and (2) that dolphins’ memories of past events incorporate representations of both self-performed acts and objects, locations, or gestural instructions. Received:10 October 1998 / Accepted after revision: 22 December 1998     

Sentence,proposition and identity

In this paper we discuss the distinction between sentence and proposition from the perspective of identity. After criticizing Quine, we discuss how objects of logical languages are constructed, explaining what is Kleene’s congruence—used by Bourbaki with his square—and Paul Halmos’s view about the difference between formulas and objects of the factor structure, the corresponding boolean algebra, in case of classical logic. Finally we present Patrick Suppes’s congruence approach to the notion of proposition, according to which a whole hierarchy of congruences leads to different kinds of objects.     

The effects of occlusion and past experience on the allocation of object-based attention

There is considerable evidence indicating that cuing a specific portion of an object results in the entire object’s being attended to. In the present study, we examined whether previous experience with an object could halt perceptual (i.e., amodal) completion. In Experiment 1, two parallel rectangles were initially displayed, and then the middle portions of these objects were occluded. Attentional cuing effects were found for both discrete portions of the completed rectangles. In the final two experiments, four discrete objects were initially displayed, followed by the same occluder as that used in the first experiment. The appearance of the occluder (500 msec before the cue in Experiment 2, 100 msec before the cue in Experiment 3) allowed the four discrete objects to be completed into two rectangles. Attentional cuing effects were found for the completed rectangles in both experiments, indicating that previous experience was not sufficient to halt the amodal completion of objects.     

Exactness,inexactness, and the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability

I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents ‘inexactly’, and that this results in violations of the transitivity of colour indiscriminability. I show that Hellie’s argument remains inconclusive, since he does not demonstrate conclusively that colour perception really does represent inexactly. My own argument for the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability uses inexactness instead as one horn of a dilemma: the key idea is that there is a class of perceptual experiences which might plausibly be supposed either to represent inexactly or to represent exactly—but which demonstrate the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability either way.     

What in the world is weakness of will?

At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia—i.e. acting, or having a disposition to act, contrary to one’s judgments about what is best for one to do. However, there has been some recent debate about whether this captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will. Richard Holton claims that it doesn’t, while Alfred Mele argues that, to a certain extent, it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about an ordinary concept here is one apt for empirical investigation. We evaluate Mele’s studies and report some experiments of our own in order to investigate what in the world the ordinary concept of weakness of will is. We conclude that neither Mele nor Holton (previously) was quite right and offer a tentative proposal of our own: the ordinary notion is more like a prototype or cluster concept whose application is affected by a variety of factors.     

Basic-level kinds and object persistence

In three experiments, we explored the basis of adults’ judgments of individual object persistence through transformation. Participants watched scenarios in which an object underwent a transformation into an object belonging to the same or a different basic-level kind. Participants were queried about the object’s persistence through the transformation as an individual (indexed by its proper name) and as a member of the original kind (indexed by its basic-level count noun in Experiments 1 and 2, or by its superordinate-level noun in Experiment 3). In all experiments, participants rated objects that were altered in a way that maintained basic-level kind to be less likely to retain their proper name than those that were altered in a way that changed basic-level kind. These findings suggest that shared basic-level kind membership serves as a dimension of similarity over which objects’ unique individual identities are highlighted. We discuss the implications of the results for existing theoretical accounts of adults’ judgments of individual object persistence.     

Perceived fairness in employee selection: the role of applicant personality

The present study investigated the role of applicant personality in relation to applicant procedural and distributive justice perceptions after being informed of an organization’s reject/accept selection decision. A sample of 503 students completed a selection test, believing the results would be used to make initial selection decisions for an organization recruiting from the university. Participants were presented with selection decisions (randomly assigned) two weeks later, and procedural and distributive justice perceptions were assessed. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that agreeableness, openness to experience, and test-taking self-efficacy were positively related with perceptions of procedural and distributive justice. Neuroticism was negatively associated with distributive justice perceptions. The relationships of test-taking self-efficacy with procedural and distributive justice were moderated by the organization’s selection decision.     

Rea’s Revenge and the Persistent Problem of Persistence for Realism

Realism about material objects faces a variety of epistemological objections. Recently, however, some realists have offered new accounts in response to these long-standing objections; many of which seem plausible. In this paper, I raise a new objection against realism vis-à-vis how we could empirically come to know mind-independent essential properties for objects. Traditionally, realists hold kind-membership and persistence as bound together for purposes of tracing out an object’s essential existence conditions. But I propose kind-membership and persistence for objects can conceptually come apart and function epistemologically distinctly from one another—in which case the usual reliance by realists on an assumption of persistence to determine kind-membership conditions is unjustified. Thus, present realist attempts to explain how empirical detection of mind-independent essential properties for objects could possibly occur inevitably results in circularity. The charge against the realist is to explain why we don’t have to first discover persistence conditions for an object before we can ascertain kind-membership conditions for an object. If no answer is forthcoming, then it seems the weight of the epistemological objection to realism is back in full force.     

What do dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) understand about hidden objects?

Object permanence, the ability to mentally represent and reason about objects that have disappeared from view, is a fundamental cognitive skill that has been extensively studied in human infants and terrestrial animals, but not in marine animals. A series of four experiments examined this ability in bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus). After being trained on a “find the object” game, dolphins were tested on visible and invisible displacement tasks, and transpositions. In Experiments 1 and 2, dolphins succeeded at visible displacements, but not at invisible displacements or transpositions. Experiment 3 showed that they were able to pass an invisible displacement task in which a person’s hand rather than a container was used as the displacement device. However, follow-up controls suggested they did so by learning local rules rather than via a true representation of the movement of hidden objects. Experiment 4 demonstrated that the dolphins did not rely on such local rules to pass visible displacement tasks. Thus, like many terrestrial animals, dolphins are able to succeed on visible displacement tasks, but seem unable to succeed on tasks requiring the tracking of hidden objects.